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Chapter 1: Introduction  1  
Chapter 1 – Introduction to the emergence of research 
problems 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis is an outcome of a PhD.-study initiated in relation to, and 
partly financed by, the programme called Proces og produktudvikling i 
byggeriet (“Process and Product Innovation in the Danish Building Industry” - 
referred to as the PPB-programme). The PPB-programme was an 8-years 
innovation programme launched in 1994 by the Danish Agency for 
Trade and Industry and the Danish Ministry of Cities and Housing 
aiming at improving innovation and productivity in the construction 
sector.1  
Undoubtedly, the programme has been a unique experience to persons 
from each of the 4 consortiums that have carried out development-
projects as part of new build social housing projects. However, in a 
broader perspective the PPB-programme is not unique. In at least two 
ways it shares basic assumptions in much of the ongoing national and 
international debate on the construction sector (further discussed in 
section 1.4.). Firstly, it is generally believed that a wide range of 
problems troubles construction: low levels of innovation and learning, 
low level of trust and high level of conflicts, poor communication and 
coordination, fragmentation etc. all resulting in a poor performance of 
the sector. Secondly, within the last decade or so it has become more and 
more common to assume that problems and solutions have to do with 
the way the building process is organised and not so much with the 
technical issues (that appear to have been the main developmental focus 
of the sector in the majority of the post-war period).  
To some degree, this thesis will concur with these two assumptions. It 
will apply an organisational perspective to the sector. And it will agree 
that its present performance is not necessarily the best possible.  
                                           
1 I will use the term “construction sector ” rather than “construction industry” having in mind Ranko 
Bons (1991) observation that the term “construction sector” is more appropriate since construction is 
composed of several rather different industries. When the term “construction sector” is used during 
the thesis, it will generally not include civil enginnering projects (physical infrastructure such as 
roads, bridges, ports etc) that often differ from house construction, in particular with respect to size 
and the number of trades involved.  
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But at the same time, the thesis will take one step back from the ongoing 
debate (including the PPB-programme). Rather than simply criticising 
the present organisation of the sector, this thesis will try first to 
understand it. As elaborated upon in section 1.4, we observe some 
identical organisational features in a wide range of countries. And we 
observe some of these features to be rather stable over time. If the 
present organisation is so inadequate, why did emerge in so many 
different settings? And how did it survive? 
It is the firm belief of this thesis, that it is hard to improve the sector if 
the benefits of present organisational forms are totally ignored. And that 
is why I will not rush to conclusions or recommendations until the very 
end of the thesis.  
Yet, I do think improvements can be made. The main thread of the thesis 
is that the present organisation of the sector in many ways is a logical 
response to the ongoing and demanding market fluctuations. And hence, 
if we aim at truly changing construction, other ways of ensuring 
adjustability have to be envisioned, understood and established 
(probably in a simultaneous and thus very confusing process). But before 
dwelling upon the golden land, we may arrive at the very end of this 
thesis, I better get back to the introduction…     
1.2. The personal starting point  
Admittedly – and even though the work at hand deals with a range of 
problems central to economic theory and potentially is of relevance to 
many industries in general and the construction sector in particular – my 
interest in the construction sector originated in personal experience. As 
chairman for a social housing organisation, I had the pleasure of 
representing the client in a number of building projects. Some of these 
projects went wrong; most of them went terribly wrong. Projects were 
always delayed in the planning phase. The time schedule in the 
execution phase was only kept due to quick and not always fully 
satisfying solutions by the craftsmen at the building site. The struggle to 
meet budget restrictions seemed endless and were only solved in last 
minute cuts (changing the houses beyond recognition). And although 
some of us in the housing organisation personally began to enjoy the 
rough and seemingly random ride of construction, we were dragged 
more and more into the process of construction while all we wanted was 
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to provide rooms for students. We thought we bought a house, but what 
we actually bought was the right to pay for and participate in a play with 
new actors and, for sure, an open ending.  
On top of things, the advisors (architects, engineers and the like) and 
contractors – no matter how trained and experienced they were - seemed 
unable to manage the process in a homogeneous and predictable way. 
This in spite of the fact that the process seemed remarkably constant over 
time; the involved parties did not appear to strive for new components 
or ways of building.  
And yet, at the end of the day, some houses emerged from the chaos and 
struggle. Perhaps not ideal, perhaps not exactly on time, but they were 
there. Somehow a “mysterious force” made all the materials, planning 
and labour work together in some kind of system and a house was 
created.  
Two questions were formed in my head and, to a large degree, they still 
echo through this thesis: First, what it is, that makes all the different and 
independently performed activities in a construction process act together 
in a more or less coherent way? And secondly, is it possible to eliminate, 
or at least reduce, the experienced problems by organising the process of 
construction in some other way and by this make the system more 
coherent? 
Later at The Technical University of Denmark and at the Danish 
Building Research Institute, I discovered that the building projects in 
“my” social housing organisation were not particularly mismanaged. 
Rather the observed problems appear to be present in the construction 
sector in Denmark, USA, UK, Australia, Norway and Sweden and 
probably many other countries as well. And for the same reason, the 
(re)organisation of this sector has been on the political, industrial and (to 
some degree) academic agenda in these countries for approximately the 
last decade.  
At the Copenhagen Business School I have been exposed to general 
economic concepts that have helped me to phrase the problems observed 
in construction in a more general way. In this context coordination, the 
division of labour and the division of knowledge, interfirm coordination 
repetition, and coordination modes are of essence.  
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The present dissertation is a result of these three interactive forces: (a) 
the ongoing debate on how to organise the sector, (b) the theoretical 
inputs (particular in the field of general economic theory) from three 
different academic environments and (c) personal experience. Even 
though I at times feared that this triangle turned out to be a Bermuda 
one, the impact of these three positions has been decisive as well as 
stimulating. Hence, the following introduction to the research problems 
(or questions) will have to include all of them. 
I will start (section 1.3) by describing how an apparently rather limited 
research problem on “how to coordinate” along the way was expanded to 
include “why to coordinate” and “by whom coordination should be 
done”. I will then (section 1.4) consider how these three research 
problems draws on – and contributes to – the ongoing debate on the 
organisation of the construction sector. Section 1.5. considers the 
theoretical contributions and delimitations of the study. Hopefully, these 
two sections will reassure the reader, that the discussions raised are of 
general interest and not only serve to satisfy personal curiosity. Having 
clarified these different perspectives, the three research problems are 
revisited and summarised in section 1.6. The chapter concludes by 
providing the reader with an outline of the thesis (section 1.7).   
1.3. Encircling the research problems of the thesis 
1.3.1. How to coordinate 
So the original “mystery” (to me at least) that fuelled my interest to 
engage in a PhD.-study was to understand how the independent actors and 
activities of the building process come to act together in a coherent way. Soon, 
this brought me to the concept of coordination which can be defined as 
how “to make different parts function together efficiently”  (Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s dictionary, 1994).  
Thus, in the outset my research problem was “simply” about how 
coordination of building processes is and should be done. 
Digging into the literature on coordination (discussed further 
particularly in chapter tree), I learned there are different ways (or 
“modes”) by which dispersed interests and information can come into 
agreement. Coase (1937) furthermore made it clear that there is not one 
best way to coordinate since the capacity of these different modes has to 
be determined in a comparative and empirical assessment. 
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Gradually, the question of how to coordinate turned out to include two 
sub-questions. Firstly, how does a typology of coordination modes look 
like. Secondly, when a typology on different information handling 
principles has been identified, what can we say about the comparative 
advantages of each mode. Consequently, one research problem of this 
thesis can be formulated as follows:   
  What particular coordination modes are used for construction 
and how do they cope with the activities involved in 
construction? 
1.3.2. Why do we need to coordinate? 
But the question of how to coordinate spurred a number of additional 
and closely interrelated questions.  
One question relates to why we need to coordinate. One might wonder if 
we could benefit from organising in a way in which coordination is not 
needed at all!  
The starting point for this reflection is undoubtedly the Wealth of Nations 
by Adam Smith from 1776 (1970). When Adam Smith identified the 
division of labour as the main source to the wealth of nations, he also 
located the flipside of this division: the need for exchange – or coordination 
as it will be termed here - linking together the specialised units ((1776) 
1970, p. 119). Without “the assistance and co-operation of many thousands” 
not even the most simple products could be produced and made 
affordable to common man (ibid, p. 117).  
Hence, in order to understand the extent and specific nature of a 
coordination problem, the way in which tasks have been grouped 
together in activities carried out by different persons (i.e. the division of 
labour) and different firms (i.e. specialisation), has to be considered. And 
conversely, the division of labour and specialisation cannot be 
understood without considering the level of coordination costs by which 
they are limited:  
  “An analysis of the forces determining the division of labor provides 
crucial insights not only into the growth of nations, but also into the 
organization of product and labor markets, industries, and firms.” 
(Becker and Murphy 1992, p.p. 1157-58).  
Hayek (1937) expanded on the idea of Smith by clarifying that alongside 
the division of labour goes the division of knowledge.  This raises the 
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questions of “...how the spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each 
possessing only bits of knowledge, brings about a state of affairs in which prices 
correspond to costs, etc” (ibid. p. 49).2 
Thus, it is hardly possible to discuss the concept of coordination in any 
meaningful way without discussing the concepts of division of labour and 
specialisation. And consequently, a second research question of this thesis 
is: 
  How is the division of labour in construction and what are 
the consequences hereof with respect to coordination?   
1.3.3. Who coordinates? 
A second addition to my original “how-question” on coordination 
relates to the organisation of coordination - by whom coordination is 
done. In order to understand how this question emerged, once again we 
have to include some of the theoretical insights discussed more 
thoroughly in chapter 2 and 3.  
From Smith (1970) we learn that the benefits from dividing labour relate 
to repetition of activities, and that disruption in production consequently 
limits the division of labour. However, since changes limit the benefits 
from dividing labour, it seems obvious, that people would organise in 
ways by which propagation of changes are avoided or, at least, 
minimised. As argued in chapter 2, the firm - in which specialists in 
coordination buffer external changes and specialists in production perform 
repeated activities under nearly stable conditions - represents an 
organisational response to changes.3 In this perspective, the strength of 
the firm is, that it, by repeating sequences of activities, allows people to 
work with (almost) identical activities or with coordination of (almost) 
identical sequences of activities (and thus allows a division of labour).  
Hence, in order to understand the issue of coordination, the boundary 
question (“what determines the boundaries of the firm”) is of interest: 
                                           
2 Richardson addresses the same fundamental question in another classic work Information and 
Investment (1960): “…The general problem…(is) how, in a competitive economy, a rational allocation 
of resources can result from the investment decisions of many independent entrepreneurs”.  
3 As also pointed out in chapter 2, even though the firm understood as a set of repeated resources and 
activities cannot be assumed per se to be identical to the contractual and legal definitions of the firm, 
due to information costs, it is likely that these different boundaries overlap significantly.  
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are activities coordinated within a single firm, bilaterally between firms 
or by some sort of intermediate third party? Or put differently, “it makes 
sense to start from an analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
boundaries of organizational units before examining”, for instance, “the 
coordination mechanisms.” (Grandori 2000 chapter 11, p. 3).  
In short, the way activities are coordinated cannot be separated from the 
way they are organised.  
For instance, it is often claimed that the fragmented nature of 
construction – many companies and persons that do not know each other 
beforehand are involved - trouble coordination (Turin 1967, Eccles 1981,  
Slaughter 1993, Pries and Janszen 1995, Kommissionen 1997, Costantino 
et al 2001, BUR 2001). If so, we will have to understand how integration 
of activities within the firm can enable coordination. And what the 
limitations of coordination within firms might be. Among other things, 
this will allow us to ask - what in light of the often proposed 
disadvantages of “fragmentation” appears to an obvious question -  
“why not coordinate all activities within a single firm?”.  
The third research problem can be formulated as follows: 
 What are the roles of construction firms with respect to 
coordination:  do coordination takes place within or between 
firms and what limits that activities are handled within a 
single firm?  
In order to understand the coordinating role of (construction) firms, we 
will have not only to consider the advantages from firms, but also their 
disadvantages. As it will argued in chapter 2, a limit of the firm bridging 
many subsequent activities is that continuing association of activities 
implies commitment to particular firms and individuals producing 
particular products. This in turn induces lack of adaptability to external 
changes like say quantitative or qualitative changes in demand of final 
customers.  
Hence, sources to change (or put differently lack of repetition) have to be 
considered. Not only as it according to Hayek (1937) is change that (in 
combination with no perfect foresight and the division of knowledge) 
creates the need for coordination. But also because change affects the 
possibilities of enabling coordination by repeating sequences of activities 
within a firm.  As it will be shown empirically in chapter 5, a key 
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characteristic of the construction sector is the dramatic change in overall 
demand. And as it will be proposed throughout the thesis, the way these 
macro changes propagate into the meso- and micro-levels is a key to 
understand the present organisation of (various aspects of) the 
construction sector.  
The proposed separation of the “how to coordinate” and “by whom 
coordination is done” may need an additional remark before this 
introduction proceed. Traditionally, these two questions have been 
considered so tightly related that no distinction has been made. In 
Coase’s seminal contribution (1937) on coordination, the market was 
defined by using one coordination mode (price coordination), the firm 
another (the absence of price coordination). Only recently is has been 
pointed out, that market principles can penetrate firms and firm 
principles can penetrate markets (Imai and Itami 1996). This 
consequently implies that it cannot be taken for granted, that the 
boundaries of the firm and the boundaries of a coordination mode 
coincide in a clear and unambiguous way.  
In order to encompass this insight in the present work, I will discuss the 
organisation of coordination and the coordination modes as two separate 
matters throughout the thesis. With the organisation of coordination I 
mean whether coordination is done within or between firms, and in case 
of the latter, if it is done directly between firms or by a third party of 
some sort. With respect to coordination modes, I refer to the different 
principles by which information is structured (for instance, is 
communication taking place directly between the persons, whose actions 
have to be coordination, or is information mediated by, say, a superior).4  
The theoretical part of the dissertation is structured according to this 
distinction. Chapter 2 discuss the organisation of coordination whereas 
the execution of coordination by different coordination modes is 
investigated in chapter 3.   
                                           
4 As a final remark to the question on how versus by whom coordination is done, it should be noticed, 
that even though these questions are not identical, they are nevertheless interlinked: as seen in the 
empirical part, the way coordination is organised, has a significant impact on the information 
involved in coordination and hence influences the selection, as well as the particular “shape” of 
coordination modes.  
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1.4. Empirical contributions and limitations  
1.4.1. The ongoing debate on how to organise the construction sector 
The idea that construction is more than a technical discipline is not new. 
For instance, in 1966 the Tavistock Institute (p. 14) recognised the 
importance of what they termed the  “administrative field” of 
construction and similarly in 1975 Turin (p. IX) finds that ”..everybody in 
the industry (and some people outside it) knows that management is 
perhaps the scarcest of all resources in the building process…”. 
Stinchcombe 1959, Bowley, M. 1966, Kreiner 1976, Eccles 1981 and 1981b 
are other examples. However, it is within the last decade or so that 
organisational and economic (and not merely technical) issues of 
construction have gained momentum outside a small group of people 
working with and in the construction sector.  
A very clear manifestation of this “new approach” to construction is the 
report written by Latham in 1994: Constructing the Team. In this review of 
procurement and contractual arrangements in the UK construction 
sector, Latham notes with respect to the problems observed: “Above all, 
it needs teamwork” (Latham 1994, p. V). This goes for the relation 
between clients, contractors and design consultants, as well as on the 
building site, and includes arrangements such as partnering (ibid., p.p. 
61-62). The Latham Report represents a strand of literature that argues in 
favour of moving from arm length transactions to close collaboration - 
often based on trust - between two or more partners. 
In the 1990’s this idea was primarily coined in the concept of partnering 
arrangements (Thomassen 1999b, Thomassen and Hansen 2001).5 
Gradually, the focus has gradually changed somewhat from partnering 
to the concept of supply chain management stressing the need to 
                                           
5 A commonly used definition of partnering (see for example Matthews 1996, p. 119; Barlow et al 1997, 
p. 6; Conlye 1999) proposed by CII in 1991: 
 "...[Partnering is] a long-term commitment between two or more organisations for the purpose of achieving 
specific business objectives by maximising the effectiveness of each participant's resources. This requires 
changing traditional relationships to a shared culture without regard to organisational boundaries. The 
relationship is based upon trust, dedication to common goals, and an understanding of each other's 
individual expectations and values. Expected benefits include improved efficiency and cost-effectiveness, 
increased opportunity for innovation, and the continous improvement of quality products and services. ” 
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incorporate most or all parts of the value chain (F.R.I. 1993, Flanagan 
1998, ATV 1999, Thomassen 1999,  Kumaraswamy and Dulaimy 2001).6  
Irrespectively of the name, this orientation towards in-depth (and in 
some case long term) relations between construction firms has been a 
source of a wide range of intertwined research and building projects 
putting the ideas to the test.  
These projects have been on the agenda in a number of countries.  
U.S. was a first mover with respect to partnering (Conlye 1999). UK was 
soon to follow with the Latham-report from 1994. In 1998 the 
Construction Industry Task Force published “rethinking construction” 
(also coined the “Egan-report” due to the Chairman John Egan). Both 
reports examined the problems of the construction sector and stressed 
the need for partnering. At the same time a number of the major clients, 
such as Sainsbury and British Airways Authorities, have organised 
building projects in accordance with the partnering idea (Bennet 1998). 
In a follow up report in 2002 – “Accelerating change” - Egan now 
stresses that “Integrated team work is key” (Strategic Forum for 
Construction 2002, p. 7): “It is self evident that a construction team that 
only constructs one job learn on the job at the client’s expense and hence 
will never be as efficient, safe, productive or profitable as those that 
work repeatedly on similar projects” (ibid). Accordingly, a key strategic 
target set out in the report is that by the end of 2004, 20% of construction 
projects by value should be undertaken by integrated teams and supply 
chains. By the end of 2007, this figure should rise to 50%. Rethinking 
construction also paved the way for initiatives like the “Construction 
Best Practice Programme” and “Movement for Innovation” (M4I).  
In Australia partnering has been a part of the Australian Government 
reform strategy for the Building and Construction sector since 1991 
resulting in a number of partnering based building projects (Uher 1999). 
In Sweden new ways of collaboration has been tested in for instance 
Svedelamodellen where the long term and cross-functional collaboration 
between the client and the design- and build contractor aimed at 
lowering production costs for multi-unit apartment buildings (Persson 
                                           
6 Cooper et al  (1997) defines supply chain management “the integration of all business processes 
across the value chain. 
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1999). In 2003 “Byggerådet” – an association supporting collaboration 
between the construction sector and universities in the south of Sweden 
– has launched “Byggprocessforum”, that has appointed “information 
and coordination” and “work site organisation” as some of the key areas 
during their first year of operation (Birve and Hansson 2003). 
In Norway a three year programme, “Samspillet i Byggeprocessen” (SIB) 
was lunched in 1996 aiming at improving productivity in construction. A 
central element in this programme was to enhance integration between 
planning, production and supply of materials (referred to as partnering) 
(Eikeland 1998) 
Denmark is no exception. In 1994 the aforementioned PPB-programme 
was launched. Soon after, refurbishment was also made subject to new 
ways of cooperation (especially at the site-level). This happened in 
Project Renovering (“The Urban Renewal Project”); a governmental 
programme initiated in 1995 and concluded 1999. Projekt Nye 
Samarbejdsformer (“Project new forms of Collaboration”) initiated by the 
Danish Ministry of Cities and Housing and running from 1998-2001 
sharpened the focus on collaboration (in particular partnering) even 
further. These programmes are (intended to be) carried on in a third 
governmental programme, Projekt Hus (a ten years programme 
commenced in 1999). Lately, a new building policy for the government 
has emerged, among other emphasising the use of partnering and 
benchmarking (Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen 2003). The foundation 
RealDania has devoted part of their financial resources to productivity-
improvement of the building industry by means of new organisational 
forms. For instance, they have supported the establishment of The 
Benchmark Centre for the Danish Construction Sector that has appointed 
management of the building process as one of their 3 major themes.7   
                                           
7 A large number of publications has accompanied this movement in Denmark, for instance: Dobbelt 
Op (F.R.I. 1989), Synergier og barrierer i byggeriet – på sporet af den tabte produktivitet (F.R.I. 1993), 
Byggeriet I det 21. århundrede – Industriel reorganisering af byggeprocessen (ATV 1999), Byggeriets Fremtid – 
fra tradition til innovation (Byggepolitisk Task Force 2000), Byggeriet – på vej ud af den fastlåste situation. 
Og hvad så? (BUR 2001), Byggeriet i Vidensamfundet (Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen 2002), Staten som 
bygherre - vækst og effektivisering i byggeriet (Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen 2003). 
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1.4.2. Some characteristics of construction 
In the ongoing debate on how to improve construction, the similarities 
appear more striking than the disparities. The similarities of the 
prescribed remedies seem to suggest that construction share a range of 
organisational features in a wide range of countries. And in fact, the 
international literature on the organisation of construction seems to 
suggest some fundamental characteristics of construction.  
While some differences between countries do exist (see for instance 
Winch 1994 for a comparison of the French and British procurement 
system, or Miozzo and Dewick’s 2001 for a comparison of the Germanic 
models of corporate governance versus a more market-oriented Anglo 
Saxon model for innovation), and even if data on construction are poor 
and erratic and hardly comparable across nations (Ruddock 2002); it may 
be justified to state, that building processes in most European and 
Western countries “look much alike” (Pries and Janszen 1995).   
Besides the overall characteristic of being organised in temporary project 
organisations (Turin 1967, Winch 1994, ATV 1999, Dubois and Gadde 
2002), other common organisational traits are believed to be:  
 a trade-based organisation of companies and individuals 
(Stinchcombe 1959, F.R.I. 1993, ATV 1999);  
 labour intensive (or put differently, small amount of fixed capital 
per worker) (Sudgen 1975, Groák 1992, González-Díaz et al 2000);  
 fragmentation due to many small (and often subcontracting) firms 
(Turin 1967, Eccles 1981,  Slaughter 1993, Pries and Janszen 1995, 
Kommissionen 1997, Costantino et al 2001, BUR 2001);  
 the separation of design and coordination from production 
(Bowley 1966, Nam and Tatum 1988, Groák 1994, Flanagan et al 
1998, Miozzo and Ivory 2000, González-Díaz et al 2000);  
 highly interdependent activities (Tavistock Institute 1966, Bishop 
1975, Robertson 1975, Dubois and Gadde 2002); 
 poor communication and coordination (Tavistock Institute 1966, 
Turin 1967, Kommissionen 1997, Shammas-Toma et al 1998, 
Carlsson and Josephson 2001, Davey et al 2001); 
 “conservatism”, little change and a low level of learning and 
innovation and in turn low improvement in productivity (Russel 
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1981, Nam and Tatum 1988, Connaughton et al 1995, Pries and 
Janszen 1995, Kommissionen 1997, Flanagan 1998, Kumaraswamy 
and Dulaimy 2001, Cripps 2002, Dubois and Gadde 2002, Erhvervs- 
og Boligstyrelsen 2002, Fairclough 2002);  
 competition only on price reduction, not on innovativeness or 
optimisation of client values (Flanagan 1998. Miozzo and Ivory 
2000, Miozzo and Dewick 2001, Kumaraswamy and Dulaimy 
2001,);   
 low levels of trust and high levels of conflicts (Korzynski 1994, 
Flanagan 1998, Loosemore 1998, Loosemore 1999, Miozzo and 
Ivory 2000); and 
 a sector troubled by low quality, late delivery and overspending 
(Kommissionen 1997, Flanagan 1998, ATV 1999, Miozzo and Ivory 
2000, Skamris 2000, Byggeskadefonden 2001, Erhvervs- og 
Boligstyrelsen 2002). 
Furthermore, is has also been suggested that the problems of 
construction are remarkably stable. Flanagan (1998, p. 13) takes this 
point of view to the extreme when he in his short review of 800 years of 
building history in UK observe that it is striking “…how little the 
problems have changed over the years, and how regularly the same ones 
crop up”.  
The suggestion that characteristics (and perceived “problems”) of 
construction show similarities across time and across national settings 
guides the search for explanations of (and solutions to) present 
organisational forms in a particular direction. It seems that we should 
not be too concerned with explanations that are tightly related with time-
specific idiosyncrasies of a national or regional setting.  Of course such 
issues matters, but there have to be more general forces in play at the 
same time.  
1.4.3. The empirical contribution of the present work 
The three research questions on “why, by whom and how” to coordinate 
addresses in multiple ways the above-mentioned debate and add 
insights and explanations to the characteristics.  
The question on “why we need to coordinate” will bring us to the 
reasons to why a trade-based division of labour arises and why – even 
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though it might appear “conservative” – it is maintained.  It also informs 
us of reasons to the particular patterns of learning and education found 
within the sector.  
The question on by whom coordination is done will provide reflections 
on why long strings of subsequent activities rarely are coordinated 
within the same firm. And why firms often remain of a limited size. 
Hence, the “whom”-question relates to the issues of fragmentation 
including the separation of production and design.  And it establishes a 
frame for analysing the possibilities for (and limitations of) engaging in 
more integrated supply chains.  
Reasons to poor communication and coordination are directly touched 
upon in the question on how to coordinate.  This question includes an 
analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of moving towards a more 
team-based coordination mode – not only in the design phase but also at 
the building site. The issue of teaming is interesting with respect to 
partnering, as much of the partnering literature favours that participants 
of a project should be allowed to communicate freely and directly 
without regarding organisational, professional or hierarchical 
boundaries (in other words, they argue in favour of coordination by 
teaming). The thesis also raises (critical) perspectives to the use of 
partnering in the sense that it gives reasons to low levels of trust and 
high levels of conflicts in construction (reasons that are not always 
explicitly reflected upon in the partnering literature). 
Indirectly, the research questions also bring perspectives to why we 
observe a particular kind of innovation in construction. Or put 
differently, why the sector appears to be so conservative. Similarly it will 
shed light on issues relating to low quality, late delivery and 
overspending.  
As mentioned in the beginning of the introduction, much of the ongoing 
debate (as shortly reviewed in the above) implicitly assumes that the 
present organisation of the construction sector is inefficient. However, at 
the same time we observe some identical organisational features in a 
wide range of countries. But if the present organisation is inefficient, 
why has it emerged and survived in so many different settings? Why did 
we not observe that other ways of organising the industry - deliberately 
or by chance - were introduced a long time ago? 
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To illustrate this perspective: The construction of the Empire State 
Building in New York in 1930-31 was organised with significant 
partnering elements: there was a close interaction among (a) the parties 
in the planning process (i.e. clients, civil engineers, architects, and 
general contractors); (b) between the planning team and the 
subcontractors; and (c) between the producers of building materials and 
the planning team (especially prefabricated iron bars innovated 
especially for the erection of the Empire State). The Empire State was a 
remarkable project not only with respect to the final product, but also 
concerning the process that involved numerous product-innovations as 
well as a record building time (yet to be beaten?) of just eleven months 
for a building with 86 floors (Willis 1998)! And yet, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers could introduce partnering as a new principle in 1989 (Conley 
1999).   
Perhaps the major contribution of the present work is that it tries to 
explain the raison d’être of the present organisation of construction rather 
then simply describing or criticizing it.  As it will be argued, existing 
organisational forms in many ways minimise on the total costs related to 
production and coordination. Or to concur with Turin (1967, p.p. xi-xii):  
“…one most conclude that the building industry is indeed a very 
healthy and sophisticated machine, responding as it does to a 
challenge put to it in terms that would be unacceptable to so many 
other more reputable industries.” 
This does not necessarily imply that there is no room for improvement of 
the sector. But we have to engage in the “difficult task of understanding 
how the process actually works, what are the forces acting upon its 
participants and influencing their decisions and their relationships, in 
order to decide on the most suitable course of action to improve the 
situation.” (ibid, p. xii).   
To study the present organisation and performance of the construction 
sector is of course not a novel idea. Besides in many governmental 
reports and the like, this is witnessed in the “classical” works of 
Stinchcombe 1959, Tavistock 1966, Bowley 1966, Turin 1967 and 1975, 
Kreiner 1976, Eccles 1981 and 1981b as well as in an increasing number 
of recent contributions that within Scandinavia alone will feature works 
like Clausen 2002, Bang 2002, Dubois and Gadde 2002.  
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This thesis differs from the majority of these contributions in at least two 
ways.  
First of all, it takes a specific theoretical departure,  “organisational 
economics”, as explained below (section 1.5). Perhaps because 
organisational economics in general is not developed directly in relation 
to the construction sector, it seems to me that it enables an explanation to 
fundamental organisational features like the division of labour, the role 
of the firm etc. Theories “born and raised” within construction might 
face the danger of being so used to these characteristics that they are 
taken for granted or described more than explained.  
The second way this thesis positions it self relates to what is considered 
the independent variable(s), i.e. the variable(s) that explain other 
variables.  
Construction is believed to have many (particular) characteristics as 
discussed previously (section 1.4.2). An important question in order to 
understand – and ultimately improve - the sector is if any of these 
characteristics are more fundamental than others. Put differently, if a 
hierarchy in these characteristics could be identified, we will know the 
causes from the effects and consequently we will know where to target 
our improving efforts. 
To sort the fundamental variables from the derived ones is not an easy 
exercise as they interacts in various ways. An ideal way to go about this 
problem would be by means of for instance experiments in which one 
variable is changed at the time in order to excess it impacts. However, as 
discussed in chapter 4 on method such controlled experiments have not 
been found to be a feasible research strategy for this Ph.D.-study. As it 
will be seen on the many pages that follow, this makes the discussion 
subtler.   
One possibility is to claim “everything interacts”. For instance, Groák 
(1992, p. 41) finds that it is the combination of industrial uncertainty, 
market uncertainty, project uncertainty, workplace uncertainty and 
uncertainty of the site organisation that “distinguish building from most 
other industrial and service activities”.  
This thesis will try to be a bit more specific as it will try to substantiate 
the argument that present organisational forms to a large degree are a 
response to the need for flexibility created by changes in overall demand. 
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The cyclical nature of construction is often pointed out as a central 
characteristic of the sector (Arctander 1955, Bishop 1975, Hillebrandt 
1975 and Hillebrandt et al 1995, Kommissionen 1997, V. Smith 1999, 
Miozzo and Ivory 2000, Bang 2002). In continuation of this insight, it will 
be argued throughout the thesis that changes in overall demand - that in 
turn partly can be explained by the durability and expensiveness of 
buildings - affects the way firms, projects and individuals are organised. 
Thus, the thesis is an attempt to see how much of the present 
organisation that can actually be explained as a response to a single 
(independent) variable found at the macro-level. 
In the terminology of Groák this implies that I will explain project 
uncertainty, workplace uncertainty and uncertainty of the site 
organisations as responses to market uncertainty and not the other way 
around (market uncertainty are then again partly created by industrial 
uncertainty). Subsequently, I will not agree with Groák (1992, p. 44) that 
all of the five levels of uncertainty necessarily are “characteristics, not 
problems to be solved”. 
Other “characteristics of a building as a product which make it different 
from all other products” (Turin 1966, p. 9) than the above mentioned 
(this section and section 1.4.2.) have been suggested more or less 
explicitly as independent variables: 
 Heavy and bulky materials which in turn creates local markets and 
limited import and export. Difficulties in transportation can also 
explain the fragmentation of the sector (Arctander 1955, Turin 
1966). 
 Production is influenced by weather conditions and is highly seasonal 
(Kommissionen 1997, Bang 2002).  
 Restrictions on working practices and final outputs (Bang 2002), partly 
in order to ensure the safety of workers and coming inhabitants.  
 Made to order and customised products, partly due to site constraints 
and individual specifications of clients (Arctander 1955, Bang 
2002).  
I will not deny the impact of these variables. Each of them probably 
deserves a Ph.D.-study in their own right. However, a brief reflection 
suggests that not all of them are equally well suited for explaining why 
the organisation of construction in some respects supposedly are (a) 
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identical over time and in different parts of the world and (b) different 
from other sectors.  
With respect to heaviness and bulkiness and associated transport 
problems, there has been an ongoing change in the costs and speed of 
transportation. As early as 1946 it was observed that: 
  “Even at 300 cubic feet we can get eight packaged houses into a 
freight car and we can ship by rail to the seaboard – the farthermost 
point in the United States from Wichita – for $75 a house. We can 
ship economically to any place in the world, because when we get to 
seaboard the ocean rates are so cheap we can ship to any place in the 
world for a few hundred dollars total from Wichita” (Fuller 1946, 
quoted from Russel 1981, p. 707)   
If transportation is a decisive variable with respect to the organisation of 
construction, we would other things being equal expect to find that 
construction change as the facilities of transportation changes over time. 
It should also be expected that construction differ in accordance with the 
transport facilities of different regions. This is, to the best of my 
knowledge, not the case.  
Similarly if weather and seasonal impacts are crucial we would expect to 
find large regional variations. It would for instance be interesting to test 
the hypothesis that the productivity of construction is positively 
correlated with some measurement for the hospitality of the climate. 
Besides, other things being equal, we should also expect to find 
similarities with other sectors troubled by the weather and seasonal 
changes, for instance agriculture. Productivity measures do not – as seen 
in chapter 5 – support this hypothesis.  
Construction is indeed regulated with respect to working procedures 
and specifications of the finalised products. But is this any different from 
production of, say, cars, ships, or planes? 
Finally, there are variations caused by different sites and clients. This 
study will not claim that these variations do not exist. But at the other 
hand, it is first of all questionable if housing needs etc. are different to a 
degree that each project has to be unique. Secondly, other sectors are 
believed to be able to customize production with an organisational set-
up different from that of construction (ATV 1999).   
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Trying to explain a vast area like the organisation of construction largely 
by change in overall demand as the independent variable is of course a 
simplification. Yet, with the words of Coase (1937) we should keep in 
mind that an explanation should not only correspond to the real world, it 
should also be “tractable”.  
Contributions to (and from) other sectors 
So far the empirical contribution has been discussed with respect to the 
construction sector. And the particularities of the sector has been 
emphasised.  
However, it may be claimed that the conditions found in construction 
apply to an increasingly expanding field of economic activities (Groák 
1994, Gann and Salter 1998). Or perhaps even that construction is “a 
model for the future development of mass production” (Winch 1994). If 
so, construction can lend insights to, and gain insights from, a range of 
current discussions.  
For instance, construction potentially contributes to the wider issue of 
project organisations and issues related to inter-firm cooperation. 
Construction activities are, and have been for a long time, generally not 
controlled within firms or not only structured by price-mechanisms, but 
are handled by close interactions across the boundaries of firms. Thus, 
construction is well suited for the study of inter-firm relations 
(Korczynski 1994), and rather than treating “special characteristics in 
construction as problems, because they are anomalous when compared 
with the idea of a single industry based on the manufacturing 
model…we now see that construction offers paradigms of response to 
…uncertainty” (Groák 1994, p. 291). More precisely, as noticed by 
Stinchcombe (1985), construction shares organisational features with 
other forms of one-off production, such as offshore oil production, 
weapons research and development, software development and the 
computer manufacturing industry, and some sales organisations. This 
point of view is presently being developed by the work on Complex 
Product Systems, where the complexity of a system is believed to have a 
major impact on the way it is innovated and coordinated (Gann and 
Salter 1998, Hobday 1998, Hobday 2000).8 
                                           
8 A wide range of product dimensions - such as the scale of the product, technological novelty, 
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Construction can perhaps also inform us on the organisation of sectors in 
which firm-based authority supposedly plays a limited role. Even 
though one should be careful to proclaim “the end of bureaucracy”, as 
Bennis did as early as 1964 (J. Pfeffer 1978, p. 130), for sure, the 
traditional authority based firm is believed to face complications (N. Foss 
2000a). Perhaps this has to do with the present preoccupation with 
innovation and learning as main drivers of competitiveness and wealth of 
nations. If innovation and the ability to learn are of essence, it is not only 
difficult, but also unsuitable to put up defined goals when entering a 
process of innovation, where goals by definition are unknown. At the 
same time it is as difficult for managers to monitor or routinize activities, 
which do not follow a recurring and well-known pattern, as it is to 
absorb the new knowledge being created.  
So in general, even though construction may seem mature (some might 
say “old-fashioned and conservative”) with respect to the technology 
used, the way it is organised and, as part of this, the way it is 
coordinated, presumably relates to issues and problems of current 
interest for economic activities far beyond the construction sector. Thus, 
in an organisational sense, the construction sector appears to be highly 
“modern”. 
1.4.4. Empirical limitations 
This Ph.D.-study will be based partly on general statistical, partly (and 
primarily) on a single case study on coordination practices in a new 
build social housing project. Reasons to - and limitations of – this 
                                                                                                                                   
intensity of user involvement - constitute the complexity of a system and consequently there are many 
potential Complex Product Systems candidates. Hobday (1998, p. 697) mentions more than 80 
candidates, for instance large construction projects, development of software systems, military 
systems, plants etc. Interestingly, “some high cost, mature products would not be included (e.g. 
roadworks and simple building constructs), as they involve a narrow range of knowledge and skills and 
utilise mostly standard components and materials.” (Ibid., p. 692, italics added). Whether “building 
constructs” are more or less complex than, for instance, the candidates mentioned by Hobday can of 
course only be decided by empirical investigations. However, at first glance, it seems to me, that even 
rather “simple” projects as the multiunit residential house case investigated in this Ph.D. (see chapter 
6) would score high on some of the complexity variables outlined by Hobday (ibid., p. 691), for 
instance on “degree of customisation of final system”, “feedback loops from later to earlier stages”, 
“intensity of user involvement”, “uncertainty/change in user requirements” and “intensity of 
regulatory involvement”. 
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approach are discussed in the chapter on method. As argued with 
respect to the external validity of the case study, what I aim for is 
“analytical generalisation” and not “statistical generalisation” (Yin 1989).  
1.5. Theoretical contributions and delimitations 
This study intends to provide insights to the theoretical field 
organisational economics, i.e. a comparative assessment of the cost of 
producing and allocating resources by different structures of ownership 
and coordination. More specifically, the study aims at bringing empirical 
insights to theories on coordination addressing questions of why we 
coordinate, how we coordinate, and by whom coordination is done.  
“Organisational economics” has been chosen as the theoretical point of 
departure for several reasons. The first reason is that organisational 
economics directly and rather thoroughly addresses all three research 
problems. Besides, by treating the questions of how to organise and 
coordinate construction as fundamental and general problems on how to 
organise economic interactions, I hope to have gained two advantages. 
Firstly, the work becomes of interest to a wider range of scholars than 
the ones particularly interested in construction. Secondly, by stressing 
the general character of the questions asked, it has been easier to get in 
dialogue with existing bodies of theories within organisational 
economics, rather than engaging in a perhaps unnecessary exercise of 
establishing an theoretical framework solely suited for construction.  
As briefly sketched out, fundamental theoretical contributions to the 
research problems on coordination can be traced back to Adam Smiths 
Wealth of Nations from 1776 and The nature of the firm and Economics and 
Knowledge published in 1937 by Coase and Hayek, respectively.  
So the basic foundation for addressing the questions of why we 
coordinate, how do we coordinate, and by whom coordination is done 
was laid down more than 60 years ago. Taking this into account, it is 
somewhat surprising that with the exception of single personal 
endeavours like Richardson 1960 and 1972, for decades these questions 
did not attract much attention within the field of organisational 
economics (Coase 1988). However, in 1975, Williamson explicitly 
adopted the central idea of Coase by addressing the relative costs of 
organising transactions in Market and Hierarchies. Williamson (e.g. 1979) 
makes this basic idea operational by proposing a set of variables that 
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determine the cost of using the market, which in turn enables an analysis 
of the appropriate degree of coordination within firms.  
In many ways this transaction costs perspective frames, if not shapes, 
central themes in recent contributions to coordination. One theme 
concerns the variety of coordination modes. In the early work of Hayek and 
Coase (and Williamson 1975) there are two modes and two modes only. 
And even though reduction of complexity is necessary in order to make 
theories “tractable”, their theoretical assumptions to some degree have to 
“correspond to the real world” (Coase 1937, p. 386) as well. By proposing 
cooperation as a third way to coordinate activities, Richardson (1972) was 
the first to give away a bit of “tractability” in order to gain a better fit 
with the real world. Later, several contributions on coordination modes 
beyond markets and hierarchies have emerged, as witnessed in for 
instance Williamson’s (1979) discussion of Hybrid Forms.9 A second, and 
closely related, theme deals with the underlying variables affecting the 
selection of coordination modes. Williamson (1979) addresses this theme by 
suggesting that variations in frequency and specificity explain the use of 
four different governance structures (including two hybrid forms). 10  
Thus, transaction costs theory has, in short, brought about significant 
achievements with respect to theories on coordination. And yet, its story 
is very incomplete. Although Williamson (ibid.) states that “the efficient 
                                           
9 Many other names have been suggested for interactions that are neither purely market or firm based, 
for instance collaboration (Dodgson 1996, referring to Teece), strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, 
franchises, research consortia (Ring and Van de Ven 1992, p. 483), Inter-organisational relationships (Ring 
and Van de Ven 1994), clans, quasi-integration (Eccles 1981). 
10 More precisely Williamson distinguishes between market governance, bilateral governance, 
trilateral governance and unified governance. The frequency and the specificity of the transaction 
determine the appropriateness of a governance structure. Frequency is simply a matter of how often 
the transaction takes place: “occasional” or “recurrent”. The investments are either characterised as 
“non-specific”, “mixed” or “idiosyncratic” (highly specific). The specificity of an investment is 
determined by the degree of non-marketable expenses incurred (Williamson 1979 and 1985); in this 
way specificity is a measure of the alternative value of an investment. Market governance is the main 
governance structure for both recurrent and occasional non-specific transactions. Trilateral governance 
is used for occasional and (medium and highly) specific transactions. Bilateral governance is used for 
transactions facing the same problems, caused by medium or high specificity, of relying on market 
governance as trilateral organised transactions. But the recurrence of transactions allows for more 
specialised governance structures, such as bilateral and unified governance, to arise. Unified governance 
is likely to be used for recurrent and highly specific transactions (Williamson 1985) 
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processing of information is an important and related concept” to 
“opportunism”, in its more formal part, transaction cost theory focuses 
mainly, if not solely, on the incentive part of coordination. As “one is 
struck by the absence of references to incentive conflicts” when reading 
Coases 1937-paper today (Foss 2000b, p. XX), so is one struck by the 
absence of information problems when reading Williamson and his 
successors. As observed by Demsetz11 almost 15 years ago (1988, p. 144): 
“A more complete theory of the firm must give greater weight to 
information cost than is given either in Coase’s theory or in theories 
based on shirking and opportunism.”  
This thesis is written very much in agreement with this proposition by 
Demsetz and subsequent writers who maintain that most formal 
economic analyses has downplayed the information perspective in 
favour of the incentive perspective (see for instance Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and N. Foss (2000b)). 
Additionally, this thesis will depart from the assumption that “agents” 
(e.g. individuals or firms) cannot foresee all future contingencies and 
cannot write contracts that cover all contingencies. Put differently, it will 
be assumed that is for some or another reason is costly to draft complex 
contracts – contracts are incomplete.  
As seen in figure 1 below, combining the incomplete contracting and the 
focus on non-incentive aspects of coordination situates this thesis in a 
particular part of what has been labelled the theory of the firm; i.e. a 
body of theory that addresses the existence, the boundaries and the 
internal organisation of the firm (Foss 2000b): 
                                           
11 And echoed in Grandori (2000, Introduction Part II p. 9, italics added): “The classification …[of eight 
coordination mechanisms]…is conducive to compare the capacity (and costs) of different mechanisms 
in governing the diversity of interests and knowledge among economic actors, under varying conditions 
of uncertainty.” More precisely, Grandori argues that if incentive and information aspects should be 
included or not cannot be determined ex ante, but depends on the object under investigation. Yet she 
define information and incentives in such a way that coordination tasks not including both aspects are 
rare indeed (Grandori 2000, Introduction Part II p.p. 2-8). 
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Figure 1: “The theory of the firm” and the position of this thesis (bold letters) 
 Incentive conflicts 
crucial 
No incentive problems 
Complete 
contracting 
Nexus of contracts 
theory, principal/-
agent theory 
The Arrow-Debreau 
model 
Incomplete  
contracting 
The asset specificity 
and property rights 
perspectives 
The coordination and 
information 
processing view 
Adapted from Foss 2000b, p. xxxi 
Hence, this thesis mainly perceives coordination in an information (and 
incomplete contracts) perspective. And as part of this, to a large extent, it 
draws on other theoretical contributions than offered by incentive based 
approaches such as, for instance, Williamson and his successors.12 
I do not wish to claim, that incentives are unimportant to coordination or 
that nothing can be learned by using or expanding on a transaction cost 
perspective. However, as the information based approach to 
coordination has been somewhat neglected since transaction costs 
economics picked up steam some 25 years ago, and since I have only 
limited time and mental resources at my disposal, I have decided to 
focus on information aspects of coordination in the theoretical discussion 
that follows. Accordingly, the empirical analysis will also pay most 
attention to information aspects, even though incentive problems are 
occasionally referred to here if I, more or less coincidently, have come 
across them. 
Besides the empirical contributions, specifically I hope the information-
based approach can advance our understanding within the following 
theoretical areas. 
 Theories of the firm I. The information-based approach creates a 
challenge with respect to understanding the existence and role of 
firms as most theories of the firm have focussed on incentive 
aspects (N. Foss 2000 b). Thus, one specific contribution of this 
inquiry into theories on coordination is that it develops on a 
                                           
12 For a recent transaction cost analysis of the Danish Construction Sector, see Bang (2002).   
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broader view on why firms exist. As it will be argued, the 
information-driven and incentive-driven boundaries of the firm are 
not necessarily identical, but they are likely to have a significant 
overlap.  
 Theories of the firm II. The existence of interfirm coordination 
besides “market and hierarchies” (to quote Williamson) has been 
acknowledged for some years. However, our knowledge on the 
specific forms interfirm-relations can take and what they are 
driven by is still limited. This thesis will elaborate on different 
types of interfirm coordination and take some initial steps towards 
an information-based understanding hereof.  
 Theories on how to coordinate I. The discussion on the efficient use of 
alternative modes of coordination is not new. However, the 
present work will elaborate on how to handle coordination in a set-
up that is likely to present in construction (i.e. a set-up with 
complex and non-repeated activities with many actors involved). 
Furthermore, the thesis will supplement existing theories by 
suggesting a learning based understanding of the efficient use of 
coordination modes.   
 Theories on how to coordinate II. In some theoretical frameworks (for 
instance contingency theory as presented in chapter 3), the nature 
of the activities is taken for granted – the match between 
coordination modes and activities is simply a matter of choosing 
the right coordination mode. This thesis will suggest dynamic 
explanations to the interplay between coordination and activities 
as the organisational “design” of activities is an managerial option 
as well.  
1.6. Summing up: Overall research question and main concepts 
To sum up, the original question of this thesis was something like why 
are certain modes of coordination selected for coordinating the activities 
involved in the process of building? 
In pursuit of this question, three empirical research questions have been 
identified. These questions will be dealt with in the following order (note 
that this sequence is different from the way they have been presented in 
the above).  
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Research question A:  How is the division of labour in construction 
and what are the consequences hereof with 
respect to coordination?   
Research question B:   What are the roles of construction firms with 
respect to coordination:  does coordination 
take place within or between firms and what 
limits that activities are handled within a 
single firm?  
 Research question C:  What particular coordination modes are used 
for construction and how do they cope with 
the activities involved in construction? 
Although the various concepts used in the research questions have been 
touched upon along the way, let me briefly recapitulate their meaning. 
Coordination is (as mentioned earlier on) broadly understood as “to make 
different parts function together efficiently”. To phrase it in slightly more 
economic terms (and anticipating some lessons from chapter 2), 
coordination can be understood as a process by which the actions of rent 
seeking individuals, each individual only possessing bits of knowledge, come 
into agreement with each other.    
As seen, the concept of coordination implies an evaluation of 
effectiveness and can be defined “as an improvement in the allocation of 
resources” (Casson 1997, p. 37) by some sort of criteria. Hence, 
coordination or to coordinate is a process towards an equilibrium in which 
“given resources are used in their best given alternative uses.” (K. Foss, 
2001, p. 12). To be coordinated is a state in which such equilibrium is 
attained.13  
By coordination modes, I refer to different ways in which this agreement 
between parts is reached. More precisely, since I apply an information 
based approach, I think of coordination modes as ways to structure 
information in order to cope with the problems of dispersed information 
                                           
13 The distinction between coordination as a process and as state can be traced back to Hayek (1937). 
As a state (that perhaps is never reached) coordination can be defined as equilibrium (in the sense of 
inter-compatibility) of individual plans. And as a process coordination is a progression, where “the 
knowledge and intentions of the different members of society are supposed to come more and more 
into agreement” (ibid, p. 44). 
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(K. Foss 2001). The function of coordination modes is to minimise on 
information costs, including for instance the cost of transmitting 
information, cost of investing in information channels, cost due to error 
in communication, or cost of obtaining information through 
investigations (ibid.) as well as the cost of storage and processing of 
information (Casson and Wadeson 1999). The structuring of information 
can take many shapes; for instance, it can be forwarded by an intended 
act of communication or by instructions in a plan, it can be carried in 
flows of materials, or it can be imbedded in norms and rules settled 
through continuous interactions. All these various forms I consider as 
ways in which coordination is done and hence I do not restrict 
coordination modes to be statements about allocation of resources in the 
future (plans) 14 or only to concern conscious actions. How all these 
potential forms of information structuring principles can be boiled down 
to a manageable typology, is reviewed in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
Selection does not only infer deliberate choices made by management, 
workers or other decision makers. I also have less conscious processes in 
mind, such as trial-and-error processes and evolutionary “thinning out” 
of less appropriate, and thus less competitive, modes.  
I perceive of an activity as a continuous performance of one or more 
tasks conducted by a single and rent seeking person using certain 
capabilities. This is done in accordance with Grandori’s (2000, chapter 1, 
p. 2) methodological proposition that “what matters for defining a unit 
of analysis… are analytical purposes. As she defines “an actor as a social 
entity in which no problem of interpersonal comparison of utility and of 
information transmission is considered to be relevant in relation to the 
problem being examined”, I define an activity in a way in which 
information transfer is not needed between persons (it is carried out by a 
single person) or over time (it is carried continuously). Here I assume, 
                                           
14 Ménard (1994) declares that coordination “is quite generally defined so as to encapsulate the set of 
processes by which initially distinct plans are brought to a condition of compatibility”, and Casson 
(1997, p. 37) defines coordination “as an improvement in the allocation of resources”. And as a state K. 
Foss (2001, p. 12) also seems to agree with Hayek: “The economic meaning of coordination is to ensure 
that given resources are used in their best given alternative uses.” Although in many ways identical, 
one might sense a tension here between Hayek  (and Ménard) on the one hand, and Casson and K. 
Foss on the other. The former uses the term  “plans”, that is statements on future allocation; the latter 
simply talks about allocation.  
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which is of course a simplification, that there are no problems of 
information transfer and hence no scope for coordination between tasks 
carried out by the same person. Activities relate to production and could, 
if it was not too troublesome, be termed a production activity. The actions 
involved in coordinating these (production) activities, I have termed 
with other words than “activity” (or “task”, see below).  
A sequence of activities can be within or between firms. The basic idea 
here is that the boundaries of coordination modes and the boundaries of 
the firm cannot be assumed to coincide. Hence, the organisation of 
coordination and the coordination modes are treated as two separate 
matters. 
Two initial levels of analysis are related to activities: at the subordinate 
level tasks; and at the super-ordinate level the value chain.  
An activity consists of one or more tasks, that is a process aiming at a 
tangible or intangible transformation of products or ideas along a value 
chain. In other words, I distinguish between activities and tasks. A task 
is a “unit of operation” that is not possible to separate for technical 
reasons (Grandori 2000, chapter 10, p.p. 4-5), or because skills or talents 
cannot be transferred (K. Foss 2000, p. 6). Hence, a task is given by the 
technology and skills involved in production  – it is not a managerial 
option.15 However, an activity can encompass one or more tasks 
depending on how the overall process of production is decomposed. 
This is within the realm of management.16 
A value chain is perceived of as the total number of coordinated activities 
resulting in an identifiable result (typically a product or service). A 
sequence of activities is a subset of a value chain. A value chain is 
identical to what Grandori (2000, chapter 10, p.p. 4-5) terms a primary 
work system.17 
                                           
15 At least on a short and medium term. It could be imagined that in the long term the size of task 
would change as a response to, say, new technology and codification of skills.   
16 It should be noticed that there is some confusion of how to employ the concepts task and activities. I 
have used the terminology of Grandori in which tasks are at a subordinate level of activities. K. Foss 
(2001, p. 6) suggests the reverse order and similarly does von Hippel (1990) perceive tasks as 
dependent on how a project is partitioned into smaller parts.    
17 And identical to what Becker and Murphy (1992) term a team. However, I will never use the term 
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The building process is defined as the activities performed by the parties 
involved in the value chain that ultimately produces a building.18  
For reasons unfolded in chapter 4 on method, empirically, I look at one 
particular housing project (a multiunit residential house) and in 
particular focus on the process of execution (and not on the prior process 
of planning or the subsequent phases of handing over and operating the 
final building). Within the execution phase, I zoom in on the activities 
and parties involved in roof construction (as roof construction is towards 
the end of the building project, it has the nice feature, that the way it 
interacts with other parts of the building is known, rather than only to be 
speculated upon).  
A very narrow definition of repetition is not applied here because, as this 
thesis hope to show, repetition can penetrate from one level to another. 
Repetition will consequently refer to recurrence of different phenomena 
at different organisational levels. This is witnessed in the theoretical 
discussion (chapter 2, 3 and the beginning of 5) pointing out, that change 
ranges from the macro to the micro level and includes, among others: 
change in overall demand, change in available resources, change in 
technology, change in taste of costumers, change in sequences of 
activities, change in working relations, change in activities and change in 
tasks (Smith 1970, Thompson 1967, Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974, Groák 
1992, Stinchcombe 1995).   
1.7. An outline of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows.  
The aim of the theoretical part (chapters 2 and 3) is to provide a 
framework by which the three research problems are addressed. This 
implies, that the theoretical part is not written as if I did not know the 
construction sector. Rather, the theoretical part is targeted at 
understanding key characteristics of construction (as captured by the 
                                                                                                                                   
“team” in the sense of a value chain since it can be misplaced by a specific coordination principle (Van 
de Ven 1976, Grandori 1997 and 2000).  
18 Hence, civil engineering works – physical infrastructure such as bridges, roads, ports etc (Bang 
2002) – is not included in this definition.  
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research questions).  Hence, I have found it rewarding not to strive for a 
complete separation of theory and empirical analysis.  
Chapter 2 relates to research problems A and B. Firstly, the major 
principles of the division or labour and knowledge are addressed in 
order to provide a basic understanding of the purpose of coordination 
(research question A). The following (and predominant) part of the 
chapter is devoted to the organisation of coordination (research question 
B). Emphasis is given to ways of organising that are found to be 
particularly important for non-repetitive interactions of activities: 
interfirm coordination, craft production and organisation in trades.  
Chapter 3 addresses research problem C. Theoretical contributions on 
typologies of coordination are consulted. Secondly, the information costs 
of these different coordination modes are discussed. Again, special focus 
is given to situations that are characterised by high levels of external 
change: coordination of non-repeated activities, and supposedly 
following from this, complex activities with many actors potentially 
involved.  
Chapter 4 contains reflections on method, for instance why a case study 
has been used, the methods used for data collection, and the subsequent 
scope for generalising the findings.  
Since non-repetitiveness is argued to be of essence for the way 
coordination is organised and structured in construction, Chapter 5 is 
devoted to validating the claim of demand volatility in construction. The 
reasons for fluctuations on the sector level are briefly summarised and 
statistical data presented. This story is broadly known – however to this 
date, the way construction firms are affected by and coping with these 
overall changes has received less attention. By using data from a unique 
Danish database covering all companies in Denmark, this issue is 
explored. The database also gives some initial empirical indications on 
the research questions; in particular on research questions a and b 
relating to the division of labour and the role of interfirm coordination.  
In chapter 6, the research questions are dealt with empirically at a less 
aggregate level. The majority of the chapter analyses the division of 
labour, organisation of coordination and coordination modes as 
observed in a case study of the construction of a roof in a multiunit 
residential house project. The chapter closes by briefly illustrating how 
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coordination takes place in sofa production (as argued in the chapter, 
sofa and roof production are in many ways alike, but they do differ with 
respect to repetition).  
The theoretical discussion in chapter 7 begins with a review of the 
theoretical framework developed in chapters 2 and 3 in light of the 
empirical observations. As part of this, three propositions relating to the 
three research problems are proposed.  
In pursuit of the research questions, elements of a more general 
understanding of the construction sector have been developed along the 
way. The empirical discussion of chapter 8 illustrates how this 
framework enables an understanding of a wider range of organisational 
characteristics of construction, than the ones studied directly as part of 
the three research questions.  
Then the summary and conclusion follows in chapter 9.  
The epilogue (chapter 10) includes reflections on how the construction 
sector might improve.  
Appendix A is an introduction to the various phases and actors typically 
involved in house production.   
Appendix B illustrates how social network analysis can contribute to a 
systematic understanding of the information costs of different 
coordination modes considered in chapter 3.  
Appendix C provides additional statistical information to chapter 5.  
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INFORMATION BASED THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE DIVISION OF LABOUR, ORGANISATION OF 
COORDINATION AND COORDINATION MODES  
Introduction and outline 
As argued, it is hardly possible to discuss the concept of coordination in 
any meaningful way without discussing the concepts of division of labour 
and specialisation. Without a division of labour there would be no need 
for coordination between individuals and in turn there would hardly be 
any specialisation within or among firms. And conversely, the division 
of labour and specialisation cannot be understood without considering 
the level of coordination costs by which they are limited (Becker and 
Murphy 1992).  
In accordance with this mutual interdependence, the theoretical part 
consists of two chapters. Both chapters aim at presenting a theoretical 
framework for the research question on why specific forms of 
coordination are used during the process of construction.  
The first chapter (chapter 2) pertains to the question of the division of 
labour and specialisation, i.e. the organisation of coordination. Hence, this 
chapter provides the theoretical framework for addressing research 
question A and research question B.  
The next theoretical chapter (chapter 3) goes on to address the 
coordination modes (i.e. information principles) that can be used for 
coordination, given a certain division of labour and specialisation. This 
chapter relates to research question C. 
Some basic trade-offs 
Implicitly, the discussion on how activities should be organised and 
coordinated is based on the assumption that organisational design is 
about striking a delicate balance between a numbers of objectives, and 
that the exact position of these balances varies from one situation to 
another. The following theoretical and empirical parts implicitly refer to 
a number of such trade-offs. 
At the very overall level, there is a trade off between coordination and 
production costs. If only production costs should be considered (and 
coordination costs are ignored) the remedy would be easy to give in 
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most situations: “increase the division of labour!”. Similarly, by reducing 
the division of labour, other things being equal, costs of coordination 
could be reduced. What naturally complicates things is, that both 
production costs and coordination costs have to be taken into account 
(Becker and Murphy 1992, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994).  
Another trade off is between different temporal aspects of production 
and coordination costs. By focusing on one particular activity as well as 
creating fixed relations to neighbouring activities, it becomes possible to 
reduce production and coordination costs respectively. However, 
developing very specialised production and coordination capabilities 
and procedures often increases switching costs in case new activities and 
working constellations, for instance due to change in demand, are 
necessitated.  Hence, there is a trade-off between specialisation and 
adaptability. The exact point of intersection is, among other things, 
influenced by the degree of stability (i.e. repetition) in inputs and 
outputs (Smith 1970).  
For instance, firms that engage themselves in more permanent structures 
face a danger of surplus or lack of production capacity in case markets 
shift. However, due to repetition, structures that allow a “smooth” 
interaction between activities gradually develop and may, in spite of 
their inflexibility, be worthwhile to consider after all.  Hence, one 
particular ramification of the trade-off between specialisation and 
flexibility is the trade-off between reducing the cost of production 
facilities when in use with the cost when not in use.1  
The cost of not having information versus the cost of getting information is a 
third kind of balance considered throughout this thesis. Acquisition of 
information reduces uncertainty (Arrow 1973, Galbraith 1973) and hence 
potentially enables coordination through an overall plan (in the 
Hayekian sense) in which the actions of each party are nicely fitted to 
each other. But it is not free of costs to obtain, transmit, absorb, process 
and store information (Arrow 1974). Hence, to some extent, it is 
profitable not to strive for complete information. An important 
implication of this is that there is an upper limit to how specified plans 
should be – the disadvantage of unplanned, and to some degree 
                                           
1 The same trade-off could exist between minimising costs of labour versus the costs of stocks.  
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unexpected, events has to be balanced with information costs involved in 
developing plans. Or to use coordination terms: the costs involved in the 
process of coordination have to balanced with the costs involved in 
being in a less coordinated state: “An efficient economy achieves a given 
degree of coordination of material goods and services at minimum 
information costs” (Casson 1997, p. 36). 
As the question of how coordination takes place unfolds during the 
theoretical part, a number of balances related to coordination in a more 
delimited field appear as well. Firstly, there is the trade off between 
different ways of organising coordination. As we know from Richardson 
(1972), coordination can take place within firms, on markets or (perhaps 
mediated by third parties) directly between firms.  And similarly, as 
considered in chapter 3, the different principles (i.e. “coordination 
modes”) by which coordination takes place have their comparative 
advantage for different kinds of information. Hence, to the degree that 
simultaneous use of coordination modes is impossible or very costly; 
there is a balance between handling different kinds of information. For 
instance, some coordination modes may handle the actions of many 
actors easily, but do so at the expense of nuances in the information 
exchanged. Other modes of coordination allow exchange of diversified 
and extensive information, but only allow interaction between a 
restricted numbers of actors.  
A banal, and truly Smithian, insight developed throughout this thesis is 
that repetition matters. Or put more precisely, the location of the exact 
point of intersection for these trade-offs depends very much on the 
degree to which production activities – and the associated job of 
coordinating these – are done continuously or once only. For instance, 
flexibility towards producing new kinds of products is obviously not 
very important in ongoing production. And similarly, the cost of 
obtaining information becomes more and more negligible, the more 
activities it can be used for.   
In this way, the work at hand brings some theoretical insights to an 
agenda that appears to be picking up steam these years: temporary 
organisations (or project organisations) as a distinct set of organisational 
forms very different from the ones traditionally found in ongoing 
production (Winch 1994).  
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Outline of theoretical part 
Not surprisingly, chapter two on the division of labour and 
specialisation sets out with Adam Smith and his clarifications on the 
benefits of dividing production among individuals. It then takes us to 
Hayek and his idea about a division of knowledge as a result of this 
division of labour (section 2.1). Having identified why alignment of 
information is needed, it is pointed out, that the smithian division of 
labour obtained by repetition in activities, is facilitated by repetition in 
sequences of activities (section 2.2.). However, as repeated interaction 
implies commitment to specific persons and products, all relations 
cannot be maintained in fixed structures in case external change exists. 
And hence, some activities will be vulnerable to the unknown in- or 
output following from novel and non-repetitive interactions. In addition 
to the specialists in activities (or in production) outlined by Smith, this in 
turn favours the existence of specialists in handling of sequences of 
production (specialists in coordination) (section 2.3).  
The benefits of having repeated sequences of activities (with the 
associated specialists in production and coordination) provide a raison 
d’être for the firm perceived as a set of resources and activities. This 
perception of the firm does not equal the (more common) coasian 
perspective regarding incomplete contracts and authority as hallmarks of 
the firm, nor the more recent property rights approach in which 
ownership is of essence. Yet, due to lower costs to experimentation and 
decisive information, it is likely that repeated interaction of activities 
significantly overlaps with the contractual and legal boundaries of the 
firm (section 2.4).  However, the main contribution of Coase is perhaps 
not to explain the firm as such, but to explain firms and markets as two 
distinctive principles by which coordination can be organised (section 
2.5). But, as Richardson points out (section 2.6), there are more nuances 
to the story than simply coordination by direction within firms or 
coordination between firms by markets. As argued in a modification of 
Richardson’s contribution, in case specific products are produced under 
rapidly shifting (external) conditions, interfirm coordination of a more far-
reaching character than market transactions arise. Since the generalness 
or specificity of products is crucial in order to understand the use of 
markets, section 2.7 addresses how standardisation of products can 
transform activities from being specific to general. As the establishment 
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of standards induces set-up costs or depends on learning from previous 
interaction, standards are less likely to emerge for non-repeated 
sequences of activities.  
Thus, it seems that the job of coordinating activities in a non-repetitive 
setting is particularly difficult, as activities cannot be linked together in 
well-known sequences within a firm, nor easily can be made subject to 
market transactions, as they are not standardised. However, craft 
production and organisation in trades are ways of enabling coordination in 
this situation, even though the latter may also create path dependency 
(section 2.8). Finally, having identified the importance of interfirm 
coordination in particular in a non-repetitive setting, the chapter 
concludes by examining the different forms interfirm coordination can 
take (section 2.9). It is shown that bilateral coordination, which has been 
given much emphasis in the literature up to now, only is one out of 
several options. Trilateral coordination as well as unilateral coordination 
with separate production are other ways by which interfirm coordination 
can be coordinated. The advantages and disadvantages of these 
organisation forms are considered with particular emphasis on how to 
reduce information costs.  
Chapter 3 addresses the question on how activities can be coordinated 
with a given division of labour and specialisation.  
More precisely chapter 3 aims at 1) identifying different modes by which 
coordination can take place, and 2) the pros and cons of these different 
coordination modes with respect to alignment of different types and levels 
of information. The first aim is addressed by reviewing different 
conceptualisations within information based views on coordination 
modes, starting with the original statements of Thompson, then the 
refinements made by contingency theory, and concluding with the recent 
and synthesising work of Grandori. Then these different coordination 
modes are analysed according to their ability to handle different types 
and levels of information. Rather than addressing this discussion at a 
very general level, it is targeted to the specific ways of dividing labour 
and organising coordination that chapter 2 identified as the likely 
outcome of a non-repetitive setting. More precisely, the use of these 
different mechanisms is considered for situations with low degrees of 
repetition in activities, many actors involved, and with high levels of 
information processing (both quantitatively and qualitatively). This 
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combination is likely to favour certain modes of coordination as well as 
give them a particular shape. Finally, the chapter directs attention to the 
costs of identifying the most suitable coordination mode. As argued, these 
costs are considerable if repetition is infrequent and hence, stable 
coordination patterns - quite different from the one expected if only costs 
of using coordination modes are considered - can emerge.  
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Chapter 2  - the division of labour and organisation of 
coordination 
 
2.1. The division of labour and knowledge 
The Smithian idea of the division of labour is broadly known. However, 
since this concept in many ways is the foundation for discussing 
coordination, it seems worthwhile briefly to recapitulate the main 
insights offered by Smith.  
Smith brings the division of labour centre stage at the very beginning of 
his book on Wealth of Nations (1970, originally 1776). “The greatest 
improvements in the productive powers of labour”, he explains, can be 
ascribed to this division (ibid. p. 109). More precisely, the benefits from a 
division of labour are threefold. Firstly, the increase of capabilities 
(“dexterity”) obtained by “reducing every man’s business to some one 
simple operation, and by making this operation the sole employment of 
his live” (ibid. p 112). Secondly, savings in time spent on switching from 
one type of work to another. And finally, there is the innovation 
argument. As “Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier 
methods of attaining any object when the whole attention of their minds 
is directed towards that single object than when it is dissipated among a 
great variety of things” (ibid. p. 114), a division of labour promotes 
invention of machines that facilitate and partly substitute labour.  
Knowledge, skills and experience (or what Richardson (1972) has termed 
capabilities) thus seem to constitute a core element in the division of 
labour. Not only do capabilities enhance the productivity directly for any 
given operation. Indirectly, capabilities about inventing and producing 
machinery also promote a higher yield of each man’s work.  And hence, 
a division of labour coincides with different knowledge bases: the 
knowledge of the nailer is different from the knowledge of the black 
smith etc. Smith (ibid. p. 120) is very clear about the causality between 
the division of labour and different knowledge bases:  
 “The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, 
much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which 
appears to distinguish men of different profession, when grown up to 
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maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause as the effect 
of the division of labour.”  
In other words, having people with different capabilities involved in 
producing a product, even a simple one like a nail, is an evitable part of 
the division of labour, according to Smith. Consequently, Smith basically 
argues that dissimilarity benefits individuals as well as society.  
Smith highlights some of the fundamental benefits of a division of 
labour. Obviously, this raises the question of what, if any, the limits are 
to this division. Probably the most cited answer is that “the division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market” (ibid. p. 121). However, 
Smith offers other explanations.  
Firstly – and this is, as I shall argue throughout this work, of outmost 
importance for the construction sector – a discontinuity of operations 
limits the benefits from subdividing labour. Smith explains this with the 
example of agriculture compared with manufacturing. Due to the 
different seasons of the year, it is difficult for one man to be constantly 
working as a ploughman, a harrower, a sower of the seed, a reaper of the 
corn etc. Even though Smith stresses the importance of the seasons, his 
observation can be given a more general interpretation: the benefits from 
performing a single operation extremely well have to be traded off with 
the increased risk that this operation is not called for. The exact point of 
intersection between these two conditions of cause depends very much 
on the stability of production activities. In agriculture, the benefits of 
specialisation are (or at least used to be) low due to seasonal changes. In 
other sectors, like construction, it may be low due to other kind of 
changes, for instance changes in overall demand.   
Secondly, the division of labour can only work with “the assistance and 
cooperation of many thousands” (ibid., p. 117). Even though Smith is not 
very explicit in this matter, the limits to the division of labour can also be 
ascribed to costs of coordination (Becker and Murphy 1992).  
The latter point – the need for coordination due to a division of labour – 
is more directly addressed by Hayek (1937 and 1945).  Alongside the 
division of labour, goes the division of knowledge (Hayek 1937, p. 49), 
which raises the problem of 
 “..how the spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each 
possessing only bits of knowledge, brings about a state of affairs in 
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which prices correspond to costs, etc., and which could be brought 
about by deliberate direction only by somebody who possessed the 
combined knowledge of all those individuals. (ibid. p. 49) 
In principle, Hayek tells us, equilibrium – that is correspondence of plans 
– between actions can come about as a result of each person acting in 
accordance with an overall plan. But as indicated in the quote, making 
such a plan requires the combined knowledge of all individuals, a 
combined knowledge that does not exist in the outset due to the division 
of knowledge. One option is for all parties to agree on a plan in the 
beginning of a period of transactions, but this equilibrium is only 
obtainable, if assumptions on correct foresight of all parties are made. 
Otherwise, changes will make each member deviate from the plan in 
ways not longer ensuring coherence of actions (ibid. p.33-34).2 Rather, in 
situations with changes and without correct foresight, the kind of 
equilibrium we can attain with dispersed knowledge is inter-
compatibility of individual plans (ibid. p. 41).3 
Two important observations can be learned from this. Firstly, by 
pointing out that the issue of coordination is essentially a matter of how 
knowledge is created and changed, Hayek makes clear, that coordination 
is essentially an information problem (even though Hayek in general do 
not use the term information). Furthermore, by using “intentions” as well 
as “knowledge” he also makes clear, that coordination is an incentive 
problem. Secondly, change4 – in combination with no correct foresight 
                                           
2 Hence, an equilibrium where the (subjective) data of each individual equals the (objective) data as 
made up by the totality of all individuals can only be reached, if assumptions on correct foresight are 
made. 
3 Hayek (ibid. p. 42) gives this example of inter-compatibility of individual plans: “Consider the 
preparations which will be going on at any moment for the production of houses. Brickmakers, 
plumbers and others will all be producing materials which in each case will correspond to a certain 
quantity of houses for which just this quantity of the particular material will be required. If all these 
activities represent preparations for the production (and acquisition) of the same amount of houses we 
can say that there is equilibrium between them in the sense that all the people engaged in them may 
find that they can carry out their plans.”. 
4 “It is, perhaps, worth stressing that economic problems arise always and only in consequence of 
change. As long as things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise no new 
problems requiring a decision, no need to form a new plan.” (Hayek 1945, p. 82). 
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and the division of knowledge – is located as a fundamental reason for 
the need for coordination. Hence, in order to analyse coordination 
practices used for a given set of activities – recall the research question - 
it seems worthwhile to consider the types and magnitude of changes 
imposed on these activities. Not only do changes affect the degree of 
specialisation (as outlined by Smith) and thereby the need for 
coordination, they also affect the need for coordination for a given 
division of labour (as outlined by Hayek). Chapter 4 starts out with a 
consideration of different types of change and how they relate to 
coordination in more detail.  
 
2.2. Repetition in activities and repetition in sequences of 
activities 
A fundamental lesson to be learned from the previous section is that 
repetition of identical activities is essential to the division of labour and 
in turn for growth. Consequently, lack of continuity in production is a 
threat to the division of labour, as illustrated in the Smithian (1970) 
example of how a farmer, due to seasonal changes, cannot focus on a 
simple activity.  
Since disturbances are of outmost importance to the division of labour 
(and in turn coordination), the question of their origins and impacts, 
becomes of essence. Hence, in the following, I will go along with 
Thompson’s (1967) idea that on one hand organisations (e.g. firms) are 
open systems facing external changes, but at the same time, as subject to 
criteria of rationality, organisations are able to create some stability in 
their operations.  
A remarkable feature with Smith’s discussion of the division of labour is 
that he does not addresses the way it is organised; for instance whether it 
is organised as fixed sequences of activities between specific persons or 
in more temporary relations. According to Demsetz (1991, p. 171) “It is 
safe to ignore the organization problem only if the gains achievable 
through specialization are independent of the way in which 
specialization is achieved”. As it will be argued in the following, the way 
activities are organised indeed affect the extent to which each activity is 
subject to disturbances. Consequently, the organisation of activities has 
to be addressed in order to understand the division of labour.  
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Put differently, in order to understand repetition in activities and subsets 
hereof, we have to understand repetition between activities within a 
value chain. And, as it will be argued, in order to understand repetition 
between activities within the value chain, we will have to understand 
repetition between value chains.  What is suggested theoretically and 
empirically in this thesis is that repetition at different levels is indeed 
interlinked and consequently that the analysis has to be the same.  
The starting point for this analysis is that the well-known gains from 
repeating the same activity can also be applied to information processing 
involved in, for instance, coordination (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994). 
And hence, by repeating sequences of activities (and not only activities, as 
Smith is preoccupied with) specialisation in coordination can be achieved. 
Besides lower costs directly related to information processing, a potential 
benefit from this specialisation is the stability it brings to each activity. 
Thus, repetition in sequences of activities is a way to ensure repetition in 
activities.  
The way repeated sequences of activities between the same persons 
bring stability to each activity relates to how  
“Continuing association of the same persons makes it easier for firm-
specific and person-specific information to be accumulated... 
Knowledge about the objectives and organization of the firm is 
learned “cheaply” through continuing association, and so is 
knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of the persons 
involved in this association.” (Demsetz 1991, p. 174).  
Among other things, repeated sequences of activities create shared 
expectations: 
 “Shared expectations arise that provide psychological security, 
reduce the cost of information processing, and facilitates the 
coordination of different activities. Moreover, established 
conceptions of the way things are done can be very beneficial; 
members of an organization can use these stable expectations to 
predict the behaviour of others” (Powell 1991 quoted in Dubois 
and Gadde 2002).  
Partly, these shared expectations relate to qualitative dimensions of 
coordination. For instance, if person B repeatedly receives input from A, 
over time he will be more and more knowledgeable about the nature of 
 Chapter 2: The division of labour and organisation of coordination 44  
 
the input and will be able to adjust his working operations accordingly. 
Further, as they interact repeatedly, it will be in the interest of B to 
inform A about potential improvements in the output from A (who 
possibly receives a higher price for his output). In addition, repetition 
can create shared expectations not only about the exchanged products, 
but also about the information going together with products. Protocols 
governing communication can economise on information costs, for 
instance by specifying a procedure for how much information should be 
exchanged, the content of the information, as well as the sequence in 
which it should be given. An important implication of such procedures is 
that no one is given too much or “double” information, nor too little or 
no information (Casson and Wadeson 1999). Finally, repeated interaction 
can allow for a shared language (March and Simon 1958) including 
coding of communication (Crémer 2000). 
To some degree (and as discussed in the section on product standards 
towards the end of this chapter), shared expectations could also be 
obtained through general standards for interaction, that is standards that 
are not dependent on repetition between specific actors. However, some 
ways to standardise activities may be impossible or costly to transfer to 
other individuals or firms due to tacit elements of the knowledge, e.g. 
firm specific codes (Arrow 1974, p. 56) or “template knowledge” 
(Langlois 1999). As Demsetz (1991) phrased in the previous quote: 
human capital is often of high specificity.  
Repeated interaction does not only enable on answer to the question of 
what, but also how much to transfer (the quantitative aspects of 
coordination). If A and B interact repeatedly, A will know how much he 
can allocate to B and correspondingly, B will know how much to expect 
from A. This reduces the costs of unused products (if A provides to 
much to B) or unused production facilities (if A provides to little to B). 
This problem becomes particularly important, when some units work 
most efficiently at certain volumes, since “techniques appropriate to 
large volumes cannot be “miniaturized”” (Langlois 1999, p. 243). Lack of 
“miniaturizability” creates the “balancing problem”: the equipment 
involved in the various phases of the process of production should be 
adjusted in accordance with the scale of production needed by the most 
discontinuous equipment (Grandori 2000). Fixed relations between 
activities are a way to ensure once and for all that the common 
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denominator (i.e. the volume at which all parts of the production works 
at it most efficient volume) is found and hence that the balancing 
problem is solved.  
 
2.3. Specialisation in buffering 
Thus, in many ways, repeated sequences of activities bring stability to 
the core of operation, i.e. to each activity. Yet, there are limits to the 
internalisation of activities in fixed structures. Continuing association 
implies commitment to particular firms and individuals producing 
particular products, and thereby induces inflexibility to new products. 
So, the efficient operation of long-term relations, for instance between 
activities, is dependent on the stability of the conditions under which 
they are operated (Bishop 1975, Demsetz 1991). Unless sources to 
instability are completely absent – which, as we learned from Hayek, is a 
questionable assumption - it will to some degree be necessary to split up 
the sequence of repeated activities.  
In order to clarify this point, consider the distinction Casson (1997) 
makes on different types of change. One kind of change is associated 
with fluctuations in demand and supply within an established market. A 
second type of change relates to the breakdowns and disrupts in a 
sequence of production activities.5 In the terminology applied here, this 
will resemble change between and within value chains respectively 
The previous sections of this chapter have considered change within the 
value chain. This section points out that the benefits of fixed relations at 
the level of the activity have to balanced with the inflexibility to new 
products. And hence, that in order to understand specialisation and 
coordination within a value chain, change external to the value chain has 
to be considered. Correspondingly, Berger and Piore (1980) suggest that 
besides the extent of the market, stability of demand (and uncertainty of 
demand) has to be added to the list of impediments to the division of 
labour. 
                                           
5 A third kind of change is the long-run structural change of the kind described by Schumpeter 
(Casson 1997). 
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According to Stinchcombe (1990), disturbances outside the realm of the 
single value chain can be caused by changes in (a) overall demand; (b) 
taste of customers; (c) technological development allowing new 
manufacturing principles and products; or (d) change in seasons or 
supply of raw materials. Casson (1997) makes, as mentioned, a 
distinction with some of the same elements; i.e. change between value 
chains (ad a) and long-run structural changes of the kind described by 
Schumpeter (ad c). Groák (1992) stresses ad a and ad d as important 
sources to instability.6  
In order to adapt to these, or other types of external changes, some 
relations between activities have to be organised on a temporary and 
perhaps one-off basis, whereas other relations can be maintained in a 
repetitive structure. This implies that these sequences of repeated 
activities are open systems exposed to external changes. Thus, the 
question is how to operate activities placed at the vulnerable border of 
such interfaces. One possibility is to let the variations in input impact 
directly on the first activity in a sequence of activities and live with how 
these fluctuations propagate through the otherwise smoothly running 
chain of repeated interactions. However, this is hardly a strategy to 
follow for firms subject to rationality, taking the loss from low level of 
repetition in each activity into account. Presumably, some level of shock 
absorbing mechanisms in the outer positions of a sequence of repetitive 
relations of activities is profitable.  
In this way, repetition in activities depends on absorption of variations 
in the adjacent activities. According to the general principles of the 
division of labour, this implies that “Organizations cope with 
uncertainty by creating certain parts specifically to deal with it, 
specializing other parts in operating under conditions of certainty or 
near certainty” (Thompson 1967, p. 13). Thus, some agents are engaged 
in production and others in the “higher-level” decisions relating to 
coordination (Hart and Moore 1999). For instance, the job of ensuring 
adequate supplies (in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms), may 
                                           
6 Within the value chain Groák also emphasise project uncertainty, workplace uncertainty and uncertainty 
of site organization. 
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be taken care of by a purchasing department, whereas a constant sale can 
be the responsibility of a department specialised in selling (see figure 1).  
Figure 1: Coordination and production specialists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanation: The bold arrows represent activities that are performed in repeated sequences. Specialists 
in production perform these activities. External changes in inputs as well as outputs makes constitute 
a potential treat to the continuous performance of these activities. In order to minimise this impact, 
specialists in external coordination switch back and forth between multiple value-chains (broken lines; 
it is coincidental that six alternative value chains are illustrated). Possibly, variations of this type can 
also be buffered by stockpiling (an option I return to in section 2.6). If external changes cannot be 
completely absorbed by these means, or if internal disturbances in production occur, simultaneous 
adaptations within the specific value chain are performed by specialists in internal production. The 
grey box represents an area in which persons interact repetitively. As argued in the next section, this 
area is likely to be identical to, or at least closely resemble, the contractual and legal boundaries of the 
firm. 
 
Such buffering mechanisms exerted by specialists, absorbs fluctuations 
in demand and supply. In order to keep a constant rate and pace of 
production, it is the job of these persons to adjust to changes in the 
supply and demand for particular products by shifting back and forth 
between different value chains. Thus, the shock absorbing specialists 
have to ensure a high level of flexibility in products (both concerning the 
usable inputs and the possible uses after production) and at the same 
time allow rigidity in production.  
In some situations adaptation to a change in the market can happen with 
no disturbance to production; in other situations more profound 
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adaptations have to be made. Changes internally in the chain of repeated 
activities may also call for a revision of the present organisation; for 
instance, if the benefits from a further specialisation in production are 
profitable to harvest or, as a more temporary phenomenon, if 
breakdowns in machinery (or personnel for that matter) causes a need 
for improvisation.  
If, in the latter example, just a single activity has to be performed 
differently, it will most likely require simultaneous changes in most or 
all other activities in the repeated sequence of activities, as they have not 
been made independent, or almost independent, of each other. Hence, in 
case external disturbances impact on production, there is a challenging 
job of securing simultaneous change in a potentially large number of 
activities. And again, according to benefits from dividing labour, this 
may pave the way for persons – e.g. shop floor managers - specialised in 
creating concerted changes in production by changing the content of 
each activity or perhaps by redefining the boundaries of activities (and 
consequently, the way a product is divided into activities is, at least to 
some degree,  “in fact a manageable process variable” (von Hippel 1990, 
p. 408)).   Where the former group of coordination specialists handled 
changes between value chains, the shop floor managers or similar handle 
coordination within a value chain. To put it differently, if the value chain 
is portrayed horizontally, the first group of specialists in coordination 
deal with vertical coordination and the latter with horizontal coordination.  
Thus, in short, it appears that in a world subject to change, in addition to 
the persons specialised in performing the very activities, persons 
specialised in handling disturbances are also likely to occur. This latter 
group may be decomposed into persons specialised in handling changes 
externally to the chain of repeated activities (persons with knowledge 
about different markets at the supply and demand side) and persons 
specialised in handling changes internally (people with knowledge on all 
the activities involved in production). 7  
                                           
7 This distinction resembles what Casson (1997) has termed changes in markets and in production, 
respectively. Casson discusses these two sorts of changes as separate matters, and even though it is 
not implausible that one type of change can exists without the other, as argued here, changes in 
markets (products) can foster changes in production. Whether the causality also runs the other way - 
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2.4. Repeated sequences of activities as an explanation to the 
existence of firms 
So far, the benefits from organising in ways that allow for sequences of 
repeated activities of some length have been discussed and the groups of 
specialists involved herein have been outlined. It is tempting, and 
possible, to think of such a repeated sequence of activities and the 
associated specialist as a firm. In this case, the firm would be perceived as 
a set of resources (e.g. persons and equipment) and activities, which interact 
closely and repetitively (Grandori 2000). The fundamental reasons 
provided in the above for such a firm is one of information costs; firms 
are units specialised in “the essence of coordination”: decision making 
(Casson 1997, p. 76). By specialisation, improvement in decisions can be 
obtained, since the firm has the potential to acquire more or better 
information than the individual worker or consumer. 
However, the information based “set-of-resources-and-activities”-
perception is not the only theoretical explanation for the existence of 
firms. The firm described as a response to certain incentive problems is 
another - and according to Demsetz (1988) less ignored – perspective on 
the firm (See N. Foss 2000 b for an overview of different perspectives on 
the existence, boundaries and organisation of firms). According to the 
latter position, long-term binding contracts with residual decision rights, 
perhaps supported by ownership, are important hallmarks of the firm.  
These legal or contractual definitions of the firm will possibly differ from 
the set-of-resources-and-activities-definition of the firm (Grandori 2000). 
Or, as clarified by Bolton and Dewatripont (1994, p. 810), when the firm 
is perceived as a communication network designed to minimize the costs 
of processing and transmitting information, the “…boundaries may be 
different from the legal boundaries of firms”. 
Nevertheless, there may be a substantial overlap between on one hand 
repetition in activities and on the other hand the legal and contractual 
boundaries of the firm.8 In order to examine this, let us try to consider 
                                                                                                                                   
changes in production will bring about changes in market – is not a trivial issue and will, with special 
focus on construction, be discussed in the introduction to chapter 5.  
8 For matters of simplicity, I ignore the discussion about whether the contractual and ownership 
boundaries of the firm coincide. Grandori (2000) suggests that they as an outset should be treated as 
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which relation that most efficiently minimises on the information costs 
involved in the interaction between the previously outlined specialists in 
activities and specialists in coordination of activities. 
To recall, it is the job of specialists in coordination to instruct the persons 
performing the very activities about the needed modification 
(irrespectively of whether it is caused by internal or external changes). 
This information cannot be learned by the persons specialised in 
activities, as this will ruin the gains from specialised learning. And if 
changes not known in advance take place, it cannot easily be described 
ex ante in a contract.  
This brings us forward to one (and perhaps the major) reason given by 
Coase (1937) on the reasons for the establishment of firms. When 
forecasting is difficult, it is less possible and desirable for the person to 
specify what the other party is supposed to do. Hence, rather than 
signing a very detailed contract subject to a market relation, it may be 
advantageous to form a contract where the exact details are left open 
until a later date. In this way an authority relation based on direction, i.e. 
the firm, is established according to Coase (ibid.). 
K. Foss (2001b) develops this idea further by taking an explicit property 
rights approach, and by pointing out some situations in which detailed 
ex ante specification in a contract is difficult.9 Her argument is that - due 
to for instance unknown technological interdependencies created by an 
increasing division of labour - real markets rarely function as smoothly 
as assumed in neoclassical price theory (e.g. rights are not perfectly 
defined and transaction costs exists). Consequently, prices alone do not 
hold all the information required to ensure that no valuable resources are 
left idle. So, in particular when  “an increasing division of labour 
introduces greater complexity and new kinds of tools and equipment 
and this in turn can create uncertainty about the best way of 
coordinating the specialized and interdependent tasks” (ibid., p. 151), it 
“is impossible for managers ex ante to specify rights over assets and 
                                                                                                                                   
separate matters. But in a property rights approach they are closely related as it is ownership that 
gives the residual rights of control on which the workability of an incomplete contract is based (Hart 
1991, pp. 141-142)..  
9 However, unlike Coase, but very much like the approach of this thesis, she does not take the costs of 
coordination activities or the extent of specialisation for granted (K. Foss 2001b, p. 153). 
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labour in such a way that each subtask fits optimally to all other tasks 
carried out” (ibid, p. 175).    
In place of ex ante defined user rights over assets, experimentation, or 
learning by doing, is a way to learn about how to coordinate these 
activities. But, K. Foss continues, experiments with coordination of tasks 
are best facilitated by certain property rights, more precisely by direction 
(i.e. by the Coasian firm). The advantage of the firm can be ascribed to 
lower cost of (re)negotiation within a firm than between firms (ibid p. 
164) and hence, the “centralisation of power has the advantage that one 
can make a decision involving many assets without having to obtain the 
consent of the owner of each asset” (Lando 1994). Or as Langlois (2001, p. 
15) puts it: “When many different pieces of the system must be changed 
simultaneously to create new value, centralized control can often help 
overcome the narrow visions of the local participants, and centralised 
ownership can more easily trump the vested interests of those 
participants.” 
Notably, with this argument K. Foss substantiates why specialists in 
handling of internal changes are expected to be superiors (and owners) to 
the persons who performs the very activities (which we as a matter of 
convenience now safely can term employees). However, it should also be 
made clear, that this specific extension of the Coasian argument does not 
account for the hierarchical position of people specialised in external 
changes.  
This aspect can be approached by Casson’s (1994) discussion on decisive 
information as the reason for hierarchical firms. Decisiveness refers to a 
situation where for instance the choice between two strategies correctly 
can be based on information about some conditions irrespectively of the 
state of other conditions. And thus, if person A holds decisive 
information, he can act without contacting person B, whereas B would 
have to contact person A in order to make a right decision. Furthermore, 
if it is easier to communicate the decision than the information on which 
it is based, a hierarchical relation with person A as a superior to B will 
reduce the cost of communication. Based on this insight, Casson goes on 
to discuss whether firms are led by the market or led by design. The first 
situation is likely to emerge if decisiveness in demand is high and 
decisiveness in technology is low. For instance, if rapid changes in 
markets result in rapid changes in demand, and where fixed costs do not 
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require any particular level of production. Conversely, a situation led by 
design may arise in the presence of changes in (high level of) fixed costs 
and stable demand. In situations led by the market, the specialist in 
external changes will take a superior position to the specialist in internal 
changes, and vice versa in situations led by design. In case of a low or 
high level in both demand and technology – that is, in case no person is 
holding (more) decisive information (than another) – hierarchical levels 
between these two groups are not expected to arise due to decisiveness.  
If the lower costs of experimentation due to common ownership are 
ignored for a moment (or are assumed to be of low value), the concept of 
decisiveness gives reason to consider if, in contrast with the argument 
provided so far, the specialist in activities could become superiors to the 
specialist in coordination. This situation could occur if the specialists in 
production had information on the performance of activities with crucial 
importance for the specialists in coordination (specialists in market and 
production changes respectively) and not the other way around. At least 
two conditions seems be required in order to create such a situation. 
Firstly, changes internally in production have to be greater than changes 
in external markets. Whether this is the case is a question of empirical 
relevance, even though Casson (1994, 1997) suggest that, at least in the 
short run, demand tends to be much more volatile than production 
technology (implying that market led firms are more common than 
design led firms). Secondly, it should be the case that specialists in 
activities have information which cannot easily be obtained by specialists 
in coordination (if both parties have the information there is no 
decisiveness). As it is the job of specialists in internal coordination to 
design, observe, and redesign (and perhaps also to monitor) all the 
various activities involved in production, these specialists usually have a 
fairly accurate picture of the conditions under which the specialists in 
activities operate. On the other hand, since the job of specialists in 
activities is to perform, well, exactly activities and not to coordinate the 
behaviour of others, it is less likely that specialists in activities have a 
comprehensive view of the doings of specialists in coordination. 
Hence, reducing information costs in case information is decisive does 
not necessarily imply, that specialists in coordination are superiors to 
specialists in activities. However, it seems to be the most likely outcome. 
And if so, in combination with lower costs to experimentation, the 
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presence of decisive information could account for why specialists in 
activities are employees and specialists in coordination are superiors and 
(perhaps) owners of the firm.   
 
2.5. Coordination by firms and markets  
Departing from Coase’s seminal contribution, The Nature of the Firm 
(1937), the previous section has offered reasons why repeated sequences 
of activities are likely to correspond with the contractual and legal notion 
of the firm. However, his article - published the same year and journal as 
Hayek published “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) - does not explain 
the existence of firms in itself, but describes firms and markets as two 
fundamental ways by which coordination can take place. Outside the 
firm, price movements direct production, whereas the entrepreneur-
coordinator directs production inside the firm. According to Coase, the 
use of these two supplementing yet distinctive concepts is determined by 
their relative cost (Coase 1937). So even though the price versus planning 
based coordination outlined by Hayek is reminiscent of Coase’s 
distinction, Coase identifies two mechanisms that both can be found in 
non-socialists economies. None of these mechanisms are given any 
supremacy in the outset. Rather, their respective fields of action have to 
be determined by a comparative assessment of their respective costs for a 
given situation.  
Information costs play a critical role in this comparative assessment. The 
costs of using the market are dependent on the cost of discovering the 
relevant prices, as well as on the cost of negotiating and concluding a 
contract for each transaction. Forming a long-term contract may reduce 
the cost of the latter and a firm is likely to emerge (ibid. pp. 390-391). 
Finally, as mentioned, when forecasting is difficult, a contract where the 
exact details are left open until a later date may be preferable. The costs 
of using the firm are largely dependent on the number of transactions, 
since (a) the costs of organising additional transactions within the firm 
may rise and (b) the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production 
in the best possible way (ibid. pp. 394-395).10 
                                           
10 Even though Coase devotes some space to this issue (see in particular pp. 396-397) it is not very 
clear in The Nature of the Firm why the cost of organising an extra activity within a firm should rise 
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Thus, Coase provides one of the earliest discussions of how coordination 
can and should be organised. The fundamental idea of markets and 
firms as the two principles by which coordination can take place was 
later taken up by Williamsons in Market and Hierarchies (1975). 
Williamson (1979, 1985) makes this basic idea operational by proposing a 
set of variables that determine the cost of using the market, which in turn 
enables an analysis of the appropriate way to organise coordination.11 In 
this way Williamson put the transaction cost perspective on track and as 
part of this, in contrast to Coase, directed theorizing on coordination 
towards incentive aspects. As explained in chapter 1, I do not pursue the 
line of reasoning offered by the incentive based coordination literature, 
but focus primarily on information-related aspects of coordination. 
Consequently, the (substantial) contributions of Williamson and his 
successors are not addressed further in this theoretical part.  
 
2.6. Interfirm coordination  
The discussion presented so far suggest that, dependent on the stability 
of the conditions under which they are performed, activities can either 
be conducted in repeated sequences or in temporary relations. The 
former is expected to take place within a firm (in which decisions are 
based on direction by an entrepreneur), the latter is expected to take 
place on a market (in which decisions are based on prices). Further, part 
of the cost of using the market relates to the costs of discovering the 
relevant prices, as well as the costs of negotiating and concluding a 
contract for each transaction. In addition to these costs ex ante and during 
a transaction, ex post costs of reinforcing a contract could also be 
imagined (Dahlman 1979, Coase 1988). 
                                                                                                                                   
more dramatically than the cost of organising an extra activity in the market. However, as discussed in 
chapter 3, authority is vulnerable to information overload and is consequently, other things being 
equal, affected more by an additional activity than coordination modes working with more local 
knowledge and decisions.  
11 An important implication of this is that (vertical) integration, given the right circumstances, may be 
desirable not only in the view of the firms, but also at a more aggregate societal level (with the 
following consequences for anti-trust policy) (Williamson 1987, p. 807-808). 
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Richardson (1972) expands on this idea of different costs for the use of 
markets by distinguishing between different types of products. Some 
products have a wide, general purpose and as a result, it is possible to 
apply the law of large numbers (the market) as a principle of 
coordination. Other products have a more particular purpose, thus 
making quantitative and qualitative coordination necessary since 
demand is far from predictable.  
The relation between size of the market and the need for coordination 
can be related to the condition that individual stochastic factors tend to 
average out in large samples whereby a steady quantity of goods are 
produced and consumed (Casson 1997). Furthermore, as markets 
become “thicker” (bigger), the cost of buffering product-flow uncertainty 
by for instance stockpiling is reduced (Langlois 2001).  
This distinction represents one part of Richardson’s argument about why 
there are more nuances to the story on the organisation of coordination 
than simply direction within firms or coordination by prices between 
firms. The distinction between identical or different capabilities 
constitutes the other half of the argument. In short, the argument goes, 
that in case different capabilities are involved in production of specific 
products, interfirm coordination of a more far reaching - with respect to 
duration and information involved - character than market transactions 
arises.  
Thus, Richardson acknowledges markets and firms as two important 
means for coordination. And as Coase, he defines the market – as 
opposed to the firm – by including “no obligation with respect to the 
future conduct” (ibid. p. 886) of a buyer and seller.12 However, future 
obligations do not necessarily equal a firm, since future obligations can 
also be established between firms. Richardson terms this kind of 
interfirm coordination cooperation. Cooperation differs from markets 
                                           
12 Note that the definition of markets offered both by Coase (1937) and Richardson (1972) appears to 
be rather limited as it only encompasses “here-and-now” relations. A wider definition of market 
contracts could, asides of pure spot market contracts, also include order contracts, piece rate contracts 
or employment contracts; contracts that aside of the spot market contract, contain some instructions, 
restrictions or are accompanied by orders. In this wider view, the difference between markets, 
interfirm cooperation (in the sense of Richardson) and the firm (in the Coasian sense of employment 
contracts based on residual user rights)  is thus a matter of degree (K. Foss 2001c). 
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because it entails obligations for future conduct, but at same time differs 
from firms because these obligations are restricted in scope and often 
also in formality (ibid. p. 886). One of the prominent features of 
cooperation is that it in contrast to markets allows for not only 
quantitative (how much to exchange) but also for qualitative 
coordination (what to exchange); Richardson considered the latter 
especially important in case of development of products and processes 
(ibid. 885). 
The scheme is that not all activities involved in a product are similar 
with respect to the capabilities involved. In line with the explicit 
penrosian position taken by Richardson, capabilities are essential to 
patterns of integration since “…organisations will tend to specialise in 
activities for which their capabilities offer some comparative advantage; 
these activities will, in other words, generally be similar…” (ibid. p. 888). 
Similar activities are activities requiring the same capability.13 14 Despite 
the fact that activities based on different capabilities are not easily placed 
within a firm, they nevertheless need to be coordinated, since they add 
up to a product. These kinds of activities are termed complementary 
activities by Richardson.15 Thus, Richardson constructs a simple matrix, 
                                           
13 This does not imply that organisations always will be arranged according to capabilities. Risk 
spreading can be another consideration leading to conglomerates (Richardson 1972, p. 889).  
14 The tendency to integrate within similar capabilities does not imply, that the organisations will 
work solely within one market, since the same capability can be useful in different production 
activities. As observed by Penrose, the traditional product based approach to the firm seems 
inadequate in explaining the existence of the multiproduct firm. Instead she suggests that the 
“…flexibility and versatility of its [the firm] resources are the important factors governing the 
possibilities of its expansion” (Penrose 1959, p. 539). In the same way – and with direct reference to 
Penrose – Teece (1996) argues that a firm capability lies in a generalizable capability that might well 
find a variety of final product applications.  
15 The distinction is identical to what Richardson (1960) terms complementary investments, that is 
investments by which the profitability of an investment (or in 1972-terms: an activity) is increased by 
carrying out another one; which is the case, for instance, “where the output of one firm provides a raw 
material or intermediate product for the manufacture of another”. This kind of interdependence is 
different from the “form of interdependence [that] derives from the fact that any form of production 
generates income, and therefore demand for other goods” (Richardson 1960, p. 31). Accordingly, table 
1 informs us about coordination of activities that are related in the sense that they, at least potentially, 
are part of the same value chain. Table 1 does not inform us of coordination between value chains that 
are only related by income.  
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which indicates factors determining the appropriate mode of 
coordination. 
 
Table 1: Coordination by markets, firms and (interfirm) cooperation – 
the “capability view” 
 Similar activities  
(= same capability) 
Complementary activities 
 (= different capabilities) 
General purpose 
products 
-16 Coordination through markets 
Particular purpose 
products  
Coordination 
through direction 
(the firm) 
Coordination through (interfirm) 
cooperation 
 
By introducing the notion of capabilities, Richardson constitutes a 
framework that can explain the existence of arrangements beyond 
markets and hierarchies. Undoubtedly, the notion of capabilities (and 
interfirm relations) has gained momentum since then (Langlois & N. 
Foss 1997), even though (or perhaps because) the concept of capabilities 
is not well understood in theoretic terms, nor is easily made operational 
(N. Foss 2000 c).   
In light of this, and without passing any final judgement on the 
soundness of a capability based approach, let me propose an account for 
the existence of “cooperation” that in a way is very close to that of 
Richardson but at the same time is more consistent with the approach 
taken here as the concept of capabilities are replaced with the concept of 
repetition. 17  
                                           
16 Richardson does not address what happens when similar activities produce general purpose 
products. In principle both market and direction could be imagined as modes of coordination whereas 
coordination by cooperation is hard to imagine because there is no need for quantitative and 
qualitative coordination when a general purpose product is produced. 
17 Even though I do not pursue a capability approach as such, I share the view that issues of 
information and coordination, and not only of incentive problems, are important to understand, 
among others, the boundaries of the firm. And indeed, in the following chapter (chapter 3) I discuss 
the contributions of Marschak and Radner (1972), Arrow (1974) Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), 
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The left hand side of the matrix is identical to Richardson’s: when 
products are general, through market transactions it is possible to 
coordinate activities in a way that is both flexible and that allows each 
activity to be performed with minimal disturbances. However, if 
products have a more particular purpose, stochastic factors do not 
average out and quantitative and qualitative coordination is necessary. 
Repeated interaction within a firm is a way to obtain such coordination, 
but - as pointed out in the upper part of the matrix - the benefits of 
repeating sequences of activities have to be traded off with a loss in 
flexibility. Hence, when the (intermediate) products are of high 
specificity and when conditions are rapidly shifting (for instance due to 
change in quality or quantity requested by customers), it is not possible 
to coordinate activities on a market or within a firm. But if the activities 
are part of the same product, they nevertheless have to be coordinated, 
potentially by interfirm cooperation.  
Thus, an alternative version of the drivers between Richardson’s three 
different ways of organising coordination can be suggested (table 2).  
Table 2: Coordination by markets, firms and (interfirm) cooperation – 
the “repetition view” 
 Activities 
performed  
under nearly 
stable conditions 
Activities performed  
under rapidly shifting 
conditions 
General purpose 
products 
- Coordination through markets 
Particular purpose 
products  
Coordination 
through direction 
(the firm) 
Coordination through (interfirm) 
cooperation 
 
Notice that this matrix is identical to the matrix proposed by Thompson 
in 1967 (with reference to Dill 1958). However, where Thompson (ibid, 
pp. 72-73) uses this matrix to explain intra-organisational differences, 
                                                                                                                                   
authors which according to Langlois and N. Foss (1997, p. 27) “ …will become increasingly important 
as first steps towards the formalization of capabilities ideas.”.  
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here it is used for explaining external boundaries to organisations (e.g. 
firms). 
In sum, when conditions are unstable and products are particular, 
neither markets nor fixed sequences of activities appear to be attractive 
solutions. In this situation “cooperation” can be an alternative.  
 
2.7. Some elements in a more dynamic approach to firm and 
interfirm coordination: The creation of product standards  
In the previous section it was argued, that coordination can be organised 
in three different ways: in firms, in markets or by long-term cooperation 
between firms. Further, it was proposed, that general purpose products 
hold many advantages to specialised ones, as a wide applicability of 
products makes is possible to lower quantitative and qualitative 
variations in inputs at low costs (thereby enabling the division of 
labour).  
So far, the specificity of products has been treated as an independent 
value. However, if the applicability of products is so crucial to 
coordination as outlined, it would be expected that firms or others 
engage in a process of turning particular products into more general 
ones. Thus, this section is devoted to the analysis of how and why 
market standards emerge. As it will be argued, the degree to which such 
standards emerge is, at least in the outset, likely to be favoured by some 
level of repetition between specific actors. Thus (what at first may appear 
paradoxical), standards which enable a disintegration of repeated 
activities over time through the ease of markets, are, at least in initial 
periods, also promoted by repeated activities.  
The purpose of addressing the dynamics of specificity in products is to 
give a more thorough understanding of when we are likely to observe 
coordination by firms, markets, or by interfirm cooperation. As it will be 
argued, interfirm cooperation is expected to be particularly profound 
when repetition in production is low.18 
                                           
18 A similar argument for how a low level of repetition enhances the level of interfirm cooperation can 
be provided with respect to Richardson’s original capability/product matrix. As for the specificity of 
products, Richardson is not very explicit about what causes capabilities involved in producing a 
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2.7.1. The emergence of product standards as an information 
economising device 
Product standards19, or standards as I shall simply term them, are often 
an attractive way to enable coordination, since they allow each 
production activity to be performed in an efficient manner and at the 
same time involve few direct coordination costs (Thompson 1967, Casson 
1997). As a written or unwritten classification of products agreed on by 
two or more parties – on matters such as size, content, the way the 
product has been produced, performance and perhaps also terms of 
delivery – standards are a way to ease, or lower, knowledge transfer 
between activities within the firm (firm standards) or between firms 
(market standards). They also enable the very act of tangible or 
intangible transformation, since the input is well known and can be 
processed without prior investigation and without further specification 
of the output. Standards can also take the shape of dies that further 
reduce production costs by fixing which tools and working procedures 
to use (Langlois 1999, p. 248).20 21   
                                                                                                                                   
product to be different or not. Yet, as Smith clearly stated, we would expect different capabilities used 
for even the “simplest” products since the creation of different capabilities according to Smith is one 
of the very reasons why it is advantageous to specialise. In other words, Smith argues in favour of 
more differentiation in capabilities (as an outcome from specialisation). However, as argued 
previously in this chapter, the design of activities is to some degree subject to the control of managers. 
Thus, managers can choose to design activities in a way so that they are based on identical, closely 
identical or at least not hard to combine capabilities and hence capabilities that can be maintained 
inside the firm. But, to recapitulate, the benefits of grouping strings of activities together within a firm 
have to be counterbalanced with the need for flexibility. Hence, if activities are performed in unstable 
conditions, the possibility of engaging in repeated interactions, and hence defining these activities by 
particular capabilities, is limited.  
19 “Product standards” are the quality standards that describe minimum attributes or characteristics of 
a product. Hence, in product standards I do not include standards pertaining to the interface of 
multiple products (compatibility standards) (Grindley 1995). Furthermore, I do not consider 
standardisation of work practices or of capabilities as a part of product standards (Mintzberg 1979). 
20 The concept of standards relates closely to the concept of economics of scale. As witnessed by 
Langlois, three explanations to economics of scale are dominant. The first (1) is the Smithian division 
of labour, where economics of scale mainly is seen as the result of learning curve effects obtained by 
increased “dexterity” as a result of increased repetition. The two neoclassical arguments are: (2) the 
substitution of larger and more specialised machines and (3) fixed factors or overhead (Langlois 1999, 
p. 241 and pp. 244-245). Explanation number two, Langlois argues, can be boiled down to explanation 
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Standards made common to a market do not only reduce the amount of 
qualitative information involved in coordination. As standards 
smoothen the process of searching for products and of specifying terms 
for exchange (i.e. lower transaction costs), the market becomes “thicker” 
and able to buffer product-flow uncertainty (Langlois 2001, pp. 31-32). In 
very large markets the effects of individual stochastic factors averages 
out, whereby a steady quantity of goods are produced and consumed 
(Casson 1997, p. 12). In smaller, but not small, markets the averaging out 
of stochastic factors can possibly be supported by stockpiling or similar 
ways of buffering variations in in- and outputs. Of course such buffering 
mechanisms induce storage costs, but these are also reduced by an 
increasing size of the market.  
In general, standards reduce the quantitative and qualitative information 
involved in coordination. And hence, by a process of standardisation, 
products can change from being “particular purpose products” to being 
“general purpose products”. Following the idea of Richardson, 
standards thereby reduce the extent of interfirm coordination. Or, as 
phrased by Langlois and Foss (1997), standards change a system from 
being systemic (requiring simultaneous change in many parts of a 
system) to become more autonomous or modular (change can take place in 
one subsystem without greatly affecting other subsystems). 
More precisely, the firm with the highest benefit is expected to engage in 
such market promoting activities (Loasby 1994). However, the creation 
of standards is dependent on whether the standard is firm, interfirm or 
sector specific (i.e. public standards). It is unlikely that firms will engage 
                                                                                                                                   
three, and this explanation can again be explained by the process of growth of knowledge. This is due 
to the fact that standards are a fixed cost as well as  “…reusable pieces of knowledge that emerge from 
the process of learning about production…” (ibid, p. 247).  
21 The concept of “standards” is closely related to the concepts of “modules” which can be perceived 
of as a “..abstract fundamental unit of measurement which, by means of multiplication, subtraction or 
division, numerically determines the geometrical system of a given modular order” and by this enable 
coordination (Wachmann 1961, p. 54). Modules (and standards) can take many different forms as 
witnessed in the modular categories identified by Wachmann (ibid p.p.  55-75): material module, 
performance module, geometry module, handling module, structural module, element module, joint 
module, component module, tolerance module, installation module, fixture module, and planning 
module.  
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in public standards on their own due to problems of free-riding. 
Consequently, one would expect these to be introduced by third parties, 
such as trade organisations or governmental institutions. However, firms 
may create public standards in a process where specific standards at first 
are located within or between a limited numbers of firms. Over time, 
these standards may outdo other standards (and perhaps firms) and 
become dominating in the entire system. 
Thus, standards ensure low variable costs to coordination of succeeding 
units of production within or, in case they are market-wide, between 
firms (Langlois 1999). But does this render the concept of interfirm 
coordination by cooperation irrelevant? Hardly, because there are 
conditions that have to be met before standardisation in the form 
discussed above is profitable or perhaps even possible. Standards can be 
“reusable pieces of knowledge that emerge from the process of learning 
about production” (Langlois 1999, p. 247). If so, some degree of 
continuity is required in order to allow learning to take place.22 An 
alternative to this reuse of knowledge is creation of standards ex ante a 
transaction. But again, standards involve set-up costs. For instance, 
standards have to be invented, disseminated and none the least, 
understood or by other means made possible to use by the various 
parties operating in the market. Therefore, ex ante definition of standards 
also requires some degree of repetitiveness in order to be profitable 
(ibid.). 
 
2.8. Repetition, craft production, trade organisation, and path 
dependency 
So even though the specificity of products is not a static variable and as 
such can be affected for instance by means of standardisation, interfirm 
coordination, in the sense of “corporation”, is expected to exist. As 
argued, it is likely to be promoted by a low level of repetition in 
                                           
22 In this way standards can be a particular way of institutionalising knowledge transfer made 
profitable by ongoing interactions: “When change is continuous then institutions will emerge to 
channel information routinely in an appropriate way. The process of change becomes embedded in 
institutionalized procedures” (Casson 1997, p. 10). 
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sequences of activities (that in turn can be ascribed to external changes of 
some sort).  
It would seem that the job of coordinating activities across firms in such 
a fluctuating environment would be enormous as there (a) are no or little 
standards to reduce information; (b) multiple parties without prior 
knowledge of each other are involved; (c) the scope for specialising in 
particular sequences of activities is limited, and consequently; (d) 
activities are not easily defined in a way that enables coordination.  
However, there are means by which coordination can be less 
troublesome even in this set up. Of these, I will particularly focus on (I) 
sector-wide standard interfaces between groups of firms and 
individuals, each group “equipped” with homogenous capabilities (in 
the following simply termed “trade organisation”); and (II) the use of 
highly skilled labour (“craft production”).  
Craft production is a mean to reduce the interdependence of activities. In 
case of a high level of standards, the input (and output) of an activity is 
without significant deviations from one time to another. And since the 
activity can be performed in exactly the same way every time, the level  - 
or more precisely the width - of capabilities is minimised and eventually 
transferred to machines (Smith 1970, Langlois 1999 and 2001). On the 
other hand, if the input as well as the required output varies from one 
operation to another, a much wider spectrum of capabilities is needed. In 
principle, managers could possess these capabilities, but the costs of 
instructing workers for each and every activity favour that a substantial 
part of capabilities are in the hands of the workers. Hence, variations in 
input and output are not buffered by the managers’ control of work 
flows, as in standardised – and often highly capital intensive – 
interactions, but are allocated to the individual stages of production 
(Langlois 2001, p. 19).  
Craft production replaces standardization of work-processes and output 
with standardisation of skills (Mintzberg 1979). Thus, the idea of “craft” 
(Stinchcombe 1959) or “artisinal” production is that the highly skilled 
worker “buffers the variation by acting as a high-quality information-
processing unit” (Langlois 2001). By reducing the need for information of 
the actions of other parties (that is reducing the amount of coordination), 
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it compensates for the high “unit cost” of information due to among 
others lack of standards.  
The rationale of trade organisation is to replace lack of repetition at one 
level with repetition at another and more aggregate level. As seen, the 
interaction between specific people and firms is not expected to be high 
when fluctuations in, for instance, demand favour flexibility more than 
specialisation in specific relations (within a firm or between particular 
firms). Since new working constellations are constantly formed, firms 
and individuals have limited possibilities of, or interest in, knowing each 
other. This can create a significant problem of lack of expectations. As the 
idiosyncrasies of each counterpart is not known, the interaction can vary 
in a close to infinite number of ways and make it impossible to provide 
structures in which only the deviations from a usual procedure (and not 
all elements of the procedure) is reported (Casson and Wadeson 1999). 
Thus, lack of expectations seriously increases the cost of handling 
information. Accordingly, it may be advantageous to establish common 
expectations not at the firm or (the specific) inter-firm level, but for a 
wider group of firms and individuals.  
The trade organisation is an example of how common expectations can 
be created at a sectoral level (through what might be called isomorphism). 
Here, all the parties involved in production are grouped into a limited 
and clearly recognisable number of groups. Each group, i.e. each trade, 
have particular but homogenous capabilities. An important element of 
creating this homogeneity can be common skills obtained by a shared and 
rather thorough education. As firms tend to specialise in activities for 
which their capabilities are similar (Penrose 1959, Richardson 1972), 
supposedly one group of firms employs workers with one set of 
capabilities, another group of firms employs workers with another set of 
capabilities etc. The absence of firm specialisation within the trade 
enables the mobility of employees within this group, resulting in high 
levels of common experience. As the individuals within a group are 
homogenous with respect to capabilities, expectations not only within, 
but also between the groups can arise even without prior knowledge of 
the specific counterparting firms or individuals.  
So, even though specialisation and the division of labour is curtailed, it 
can be in the interest of firms and individuals to give up (or not to 
develop) their idiosyncrasies in order to establish not great, but shared 
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expectations. Thus, in situations where expectations are not easily 
created and used on the level of the firm, there can be benefits from 
isomorphism, i.e. using a single way of organising a larger group, for 
instance a sector. The more a single design is used the better, as 
competing ways of organising reduce shared expectations.  
To the degree that it is beneficial to use a single way of organising, i.e. 
the degree to which returns are increasing and not constant or 
diminishing, this potentially creates path dependency.   
Path dependency inform us that even in the long run, inferior solutions 
are not necessarily outperformed by less inferior solutions. First of all, 
insignificant or random events in early periods can give a certain way of 
organising a lead early on, and as it can beneficial to stick to a single 
design, this can eventually drive out the others. Small events do not 
average out and the development can be very difficult to predict in the 
outset. But at the same time, as a single design becomes dominating, the 
system becomes less and less flexible. So gradually the system becomes 
less and less unpredictable with the following benefits of shared 
expectations. However, the lock-in that the system eventually reaches at 
is not necessarily the one with the best long-run potential. This relates to 
the fact that decisions and conditions, which seemed reasonable or 
unimportant in early periods, later can have consequences of which there 
was no knowledge ex ante. Or because early developers did not take the 
long-term consequences, which they might envisioned, but for which 
they did not expect to be compensated, into account (Arthur 1989).23 The 
invention of the QWERTY-keyboard is a vivid example of this (David 
1985).   
To illustrate, consider the following possibility (that can be perceived as 
some elements in a very rough working hypothesis for the historical 
development of construction): In the outset, the choice between, on the 
one hand, a system based on firm specialisation and, on the other hand, a 
trade system is a close race between the benefits of specialisation versus 
the benefits of shared expectations. The conditions initially favoured (a 
particular kind of) trade organisation, but later changed in favour of 
specialisation (or another type of trade organisation). For instance, a 
                                           
23 Arthur considers competing technologies, whereas I consider competing organisational designs.  
 Chapter 2: The division of labour and organisation of coordination 66  
 
higher level of income in society and better physical infrastructure later 
increased the extent of the market, which encouraged specialisation 
(Smith 1970). However, as the trade system became dominant, it 
reinforced itself. For instance, as firms were not specialised, the mobility 
of workers increased, which in turn lowered the degree of firm specific 
investments in training of the employees.  It also reduced the possibility 
that firms could define activities in such a way that they could be kept 
in-house. This in turn lowered the benefits from firm specialisation and 
hence made a shift from trade to firm specialisation less likely. 24  
Of course this illustration is highly speculative. However, the potential 
existence of path dependence is important to have mind when 
discussing the organisation of construction in general and in particular 
when considering room for improvement in this sector.  
 
2.9. Different types of interfirm coordination 
Until now, the theoretical inquiries have addressed some major 
principles in the division of labour and specialisation, and pointed to the 
existence and reasons for interfirm coordination. This has developed a 
theoretical frame for addressing research question A and partially B. 
Interfirm coordination has been discussed in the vein of Richardson as a 
question of markets, firms or interfirm cooperation. However, this does 
not pre-empt the field of possible and existing (as the discussion of the 
construction sector will show) ways by which interfirm coordination can 
take place, and as part of this, the question of third party coordination 
raised in research question B has not yet been fully addressed. 25   
                                           
24 Conversely, at the same time as standards on products depend on repetition, they increase 
repetition since the impact from variations in possible inputs and outputs are reduced (Langlois 1999, 
p. 25). Thus, it is likely that a positive circle of standardisation can be established: with some level of 
repetition in the outset, standards are established that again increase repetition that in turn enables 
standardisation etc. Therefore, if standards for products had become the dominant design it might 
had reinforced itself in the same way as the trade organisation.  
25 Most likely it does not give full justice to the different ways market and intrafirm coordination can 
be organised either. However, since my main concern is to understand especially inter-firm 
coordination, I do not pursue these aspects in the following.  
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In order to broaden our view on interfirm coordination, let us recall the 
basic notion of the firm discussed throughout this chapter: a firm – 
irrespectively of whether it is considered a repeated set of resources and 
activities or by ownership and residual contracts - consists of (a) 
production activities and (b) actions of coordinating these activities. If 
we, for the purpose at hand, accept this view of the firm this leaves four 
possible options: 
I. unilateral coordination, 
II. unilateral coordination with separate production, 
III. bilateral coordination, and  
IV. trilateral coordination. 
These different forms are illustrated in figure 1.  
Figure 1: Four types of firm and interfirm coordination 
Production level
Coordination level
Coordination level
Coordination level
Coordination level
Production level
Production level
Production level
Unilateral coordination
(one firm)
Unilateral coordination
with separate production
(two firms)
Bilateral coordination
(two firms)
Trilateral coordination
(three firms)
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So far the discussion so far has been preoccupied with coordination of 
types I and III. Coase (1937) discussed unilateral coordination (firms) 
versus bilateral coordination (markets). Richardson (1972) pointed out, 
that bilateral coordination can be of a more binding character than the 
one known from markets. K. Foss (2001b), Casson (1997), and Casson 
and Wadeson (1999) focused on unilateral coordination by clarifying 
why, and under what conditions, this way of organising activities is 
superior to bilateral coordination.  
But what about the other two: when and why would we expect to see 
unilateral coordination with separate production or trilateral coordination? 
(From the construction sector we know that they exist. For instance,  the 
general contractor who carries out one trade on the building site but 
coordinates all trades on behalf of the client is an example of the former, 
the pure design and build contractor is example of the latter).26  
Let me conclude this chapter by reflecting on this question by pointing to 
some potential advantages and disadvantages of coordination by a third 
party firm. (I also return to this question in the beginning of chapter 8, 
where some of the more overall theoretical implications of the empirical 
findings are discussed).  
To recapitulate, low repetition makes it more difficult to manage 
coordination as strings of activities within a firm. Bilateral coordination 
in the sense of Richardson (that is, long- or medium-lasting relations 
directly between two firms, including quantitative and qualitative 
coordination) is one way to organise in this setting. However, even 
though the duration of these interfirm relations are shorter than when 
organised within the firm, they nevertheless rely on some degree of 
repetition. And presumably, in case the conditions under which 
activities are performed are extremely unstable, even bilateral 
coordination by cooperation is too rigid.  
                                           
26 In Denmark three mains forms of procurement are common: (a) a separate trades contract where the 
client make direct contracts with both consultants and contractors; (b) main contracts, where one 
contractor (the main contractor) coordinates the behaviour of the other (sub)contractors on behalf of 
the client; and (c) design and build contracts where one contractor coordinate subcontractors and 
consultants on behalf of the client. See Bang 2002, chapter two, for at more thorough introduction to 
different contractual relations in construction.  
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Hence, situations of great instability favour that firms and individuals 
interact in one-off relations (i.e. coordination is not organised within or 
directly between two firms). If products do not have a general purpose, 
coordination through markets does not appear to be an attractive 
alternative. In this setting, coordination by a third party can hold 
comparative advantages. 
As there is very limited room for repetition of specific relations, it makes 
little sense to specialise here. In particular not if a trade organisation is 
used (as discussed in the previous section). Because the interfaces are 
(almost) identical from one project to another irrespectively of the 
specific firms or individuals involved, a person or a firm can specialise in 
coordination without knowledge of, and thus without repeated 
interaction with, specific counterparts.  
This line of reasoning suggests that there are no compelling reasons why 
specialists in internal coordination should be a part of the firms that 
carry out production. On the contrary, placing specialists in internal 
coordination in separate firms can be beneficial for a number of reasons.  
Going back to the insight of Penrose (1959) and Richardson (1972), it is 
difficult to bridge different capabilities within one firm. Other things 
being equal, this favours that specialists in activities and specialists in 
coordination are placed in different firms. However, it is also possible to 
account for the existence of firms specialised solely in coordination, 
without including the (somewhat dubious) notion of capabilities.  
An important part of the job of specialists in internal coordination is to 
process information about external changes and subsequently translate 
them into adequate modifications of the value chain. Placing this 
function within a single firm rather than in all the firms involved in 
production, reduces costs related to duplication of information. Hence, 
coordination by a third party is a way to reduce information and 
decision costs related to interfirm coordination between multiple firms 
(Grandori 2000). That a substantial number of firms are expected to be 
present in situations, where little external stability does not favour 
integration of subsequent activities, accentuates this argument.   
In addition, if incentive based reasons (for once) are included, direct 
negotiations directly between two parties can be difficult to settle in case 
of strongly divergent objectives. Here, arbitration by a third party can be 
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a favourable solution (ibid.). Furthermore, assigning the responsibility 
for the overall design to one party can be a safeguard against solutions 
that favour some part of the value chain at the expense of other parts. 
Thus, to specialise in coordination holds some advantages. However, 
compared with bilateral coordination, third party coordination has 
drawbacks as well. Hands-on experience from production does not 
enable innovation of new working processes and machineries, as realised 
by Smith (1970). Hands-on experience also provides important 
information about coordinating aspects: what to coordinate, when to 
coordinate, between whom etc. Due to these partly unanticipated 
spillovers, it will often be cheaper for a producing party to obtain this 
information, than for a third party to focus solely on coordination. 
Secondly, the separation of production and coordination can bring about 
conflicting incentives as well. It is in the interest of each of the producing 
firm to pass on exactly the information to the coordinator that ensures an 
efficient - from each firm’s point of view – coordination. The asymmetric 
information created by the lack of hands-on experience stresses this 
possibility. And conversely, since the coordinating firm is not taking part 
in the production process, it may be in their interest to “under-invest” in 
coordination.  
The invention of new production techniques is likely to face problems in 
third party coordination. Compared with unilateral coordination, there 
are difficulties in bringing about simultaneous change in a number of 
firms not subject to centralised control and ownership (K. Foss 2001b, 
Langlois 2001).   Compared to bilateral coordination, it is more costly to 
transfer knowledge on these new techniques to a coordinating party 
without “hands-on” experience. Furthermore, it is not necessarily in the 
interest of the coordinating party to take new techniques, which enable 
production, but do not take the job of coordinating into account.27 In this 
perspective, unilateral coordination with separate production can be seen as a 
                                           
27 The premise for this discussion is that the price/quality ratio is difficult to estimate for the final 
costumer. If not, he or she will be able to buy another product or specify the price for a given product. 
In this case, production systems with less sub-optimisation will eventually rule out more sub-
optimised systems. Hence, the experience of the final customer, as well as the degree to which the 
final product is standardised, seems important to consider in order to access the (mal)functions of a 
coordination set-up.  
 Chapter 2: The division of labour and organisation of coordination 71  
 
way of balancing the benefits of specialising in coordination with the 
benefits of “hands-on experience.  
In conclusion, it appears that firms can act as coordinators in three 
distinct ways: (a) as coordinators of market changes as well as value chain 
changes (e.g. the role of the firm in unilateral coordination); (b) as 
coordinators of changes in markets, but not within the value chain (e.g. 
the producing firm in trilateral coordination); and (c) as coordinators of 
changes in the value chain, but not in markets (e.g. the coordinating firm 
in trilateral coordination). As argued in this and previous sections, firms 
of type a are expected to be dominant when low levels of external 
changes allow activities to interact repetitively. Firms of type b and c are 
expected to become more dominant as activities approach a one-off 
relation.    
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Chapter 3 – The selection of coordination modes 
The previous chapter provided a framework for understanding why a 
division of labour arises, the need for coordination created by this, and 
some of the ways in which coordination can be organised. However, we 
have not yet addressed the different information structures (coordination 
modes) used in order to overcome the problems of dispersed 
information.1 Hence, there is some way to go before we can engage in an 
empirical analysis of the research question on how to coordinate activities 
involved in the process of house construction. 
It is this discussion of coordination modes that I will embark upon in this 
chapter. More precisely, the aim of this chapter is twofold. First of all, in 
order to distinguish between different modes of coordination, we need 
some sort of typology. A typology however, does not further an 
understanding of the efficient application of alternative coordination 
modes and thus does not explain why particular modes of coordination 
come into play in construction. Hence, a second objective of this chapter 
is to provide a framework that captures the comparative advantages of 
different coordination modes. In the information perspective applied 
here, this is to understand how the modes differ with respect to their 
ability to handle information. 
 
3.1. Views on a coordination mode typology  
This section addresses the issue of the different principles by which 
coordination can be done. The starting point is Thompson’s work 
Organizations in Action from 1967. Thompson is included because much 
of the subsequent work within the information-based perspective to 
coordination can be traced back to the way he conceptualise 
coordination modes, and the way he subsequently links coordination 
modes to different informational situations. Thompson is one of the 
originators to a wide range of contributions developed mainly in the 
1970s under the label “contingency theory”, which I will consider next. 
From this view, I extract the way contingencies are made operational by 
                                           
1 “As well as different incentives” one might argue. However, as the focus of this thesis is on 
information aspects of coordination, incentive aspects have been given less attention.  
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considering different informational characteristics of an activity. I then 
make a rather large historical, but not conceptual, jump to the recent 
work of Grandori (1997 and 2000). Grandori is included because she tries 
to encompass the work on, among others, contingency theory into a 
more overall categorisation of coordination modes in which information 
plays a critical role. Furthermore, Grandori is unique in the sense that 
she provides a rather systematic assessment of the advantages and 
disadvantages of handling information by these modes. Hence, she does 
not only make important contributions to an information-based typology 
on coordination modes, as discussed in this section. She also facilitates 
an understanding of the efficient application of alternative coordination 
modes, as discussed in section 3.2.  
3.1.1. Coordination modes and drivers according to Thompson 
An early contribution on different coordination modes with distinct 
information handling capacities was introduced by Thompson (1967). 
His central idea is to explain the workability of different coordination 
modes with the different ways activities can be interdependent on each 
other. Thompson does not claim this to be new; he makes explicit 
reference to Organizations by March and Simon (1958) in which the need 
for joint or not joint decision-making depends on different forms of 
interdependence. Accordingly, the coordination-typology used by 
Thompson is a (very mild) modification of Simon and March (1958, 
especially pp. 181-82).  
It is with respect to the concept of interdependence that Thompson 
makes the perhaps most obvious extension of Simon and March.2 Rather 
than using the concept of “mutual dependence” and “interdependence 
of timing”, he introduces the following:  
• Pooled interdependence, referring to a situation where activities belong 
to the same system, while not being interdependent in any direct way. 
It can be described as a situation where “…each part renders a 
discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the 
whole.” (Thompson 1967, p. 54).  
                                           
2 However, this is probably not the most fundamental difference. The explicit use of learning in March 
and Simon and that organisations can define activities themselves are probably of a more far reaching 
nature as illustrated in the empirical analysis of this thesis.  
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• Sequential interdependence, describing a direct, non-symmetrical, 
relation between activities; for instance, activity 1 has to be carried out 
before activity 2 can proceed.  
• Reciprocal interdependence, characterising a direct and ongoing 
symmetrical relation between two activities: Activity 1 depends on 
activity 2 and vice versa. 
Thompson then goes on to relate these interdependencies with types of 
coordination. The implicit assumption seems to be, that the 
informational complexity corresponds to this directionality (i.e. the three 
types of interdependence) in a clear-cut (and in the order mentioned, 
increasing) way.3 Pooled interdependence should be coordinated 
through standardization, involving “the establishment of routines or rules 
which constrain action of each unit or position into paths consistent with 
those taken by the others in the interdependent relationship” (Thompson 
1967, p. 56). With sequential interdependence, coordination by plan – such 
as work schedules - is suitable. And finally, with reciprocal 
interdependence, coordination by mutual adjustment (or by feedback) is 
suitable, encompassing “new transmission of information during the 
process of action” (Thompson 1967, p. 56). 
Even though the three different mechanisms for coordination copes with 
the respective interdependencies, they do so at different costs: 
“…coordination by mutual adjustment is more costly, involving greater 
decision and communication burdens, than coordination by plan, which 
in turn is more costly than coordination by standardization.” (ibid. p. 57). 
And hence, “We would therefore expect first priority to be given to 
grouping in such a way as to minimize the most costly forms of 
coordination” (ibid. p. 57). This gives the guttman-type scale 
summarised in table 1, where “all organizations have pooled 
interdependence; more complicated organizations have sequential as 
well as pooled; and the most complex have reciprocal, sequential, and 
pooled” (ibid. p. 55).  
                                           
3 Grandori (2000, chapter 8, p. 30) strongly disagree with this implicit assumption: “What complicates 
and makes the effective coordination mechanisms qualitatively different is not the bidirectionality of 
the relationship per se, but the non-predictability of the relationship and the need to resolve new 
problems – that is, the information complexity of the relationship.” 
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Table 1: Coordination and interdependencies according to Thompson  
Type of interdependence Mode of coordination Information and decisions costs / 
difficulties of coordination 
Pooled Standardisation Low 
Sequential Plans 
(+ standardisation) 
Medium  
Reciprocal Mutual adjustment 
(+ plans) 
(+ standardisation) 
High 
 
3.1.2. The contingency view on coordination 
Organizations in Action inspired a number of empirical and theoretical 
studies conducted mainly in the 1970s. Contingency theory is the label 
often used to classify these related contributions (Lorsch and Lawrence 
1970, Galbraith 1973, Adler 1995). “Contingency” refers to the idea that 
the best way to organise is contingent upon a set of variables that differs 
from one situation to another (ibid., Mintzberg 1979). Hence, a key 
element of contingency theory is to locate different forms of 
contingencies and assess their impact on organisational forms in general 
and coordination modes in particular.  
As we know by now, the main contingency considered by Thompson is 
interdependence – when the type of interdependence is known, so is the 
appropriate way to coordinate it. Contingency theory expands on this 
idea by proposing different aspects affecting the degree of 
interdependence:  
• Task complexity4 (Van de Ven 1973), task diversity (Galbraith 1973) or 
task difficulty (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974) refers to the degree of 
difficulty in the search process, the amount of thinking time, and the 
knowledge required to perform the task. 
                                           
4 Van de Ven uses “tasks” for the work done by a “work unit” that is the smallest formal grouping of 
individuals within an organisation. Thus, the concept of tasks is used at a more aggregate level than 
the definition of tasks than I use (recall chapter 1). In order to avoid confusion with the definitions 
used in chapter 1, in the sections that follows, I will use the term “activity complexity” in stead of “task 
complexity”, “activity variability” in stead of  “task variability” etc.  
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• Task variability refers to the number of different cases encountered in 
work. Hence, task variability relates to the stability and uniformity of 
inputs and outputs (ibid.).  
• Task uncertainty is seen as the combination of task complexity and task 
variability by Van de Ven (et al 1976). However, Galbraith (1973) 
conceives it as a contingency in its own right characterised by the 
degree to which it is known in advance and can be preplanned, or 
conversely, if it is not well understood ex ante, the degree to which 
information must be processed during task execution. 5 
• Size of work unit simply refers to the total number of people of a work 
unit (Van de ven et al 1976). Restricting the question of number of 
people involved in coordination to the work unit makes sense for Ven 
de Ven (et al, 1976), who sole focus is on coordination within this unit. 
However, in more general terms, this contingency can be understood 
simply as the total number of people involved in coordinating a given 
set of activities.  
Even though activity complexity, activity variability, activity uncertainty 
and size of work unit are presented as (three or four) autonomous 
concepts, they are obviously related. For instance, without activity 
variability there would be no activity uncertainty (whereas no activity 
uncertainty does not imply no activity variability). As we know, the 
division of labour, by which each person deals with a delimited activity 
in which he becomes particular skilled, is a way to reduce activity 
complexity. However, the benefits of a division of labour depend on the 
level of repetition, that is a low activity variability. Hence, activity 
variability promotes activity complexity. If activities cannot be 
performed as pre-planned due to activity uncertainty, they become more 
difficult to execute (Galbraith 1973). Conversely, high levels of activity 
complexity can often be traced back to a number of contingencies 
interacting in a way that is not easy to analyse. Thus, what makes them 
complex to perform can also make them difficult to pre-plan. Similarly, 
many different actors (size of work unit) can enhance the cost of 
                                           
5 As I will return to in section 3.2.2, the disagreement can perhaps relate to two different dimensions 
of task variability. The first dimension relates to task variability at any given point of time (stressed by 
Van de Ven). The second dimension relates to task variability from one period to another, and as part 
of this, the possible of knowing this change ex ante (stressed by Galbraith). 
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searching, as well as processing information and thereby increase 
complexity. In short, these reflections suggest a (often positive) 
correlation between the concepts of activity complexity, activity 
variability, activity uncertainty and size of work units. 
These contingencies are by contingency theory hypothesised to favour 
particular organisational forms and coordination modes. With respect to 
the latter, contingency theory expands Thompson’s view on coordination 
modes. Firstly, new coordination modes – of which teaming is probably 
the best known - are proposed. Teaming refers to situations where work 
and activities do not only flow back and forth (as in Thompson’s 
reciprocal interdependence), but are done at the same time within a 
group (Van de Ven et al 1976). Secondly, a number of refinements are 
made (for instance if coordination is done in an impersonal, personal or 
group mode; if it is done in a planned or unplanned way; by vertical or 
horizontal relations within the firm (ibid.)6; by centralised or de-
centralised decision-making (Van de Ven 1973); or by rules and 
programs, hierarchy or goal setting (Galbraith 1973); or by highly or less 
educated personnel (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974).  
3.1.3. Interdependencies and coordination modes – two different 
interpretations of the direction of causality 
As the names suggests7, contingency theory considers the contingencies 
as independent variables, for instance determined by the environment 
(Lorsch and Lawrence, 1970). It is in general not perceived as a 
possibility, that these can be affected by deliberate actions of, for 
instance, managers. Rather, the contingencies tend to be perceived as 
innate characteristics of the activities and/or the sectors in which they 
are performed (see box 1). Not surprisingly, strategical advice focuses 
exclusively on how to identify and act according to, say, 
interdependencies (see for instance Mccann and Ferry 1975 and Malone 
                                           
6 A point of view that was later developed by Aoki (1986 and 1990), who discusses hierarchical control 
versus horizontal coordination. The former is supposed to be typical for American manufacturing 
firms, whereas horizontal is predominant in Japanese firms.   
7 Contingency means “event that may or may not occur; event that happens by chance” (Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary) 
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and Crowston 1994) and not on how these interdependencies are 
created.  
However, as witnessed by the very structure of this theoretical part, and 
as indirectly discussed in the previous chapter, this is a very one-sided 
version of the story on the interplay between coordination modes and 
interdependencies. Since the way a product is portioned into activities to 
some degree is a manageable process (von Hippel 1990) it makes sense to 
start from an analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
boundaries of organizational units before examining coordination modes  
(Grandori 2000).  
The latter view suggests a much more active role of management 
(centralised or not) than the one of simply adjusting to given 
contingencies. As work processes can be partitioned in different ways, 
management has the option to influence the division of labour and hence 
the need for coordination. Naturally, the size of this managerial scope is 
not infinite to the firm. It will depend on a wide range of conditions like, 
for instance, the kind of technology available, the specificity of costumers 
demand, and the actions of other firms. And if these conditions change 
over time, the exact room for manoeuvre is furthermore time-dependent, 
but none the less, some degrees of freedom are present.     
In line with this approach, I would like to propose that, within limits, 
one managerial option is to define activities in such a way, that they 
minimise on information costs. For instance, by designing activities in a 
way in which the output of an initial activity determines the completion 
of subsequent activities, the cost of instructing employees can be 
minimised. Or, as another example, activities can be defined in ways in 
which errors are more easily discovered in subsequent steps of 
production (by which efforts spent on assessing the quality of input is 
narrowed).  
The extension of the contingency view I offer here is in line with the 
more overall classification of coordination modes proposed by 
Staudenmayer (1998). In a survey of the literature on interdependency, 
she identifies four theoretical approaches (or “paradigms” as she phrases 
them). The first approach considers interdependencies as a matter of 
information processing which arises as a consequence of inherent aspects 
of the tasks and technology, and hence interdependence is depicted as an 
independent variable. According to Staudenmayer, this position is 
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represented by contingency theory as initiated by Thompson (1967). 
Another approach, in agreement with the proposal offered here, argues 
that interdependencies reflects the organizing choices made by management: 
“The very acts of defining tasks and allocating them across individuals 
and sub-units…create different interdependencies in an organization.” 
(ibid. p. 4). A third approach focuses on scarce and valued resources that 
create interdependencies as people compete for these resources. By 
stressing difference in interests, this approach is related to the incentive 
perspective to coordination that, as discussed in chapter 1, is not in focus 
in this thesis. The final approach to interdependencies relates to more 
cognitive aspects, emphasising the interdependence of knowledge and 
belief structures. According to Staudenmayer, an important element of 
this interdependence is how people come to recognise interdependencies. 
I discuss aspects of this approach below under the label of costs of 
identifying coordination modes.  
 
Box 1: The contingency view on determinants of interdependencies – 
The example of Thompson (1967)  
Thompson proposes that organisations can, and should, adjust their coordination modes 
according to the interdependencies. But what about the interdependencies; where do 
they come from according to Thompson? Well, they are determined by the kind of 
technology used for producing different products, he seems to answer.  
To see this, we have to consider Thompson’s conceptualisation of buffering, smoothing, 
adaptation, and rationing as ways to cope with shocks (Ibid., pp. 20-23). Buffering absorbs 
environmental fluctuations by surrounding the technical core with input and output 
components. A way of doing this is to stockpile supplies or output. Buffering brings 
considerable advantages to the technical core, but at the same time induce storage costs. 
A second option is smoothing fluctuations by affecting the environment. For instance, 
lowering prices in low-peak periods can reduce variability in the use of electricity. 
Similarly, fines can be introduced if services or products are not delivered on time. 
Adaptation is a third option. In case changes in environment can be foreseen, they can be 
incorporated in plans or schedules and the technical core is only mildly affected. 
Unanticipated fluctuations interfere more seriously with the operation of the technology 
and thereby reduce its performance. In case none of these shock-absorbers work, 
rationing is the only option left for securing an organisational part some degree of 
stability. But it is “an unhappy solution, for its use signifies that the technology is not 
operating at its maximum” (Thompson 1967, p. 23). Either the production facilities are 
idle in low-peak periods or/and there is waiting time in high-peak periods.  
(Continues) 
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Box 1 : The contingency view on determinants of interdependencies – 
The example of Thompson (1967). Continued. 
Even though Thompson is not very explicit on this matter, the four shock-reducing 
methods presented here obviously relate to the three different coordination mechanisms 
and the associated types of interdependencies previously described. Adaptation works 
through plans and schedules and is clearly associated with the coordination mechanism of 
planning. Coordination by standardisation requires rather stable and repetitive situations, 
which seems to be best honoured by buffering. Smoothing is an ongoing interaction with 
the environment (for instance by informing about price-levels in low- and high-peak 
periods) and in that sense it resembles coordination by mutual adjustment. However, 
Thompson has a rather extensive interaction in mind, when he discusses this coordination 
mode (for instance, he describes it as something that is done in crews or teams, ibid. p. 58) 
and hence the congruity between smoothing and mutual adjustment is only partial. 
Finally, rationing is the outcome if none of the three other coordination modes work.  
Finally, the shock absorbers relate to three different kinds of technologies. The principle of 
buffering “is especially important for mass-manufacturing organizations” (ibid. p. 20), 
where mass manufacturing, at least in the form of the mass production assembly line, is a 
long-linked technology (p. 16). Another type of technology is the mediating technology that has 
to meet the needs of multiple clients by working in standardised ways. Thompson 
mentions banks and post offices as examples of mediating technologies (ibid. p. 16) and 
also makes clear that banks and post offices often work by plans or schedules (ibid., p. 22), 
in other words are coordinated by planning. And finally, there is the intensive technology 
where the order by which production techniques are used is determined by the feedback 
from the object itself. However, he does not clarify which kind of coordination mode this 
kind of technology associates with. One possibility is mutual adjustment (which seems to 
fit well with the idea of that this kind of technology works by low degrees of repetition); 
another is coordination by rationing (which seems consistent with the fact that 
“therapeutic” technology, the kind of technical logic used in the construction industry 
according to Thompson, is coordinated by this mode (ibid. p. 23). 
This line of reasoning seems to propose the following. Firstly, since interdependencies are 
rooted in a few different types of technology, all firms using a particular technology must 
be expected to coordinate their activities in similar ways. For instance, all mass 
manufacturing firms coordinate by means of standardisation and nothing else (whereas 
all post offices and banks are expected to use an identical blend of planning and 
standardisation etc). Secondly, unless it is assumed that management can change from 
one basic type of technology to another, the role of management is to adapt to given 
interdependencies by choosing the corresponding coordination modes. Changing the 
interdependencies or making firm-specific combinations of coordination modes does not 
appear to be an option in the  “Thompsonian” framework. As I return to later in this 
chapter and in the discussion of theoretical perspectives (chapter 7), this is a very limited 
interpretation of the role the firm may play in the process of coordination. 
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3.1.4. Coordination modes and drivers according to Grandori 
Contingency theory stages the work of Grandori in two important ways, 
considered in the following. Firstly, by introducing a wide range of 
concepts related to coordination as well as coordination modes, that are 
all found to be important, but that do appear to be integrated into a 
coherent framework. Secondly, by stressing that choosing the right 
coordination mode, or other organisational forms, is not simply a one-
dimensional choice of, for instance, being more or less interdependent 
(as Thompson proposes). As many contingencies have to be considered 
simultaneously, finding the right coordination mode, or combination of 
coordination modes, is a subtle exercise, which includes the danger that 
not all contingencies can be handled. 8  
The four coordination modes developed partly by Thompson, partly by 
Van de Ven, was considered on a nearly 1:1 scale in a paper by Grandori 
and Soda (2001). However, Grandori’s main elaboration and synthesis of 
a wide range of literature on coordination unfolds in her principal work 
Organisations and economic behaviour (2000), as well as in an article from 
1997. In the subsequent discussion I will rely mainly on these latter 
sources, in which a more multi-facetted typology of coordination is 
developed. 
In short, Grandori’s ambition is to move towards an exhaustive typology 
based on explicit and non-contradicting assumptions. One of the 
assumptions she modifies is the Coasian idea that the principles used for 
coordination are not equal to the organisation of coordination. Grandori 
thereby makes clear, that the same kind of coordination mode can be 
found within as well as between firms.9  And since Grandori (unlike 
Thompson) does not only consider coordination to be an intra-firm 
phenomenon, her typology covers more ground than that of 
                                           
8 Contingency theory also contributes a large empirical programme developed in particular by Van de 
Ven and Ferry (1980) in which propositions of Thompson and successors are tested empirically. As an 
important part of this, concepts are made operational for empirical studies. However, since the aim of 
this chapter is to provide a theoretical overview and discussion, here I focus on the theoretical 
contributions.  
9 Imai and Itami (1996) point to a similar conclusion in their concept of “interpenetration”. 
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Thompson’s. Furthermore, she includes a lot of nuances added since the 
original statements of, say, Coase – often from areas outside the limited 
circles of economists - and thereby she moves far beyond a simple 
market-firm continuum.10 
More precisely, she outlines eight different archetypical mechanisms, 
grouped in four pairs, by which coordination can take place: 
• Price11 and vote coordination. Using common codified12 information 
(i.e., price), each agent makes up an independent decision based on 
his local knowledge of his own productive or consumption capacity. 
Besides price, no information is transferred between agents. Voting 
resembles price coordination in the sense that it is based on local 
knowledge and local decision-making. Here, each agent maximizes by 
choosing between a numbers of well-defined alternatives.13 
• Authority and agency coordination. In the case of authority, according 
to centralized managerial knowledge and transfer of information, a 
central agent makes decisions on, and control of, subordinates’ 
behaviour. This coordination mechanism is consequently based on the 
premise that the central agent has the capacity to handle the 
information required for directing (and monitoring) the behaviour of 
subordinates. If this condition does not obtain, agency can serve as an 
                                           
10 In this way Grandori see herself as an exponent of the view, that it is necessary to move beyond the 
dichotomised view on governance structures. Including the notion of a third type of governance, like 
“clans”, “trust”, and “networks” is clearly a step in the right direction, but it is not sufficient: “to reduce 
the number of alternatives to two or three is to under-evaluate our cognitive capacity to a considerable extent” 
(Grandori 1997, pp. 29-30).  
11 Since “The market as a governance system is constituted by a larger and more complicated set of coordination 
mechanisms than just price, exit and buffers” (Grandori 2000, chapter 3, p. 7), Grandori insists that we 
should term this coordination price-coordination and not market-coordination (Grandori 1997, p. 34). 
12 Grandori uses the term “codified” for capturing what type of information is needed before it can be 
transferred by price coordination. However, it seems to me that the two major preconditions for 
information in a price system are that information is (a) easily transferred and (b) easily understood in 
the same way by local decision makers. It is questionable whether the fulfilment of these requirements 
equals that information is codified.  
13 Without denying that voting can be of importance even in economic relations, in the following 
discussion I will mainly focus on price-coordination; an area in which organisational economics has 
most to offer.   
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alternative, using a mixture of incentives (as in the cases of price and 
vote coordination) and of monitoring mechanisms (as in the case of 
authority). In the case of agency coordination, parts of the decision 
rights (and often also of risks) are transferred to the subordinates. 
Both authority and agency require information transfer between the 
principal and the subordinates. The principal transmits information to 
subordinates in the guise of more specific (the case of authority) or 
less specific (the case of agency) instructions. Subsequently, 
monitoring provides the principal with information on the behaviour 
of subordinates (which is then used for providing incentives, 
designing new instructions, etc).  
• Coordination in teams and by negotiation. In team coordination, 
information is transferred without any hierarchy among a group of 
agents. Decisions are made jointly and unanimously, and 
consequently decision rights are equally shared. Closely related is 
negotiation, which is also based on reciprocal information sharing, but 
where conflicting issues are paid more attention. Negotiation 
processes lead to joint, but not necessarily unanimous, decisions. 14 
• Coordination through institutionalisation of norms and rules. Rather 
than pertaining to calculations of interests and processing of 
information, actions are based on knowledge that is common within a 
given context, i.e. the knowledge included in (social) norms 
(including routines) or (formal) rules (including procedures). This 
allows agents to coordinate their actions by first coordinating their 
beliefs (expectations, plans, strategies, etc.). Using such 
institutionalised “signposts”, decisions are made unilaterally. Hence, 
these coordination mechanisms do not primarily serve to coordinate 
the actions of agents with different information and interests. Rather, 
they align the very information and interests.  
As seen, these 2x4 coordination mechanisms represent different types of 
information transfer and use of knowledge. They span from a limited 
transfer of information in the cases of price and voting; hierarchical 
dissemination of information in the cases of authority and agency; local 
                                           
14 The difference between teaming and negotiation is that conflicts/different interests are supposed to 
be dominant in the latter. Since I have paid less attention to incentive problems, I will not consider 
coordination by negotiation in the sections that follows.   
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sharing of information within teams and negotiations; and in the case of 
norms and routines, only a limited information transfer due to the 
prevalence of shared knowledge.  
The different types of coordination and their properties with respect to 
information and knowledge are summarised in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Information and knowledge properties of coordination 
modes according to Grandori 2000 
Source: Grandori 2000, part II, p. 8. 
As the figure visualises, the different coordination modes can be 
conceived of as different information structures (or networks), that is a set 
of nodes combined in different ways. In the perspective taken in this 
thesis, a node would represent a person performing an activity and the 
links represent transfer of information. Grandori (2000) hints at this 
approach, as she refers to authority as a partially connected network and 
teaming as a totally connected network. Yet she does not make 
information structures the main lead in her comparative assessment of 
coordination modes. As I will return to in appendix B, an ”information 
structure” approach appears to be a promising way of grasping 
informational characteristics of coordination modes.  
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3.2. The choice of alternative coordination modes in a non-
repetitive setting 
3.2.1. Introduction: costs of identifying, creating and using coordination 
modes 
Common to the approaches and typologies considered in the above is 
that all coordination modes are expected to have advantages and 
disadvantages. Thus, in general it seems that the use of coordination is a 
comparative assessment excised with the specific nature of the 
coordination job in mind. In more economic terms “advantages and 
disadvantages” can be perceived of as different costs. I propose that these 
costs can relate to different phases of the process of coordination: 
I. The cost of identifying the appropriate coordination mode. To 
recall, the appropriate coordination mode is expected to depend on 
a number of contingencies. Among other things, the costs of 
identifying coordination modes relate to the information costs 
induced by determining the exact nature and level of the 
contingencies. 
II. The cost of creating coordination modes. Coordination modes often 
depend on some sort of “infrastructure” to work efficiently. For 
instance, price coordination works through codified information 
(Grandori 2000) and thus, without an initial coding of information, 
it would usually be a very difficult coordination mode to use. In 
addition, there may also be implementation costs for a single firm or 
individual even when this infrastructure is in place, because the 
exact nature of the “infrastructure” has to be learned (think for 
instance of the costs associated with going from the US to the 
metric system).  
III. The cost of using coordination modes. One element of user costs is 
the information costs involved directly in the process of 
coordination, for instance the cost of obtaining, transferring and 
calculating information. Another element concerns the outcome of 
this information treatment: how well are activities coordinated, 
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that is to say how much are the actions of each party in agreement 
with the activities of other parties.15  
Rather than addressing these costs of alternative coordination modes on 
a general level, I will try to direct the following discussion towards the 
specific setting addressed in this thesis: coordination of construction 
activities. Hence, let me briefly consider how construction activities are 
likely to look like when assessed according to the contingency view on 
interdependencies (see “The contingency view on coordination“ above).   
As mentioned (and as further elaborated on in chapter 5) this thesis is 
devoted to understanding coordination practices in situations of low 
repetitiveness, that is activities with a high variability. Hence, the impact of 
low repetitiveness on the cost of selecting, creating, and using different 
coordination modes is the first issue considered in the following sections.  
In construction, two informational features go together with – and, as 
argued in chapter 2, are probably caused by - low degrees of repetition. 
The first is exchange and processing of “heavy” information. Since in- and 
output, as well as working procedures to a smaller degree, are 
standardised in one-off relations, a substantial amount of (quantitative 
and qualitative) information collection and processing is needed to 
perform an activity (Galbraith 1973, p. 5). This feature equals high levels 
of activity difficulty because in- and output and in turn also working 
procedures do not follow any recurrent and well known practices or 
procedures, but have to be assessed for every single operation  (Van de 
Ven and Delbecq 1974, Van de Ven et al 1976).  
Secondly, the numbers of actors (identical to “size of work unit”, Van de 
Ven et al 1976) that have to be considered in the act of coordination are, 
other things being equal, high for non-repetitive interactions.  Due to 
activity complexity, variations and delays in input can easily accumulate 
along the value chain, thereby creating interdependence between remote 
parts of the value chain. And for novel or frequently changing activities, 
interdependencies are to a lesser degree known ex ante, and 
                                           
15 In addition to these variable costs, there are also potential costs of maintaining the infrastructure 
needed for the respective coordination modes. For matters of simplicity maintenance costs are ignored 
in the following discussion.   
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consequently, many potential interactions have to be considered (K. Foss 
2001b).  
Thus, the analytical scheme for this subsection is to discuss the costs of 
(I) identifying, (II) selecting and (III) using alternative modes of 
coordination for activities that are (a) highly variable, (b) complex, and 
where (c) numerous actors are included. This discussion will mainly 
consider different theoretical contributions relating to different parts of 
this 3x3 matrix. As the literature on information costs on coordination is 
limited, rather than considering only narrowly defined schools, I have 
found an eclectic approach useful. With respect to coordination modes, 
the terminology used by Grandori is the main thread in the following 
discussion.16  
The costs of in particular using, but to some degree also the costs of 
creating, coordination modes have been given most attention in existing 
literature on coordination. As these two costs are often treated as closely 
related (usually no distinction is made), I treat these contributions under 
the first heading (“The costs of creating and using coordination modes in 
a non-repetitive setting”) in the following. The discussion is summarised 
by pointing out how the different theoretical claims can be understood 
by perceiving coordination modes as different information structures. 
However, the costs of identifying the appropriate coordination mode or 
modes appear to be a somewhat neglected issue in existing literature. In 
a repetitive setting this may be acceptable, but as I show in the second 
section from now (“The cost of identifying cost-effective coordination 
modes”), taking these costs on board in a non-repetitive setting seriously 
changes the expected relation between contingencies and coordination 
practices. 
                                           
16 Grandori’s own way to go about the advantages and disadvantages of coordination modes is by 
locating their failure mechanisms. A failure mechanism is a condition that, if met, makes a coordination 
mode inapplicable (Grandori 1997, pp. 29-33). However, as an analytical tool, failure mechanisms only 
describe the extreme positions where a coordination mode cannot be used. In order to get a more full 
description of which coordination mode to use when, I prefer to think of costs in order also to include 
less dramatic drawbacks, as well as the advantages of the different modes of coordination.  
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3.2.2. The costs of creating and using coordination modes  
Coordination modes and low degree of repetition 
Although all coordination modes include some infrastructure to work, 
the cost of creation (as well as using) differs from one mode to another. 
This in turn results in different impacts from the degree of repetition. 
Presumably norms, rules, prices, and, to some extent, authority are most 
significantly made more costly to use in situations of discontinuity.  
Rules and norms guide behaviour in a non-calculative fashion and thereby 
reduce information costs on search and calculation (March and Simon 
1958, chapter 6, Galbraith 1973, p. 10). They can be the result of a 
calculated design and implementation or the result of a learning process 
transforming past experience into guidelines for behaviour. In case of the 
former some level of repetition is necessary to carry the initial costs of 
inventing and implementing standards. In case of the latter, without 
repetition, there is no experience to learn from. Further, the unreflected 
“advice” from norms and rules would most likely be ill suited for 
problems that are not identical. Consequently, it is hard to imagine 
norms and rules without decisions that are repeated approximately in 
the same way for long periods of time (Grandori 1997, pp. 37-38) and 
their effectiveness is conditioned to repetitive and stable activities 
(Grandori 2000, chapter 7, p. 7).  
As Thompson (1967) defines standards as “the establishment of routines 
or rules”, the cost of creating and using standards in a non-repetitive 
setting is closely related to the identical costs of norms and rules. 
Standards involve set-up costs and often work by being “reusable pieces 
of knowledge” (Langlois 1999). Consequently, they do not only enhance 
(March and Simon 1958, p. 181) but also depend on stable and repetitive 
activities. Thus, low repetitiveness limits the use of a range of different 
kinds of standards: standards on material, standards on language (ibid. 
p. 184), including coding of communication (Crémer 2000), or standards 
for tools and working procedures (Mintzberg 1979), including the 
provision of dies (Langlois 1999), standards on output or standards on 
skills (Mintzberg 1979). 
Even though these different types of standards are all associated with 
some level of recurrence, they are not identical in this matter. Mintzberg 
(1979) suggest that standardisation of work, outputs and skills is used for 
 
Chapter 3: The selection of coordination modes 90   
 
increasing levels of complexity, respectively. Although Mintzberg is not 
very explicit on the concept of complexity, it is at least partly related to 
the degree to which activities are routine (ibid.), i.e. repeated.17 In a 
similar way, Galbraith (1973) argues that as activity uncertainty increases 
beyond the capacity of hierarchy, centralised programming of work 
processes will be replaced with decentralised decision-making by a 
professionally trained workforce working with “craft principles” (as also 
discussed in chapter 2).       
Prices are based on a particular form of standardisation: the provision of 
a market-wide code. It is this coding that allows information to be 
transferred and understood in identical ways by a wide range of actors 
making up and, in a similarly codified way, reporting back their 
decision. As the cost of codification in part is an irreversible investment - 
not only for the “creator” of the code, but also for the one who would 
like to acquire an existing code – (Arrow 1974) the profitability of this 
type of coordination depends on some degree of repetitiveness (Crémer 
2000). Codification of information takes time. Thus, when coordination 
concerns new kinds of information, coordination by prices is usually not 
a swift mode. On the other hand, if information is codified, coordination 
by this principle can be quick indeed (as witnessed on, for instance, the 
stock exchange). 
As pointed out by Coase (1937), the meaning of coordination by 
authority (“direction”) is to allow for the use of more flexible contracts 
when forecasting is difficult. Hence, a core feature of authority and the 
firm is its ability to adjust to changing or truly new situations. The latter 
aspect is stressed by K. Foss (2001b), who explains the existence of the 
firm by its, compared with the market, low costs of experimenting with 
new coordination problems stemming from an increased division of 
labour. According to this view, it seems that, compared with price based 
coordination, authority is generally better at handling coordination of 
activities where forecasting is difficult, for instance, due to limited 
repetitiveness.   
                                           
17 According to Mintzberg (ibid.), complexity also refers to the size of the group. 
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The exertion of authority is often defined by, or at least associated with, 
the establishment of the firm (Coase 1937, N. Foss 2000a).18 As authority 
implies that a sub-ordinate places his working capacity at the disposal of 
a superior, an employment contract has to be specified. In this way, there 
are set-up costs to the firm and thus “continuity of operations is one of 
the hallmarks of the firm” (Casson 1997, p. 79). Without repetition of this 
kind, it may not be worthwhile for individuals to transfer the 
responsibility for decisions to a firm (ibid.).  
Consequently, in situations where decisions are expected to be repeated 
only for a limited period, a temporary delegation of decision rights to 
superiors can be in the interest of individuals. In case some decisions are 
repeated for long periods and others for shorter periods, a way to reduce 
on the overall number of contracts is to employ people working with the 
longer-term decisions within the firm. The rights relating to the shorter-
term decisions can then temporarily be transferred to another firm. In 
this way, quasi-integration, or subcontracting, can be alternatives to firm 
integration (Aoki 1986). 
The level of repetition will not only affect the extent, but also the 
character of authority. As Penrose (1959) makes clear (in her discussion 
on why and along which lines firms grow), when an operation is 
launched for the first time, management will be devoted to planning and 
guiding this operation. However, as time passes, additional experience is 
gained, thus releasing resources, which can be directed towards new 
activities (ibid. pp. 537-538). Hence, in the beginning of an operation, 
managers will presumably work with activities in a conscious and time 
consuming way that is gradually reduced as the operation continues.  
A third implication of repetition with regard to authority goes back to 
the fact that low repetition is likely to result in the establishment of 
“clusters of identical knowledge” (like trades) (see chapter 2). If 
employees within a firm have the same educational background, it 
would be expected that the person directing these people would be of 
                                           
18 As N. Foss (2000a) favours a property rights approach (in which authority indirectly is acquired 
through ownership), he disagrees with the point of view taken, for instance, by Grandori (2000), that 
there or no clear relation between boundaries of the firm and boundaries of coordination modes. 
Correspondingly, Grandori (1997, p. 35) disagrees with the fundamental assumption that there is a 
clear relation between authority and ownership.  
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the same profession, since it is “easier to communicate with other 
individuals with whom one has a common approach or a common 
language” (Arrow 1974, p. 42).19  
However, there might be situations in which activities are so different 
from one point of time to the next, that the costs of creating a firm are not 
feasible. In this situation, it may be favourable to coordinate activities by 
teaming. As decisions are taken unanimously (any person can veto a 
decision), no initial contract specifying the rights and duties of each 
party has to be formed. Thus, for highly variable activities (i.e. activities 
with low repetitiveness “in and across time”), teaming appears to be a 
better-suited coordination mode. Yet, in order fully to understand the 
relation between low repetitiveness and the (widespread) use of 
teaming, the impact of low repetitiveness on the number of actors and in 
particular the complexity of activities – as discussed in the two sections 
that follows – must also be considered. 
In balance, it seems that teaming and negotiation is most apt for 
handling variability in activities, then follows authority and agency, then 
pricing and voting whereas norms and rules requires the most stable 
environment to work efficiently.   
Coordination with many actors 
As the number of actors involved in a process of coordination increases, 
so does the amount of information transferred and assessed in the 
system. However, due to different designs for handling information, 
coordination costs as a function of size differ in, at least, two separate, 
and often opposed, aspects: (I) the total information handled within the 
system (i.e. the sum of information costs carried by each individual in 
the system); (II) the maximum information load put on one or more 
central actors. As the capacity of the individual to obtain and process 
information is limited (Arrow 1974, p. 37 and p. 39), information 
bottlenecks – for instance resulting in delayed or inferior solutions (K. 
Foss 2001, p. 7) – is a potential drawback from exceeding this capacity.   
                                           
19 If it is assumed that the benefits from specialisation are positively correlated with the difficulty of 
performing an activity, it should also be expected that as homogeneity decreases, the difficulties of 
monitoring and instructing people, managers in homogenous firms will to a lesser degree than 
managers in more heterogeneous firms possess specialised managerial capabilities. 
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Teams and negations is probably the type of coordination mode that 
suffers the most from increased group size. As they represent totally 
connected networks, the total number of relations increases dramatically 
when a new person enters. 20 Thus, team coordination is usually not 
considered to be efficient for large groups (Grandori 2000, chapter 5, p. 
12).  
A way to reduce overall communication costs in large groups is to 
establish a network that is only partially connected (Grandori 2000, 
chapter 4, p. 1), for instance, centralised networks. Centralisation can 
reduce the number of communication ties and by this minimise 
duplicate (Arrow 1974) or irrelevant (Casson and Wadeson 1999) 
information. In particular (and as discussed in chapter 2), it is efficient 
when information is decisive (Casson 1994).    
Hierarchies, in which persons are given authority to direct actions of 
subordinates, are one example of such more centralised designs (Balton 
and Dewatripont 1994).  As communication is bilateral (as it is between a 
subordinate and a superior), the sum of relations as a result of group 
size, in most cases and roughly speaking, only increases with a factor 
two. However, since information is concentrated at superiors, the risk of 
information overload and subsequent errors rises (Arrow 1974, p. 74) 
with increasing size. A progressive decentralisation of authority is 
therefore likely to go together with size (Penrose 1959, p. 566).   
In principle, bottleneck problems in hierarchies can be solved by creating 
sub-hierarchies, where the size of each hierarchy does not exceed the 
number of actors possible to handle by a single superior.  However, this 
solution relies on the premise that the knowledge required for 
coordination at the next higher level need not descend into the lower 
levels of the scale. This is not always possible due to the fact that “the 
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek 
1945, p. 80)  “in almost every instance [makes] knowledge of the detail of 
a problem … an essential condition of its solution” (Robinson 1934, p. 
254). Furthermore, many sub-ordinate levels - or to term it differently, a 
big span of control - makes decision-making a lengthy matter not suited 
                                           
20 The number of relations in a totally connected network is  n*(n-1)/2 (where n is the number of 
members in a team). For example, in a team with two members there is one relation, with four 
members there are six relations and with 8 members there are 28 relations.  
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for urgent decisions. Another implication of a big span of control is the 
danger that information is lost due to noise (Marschak and Radner, 1972) 
when decisions are pushed up and down many hierarchical layers.  
A partial delegation of decision rights, as in agency, is another way to 
reduce, but not avoid, information bottlenecks and large spans of 
control.  
Decisions based on votes or price-bids are unilateral: the individual only 
needs to pay attention to his own needs and can disregard the wider 
effects of his actions (Arrow 1974). As a result, the overall 
communication costs do not expand dramatically, when a new actor 
enters – only the actor that enters needs to obtain and calculate 
information. At the same time, information bottlenecks do not rise, since 
information is not centralised at any single agent, but is possessed and 
used by the “man on the spot” (Hayek 1945. p. 83). In this sense, it is a 
highly efficient way “for coordination of large systems of comparable 
actors through structured quantified information available to everybody 
and without further communication” (Grandori 1997, p. 33) than the one 
conveyed in prices (Shearmur 1994, p. 191). On the other hand, due to 
the aforementioned set-up cost of codification, it is usually costly to use 
for a limited number of transactions and thus, other things being equal, 
costly to use in small groups.   
The same conclusion pertains to social norms and rules that also work 
through local decision-making (but with the use of common and not 
individual knowledge).  As calculative decisions often are replaced by 
learning from past decisions and experimentation, the individual costs of 
using this network, given that norms and rules are in place, is very low.  
In balance, these reflections suggest that, other things being equal, the 
cost of coordination when groups expand in size increases most rapidly 
for coordination by teaming; then for authority and to a milder degree 
agency; whereas coordination by price, and in particular norms and 
rules, are the most efficient ways to economize on information costs in 
large groups.   
Coordination with activity complexity  
To recall, activity complexity refers to the degree of complexity of the 
search process in performing the activity and the amount of thinking 
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time involved in processing information. In general, teaming is believed 
to be efficient for high degrees of activity complexity:  
  “A team can realize significant cognitive advantages over other 
mechanisms in dealing with complex problems. Rather than working 
to reduce the quantity of information processed and exchanges, as 
pricing, voting, authority and agency do in different ways, a team’s 
distinctive way of dealing with uncertainty and knowledge 
complexity is to amplify the capacity for processing information, the 
cognitive power of the decision systems.” (Grandori 2000, chapter 
5, p. 4).  
Consequently, as activity complexity increases, coordination by for 
instance standards or authority is expected to be replaced with direct 
lateral contact among “subordinates” (Ito and Peterson, 1986).    
The problem of using authority for high levels of activity complexity 
goes back to the aforementioned bottleneck problem. The central agents’ 
limited capability for handling information involved in instruction and 
monitoring makes it important, that activities are of a rather 
homogeneous or structured nature concerning their information 
requirements (Grandori 1997, p. 35, Grandori 2000, chapter 4, p. 6)). 
Agency - as a less centralized model - is able to manage higher degrees 
of activity complexity. But as the set of possible actions taken by agents 
should be clearly defined (Ibid. p. 36), there are limits to the span of 
different activities coordinated by agency due to, among others, “ink-
costs”.  
When activity complexity is high, a great deal of (different) information 
needs to be codified prior to the use of pricing, which makes 
coordination by this principle rather costly. These costs pertain to the 
costs directly involved in codification, as well as to the information often 
lost in this process due to “sticky” information (Hippel 1990b).  
However, teaming is not the only way to handle high levels of activity 
complexity. In repeated interactions, it is possible to save enormous 
amounts of cognitive effort - and thereby freeing attention and cognitive 
resources for new areas of action – by norms and rules based on 
experience rather than calculative decisions. As a significant part of 
information collection and processing can be built into norms and rules, 
they have the potential of coping with still higher levels of activity 
complexity. This is particularly true for social norms. Unlike formal rules 
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they do not depend on whether a complicated coordination problem can 
be translated into codified descriptions or procedures. Consequently, 
even though norms and rules often appear to solve trivial coordination 
problems (as Thompson 1967 suggest), ex ante institutionalisation of 
these problems can be very complex indeed (Grandori 2000).   
Summary: Coordination of non-repeated complex activities with many actors 
involved 
In the above, I have discussed the use of different coordination modes in 
a set-up that is likely to be prevalent for non-repeated activities. Besides 
low degrees of repetition (high activity variability), this is - as argued in 
this chapter and chapter 2 – complex activities with many actors 
involved. The main argument developed throughout this discussion is 
how costs of creating and using alternative coordination modes differ 
according to these three information-related dimensions.  
The discussion presented here suggests that the different information 
aspects of coordination and the different costs of coordination interact in 
a complex way. Firstly, the costs of using a coordination mode depends 
on the initial investment made in this mode. Secondly there is an 
interplay between the three contingencies. For instance, if activity 
variability is high, it becomes less profitable to reduce the complexity of 
an activity by, say, norms and rules.  
Nevertheless, the assessment of a range of literature pertaining to 
information costs of coordination has given credence to the proposition, 
that each of the four pairs of coordination modes outlined by Grandori 
has specific properties with respect to the three informational 
contingencies. Figure 2 recapitulates, in a very rough way and other things 
being equal, this discussion by indicating the ranking of the different 
coordination modes along these variables. As the position of each 
coordination mode indicates its maximum ability to handle information, 
supposedly multiple coordination modes can be found towards the left-
hand side of the variables (that is with low information requirements for 
that particular variable).  
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Figure 2: A rough ranking of the expected ability of coordination 
modes to cope with three information-related variables 
Explanation: The more to the right a coordination mode is placed, the higher the level of the relevant 
variable this coordination mode can cope with. As the figure only proposes a ranking, it is only the 
order and not the exact position of each coordination modes that matters.  
The existence of multiple equally efficient combinations of coordination modes 
If the dimensions and rankings proposed in Figure 2 are put together in 
a three-dimensional space, it appears that it is difficult to advise a 
coordination mode for a combination of non-repetitiveness, many actors, 
and complex activities. For instance, norms and rules would be effective 
with respect to many actors and a high degree of activity complexity, but 
is poorly suited for the low level of repetitiveness. Teams and 
negotiations are efficient with respect to coordination of non-repeated 
complex activities, but are difficult to use with many actors. 
Alternatively, authority and agency, which take a medium position on 
all three variables, could be used.  
Thus, the inclusion of more than one variable on which the cost of using 
coordination depends, does not only makes the analysis (of which 
coordination mode to use when) more complicated. It also creates the 
risk that activities are placed in a part of the n-dimensional room (of 
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which I have only considered three dimensions) in which there is no 
obvious coordination mode to use: 
 “Some combinations of these [failure] mechanisms are easier to 
handle – that is they are compatible with a wider set of mechanisms 
– eventually all…Other combinations are very difficult to govern, 
the set of feasible solutions shrinks – eventually to a void set. 
(Grandori, Conclusion, part II, p. 2): 
Therefore, unlike Thompson (1967), choosing a coordination mode is not 
only a question of identifying the kind of interdependence and then 
apply the appropriate mode. There may be a trade-off between 
coordination of different variables. For instance, the complexity of how 
to carry out an activity may be ignored deliberately in order to allow for 
interaction of more parties. As there is not always a single superior way 
to coordinate a given set of activities, multiple equally efficient 
combinations of coordination modes can exist.  
3.2.3. The cost of identifying cost-effective coordination modes 
So far, we have been concerned with the cost of creating and using 
coordination modes. The underlying assumption has been that by 
adjusting activities and coordination modes to each other, coordination 
costs can be minimised. However, one aspect of coordination has not 
been dealt with yet: the cost of identifying such a fit.  
For instance, if we for moment consider the activities as given, 
coordination modes should be selected according to contingencies of the 
activities subject to coordination. To collect and process information 
about these contingencies is an investment that has to be traded off with 
improvements in coordination. In a repetitive setting, such initial costs 
can be issued to several interactions, or they can be substituted with 
learning from past experience. But as we move towards one-off 
interactions (as this theoretical part has in focus), costs of identifying 
effective coordination modes should be taken more and more seriously.  
Thus, in a non-repetitive setting, it would usually not be profitable to 
fine-tune activities and coordination modes to each other. Rather, a 
coordination mode, or combination hereof, that roughly fits most 
activities would probably be recommendable. Hence, we would expect 
that in coordination of systems with low recurrence of identical activities 
or identical sequences of activities, coordination patterns are relatively 
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robust to differences in contingencies, and therefore distant from the 
predictions of the theories on coordination modes discussed previously. 
And conversely, in coordination of recurrent activities, patterns of 
coordination modes are relatively differentiated and closer to theoretical 
predictions.  
The robust coordination pattern applied in situations of low repetition 
would ideally be designed in such a way, that it on average is closest to 
the coordination modes encouraged by the different contingencies (e.g. 
number of actors, and activity complexity). The exact position of this 
average could ideally be estimated by an ongoing trial and error process 
which also allows for encompassing changes over time in the activities 
subject to coordination. However, once investments in particular ways of 
structuring and transmitting information have been made, it will be 
cheaper to use these, rather than to establish new – and in itself better - 
ones (Arrow 1974, p. 41). Due to this initial and partially irreversible 
investment in coordination modes, patterns of coordination modes are 
likely to be stable not only for a range of different activities at any given 
point of time, but also over time.  
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SUMMARY ON THEORETICAL PART 
Chapter 2 and three have provided a theoretical framework by which we 
can address the research question on why specific forms of coordination 
are used during the process of construction. Chapter 2 provided 
theoretical explanations to why coordination is needed and by whom it is 
done. Chapter 3 dealt with the issue of how to coordinate.  
Chapter 2 emphasises repetition as essential to coordination. Repetition in 
activities encourages a division of labour (and hence creates growth); a 
division of labour, which creates a division of knowledge and hence 
necessitates coordination. Repetition of the single activity can be 
promoted by well-known and identical in- and output made feasible due 
to repetition in sequences of activities. However, a system, where all 
activities are fixed to each other, is not very adaptable towards change in 
external conditions such as, say, (quantitative or qualitative) variations 
in the demands of customers. Hence, some relations between activities 
are organised on a more temporary basis. These temporary and varying 
relations constitute a threat to repetition of activities; in particular when 
products do not have a general use and hence cannot easily be 
coordinated by markets (and as argued, the degree to which products 
are standardised/have a general use is also expected to be dependent on, 
or at the least promoted by, some initial level of repetition in specific 
relations).  
However, the existence of people specialised in handling these variations 
allows for a division of labour even when external changes exists: one 
group of people works repetitively with adaptation to changes (specialists 
in coordination); another group works repetitively with performing 
specific activities (specialists in production). As argued, it is likely that a 
structure in which the former group of specialists instructs the latter 
group, minimises on information costs. In this perspective, the firm is 
essentially a structure that enables specialisation in production through 
specialisation in coordination. The specific boundaries of the firm are 
drawn by these benefits of specialisation (i.e. of repetition) versus the 
benefits of being adaptable to external changes. Therefore, as external 
changes increase, shorter and shorter strings of repeated activities are 
handled within a firm (unilateral coordination) or directly between two 
firms (bilateral coordination). Since interactions between specific firms and 
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individuals are not repeated, coordination is potentially troubled by 
idiosyncrasies. The existence of the trade organisation (or isomorphism) is a 
way to replace repetition between specific firms and individuals with 
repetition between specific groups (i.e. trades). An important implication 
of (the benefits of) having a single organisational design, such as the 
trade organisation is that it potentially creates path-dependency. Craft 
production is another mean to reduce the interdependence of activities by 
using highly skilled workers, who buffer in- and output variations 
through local decisions. 
Finally, a high level of change in external conditions, e.g. changes in 
overall demand, is likely to increase the limitations of both markets and 
firms. Hence, it is argued that the existence of interfirm coordination 
beyond simple market coordination is likely to be especially dominant in 
non-repetitive settings. Bilateral coordination directly between two firms is 
one type of inter-firm coordination. However, interfirm coordination 
mediated by a third firm specialised in coordination (trilateral 
coordination) is another (and theoretically less explored) option. The line 
of argument in chapter 2 proposes, that the higher the level of external 
change, the more interfirm coordination will move from being bilateral 
to trilateral.  
Chapter 3 analyses the cost of handling information through different 
modes of coordination in a setting of unrepeated production.  
The information-based (or at least information biased) literature on 
coordination has been reviewed in order to identify different modes of 
coordinating activities. Then theoretical contributions that further an 
understanding of the cost of handling information by these different 
modes have been considered. Particular emphasis has been given to 
contingencies that are likely to follow from low repetition. Besides (a) 
low repetition (/high variability) in activities, this is (b) complex 
activities with (c) many persons potentially involved. The costs of 
handling these contingencies through different coordination modes have 
been discussed along three different dimensions of information costs: the 
cost of identifying which mode to use, the cost of creating coordination 
modes, and the cost of using coordination modes.  
With respect to the costs of creating and using coordination modes, it is 
argued that discontinuity is likely to impose significant costs of using 
coordination by prices, norms and rules and thereby excludes 
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coordination modes that are considered very cost efficient in repetitive 
settings. This brings coordination by authority, agency¸ and teaming to the 
fore.  However, these coordination modes face limitations with respect to 
handling the extensive information and involvement of many actors. 
Thus, it is proposed that is very difficult to find coordination modes 
which nicely suit the combination of coordination objectives likely to 
arise in non-repetitive situations. Consequently, the selection of 
coordination modes for specific activities is not necessarily a matter of 
choosing a superior solution to an inferior one (as Thompson suggest), 
but can be a matter of choosing between two or more equally “poor” 
alternatives. 
In contrast to the reviewed literature, it has been argued, that in order to 
understand the efficient application of alternative coordination modes, 
costs of identifying coordination modes has to be added to the cost of 
using and creating different coordination modes. For recurrent sets of 
activities, these identification costs may be negligible since they are 
written off on many activities. But the lower the degree of repetition, 
they more important they become. Consequently, in coordination of 
systems with low recurrence of identical activities, coordination patterns 
are expected to be relatively robust to differences in contingencies, and 
hence often distant from the theoretical predictions following from 
considering only costs of using and creating coordination modes. 
Conversely, in coordination of repeated sequences of activities, 
coordination modes are expected to be relatively differentiated and close 
to theoretical predictions – i.e. the same coordination mode is used for 
activities with the same kind of contingencies, and different coordination 
modes are used for activities with different kinds of contingencies. 
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Chapter 4 - On Method  
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the choices and reflections on method 
governing the empirical analyses presented in chapter 5 and 6.  
I start out by explaining why a case study - in combination with statistical 
inquiries - is chosen as the main source to empirical data (section 4.2). 
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to analysing and discussing 
consequences of this choice. Section 4.3 relates to the possibility of 
making generalisations primarily from a single case study. In section 4.4 it 
is discussed, how different empirical sources enhance the construct 
validity of the case study. Section 4.5 explicates why the particular case on 
roof construction in a multiunit residential house was selected and some 
consequences hereof with respect to generalisation. The section (4.6) on 
reliability concerns the questionnaire and operationalisation of main 
concepts used for collection of data. The final section (4.7) discusses the 
strategies used for analysing data taking the explanatory AND explorative 
elements of the present case study into account.  
 
4.2. Why a case study 
Numerous research strategies can be used for data collection: 
experiments, archival analyses, histories, surveys, case studies etc. 
(Andersen 1997 and Yin 1989, p.p. 15-20).  
Choosing a strategy (or combination hereof) is not easy because as 
observed by Turin 1966 (p. 8): 
 “Studies of the building process have to steer a difficult course 
between the Scylla of intensive and necessarily expensive inquiries of 
isolated examples, and the Charybdis of more superficial studies of a 
large number of objects examined under few headings only, but 
having some statistical significance. It is easy to say that both 
approaches are complementary; it is considerably more difficult to 
make them so…” 
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This thesis combines statistical data with an in-depth case study. 
Hopefully this will make it possible to find a safe course between Scylla 
and Charybdis.  
In chapter 5 the data provided by public registers and summarised in the 
so-called IDA-database will be used (this may be conceived off as 
archival analyses by statistical means). A benefit of this data source is 
that it gives information on a wide range of objects (in fact all persons, 
working places and firms in Denmark). Besides allowing for broad sector 
and cross-sector inquiries, it makes it possible to study economic 
organisation at different aggregation levels: the national levels, the 
industry level, the firm level and the level of individuals. So even though 
it does not provide us with direct data on the project level, to some 
degree it makes it feasible to link the macro (systemic) level with the 
micro (actor) level, rather than simply having both the dependent and 
independent variable at either the macro or the micro level (Coleman 
and Hao 1989). In addition, it allows for longitudinal studies on, for 
instance, survival rates. Finally, by using an existing database, resources 
are saved on collecting data. 
However, the latter is also a limitation to this data source. As the IDA-
database is based on public registers and designed for research in the 
labour market, obviously it only provides indirect and limited data 
relating to the research questions of this thesis. As illustrated in chapter 
5, some indirect indications on the division of labour (research question 
A) and the role of the firm as a coordinator (research question B) could 
be given, but among other things, we learn nothing about how 
coordination is organised and practised on site.  
For this and the following reasons I have found it most appropriate 
mainly to examine the research questions of this thesis by means of a 
single case study.  
According to Yin (1989), the choice of a research strategy depends on (a) 
the type of research question posed, (b) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the degree of 
focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. More precisely 
(ibid. p. 20) a case study research strategy is perceived to be 
advantageous when “a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control”.  
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In many ways these three conditions fit to the situation of the present 
study. First of all, the overall research question is mainly of an 
explanatory nature (although it also contains explorative elements) as it 
aims at understanding why certain modes of coordination are selected for 
coordinating the activities involved in the process of house construction. 
The general idea being, that in depth studies, like case studies, are better 
at identifying causes than more distant methods, like surveys; the latter 
relating more to prevalence of phenomena (how widespread phenomena 
are) (Yin 1989).  
A second characteristic of the object studied in this thesis, is that it 
represents a complex and only partly understood interaction between 
numerous parties.  Thus, it is very difficult to study coordination 
practices by controlled experiments of any kind.  An argument that is 
further strengthened by the fact that it would be very costly to use 
research designs, where people at the site are hindered from performing 
their daily business. This is particularly true for the craftsmen who are 
paid by the piece, and hence the only option is to interview them, when 
they have some spare time between some of their operations. An 
alternative would be to restrict the interviews to people at the higher 
level of the organisation who are not governed by the payment by the 
scheme contract. But this will leave out the potentially important part of 
coordination taking place directly between the craftsmen and would 
seriously limit the relevance of the study. Furthermore, the story of 
coordination would be very incomplete if only the “upper level” of the 
project organisation was examined – as witnessed on several occasions in 
the case study, the gap between what is planned and what actually takes 
place can be rather large. 
Thirdly, I am studying contemporary events and hence have the option 
of using the various sources of evidence – like interviews and 
observation – that in combination are the unique strength of case studies 
(Yin 1989, p.p. 20-21). Hence, an advantage of the case study is that it 
provides a very detailed and embracing view on ongoing processes 
(Holme and Solvang 1986). This is important since I do not have any 
personal experience with construction activities on site - many of the 
activities performed by the craftsmen would mean little to me if only 
explained in words. In order to understand what is going on, 
observation on site was needed. On top of that, being a part of the 
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environment for a four-week period gave a brilliant opportunity for 
informal discussions and observations on issues, that I would not have 
known to ask for in advance. In order to reap the full benefits of this, I 
followed the same working hours of the craftsmen (7.00-15.00) and 
participated as often as possible in the breaks at 9.00, 11.00 and 13.15 in 
the workmen’s hut.  
In the same vein, case studies are perceived to be beneficial in situations, 
where little is known about a phenomenon empirically, or when 
“freshness” in a theoretical perspective is needed for an already 
researched topic (Eisenhardt 1989). To recall the introduction (chapter 
one), both situations seem to apply to the present study. Firstly, 
organisational studies of construction processes are sparse and studies 
explicitly addressing these processes from a coordination point of view 
even more so. Secondly, even if the empirical field is extended beyond 
the construction process, most contemporary studies of coordination 
practises have taken an incentive based approach to coordination. 
Naturally, these studies only add limited insights to information-based 
theories on coordination.  
With these characteristics in mind, it also becomes evident why a survey 
- for instance based on a large sample of questionnaires – for very 
practical reasons was not an option I considered at any length. Firstly, I 
would not know how to phrase the questions in a way comprehensible 
to people on the construction site. Secondly, the options for adjusting my 
questions on a, at least in the beginning, continuous basis would have 
been very limited. The limited empirical interaction would increase the 
risks that the concepts that I used did not capture the most important 
elements of the studied objects (as discussed later in the section on 
“construct validity”). Thirdly, the craftsmen would not bother to answer 
questions – especially not in a written format.  
However, case studies are time consuming; especially when interviews 
can only be made, when craftsmen have some spare time. For the same 
reason it has only been attempted to conduct a single case study. This in 
turn raises the question of generalisation: how much can be said about 
other building projects based on this single case? 
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4.3. Generalisation from a (single) case study – external validity 
Perhaps the most important lesson to take away from this chapter 
concerns the external validity of the case study; that is the degree to which 
the findings can be generalised beyond the very domain of the case 
study. In accordance with Yin (1989), the view taken here is that the 
possibility of generalising the empirical findings of a case study relates 
to theoretical propositions or claims (“analytical generalisation”), and 
not to populations (“statistical generalisation”). In this way the case 
study does not represent a “sample”, that (with some level of statistical 
uncertainty) is claimed to be valid for the organisation and structuring of 
coordination outside of construction.  
Thus, I do not claim that I am able to say anything specific about the 
extent to which the observed coordination practices apply to other 
empirical settings. To the degree that there is any room for 
generalisations of an empirical nature, this goes through a theoretical 
framework and further empirical studies. The concepts and perhaps 
even the causalities identified in this case study can pave the way for a 
(revised) framework on the selection of coordination modes. This 
framework can then facilitate an analysis of the selection of coordination 
modes used for other economic activities; but the degree to which the 
framework actually represents a (more or less) “true” picture of how 
these activities are coordinated, cannot – not even by some measures of 
probability – be known in advance.  
The degree to which generalisation of a statistical nature is possible, 
partly depends on how the case is selected. A critical case is a case in 
which a theoretical proposition is expected to be extremely likely to be 
confirmed (or not to be confirmed). By using such cases, it is possible to 
deduct that “if the theory is (not) valid even in this unfavourable 
(favourable) situation, it will apply to all (no) other cases” (Flyvbjerg 
1992). However, a fundamental problem with this approach is, that it 
depends on ex ante knowledge about whether a case is critical or not. 
This requires some initial empirical knowledge on the causalities of the 
involved concepts, and hence excludes the use of critical cases in 
situations in which there is limited empirical knowledge; exactly the 
situations for which the case study is pointed out as a particularly useful 
research strategy (Eisenhardt 1989). Thus, this dissertation has not aimed 
at identifying a critical case which, beyond the level of analytical 
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generalisation, could explain the selection of coordination modes outside 
the empirical setting of construction.  
Yet, in the section “selecting the case” (4.5) I will argue, that the activities 
studied as part of the case study on roof construction with some 
reservations is similar to a wider set of construction activities. And 
hence, that I have no reason to expect that they are fundamentally 
different from construction processes in other parts of a building project.  
 
4.4. Construct validity 
Construct validity relates to whether the concepts and measures applied 
for studying phenomena measure what they are intended to measure. 
Thus, internal validity concerns if the operational definitions (the ones 
used during fieldwork) correspond to the theoretical definitions. A lack 
of correspondence can have two outcomes. Too narrow an 
operationalisation of a theoretical concept will cause important 
phenomena to be overlooked; too wide an operationalisation, that 
irrelevant phenomena are included.  
Using multiple sources is a way to increase the construct validity of a 
study. The study at hand has combined different sources in various 
ways: (a) combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, (b) prior 
knowledge of the parties and phases involved in building, (c) a test 
study on coordination practices, and (d) a combination of observation 
and interviews. In the following I consider these four different ways to 
increase the construct validity of the case study.  
4.4.1. Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches 
As mentioned in section 4.2, even though the main data source in this 
thesis is a single case study, statistical information provided by in 
particular the IDA-database has also been used. A primary objective of 
using this database was to show, how changes in overall demand 
propagates to the level of firms and individuals, which in turn is likely to 
favour certain ways of organising and executing coordination of the 
building process. However, the data also provided information, that is 
more directly related to the research questions.  
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In this way, it has been possible to substantiate some of the observations 
from the case study, for instance with respect to the existence of the trade 
organisation and craft production.  
The presence of cliques is another example of using multiple sources by 
combining quantitative and qualitative data. During the case study I 
became aware of the fact that some of the carpenters move in cliques 
from one firm to another. This is potentially a very interesting 
observation, as it suggests, that repeated interaction and thus 
specialisation perhaps takes place even without repeated interaction 
between or within specific firms. And thus, it could be the case, that - in 
spite on the picture on building outlined in chapter 5 - there would be 
specialisation in building. However, the subsequent inquiries in the IDA-
database did not support the view, that cliques are particularly 
widespread in construction compared with manufacturing.   
4.4.2. Prior knowledge of the construction process - To get a “feeling” for 
the  actors and phases involved 
An important part of conducting empirical research on a topic on which 
there is only limited prior knowledge, is to get a “feeling” for the 
empirical field. First of all, without knowledge of the basic actors and 
processes, it is not only difficult to understand, for instance, the answers 
given by respondents; very often some minimal knowledge is required 
in order to gain access to and acceptance from the people working in the 
field. Secondly, a theory-informed approach to collecting data – as used 
during the case study of roof construction – seriously faces danger of 
merely reproducing theory, rather than grasping the essence of the 
empirical field (Eisenhardt 1989). This thesis has benefited from different 
sources of prior knowledge on the process of construction (see also table 
1 in section 4.4.5) 
To recall the remarks in the preface of this thesis, originally I was 
introduced to the “world of construction” while representing the client 
in a dozen building projects. Besides arousing my curiosity, this gave an 
introduction to some of the major parties involved in the building 
process; especially the client representatives, the design team (i.e. the 
firm of architects and the firm of engineers), the main contractor and the 
local authorities involved in the initial planning and tendering phases. 
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In commencing the PhD-programme, I participated in 10 site-meetings 
over 6 months in a social housing new build project placed in Farum, 20 
km north of the centre of Copenhagen. The purpose of this was to get an 
idea about, what was going on at the building site. Later I decided not to 
use site meetings as a primary empirical source to coordination practices 
due to the specific status held by these meetings (see textbox on The site 
meeting in chapter 6). Nonetheless, these meetings gave an introduction 
to some of the superior (compared with the level of the craftsmen) 
organisational levels working on site.  
Furthermore, I have been allocated part time to the Danish Building 
Research Institute, the Group for Productivity studies, during the PhD-
programme. The people working here are relatively close to the daily 
practices of construction. I have benefited tremendously from being part 
of this environment, bridging practical and theoretical approaches to the 
organisation of the building process.  
Finally, the mandatory work in the PhD-programme included three 
empirical reports (Thomassen 1998 and 1999, Clausen and Thomassen 
2000) on the strategies for reorganising the building process pursued by 
the four Consortia involved in the PPB-programme (which this PhD-
study is a part of). The contacts established in drawing up these reports 
turned out to be important in order to gain access to the empirical field, 
for instance the case study.   
4.4.3. A test study conducted on the site 
Departing from the theoretical speculations as presented in chapter 2 
and 3, I developed a lengthy questionnaire addressing different aspects 
of the three research questions. Rather than using the questionnaire 
straight away, a test study (pilot case) was conducted on the site. In this 
case study, the organisation of coordination and the coordination modes 
used for instalments of windows were studied.  
There were two major outcomes of this test study. Firstly, the theoretical 
concepts were turned into concepts, which were familiar to the people 
working on the building site. For instance, the theoretical concept of 
authority was translated into instructions from foreman or instructions from 
project management. Similarly, some constructs were deepened.  For 
instance, rather than asking about how activities were dependent on 
each other, different dimensions of interdependencies were identified.  
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Secondly, the questionnaire was somewhat shortened as the interviews 
with the craftsmen usually were restricted to their short “natural” 
breaks. Some additional questions on innovation, that were “nice to 
know” but not “necessary to know”, were not pursued systematically. 
Similarly, the questionnaire was divided into some basic questions, 
which were asked for all activities and some additional questions, which 
were only asked, if the time and the conditions allowed for it.  
How these different measures, partly triggered by the test study, were 
made operational is further explained in the section The Questionnaire and 
operationalisation of main concepts later in this chapter. 
4.4.4. Data collection on site: combining interviews and observation 
A third way used in order to increase construct validity was to combine 
the two main qualitative methods (Marshall and Rossman 1989): 
observation and interviews.  
To recall, observation was almost inevitable since the only feasible way 
to get information at the level of craftsmen, was to stand next to them 
while they were working. By being present on the site, it became possible 
to understand the exact character of the activities performed during roof 
construction, which in turn enabled the interview with the craftsmen. As 
a further benefit of data collection through observation, the change of 
“getting surprised” (in the sense of becoming aware of aspects, which 
was not considered ex ante the fieldwork) is increased. 
However, to rely solely on observation is a very time consuming affair 
and does not allow for observation of phenomena, that do not manifest 
themselves in any explicit form. Hence, interviews were used as a major 
source of data. The interviews were conducted by following a rather 
closed set of questions. This enables the collection of relevant and 
comparable data. A disadvantage of a (semi-)closed questionnaires is, 
that they do not favour more informal discussions in which crucial 
information often is revealed because the respondents can express 
themselves more freely. However, this kind of conversation took place 
during (often very lively) discussions at lunch and coffee breaks. 
Furthermore, the test study and previous experience with the 
construction process also reduced the risk, that the use of closed 
questions would miss important empirical insights.  
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The use of a questionnaire partly rooted in theoretical concepts – and 
partly adapted by initial findings in particular in the test study – also 
reflects a more fundamental stand of this dissertation. The purpose of 
this thesis is not to conduct studies inspired by a grounded theory 
approach. In this approach observations are (supposedly) interpreted 
with outmost care and with a limited theoretical interference in the 
outset. Even though this may provide more nuances than a more 
(deductive) theory-driven approach, it may also imply, that the 
theoretical point of departure is less pronounced, but not necessarily less 
influential. Furthermore, there is a balance to strike between on one hand 
making, theories “tractable” and, on the other hand, ensuring that 
theories to some degree “correspond to the real world” (Coase 1937, p. 
386). The exact point of balance is of course difficult to locate and may 
also be a matter of personal opinion. If an inquiry is truly grounded (and 
does not only pretend to be so), in comparison with a more theory-
driven approach, it will most likely get closer to “correspond to the real 
world”, but at the same time will probably also contribute less to 
“tractable” theories. Thus, the purpose of this study is to conduct 
empirical studies within the process of construction in order to see how 
this contributes to the theoretical field of organisational economics in 
general and theories on coordination in particular.  
Coming back to more down-to-earth aspects of data collection, in most 
cases the respondents were treated as “ordinary” respondents, in the 
sense that they were only asked questions about their own behaviour. In 
a few cases however, they were interviewed as key informants (Marshall 
and Rossman 1989); that is, due to their experience, they were asked 
questions not concerning themselves directly (for instance “do you 
consider the problem described here to be typical for building projects in 
general?”).  
Of course a central question is, whether the interviewed people are 
biased in any way: perhaps the interviewed people want to emphasise 
certain aspects of the story; think that they are expected to give certain 
answers; or give answers, that represent the common understanding of 
how things work etc. As an interviewer this is very difficult to control for 
due to asymmetric information. The questions on activities and 
coordination I was asking, did not appear to be very conflict-ridden 
(unlike issues like the working environment and salary, which the 
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craftsmen addressed unaided on several occasions). Furthermore, by 
combining observation and interviews, to some degree, it became 
possible to crosscheck for biases.   
Finally, by studying a string of activities, I had information about both 
sides of the interdependencies reported between the activities. The 
relation between two activities is by no means symmetrical (a can be 
dependent on b without b being dependent on a), but having information 
on the relationship nevertheless facilitated an understanding of the 
answers given and allowed for crosschecking by asking additional 
questions. 
4.4.5. Different data sources used as part of the case study 
The different data sources that directly or indirectly enhance the 
construct validity of the present study are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: The data sources used directly and indirectly in the case study 
Location Method used Date Duration Persons/parties 
involved 
Topics related to the 
case study 
Chairman 
for a 
social 
housing 
organisati
on 
Participation 1993-
96 
Represented 
the client in 
12 building 
projects 
Client , client 
representatives, 
architects, engineers, 
main contractor, public 
authorities 
Basic understanding of 
the actors involved in the 
building process, in 
particular with respect to 
the initial planning and 
tendering phases. 
Social 
housing 
project in 
Farum1 
Observation at 
the site meetings 
1999 Participated 
in 10 site 
meetings 
Client representative 
and three main 
contractors 
Basic understanding of 
the actors involved in the 
building process, in 
particular with respect to 
the superior levels in the 
execution process.  
Social 
housing 
project in 
Gentofte 
(the case 
study) 
Observation at 
project planning 
meetings 
2000-
2001 
Participated 
in 4 
planning 
meetings 
The firm of architects 
and the firm of 
engineers (the design 
team), the main 
contractor and client 
representative. 
Basic understanding of 
the actors involved in the 
building process, in 
particular with respect to 
the more detailed parts 
of the planning phase.  
Social A test study on 2001 Approx. 20 The carpenters and the Revising questionnaire 
                                           
1 The building project consisted of 67 + 33 (constructed in two phases) one-story row-houses.  
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housing 
project in 
Gentofte 
(the case 
study) 
the instalments 
of windows 
combining obser-
vation and 
interviews.  
hours on site driver of the mobile 
crane.  
and main concepts.  
Social 
housing 
project in 
Gentofte 
(the case 
study) 
The case study 
of roof 
construction 
combining 
observation and 
interviews. 
2001 Approx. 100 
hours on site 
Interviews (using the 
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about their role in the 
execution phase.  
Informal discussions 
with the craftsmen 
working on site, 
especially carpenters 
Collecting information 
on the three research 
questions (see section on 
the questionnaire below).  
 
4.5. Selecting the case 
A building project can vary in multiple ways, for instance: 
 The purpose of the building: is it a house, an office or an industrial 
building etc. 
 The type of client: is it a private or publicly supported client.  
 The size of the building. 
 New build or refurbishment   
 The exact period in which the construction project takes places.  
 The geographical position of the building.  
Based on prior knowledge, I had no reason to suspect that within the 
building part of the sector,2 the organisation of this process would differ 
largely from one type of project to another. 
                                           
2 Whether this also is true for civil engineering projects (physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, 
ports etc) is hard to say from the arguments that follow.  
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First of all, as a client, I had experienced more or less the same kind of 
problems on various projects even though they differed with respect to 
size and geographical position. Secondly, in the ongoing debate on how 
to organise construction in Denmark, the parties involved do not seem to 
consider that the perceived problems (and their remedies) were 
particularly profound in, for instance, social housing or that they have 
changed much over time. Thirdly, the construction firms in general do 
not appear to specialise in certain parts of the market, which indicates 
common organisational traits.  
Of course these pieces of circumstantial evidence do not prove the 
uniformity of the organisation of construction projects (and thus the 
possibility of generalising from one building project to another). In order 
to check for this, additional questions to key informants on the specific 
project have to be asked (see the next section). Nevertheless, it reduce the 
criteria for selecting a case study to three main concerns.  
Firstly, the case should be accessible, both in the sense, that it should be 
possible to gain access to the project, and in the sense, that it should be 
within geographical reach.  
Secondly, this study intends to bring insights to the efficient application 
of coordination modes by studying the coordination practices used in the 
process of construction. However, the coordination practices observed in 
a single case study can be an efficient response to given contingencies, or 
a result of mismanagement. In order to ease the interpretation of data, it 
would be ideal, if the impact of management could be reduced (at least 
to the degree that the observed coordination practices are not a result of 
particularly bad management).  
Naturally, it is difficult to identify best practise based on a single case 
study. However, tentative indications suggest, that the project  at least 
do not represent “worst practice” with respect to how coordination is 
managed.  
First of all, the case is part of the PPB-programme (as outlined in the 
introduction) as it is built by the PPU-consortium.3 At the building site 
                                           
3 The PPU consortium is a one out of four consortium in the PPB-programme. The PPU consortium 
consists of MT Højgaard, Rambøll and Arkitektgruppen i Århus. MT Højgaard is the merger between 
Højgaard og Schultz and Monberg og Thorsen. Højgaard og Schultz is the original participant in the 
consortium.  
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level – studied in this dissertation – this seems to have very little impact 
since the constellation of people is as new as for any other building 
projects. At the planning level however, there is a higher degree of 
repetitiveness among the architect, engineers and main contractor, which 
provides better conditions for a well-planned project.4 Secondly, the 
carpenters are rather experienced. The two carpenters mainly assigned to 
roof-construction have more than 30 years of experience as carpenters. In 
this period they have worked together for more than 20 years. Thirdly, I 
study the second of three phases in the building process. In the first 
phase a kindergarten was constructed. In the two latter phases, two 
separate residential buildings (with identical roof constructions) are 
erected. Hence, project management is “up and running” and the 
relation between the different trades had some time to mature.5 
Furthermore, the prospect of a subsequent roof makes it worthwhile for 
the involved parties to consider, how coordination practices can be 
improved. Of course there are also elements that did not work optimally 
on this building project. For instance it was obvious, that the local 
authorities in the municipality had not had many social housing projects 
during the past years.  
A second bias I would like to avoid, is the impact from regulative 
provisions. Danish contractors often hold it to be impossible to establish 
long-term relations between contractors due to procurement and tender 
regulations at national and ECC-level (the former being changed by 
revised regulations coming into force the 1.9.01). However this claim is 
not relevant for the case study, which is the sixth building project 
conducted by the PPU-consortium, which has been granted an 
exemption from the general procurement and tender regulations. Hence, 
the limited repetition in working constellations found on the personal 
level, and to some degree at the firm level, cannot be explained by 
specific regulative provisions. On the contrary, it was possible and an 
intended purpose of the PPU-programme to establish long-term 
                                           
4 In some respects however, there are some novelties also at this level: the client and local authorities 
have not been counterparts on previous PPU.projects.   
5 The impact of this is somewhat limited for the carpenters, who were replaced midway the project. 
Consequently, the carpenters making the roof on the kindergarten are not the same as the ones 
studied in the case study.  
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relations between firms. In this (limited) sense, the case study may be a 
critical case: if long-term relations between firms and individuals are not 
identified on this project, they will probably not be identified on most 
other projects.   
On this background, it was decided to use the multiunit residential 
housing project located in the Municipality of Gentofte (the northern 
part of Copenhagen) as a case study. The building project consists of 
three buildings. The first building is a two-storey kindergarten also 
housing shared facilities for the residents of the two other four-story 
buildings containing 43 apartments (ranging from 45-80m2) for singles 
and families and 24 apartments (ranging from 65-89m2) for elderly 
persons. The buildings periods for these three buildings were partly 
overlapping. The client was a social housing organisation and, for the 
kindergarten, the Municipality of Gentofte. The daily operations of the 
social housing organisation were taken care of by a client representative, 
more precisely, a larger social housing organisation. The latter is 
continuously engaged in house building, but the interaction with the 
Municipality of Gentofte was novel as this was the first social housing 
project in the Municipality for decades.  Additionally, the specific person 
representing the client and the PPB-consortium had no prior common 
working experience.  
4.5.1. Identifying the specific part of the building process used as a case 
study 
To study coordination practices in progress for the entire building would 
be a very time consuming affair amounting to at least 9-12 months of 
full-time fieldwork (corresponding to the construction time). Hence, after 
having identified the building project to use as a case study, the next 
exercise was to “zoom in” on a particular part of the process.  
An important part of the case study was to locate the way activities are 
dependent on each other. For this reason, it was decided to study the 
coordination practices involved in roof construction. As roof production 
is towards the very end of the construction process, the 
interdependencies with other parts of the building process can be 
estimated based on experience. If some of the earlier processes had been 
studied, the interdependencies would partly concern the future, and 
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hence the respondents would to some degree have to make guesses 
about the interdependencies.  
This of course raises the question of how representative roof construction 
is to building in general.  In the above it was argued, that I had no 
compelling reason to assume, that one type of building would vary 
significantly from other types of building. The subsequent data collection 
seems to confirm this initial assumption along most dimensions. 
With respect to coordination practices, carpenters from the first and 
second team expressed that the events on the roof were nothing 
particular. On the other projects they had worked on, they usually 
experienced approximately the same level of “project errors”, the same 
interaction with other trades and the same way of (not) communicating 
with other contractors, project management and the design team. 
Further, the two carpenters from the second team with 30 years of 
experience did not find, that issues relating to interdependencies 
between activities and project errors due to lack of information and 
communication had changed much in their professional career. For five 
activities – carried out by a plumber, a crane driver, a person doing the 
roofing felt and two different carpenters respectively – the craftsmen 
were asked if they during this or previous building projects, had 
experienced, that he or some of the other persons working on the site 
had changed their way of performing activities. In all cases the answer 
was “no”, which also seems to confirm the picture, that the observations 
are not very time dependent.  
However, on two dimensions carpenters from the first and second team 
spontaneously reported deviations concerning the used coordination 
practices. The first dimension relates to refurbishment. As reported in 
chapter 6, the degree of unforeseen conditions is very high in 
refurbishment and consequently, the craftsmen are more involved in 
providing the solutions (or put differently, the solutions are to a lesser 
degree specified ex ante by the design team). Secondly, the carpenters 
also reported coordination practices to be different on smaller projects 
where more decisions are taken unanimously and directly between the 
master or clerk of work from the different trades (again giving the design 
team a more limited role than the one found in the case study). As this 
suggests, one should be careful to generalise the findings of the case 
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study to small projects like single family houses or to refurbishment 
(even on a larger scale).  
The question on the generalness of roof construction was also addressed 
in an interview with the foreman for the carpenters. He did not find that 
the observed interdependencies and coordination practices would have 
been different if (a) the roof was not made on a house but another type of 
building, e.g. an office or industrial building; (b) if the client was not a 
social housing organisation (but e.g. a private or institutional investor); 
(c) if the project was made 10 years ago; (d) if the project was located in 
another part of the country; and in contrast to the other carpenters, (e) if 
the project was bigger or smaller. However, in agreement with the other 
carpenters, he did find that interdependencies and coordination was 
different in refurbishment than in roof construction on new houses.  
With respect to regional differences, it should be noticed, that during his 
career the foreman has been working mainly in the Northern part of 
Zealand. In fact, the statistical information provided in appendix C on 
years of establishment for firms and the interrelated measure on year of 
employment of the individual worker, suggest some regional differences 
between Zealand on one hand, and Funen and Jutland on the other. This 
data suggests, that high turnover in firms and employees in particular 
(but compared with manufacturing, not only) is a characteristic of 
Zealand. The exact reason for this would be interesting to dig into, but 
can at the present stage only be guessed upon. One possibility is that 
demand in Jutland and Funen is more stable due to a larger share of 
maintenance (unfortunately it is not possible to check for this by 
combining figure 4 and 6 in chapter 5). A related possibility is that up- 
and downswings in demand in particular applies to larger cities in 
which case Zealand, homing Copenhagen, presumably is most 
vulnerable.    
 
4.6. Reliability 
Reliability relates to whether a later investigator - following exactly same 
procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducting the 
same case study all over again – will arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions (Yin 1989). The concept of reliability acknowledges that 
observations are not objective as data are collected and interpreted by 
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individuals. However, with reliability it is insisted that the impact of the 
specific individual conducting a case study should be limited as much as 
possible. This replaces a criterion of objectivity with a criterion of inter-
subjectivity (Andersen 1990). 
An important part of ensuring reliability is to display the procedures 
used for collecting data, as well as character and amount of collected 
data. These issues are considered in this section.  
4.6.1. The questionnaire and operationalisation of main concepts  
In order to guide my observations as well as questions, I used a 
structured questionnaire for collecting data. A set of basic questions 
were asked for each activity performed on the roof (see figure 2 in 
chapter 6 for an overview of activities). Some additional questions were 
asked, when the situation gave time and room for it. The questions were 
tested and modified in a test-study, conducted at the same building 
project, of coordination practices used during instalment of windows.  
Some parts of the construction process may be more informative than 
others with respect to the coordination practices used during 
construction. Originally, I planned to collect data at the weekly site 
meeting (in which access to the interaction between the various trades 
could be given with a limited time invested). However, I was “warned” 
by experienced people within the sector (but working on other building 
projects), that the site meeting only gives a very partial picture of what is 
going on in the process of construction. An important function of this 
meeting is to clarify extra payment and reasons for delays (potentially 
leading to withholding of payment) meaning that the participants are 
very aware of which information they pass on and which information 
they retain. So even though site meetings have been used for empirical 
studies on the site construction (see for instance Kreiner 1976), it was 
decided to use the questionnaire directly in connection to the craftsmen’s 
execution of the activities. 
Questions identifying the activity 
The first part of the basic questionnaire identifies the content of the 
activity (or set of activities) and the persons who execute them (as I 
became acquainted with the craftsmen this question became 
superfluous). 
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Question Scale  
What is the name of the thing you are doing now? 
Text 
What is your name (and from which company)? 
Text 
Which persons take part in this job? 
Text 
Try to describe the operations of this job6. 
Text 
 
 
By regular presence on the roof throughout the entire period of 
construction, it was possible to map all 18 activities involved directly in 
making the roof. To recall, an activity is characterised by being a 
continuos performance of one or more task conducted by a single person 
and resulting in a tangible or intangible transformation. A few words on 
operationalisation are required here. Firstly, as I due to time-constraints 
mainly, but not solely, probed into coordination practices at the level of 
the craftsmen, the activities all resulted in tangible transformations. 
Secondly, when one person takes over from another, clearly this 
constitutes a new activity. However, when the same person work on the 
same part of the building, it can be difficult to tell whether it is continuos 
or not (and hence if coordination due to a time-span is required). In 
order to limit the number of observations (and the number of questions I 
had to trouble the craftsmen with), I only considered the tasks to be a 
new activity, if a new person was involved.7 A second issue of 
operationalisation is that in many cases, two craftsmen from the same 
trade worked on the same part of the building at the same time. When 
they performed subsequent tasks, these tasks were perceived as different 
activities. However, when they performed the same tasks in parallel, this 
                                           
6 I used the term “job”  (“opgave” in Danish) which is a more popular term than the rather formal 
term “activity”  (“aktivitet” in Danish) used throughout this work.  
7 In the figure on activities involved in roof production shown in chapter 6, some activities have been 
split up in order to illustrate the major tasks involved in roof construction.   
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was considered as duplication and not different activities. In these cases, 
I only interviewed one of the craftsmen.  
Questions on the division of labour and specialisation.  
A set of questions relate to the division of labour between craftsmen and 
specialisation between firms.  
Question Scale  
What is it particularly important to be good at in order 
to carry out this job? 
Text: 
To what degree would other craftsmen within your firm 
be able to perform the job you are performing here? 
1: All of them 2: Most of 
them 3: Approx. half of 
them  4: Only a few  5: I 
am the only one 
To what degree would craftsmen from your trade but 
from other firms be able to perform the job you are 
performing here? 
1: All of them 2: Most of 
them  3: Approx.  half of 
them  4: Only a few  5: I 
am the only one 
Why do you think that you were assigned to this 
particular job?  
– Particular knowledge about how to execute 
this job.  
– Previous experience working together8. 
– Randomness.  
– Other reasons (e.g. health). 
(5-point Likert Scale for 
each option) 
1: Decisive 2: Very 
important 3: Somewhat 
important 4: Not very 
important 5: Not 
important at all. 
 
 
The first open question aims at identifying the skills involved in the 
working process in order to see, if very specific or general skills were 
stressed. The answers given to these questions were of a mixed quality, 
as it was obvious, that the craftsmen took their skills for granted and 
therefore often did not consider them at all when answering. For 
instance, a carpenter replied, that for this particular activity “it was only 
                                           
8 This of course does not inform us about why a group of people are appointed for a particular job – 
only why people are grouped together in a particular way.   
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important to be strong”, even though the activity to me clearly involved 
several technical skills.  
The next question concerns specialisation within the firm and the third 
specialisation between firms. As it turned out, the answers were very 
uniform (i.e. they replied in favour of no specialisation within or 
between firms) and for that reason, I did not bother the craftsmen with 
these questions for each activity.  
A related question (the fourth) concerns the reasons for delegating 
particular persons to a job. The idea is simply, that different degrees of 
specialisation will result in different criteria used for job delegation. One 
category was left open (“other reasons”). As it turned out, health reasons 
were often mentioned as the reason for job delegation in this category 
(for instance, the senior carpenters were not appointed to the tough (for 
the knees) job of putting down floors).  
Information on these activities has been collected for seven activities 
(three for carpenters, one for plumbers, one for roofing felt contracts, two 
for haulage and hoisting of materials). The limited data set refers to the 
fact, that with respect to the carpenters, the data was supported by 
observations at the workman’s hut in the morning, when jobs were 
delegated. Secondly, the answers given also provided information for 
other activities.  For instance, when specific qualifications were not 
mentioned as a reason for being delegated to the jobs subject to inquiry, 
it would not be logically consistent, if specific qualifications were used 
for delegation of other jobs (because in that case, the specific 
qualifications of not having specific qualifications would be the criteria 
for job delegation).  
Questions on activity variability and activity complexity 
During the case study it was observed how the same craftsmen 
conducted various activities on the roof as well as elsewhere on the 
building project. The exact input and output and to some degree the 
tools and working procedures differed for these activities. Hence, within 
the building project, there is obviously a rather high level of activity 
variability. However, this does not inform us of the level of activity 
variability from one project to another. The first of the following 
question addresses this issue by examining, whether activities that look 
similar from one project to another, actually are alike when it comes to 
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the working process. Question two locates the degree to which the 
sequence of activities differs from one project to another. The idea is to 
check whether sequencing can be the cause of variability even in cases, 
where the outcome in principle is supposed to be the same from one 
project to another.  
 
Question Scale  
If you think of other building projects, where you performed 
an identical job, have you in this particular project been 
influenced to do the job differently from what you expected, 
for instance due to the way previous jobs in this project were 
completed? 
 
1: Not at all., 2: A 
little 3: Some,  4: A 
lot, 5: Completely.   
Is the sequence of jobs in a building project different from one 
project to another – to which degree does the moment, at 
which this particular activity is carried, out differ from one 
project to another? 
 
1: Not at all, 2: A 
little, 3: Some,  4: A 
lot, 5: Completely. 
 
Another set of questions relates to activity complexity as the question 
focuses on the time spent for search and processing of information in 
order to find out how to perform an activity.   
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Question Scale  
How much time do you spend on preparing the job – 
that is finding out how to perform it – compared with 
the time spend actually executing it? 
(5 Point Likert Scale) 
1: Almost all time spent on 
executing it and no time 
spent on planning.  
….. 
5: Almost all time spent on 
planning it and no time 
spent on executing it.   
How many hours do you have to work on this job 
before you feel absolutely confident with it? 
How much time will you save on preparing this job if 
you should repeat it straight away? 
How much faster do you think you will be able to 
perform (preparation included) if you should repeat it 
straight away? 
 
Hours:  
 
1: Nothing 2: A little, 3: 
Some, 4: A lot, 5: 
Completely. 
% :  
 
The first of these two sets of questions relates directly to the time spent 
on planning. The next question is based on the idea, that activities, which 
are not well known to the person who performs it and/or is not easy to 
solve, will take longer to get confident with. Hence, the more hours 
spent on the activity, the higher a task complexity. The last two 
questions are based on the assumption, that the learning curve levels off 
with increased repetition/decreased task complexity. Thus, high values 
reported for question five and six will be considered identical to high 
activity complexity.  
After the three first interviews it turned out that these questions on 
variability and complexity did not work very well. First of all, it became 
clear, that the answers depend very much on the respondent 
expectations. For instance, low values were reported for answer one (the 
activities where not performed very differently from the expectations of 
the craftsmen). At the same time, it was observed, that a range of other 
activities affected the activities studied in a very particular way. When 
the craftsmen were confronted with this, in my view, apparent 
contradiction, the reply, was that they did not consider it to be different 
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from expectations, because they expected it to be different. Likewise, the 
sequence of activities (question two) did not differ much; it always 
differed. And finally, as the craftsmen were used to work with new 
activities (question four), they felt confident with a new - and not very 
well defined concerning the procedure – activity from the beginning. The 
questions of preparing versus executing the activity (question three and 
five) made little sense to the craftsmen, as they appeared to find out how 
to perform the activity, while they performed it. Finally, question five 
and six was difficult to answer due to their hypothetically nature – as the 
craftsmen did not repeat the activities straight away, they did not know 
the impact of repetition from experience.  
For these reasons, even though the answers given can be seen as an 
indirect support of the high task complexity, the estimation of task 
complexity had to be measured by other means. One way is to look at 
the skills and educational level of the craftsmen. Another way is to look 
at the degree and strength of interdependencies, that is, how and how 
much the performance of each activity is affected by other activities (as 
discussed below).  
Questions identifying the interdependence of activities 
One set of basic questions identifies the interdependence of activities. 
Question Scale  
What other jobs in this project affect the execution of 
this job? It can be jobs prior to or after this job.  
Name of 
activities 
 
Having identified the interdependencies, they were specified in 
accordance with the following matrix: 
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Name of activity N 
Kind of dependence  
Activity X 
(5 point likert 
scale) 
Activity Y 
(5 point likert 
scale) 
Activity Z etc 
(5 point likert 
scale) 
Time-dependence    
Material-dependence    
Tool-dependence    
Method-dependence    
Access-dependence    
Damage-dependence    
 
As seen, interdependencies are decomposed into different sub-groups:  
- Time-dependence: the degree to which other activities have to be 
completed before this activity can be commenced;  
- Material-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect which 
materials to use for this activity; 
- Tool-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect which tools 
and equipment to use for performing this activity); 
- Method-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect which 
methods / working procedures to use for this activity; 
- Access-dependence: the degree to which other activities physically 
obstruct the physical accessibility needed for carrying out this 
activity); and  
- Damage-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect the 
quality of the result of this activity, for instance by damaging or 
making the outcome dirty. 
These different kinds of dependencies were observed in the test-study of 
the instalment of windows. 
The answers were given according to a 5-point scale ranging from “not 
dependent at all” to “completely dependent”.   
The dataset consisted of 18 observations (i.e. activities). As 
interdependencies not directly involved in roof production – e.g. 
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activities concerning planning of the roof or completion of other parts of 
the building – were reported on eight occasions, the total number of 
nodes (i.e. activities) in the network is 26.  
A set of additional questions tried to estimate the extent of delays, as 
well as change in working procedures caused by interdependencies. The 
reason for asking these questions is, that information on the existence of 
interdependencies does no not inform us about their impact. The 
interpretation of the answers given to these questions turned out to be 
very difficult. Often, the craftsmen replied that they were not very much 
delayed due to a delay in the completion of previous activities even 
when these were weeks or months behind the official timetable. 
However, as it will be seen in chapter 6, a constant reallocation between 
various activities is an important way of optimising the use of 
manpower. Hence, the craftsmen did not consider themselves to be very 
delayed simply because they did not expect to commence before the 
previous activities were completed. In a similar way, they did not expect 
the input from previous activities to be of a very specific nature.  So, 
even though these questions were abandoned at an early state, their 
“meaninglessness” is important evidence on how coordination in 
construction is done by a “slack” timetable (the deadline for finishing the 
overall house is fixed but the exact sequence of activities is not) and a 
great activity variability.  
An interdependence is a potential source for coordination. Hence, by 
estimating the number of interdependencies, or rather the number of 
different actors involved in activities on which an activity is dependent, 
the number of actors potentially9 involved in the act of coordinating an 
activity with other activities can be assessed.  
Questions identifying the coordination modes used during roof construction 
The final part of the basic questions asked for roofing-activities concern 
the information principles by which activities are coordinated. The 
                                           
9 It is important to stress “potentially” since it in some situations can be desirable to disregard the 
impact of some of the, say, weaker or hardly recognisable interdependencies. This will most likely 
result in higher indirect coordination costs (costs due to a less efficient coordinated state) but will on 
the other hand reduce the cost directly involved in coordination (for instance the cost of identifying 
interdependencies).  
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person performing the activity was asked: “When you carry out this job, 
how do you find out how to do the job?”. The respondents were asked to 
specify the question according to the following matrix:  
 
 
 
Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to conduct 
activity 
W
hen 
to 
con-
duct  
W
hich m
aterials 
to use 
H
ow
 
m
uch 
to 
produce 
H
ow
 
it 
should 
look like 
W
hich 
tools 
to 
use 
H
ow
 to do it 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if in 
doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman          
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm 
         
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management          
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions). 
         
Pricing – using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.  
         
Teaming – talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc.          
Formal rules – Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use).  
         
Social norms 1 – by accessing the task and use my 
experience.  
         
Social norms 2 – not something I think about, I do as I 
always do.  
         
Other 
         
 
The matrix is derived by juxtaposition of the coordination object with 
different coordination modes.  
Coordination objectives represent different areas in which information was 
exchanged. The objectives were identified during the test study of 
instalments of windows and includes information on: Who and when to 
do the activities; which materials to use and the extent of the work (how 
much to produce); the finish (look) of the output (if any further 
requirements than the one given by the materials and the extent of the 
work); and which tools to use and how to do the job. Finally, there is 
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exchange of information with respect to quality control and resolution of 
doubts. 
The typology of coordination modes is an adaptation of the typology of 
Grandori (1997, 2000) (as discussed in chapter 3) customised for 
construction during the test study.  
Besides adjustment in language (making the concepts easier to 
understand for the people on site), the customisation of Grandoris 
typology is based on the following reflections.  
Authority is, according to Grandori, characterised in that a central agent 
makes decisions on, and control of, subordinates’ behaviour. In this 
view, it would be expected, that at the level of the worker (or more 
precisely, the craftsman), authority is characterised by orders, 
commands, instructions and the like (for matter of simplicity 
summarized as “instructions” in the matrix above).  
This approach to authority seems to fit well with the classical statement 
of Coase (1937, p. 404) in which direction includes the right to tell and 
control “when to work (within the hours of service) and when not to 
work, and what work to do and how to do it (within the terms of such 
service)”.10 Based on the case study, I found, that on some occasions 
these instructions were offered by a employee-employer relation within 
the same firm as the craftsmen, i.e. either by “Instructions from foreman” 
and by “Instructions from clerk of works / management of firm”. 
However – in contradiction to Coase’s perception – persons (usually) in 
external firms were also mentioned as a source of directions; more 
precisely, the craftsmen did receive “Instructions from project 
management” and “Instructions from the design architects and 
engineers”. 
As noticed by N. Foss (2000 d, p. 40) “Authority is a dangerous word 
because it is easily invested with a too narrow meaning, for example 
detailed direction and supervision. However, authority also means 
setting boundary conditions for a relation….And ultimately, the 
meaning of being a boss is that one can restrict the decisions of one’s 
                                           
10 As indicated in the brackets, and as later explicated by Simon (in 1951), this right to give orders are 
not unlimited as some constraints between employer and employee is negotiated initially (K. Foss 
2001c). 
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subordinate, overrule him and perhaps fire him. In turn this means, that 
although decision rights may be delegated, we can still trace the chain of 
authority in a firm, and we will always realize that ultimate decision-
making power resides at the top. In this sense, all subordinates’ decision 
rights “are loaned, not owned”…”.  
This note raises three remarks with respect to the present discussion of 
an operationalisation of Grandori’s typology. Firstly, is should be 
acknowledged, that this typology indeed is exposed to the risk of only 
focussing on the more direct elements of authority provided by 
directions and orders. In agreement with N. Foss it was found, that in 
order to understand the role of authority in sofa producing, the 
“boundary conditions” provided by tools, working procedures and dies 
has to be included (see discussion on impersonal authority in chapter 7). 
However, authority by these, and presumably also other, means will 
properly be very difficult to identify by asking, due to their indirect 
character. Other methods for data collection – for instance observations 
and interviews on the degree to which management engage themselves 
in defining such guiding structures - seem to be a less insufficient way of 
assessing these aspects of authority.  
Secondly, it should be noticed that an authority relation might exist 
between two parties without manifesting itself for a specific activity, as 
decision rights can be “loaned” to the subordinate – or coordination by 
“agency”, as Grandori terms it. Since coordination by agency is 
characterised as when information is given by instructions from 
superiors for some activities and not for others, it is not included in the 
matrix on coordination modes used for single activities.  
And finally with respect to the “chain of authority”, it may very well be 
the case, that at the same time as craftsmen receive information via 
instructions from people in external firms, these instructions are 
supported by a set of contracts between the contractor and subcontractor 
(for instance a contract reached during a process of tendering) and 
between the subcontractor and the craftsman. It should, in other words, 
be kept in mind, that the purpose of the coordination matrix is to 
identify information flows (and not contractual relations as such), and 
that the principles used for handling information can change from one 
organisational phase or level to another.  
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According to Grandori, the key characteristic of coordination by price is 
that all transferred information is contained in prices. Based on this 
information, each agent uses his local knowledge on his own productive 
or consumption activity to make an independent decision on what to 
produce, when to produce etc. As emphasised by Grandori (1997), 
pricing is usually supported by other coordination modes. In the case of 
construction, before a subcontractor locally decides on his price for 
performing an assignment, the design team has usually provided tender 
documents or similar descriptions of the extent of the work, deadlines 
etc. Thus, in this matrix coordination by pricing has been made 
equivalent to using the information provided by the contract signed ex 
ante production. 
As “all contracts, with the sole exception of pure spot market contracts, 
contain some instructions, restrictions or are accompanied by orders” (K. 
Foss 2001c), some of the instructions given from architects and engineers 
(referred to as “Authority 4 – instructions from architects and 
engineers””) may in fact relate to these initial contracts. On the other 
hand, due to among other things “ad hoc planning” and “project errors” 
(see chapter 6), it will not be correct to comprise these instructions under 
the label of “pricing”. Since the craftsmen are usually not involved in 
external contractual relations (and consequently do not know the source 
of the instructions), the category “Authority 4…” is likely to contain 
information provided by authority as well as by pricing.   
In coordination by teaming, information is (according to Grandori) 
transferred without any hierarchy, and decisions are made jointly and 
unanimously. In the case study, coordination has been classified as 
teaming when the craftsmen answered, that they obtained information by 
talking directly to and agreeing with the other persons involved in 
production. This category can also contain elements of coordination by 
negotiation as the test study showed, that the difference between 
decisions made unanimously (without conflicts) or jointly (with some 
elements of conflict) is very subtle.     
Coordination by norms and rules is the last of the four pairs of 
coordination modes outlined by Grandori. Here, actions are based on 
knowledge that is common within a given context rather than pertaining 
to calculations of interests and processing of information. Grandori 
defines rules as being formally expressed and thus this is the 
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terminology used here.  In the matrix, rules are exemplified as “using 
general and written line of directions”.  
Norms are perceived as socially defined – i.e. they are not formally 
expressed. In the matrix, they have been split into two in order to 
distinguish, how ingrained they are in people possessing them (and 
hence how much information processing there is involved). Some norms 
need to be activated by a conscious effort (“by accessing the task and use 
my experience”) whereas others are so deeply rooted that no estimation 
is required (“not something I think about, I do as I always do”).   
The interviewed people could answer on the use of coordination modes 
and coordination objectives on a five-point likert scale (1: Not at all, 2: 
only to a small extent, 3: to some extent, 4: to a large extent, and 
5:completely).  The dataset on coordination modes for the roof case 
consisted of reports on 12 activities. Eight activities performed by 
carpenters (construction of roof houses, making heads, erection of 
rafters, installing edge strip, covering rafters with wooden plates, 
wooden frame for eternit-covering, installing gratings, installing plates 
of eternity); one activity by the crane driver (delivery and hoisting of 
building materials); one activity by the roofing felt contractor (making 
the roofing felt); one activity by the ventilation contractor (installing 
ventilating plant on roof); and one activity by the plumber (installing the 
gutter). Notice that for practical reasons I was not able to make reports 
for coordination modes used by producers of the carcass and by the 
surveyor.  
As seen, the matrix used for the question on coordination modes 
contains information about the place of employment. Hence, besides 
informing us about the coordination modes used during construction, 
the matrix also contains information on the organisation of coordination (i.e. 
the degree to which it is done within or between firms).  
The questions presented so far only describe the present use of 
coordination modes. The degree to which these modes ensure little 
indirect and direct coordination costs and hence the degree to which 
they are the best of alternatives, is not addressed. In order to probe into 
this aspect, a set of additional questions explored, how satisfied the 
craftsmen were with the used coordination modes and if they could 
think of better alternatives. And if “yes”, what in their opinion prevented 
these alternatives from being realised. It turned out, that these additional 
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questions were very difficult to ask for each of the 18 activities. First of 
all, they are very “time-consuming” and not easy to fit into the natural 
breaks. Secondly, in order to answer, the respondents have to 
understand the typology I used on coordination modes – again the 
possibilities of explaining these on top of the roof while the craftsmen 
tried to follow the pace of the piece work contract was limited. 
Furthermore, it did not give the respondents room for expressing 
themselves in terms with which they were familiar. Consequently, I 
addressed these questions in a more open manner on occasions were 
there was room for talking. In particular, this was possible, with the 
carpenters with whom I socialised the most.  
Additional questions 
Finally, a set of additional questions relates to innovation within (“Have 
you, in this or previous projects, changed the way you carry out this 
job?”), between (“Have you, in this or previous projects, changed the 
way you interact with others when carrying out this job?”) or in 
neighbouring activities (“Have you experienced that people in 
neighbouring activities, in this or previous projects, have changed the 
way they carry out their job?”). If an innovation was identified, its nature 
(“Is it a product or process innovation?”) and its origin (“Who got the 
idea and how did the innovation develop?”) was investigated. However, 
since innovation is not a core feature in this dissertation and since initial 
inquiries did not find evidence of any innovations, these questions were 
not considered systematically.   
 
4.7. Explorative and explanatory case studies and strategies for 
data analysis 
Different strategies can be used in order to analyse the data collected 
during a case study. As the choice of analytical strategies depends very 
much on the type of the case study, let me briefly explicate the status of 
the case study used here. 
Ultimately, the case study on roof construction aims at being explanatory 
– I would like to explain why certain coordination modes are used 
during the construction process (recall the overall research question). 
However, before this question can be addressed, knowledge on the 
existing coordination practices has to be acquired; for instance “what are 
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the coordination modes currently used during construction?” or “who 
are the major actors partaking in coordination?”. Hence, the case study is 
to some degree also explorative. This explorative element reflects, that the 
existing empirical knowledge on coordination practices (understood in 
an information-perspective) is limited.  
Due to this relatively “immature” state of current empirical and 
theoretical research on the issues considered here, it is difficult, as well 
as undesirable to develop very specific hypotheses or propositions ex 
ante the field work (Yin 1989). Rather, the theoretical framework can and 
should point out some concepts and trade-offs, that are likely to be of 
relevance for the empirical analysis. This theoretical framework can then 
be compared and contrasted with the empirical findings during and after 
the case study is conducted (Eisenhardt 1989).  
As this suggests, in the work at hand, there is a rather close interplay 
between theoretical and empirical reflections. Rather than first 
developing theory, then collecting data and then doing the analysis, to a 
large extent the theoretical and empirical reflections co-evolve. In this 
thesis, this is reflected in two ways. Firstly, some of the empirical 
insights are taken on board from the very beginning (e.g. in the research 
questions). And accordingly, the theoretical chapters (chapter 2 and 3) 
are to some degree targeted at understanding coordination in a setting 
typical to construction. Secondly, propositions have not been developed 
during the theoretical part. Rather, the theoretical part has been used for 
developing a framework that points out some potentially central 
concepts and causalities.   
Thus, a strategy for analysing data relying on theoretical propositions has 
not been found useful for this case study. As an alternative, a case 
description has been used for presenting and analysing the case data in 
chapter 6 (Yin 1989).  
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Chapter 5 – Unstable markets and non-repetitiveness in 
relations of firms and individuals 
 
5.1. Introduction – non-repetitiveness in markets and firms  
In the theoretical part is was argued that repetition of activities and 
working constellations is important to the way coordination is organised 
within or between firms, and how it is handled by different coordination 
modes. It has further been claimed that construction faces low degrees of 
repetition on these dimensions at least partly due to change in overall 
demand. The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate this claim by 
analysing the way fluctuations at the sector level appear to propagate 
into the levels of firms and individuals.1 Further, the chapter will provide 
the first empirical indications on the organisational responses to these 
fluctuations; in particular the existence of trades, craft production and 
trilateral coordination.  
Thus, this chapter illustrates how change (i.e. lack of repetition) at one 
level can trigger change at other levels. In the following some evidence is 
given on how lack of repetition at the level of the market (between value 
chains) seemingly creates lack of repetition at the single building project 
(within a value chain). This emphasises why coordination of activities 
involved in a single product cannot be understood without considering 
the way coordination is done between products.  
The content of the empirical part of the thesis is structured according to 
the interplay between changes in markets and in the single building 
project. This chapter starts by considering change at the market level and 
give some ideas of how these changes flow into changes at the level of 
firms and individuals. As part of this, the chapter provides sector-wide 
evidence on organisational responses – in particular relating to 
                                           
1 In the following, I will assume that change in demand largely determines change in supply and not 
the other way around. This assumption may be justified for this particular sector with reference to the 
existence of many small firms presumably having none or extremely little possibilities to affect prices. 
Even though this chapter analyses how the macro-level impacts on less aggregate levels, it should not 
be ignored that in some situations processes at the micro level can also affect the macro-level 
(Coleman and Hao1989). For instance, changes in aggregate demand implies less specialisation at the 
level of firms and individuals which in turn, as suggested in the discussion in chapter 8, creates a 
system characterised by little overall innovation.   
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specialisation and the division of labour – taken by construction firms. 
Chapter 6, in which an example of roof construction is analysed, is fully 
devoted to understanding coordination at the level of the single building 
project.  
The data on fluctuations on the market level are mainly derived from 
ordinary statistical reviews. The hitherto untold story on how firms and 
individuals are affected by, and coping with, these market changes is 
told by using data from a unique Danish database covering all 
companies in Denmark. Thus, all figures and tables in this chapter relate to 
the Danish Construction sector.  
Several reasons to why demand for construction products fluctuates 
significantly can be given. Some highlight the durability of construction 
products. As the production of these items is small compared to the total 
stock, small variations in demand for the finalised products create big 
variations in the need for building activities (V. Smith 1999, p.p. 402-403). 
Secondly, investments with long durability are more sensitive to 
expectations on interest and inflation rates, which themselves are 
fluctuating. Furthermore, construction is also encouraged or discouraged 
by the political responses taken to administer trends in for instance, 
employment, trade-balances, and governmental expenditures and 
incomes. Hence political responses sometimes smoothen, but other times 
accelerate the fluctuations of an unregulated market (Wendt 1992).  
Furthermore, if people make systematic errors about future market 
conditions, endogenous cycles in demand can occur (Wheaton 1999).  
The conditions triggering change in demand are important to have in 
mind in order to locate industries that might share some of the following 
characteristics of construction. As pointed out in chapter 2, other reasons 
than markets to change outside the realm of the single value chain can be 
imagined: (a) unstable specifications of the product (e.g. customised 
production), (b) unstable technology, or (c) variable materials or seasonal 
changes (Stinchcombe 1990). Hence, the lessons learned in this and the 
following chapter on how coordination is coped with in situations of low 
repetitiveness might be of relevance to activities within many different 
industries.  
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5.2. Non-repetitiveness on sector level 
Consider the development in number of people working in different 
industries shown in figure 1. Here the well-known claim (Bishop 1975, 
Hillebrandt 1975 and Hillebrandt et al 1995, Kommissionen 1997, V. 
Smith 1999, Miozzo and Ivory 2000, Bang 2002) becomes visible: 
construction stands out by having periods of high degrees of expansion 
as well as contraction. This unlike other industries facing stable growth 
or decline in employment (finance and agriculture etc. respectively) or 
industries having more permanent levels of employment (the remaining 
industries).  
Figure 1: Employment in all sectors 1985-99 (1985=100)2 
Source: Statistical ten-year review 2000 
                                           
2 The data from the IDA-database used later in this chapter covers the period 1981-98. Hence, it would 
be preferable to show change in employment from 1981 and onwards and not start with 1985. 
However, there is a break in data in the general data from 1984 to 1985. A figure on employment 
trends from 1981-1992 is shown in figure 1 in appendix C.   
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Figure 1 displays the long-term changes in the number of people 
working in the different sectors. However, if the changes from one year 
to another are considered, the magnitude of shifts in employment in 
construction is probably even more striking (figure 2). The average of the 
absolute value of annual employment changes in the period 1985-99 is 
4,4% for construction whereas it is 2,2% for manufacturing firms. 
Furthermore, it also takes on very different values from one year to 
another. For instance construction firms had to lay off approximately 4% 
of its workforce in 1994 only to expand by approximately 8% the 
following year. 
Figure 2: Change in employment from previous year  (percentage 
points) - all sectors 1985-99 
Source: Statistical ten-year review 2000 
Taking a more fine-grained look at fluctuations would display even 
higher degrees of fluctuation in employment in construction due to its 
seasonal character. Seasonal data for building and construction in 
Denmark from 1993 to 1999 illustrates that the aggregate turnover drops 
with approximately one third from the summer to winter (Danske 
Entreprenører 2000)3.  
                                           
3 This phenomenon must of course be assumed to be highly dependent on the climate. However, it 
should be taken into account that the Danish Government for many years has given extra financial 
support to building projects performed during wintertime hence reducing the seasonal impact of the 
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Importantly, the different trades all follow the general trend in 
employment, that is if employment goes down in, say, plumbing firms, it 
also goes down in, say, carpenter firms (figure 3).4  
Figure 3:Employment of wage earners and working masters in the 
private construction sector - different trades 1985-99 (1985=100)5 
Source: Statistical ten-year review 2000 
The fluctuations in supplied labour obviously relate to changes in 
demand. The harsh fluctuations at the level of the industry and of the 
                                                                                                                                   
climate.  
4 The figure also displays an overall trend where, if the importance of fluctuations in overall demand 
is omitted, more people constantly are employed in especially electrician firms, but also contractor 
firms, and less people are employed in bricklaying firms.  
5 Unlike the two previous figures, in this and the following figure, owners, salary earners and other 
employees are not included. Furthermore, the principles for counting differs as well Thus, the trend in 
overall employment in figure 1 and 2 cannot necessarily be identical to the overall trend in figure 3 
and 4 (in fact it is different as figure 1 and 2 display a 10% increase in the period 1985-99, whereas 
figure 3 and 4 display status quo for the similar period).   
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trades indicate that up- and downswings in different segments of the 
market only to a very limited degree counterbalance each other.  
Additional data seems to support this reflection.  
Concerning the type of construction, house building, construction works 
(roads, bridges etc.) and other types of construction all follow the general 
trend in employment. Maintenance on the other hand is less associated 
with overall fluctuations (figure 4). However the relation is not 
supplementary (maintenance is not reinforced when other construction 
activities go down). This clearly limits the degree to which construction 
firms can keep up employment by moving from one kind of construction 
work to another.  
Figure 4: Employment of employees and employers masters in the 
private construction sector - different types of construction 1985-99 
(1985=100) 
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Source: Statistical ten-year review 2000 
If we focus solely on house building (multi-unit houses, single-family 
houses, terraced houses, offices, summer houses, and other types of 
houses), the picture is the same: fluctuations are synchronised and 
roughly of the same relative size (figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Completed m2  – different types of house building 1985-99 
(1985=100)6 
Source: Statistical ten-year review 2000 
Concerning spatial variations in demand, rough statistical data once 
again indicates a very uniform pattern (Figure 6).  
                                           
6 Two and three family houses represent in average only 6,8% of completed m2 in the period 1985-98.  
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Figure 6: Completed m2 in construction - Different regions (1988=100) 
in Denmark 
Source: Statistical ten-year review 2000 
Obviously, this figure does not inform us of the potential for reducing 
the impacts of market fluctuations by entering foreign markets. 
According to the VAT statistics, construction firms only do this to a very 
limited degree: in 1996, exports represented less than 4% of the turnover 
of construction firms (43% for manufacturing firms) (Statistisk Årbog 
1998, Table 355). Similarly, within the EU, construction imports from 
other EU-countries represented app. 3% of all public construction 
activities and close to 0% from countries outside EU (Kommissionen 
1997).7 
In balance, compared with other sectors, changes in demand are very 
severe in construction. The fluctuations in different segments of a market 
                                           
7 There are two alternative explanations to the low level of export (a) it is difficult to enter foreign 
markets or (b) there is nothing to gain from it as would be the case if for instance they co-oscillated. 
Without going into details, experiences from Danish contractors exporting to Germany during the 
boom of the 1990s illustrates that entering even neighbouring markets indeed is very difficult (Skaates 
2001). On the other hand, concerning ad b, one of the explicit reasons mentioned by the large Swedish 
contractors (notably NCC and Skanska) for expanding their activities in Denmark, was that the 
national differences in demand would smoothen out their total turnover.   
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with limited extent of the market make it difficult for construction firms 
to keep a constant level of employment.  
 
5.3. Non-repetitiveness on firm level 
Some basic information on construction firms in comparison with 
manufacturing firms is provided in Table 1. 
As seen, the number of construction firms roughly equals the number of 
manufacturing firms, but since construction firms are much smaller with 
respect to employees, construction “only” constitutes 20-25% of the 
manufacturing workforce (and approximately 4% of the total workforce).  
Furthermore, the table is also evidence of a different long-term 
development in size. To a certain degree (as I shall return to later in the 
chapter) this can be explained by a higher turnover of construction firms, 
but also construction firms established at the same time as other 
manufacturing firms exhibit considerably lower growth rates. For 
instance, the number of full-time employees in 1998 for firms established 
in exactly 1981 was 28,95 for construction firms and 155,39 for all 
manufacturing firms (IDA-database, own inquiries 2001). Presumably, 
this development is, at least partly, associated with different trends in 
the ratio of capital and labour – an issue on which the IDA-database 
unfortunately does not shed much light.8  
                                           
8 For instance, there is no information of the total turnover of each employee (a higher turnover of 
each employee could be taken as a proxy for higher capital-to-labour ratio). Merging the IDA-database 
with account-data could be a promising way to overcome these shortcomings.  
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Table 1: Number of firms9, firm size10 and total employees in 
construction and manufacturing11 - 1981-98 
 Construction Manufacturing 
Year 
Number of 
firms 
Average  
full-time 
employees 
Total  
full-time 
employees 
Number of
firms 
Average  
full-time  
employees 
Total  
full-time 
employees 
1981 21285 5,08 108128 23796 16,33 388589 
1989 18601 6,84 127231 23392 18,14 424331 
1992 16983 5,96 101219 22201 18,1 401838 
1995 16507 7,17 118355 20440 20,54 419838 
1998 17155 7,45 127805 19283 21,65 417477 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
But the table also tells us something about the main question of this 
chapter: how do construction firms cope with the demand fluctuations at 
the sector level? Basically, adjustment to changes in overall demand (as 
expressed by number of employees) can take place by two different 
means: by adjusting (a) the size of firms and (b) the number of firms. The 
                                           
9 If nothing else is stated, a firm represents a working-place (“arbejdssted”) with people employed by 
ultimo November for the relevant year. A working-place is not identical to business units registered for 
VAT settlement (“momsregistrerede virksomheder”).  As the working place is a geographical related 
concept, a business unit with subsidiaries (but not, say, a construction firm working on building 
projects in different parts of the country) can contain more than one working-place. On the other 
hand, firms that have no people employed by ultimo November will not be counted as a working-
place. For both manufacturing and construction the number of business units is more than 50% higher 
than the number of working places in 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998, suggesting that the effect of not 
having people employed in November by far exceeds the effect of subsidiaries. Further, the ratio is 
more constant in manufacturing than in construction, which potentially indicates that in periods of 
recession, construction firms (defined as business units) are dormant but not necessarily closed down.  
10 Employees are measured as full-time employees. For instance, a person only working half time is 
counted as half an employee.  
11 If nothing else is stated, according to the general categorisation of Statistics of Denmark, 
construction firms have been defined as Nace-code 451100-455000 and manufacturing by Nace-code 
151000-372000. However, in the inquiries for this table, Nace-code 401000-410000 (“Electricity, Water 
and Gas supply”) was included as part of manufacturing. Due to the limited size of firms and 
employees in electricity, water and gas (in 1998 approximately 4% of full time employees and 8% of 
working places), the impact of including this group in manufacturing is very limited.  
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use of these two means within construction and manufacturing 
industries is shown in figure 7.  
Figure 7: Change in number of firms, firm-size and total employees in 
construction (red) and manufacturing (black) 1981-98 (1981=100) 
IDA-database: Own inquiries 2001 
For manufacturing firms, the story seems rather straightforward: they 
become bigger and fewer. Even the overall increase in employees 
witnessed from 1981-89 and 1992-95 cannot outweigh this tendency. For 
construction, the story is less clear-cut since there are periods of 
increasing and decreasing firm size as well as ups and downs in the 
number of firms. However, the divergence can to a large degree be 
explained in different levels of change in overall employment rather than 
different ways of handling these. For both construction firms and 
manufacturing firms applies (although to a different degree) that in 
periods of mild up and downswings firms become larger and fewer. In 
periods of more extreme variations this tendency can be 
counterbalanced, causing increasing number of firms or decreasing firm 
size.  
With respect to the survival and emergence of single firms, the observed 
pattern in figure 7 suggests that due to higher levels of fluctuations, the 
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turnover of firms is higher within construction than within 
manufacturing industries. Or put bluntly, more construction firms will 
die because there are more periods of step recession and more 
construction firms will be established because there are more periods of 
rapid upswings. Rather than having a constant thinning out of an 
existing stock of companies as in manufacturing industries, construction 
has a high number of exits and entries. Hence, construction firms are in 
general younger than manufacturing firms (figure 8).  
Figure 8: Year of establishment for construction and manufacturing 
firms (1998=100) 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
The difference in age for construction versus manufacturing firms varies 
with the regional area. In general firms are younger in Zealand than in 
Funen and Jutland. However this impact is not as big for manufacturing 
as for construction. Thus, it is in particular in Zealand that the year of 
establishment differs between construction and manufacturing firms.  
Yet, the difference in year of establishment in manufacturing versus  
construction is significant in all three regions (see Figure 2 in Appendix 
C). 
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over time. However, even if only firms of the same age are considered, 
construction is characterised by many small firms (figure 9).  
Figure 9: Size (full time employees) of construction and manufacturing 
firms established in 1981 and in 1989 
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IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
As observed here, both construction and manufacturing firms doubled 
their size from 1981-1998 as well as from 1989-98. However, as 
construction firms are only a third or half of the size of manufacturing 
firms in the year of establishment (i.e. in 1981 and 1989 respectively), the 
growth in absolute terms is much smaller. Furthermore, in the period of 
recession from 1989-92, construction firms established in 1981 actually 
decreased in size. Reasons for the existence of many small firms in 
construction are further discussed in chapter 8. One of several potential 
explanations pointed out here relates to the specific role that the 
construction firm takes (or rather does not take) in coordination. As 
argued in chapter 2, a high level of external change limits the potentials 
from integrating subsequent activities within the firm. Unlike 
manufacturing firms in general, it would be expected that construction 
firms work at low costs even when only performing a single activity 
“here and there” in the value chain.  Thus, the small growth in firm size 
is perhaps a sign of bilateral and trilateral coordination.  
Even though the main difference between construction and other kinds 
of manufacturing presumably is within entries of firms, construction is 
also above average concerning exits. If we look at the stock of companies 
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in 1981, 28,4% was alive by the end of 1997. For manufacturing firms, the 
figure is 33,0% (Table 2). As smaller firms have lower survival rates than 
larger ones, this difference can to a large degree be explained by the 
relatively large ratio of small firms in construction. In fact, for medium 
sized (5-24 employees) firms, the survival of construction firms is higher 
than for manufacturing firms (see table 3 in appendix C).    
Table 2: Survival of construction and manufacturing12 firms - 1981-9713 
 Construction firms Manufacturing firms 
 
Year 
In business % Survived % change from 
previous year 
In business % Survived % change from 
previous year 
Start 1981 21285 100,0% 23795 100,0%  
End 1981 17650 82,9% -17,1% 20857 87,7% -12,3% 
1982 15429 72,5% -12,6% 18862 79,3% -9,6% 
1983 14126 66,4% -8,4% 17481 73,5% -7,3% 
1984 13034 61,2% -7,7% 16365 68,8% -6,4% 
1985 12198 57,3% -6,4% 15346 64,5% -6,2% 
1986 11492 54,0% -5,8% 14516 61,0% -5,4% 
1987 10833 50,9% -5,7% 13561 57,0% -6,6% 
1988 10141 47,6% -6,4% 12826 53,9% -5,4% 
1989 9468 44,5% -6,6% 12002 50,4% -6,4% 
1990 8786 41,3% -7,2% 11255 47,3% -6,2% 
1991 8206 38,6% -6,6% 10605 44,6% -5,8% 
1992 7675 36,1% -6,5% 9996 42,0% -5,7% 
1993 7210 33,9% -6,1% 9477 39,8% -5,2% 
1994 6861 32,2% -4,8% 8920 37,5% -5,9% 
1995 6555 30,8% -4,5% 8552 35,9% -4,1% 
1996 6290 29,6% -4,0% 8201 34,5% -4,1% 
1997 6052 28,4% -3,8% 7857 33,0% -4,2% 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.   
It is surprising that the decease of construction is almost constant in the 
period from, say, 1985 to 1993 taking into account that this period covers 
                                           
12 Nace 151000-410000. 
13 A Mantel-Haenzel test shows that the difference in survival rates between manufacturing and 
construction is significant (p<0.0001, df=1) 
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a clear upswing period (1985-1988) and downswing period (1988-1994). 
This supports the observation that construction firms are organised in a 
way that allows them to survive market fluctuations.  
Nonetheless, to some degree the survival rates differ according to the 
initial year, assumedly due to the demand fluctuations. In table 3, the 
1989 stock of construction and manufacturing firms are considered. After 
nine years (in 1997) 48,7% of the firms are left, whereas the same figure 
for 1981-89 is 44,5%. For manufacturing firms survival rates seems more 
stable (50,4% and 50,6% for 1981-89 and 1989-97 respectively).  
Table 3: Survival of construction and manufacturing14 firms - 1989-9715 
 Construction firms Manufacturing firms 
 
Year 
In 
business 
Survived % change from  
previous year 
In 
business 
Survived % change from  
previous year 
Start1989 18601 100,0% 23392 100,0%
End 1989 15909 85,5% -14,5% 20496 87,6% -12,4%
1990 14069 75,6% -11,6% 18518 79,2% -9,7%
1991 12780 68,7% -9,2% 16989 72,6% -8,3%
1992 11723 63,0% -8,3% 15705 67,1% -7,6%
1993 10911 58,7% -6,9% 14608 62,4% -7,0%
1994 10327 55,5% -5,4% 13656 58,4% -6,5%
1995 9846 52,9% -4,7% 12995 55,6% -4,8%
1996 9423 50,7% -4,3% 12409 53,0% -4,5%
1997 9052 48,7% -3,9% 11845 50,6% -4,5%
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
Both table 2 and table 3 show that, unsurprisingly, “in the long run we 
are all dead”. However, seen from a (not to farsighted) firm point of 
view, the risk of a firm with whom one collaborates disappearing the 
following year, is not only higher in the construction sector, it is 
probably also more difficult to predict from past experience. 
The closure of a firm can take different forms. As seen in Table 4, more 
than 80% of the closures for construction as well as for manufacturing 
                                           
14 Nace 151000-410000. 
15 A Mantel-Haenzel test shows that the difference in survival rates between manufacturing and 
construction is significant (p<0.0001, df=1) 
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firms are final in the sense that the firm is not maintained by being 
(partially) transferred to another firm or into a company with no 
employees. If keeping up a relations with employees in a new firm or 
keeping up relations with a person working on his own is considered to 
be two sides of the same coin, in this respect, it is not particularly 
difficult to establish long-term working relations in construction.   
Table 4: Identity of deceased firms 1981-98 (%) 
 Construction firms Manufacturing firms 
Closed down 82,77 81,05 
Absorbed by another firm16 7,71 13,57 
Changed to company (in same 
industry) without employees. 
8,19 3,65 
Other  1,33 1,73 
Total  100 100 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
Even if an important part of the adjustment in construction takes place 
by adjusting the number of firms, the fluctuations for firm size are also 
higher for construction compared with manufacturing firms. This 
becomes evident if we look at the distribution of the change of 
employment for each firm measured for the previous (Table 5) and 
subsequent (Table 6) year. 
                                           
16 At least 30% and two employees transferred to new firm i.e. a new working-place).  
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Table 5: Distribution of change in employees - % growth for previous 
year 
1981 1989 1992 1995 1998 Average 
Construction 
firms 
 
Quartile  
90% 167 180 171 168 162 169,6
75% (Q3) 111 120 119 122 120 118,4
50% 100 100 100 100 100 100
25% (Q1) 69 79 77 85 86 79,2
10% 50 50 50 58 63 54,2
Q3-Q1 42 41 42 37 34 39,2
90%-10% 117 130 121 110 99 115,4
  
Manufacturing firms 
 
Quartile  
90% 150 150 145 150 144 147,8
75% (Q3) 114 117 111 116 113 114,2
50% 100 100 100 100 100 100
25% (Q1) 83 88 85 91 90 87,4
10% 57 63 63 66 70 63,8
Q3-Q1 31 29 26 25 23 26,8
90%-10% 93 87 82 84 74 84
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Unstable markets and non-repetitiveness  154 
Table 6: Distribution of change in employees - % growth for 
subsequent year 
1981 1989 1992 1995 Average 
Construction 
firms 
 
Quartile  
90% 200 157 200 171 182
75% (Q3) 120 113 125 125 120,75
50% 100 100 100 100 100
25% (Q1) 75 75 80 88 79,5
10% 50 50 50 66 54
Q3-Q1 45 38 45 37 41,25
90%-10% 150 107 150 105 128
 
Manufacturing firms 
 
Quartile  
90% 150 150 141 144 146,25
75% (Q3) 116 115 109 112 113
50% 100 100 100 100 100
25% (Q1) 86 86 83 88 85,75
10% 61 63 60 66 62,5
Q3-Q1 30 29 26 24 27,25
90%-10% 89 87 81 78 83,75
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
For all years, the pattern is the same. Construction firms face higher 
degrees of change in hiring and firing from one year to another. In 
average, one quarter of the manufacturing firms expand their size with 
13% or more (the 75% quartile) and another quarter reduce their size 
with approximately 14% or more (the 25% quartile). In construction, 
change in number of employees is more profound, as the values of the 
75% and 25% quartiles show an approximately 21% increase and 
decrease respectively. As also seen in the tables, in average for the four 
years, 10% of construction firms had to expand their number of full-time 
employees by 82% or more and similarly 10% of construction had to 
reduce their number of full-time employees to almost half (54%) or more 
(the same figures for manufacturing firms are 46,25% and 62,5%).  
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As illustrated in figure 10 the conclusion is also valid if the limited size 
of construction firms (as reported in table 1) is taken into account. In this 
figure, the distribution of change from the previous year in number of 
employees for individual firms has been compared for firms with 1-9 
employees17. In all years, a relatively high proportion of manufacturing 
firms are concentrated around the value of 100 (i.e. with no change or 
little change in size), whereas construction firms are concentrated 
around low or high values (i.e. with a large reduction or increase in 
number of employees respectively). 
Figure 10: Change in number of employees from previous year - 
distribution for construction firms minus distribution for 
manufacturing firms, firms with 1-9 employees 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
                                           
17 This group is a not weighted average of the group of 1-4 and 5-9 employees irrespectively. As these 
two sub-groups did not differ much with respect to change in employees, for illustrative matters they 
have been joined.    
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5.4. Non-repetitiveness at the individual level 
Naturally, change in number of employees is also reflected in the 
mobility of the employees. In spite of identical ages of individuals (in 
1996 the average age was 37,83 and 38,64 for people in construction firms 
and all other sectors respectively (inquiries by Maskell 1998)) people 
have less seniority in construction firms as seen in figure 11 (the 
difference has been found to be significant with p<0,0001, chi-
square=6557, df=18). 
Figure 11: Year of employment for employees in construction and 
manufacturing firms 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
 
If the difference in distribution of men and women is compensated for 
(women represent 10,07% of the employees in construction and 31,35% 
of the employees in manufacturing) by comparing only year of 
employment for men, the difference between construction and 
manufacturing is slightly greater (see figure 4 in appendix C). 
Furthermore, there are some regional variations in year of employment, 
but as this affects both construction and manufacturing (see figure 3 in 
appendix C), the difference for the investigated counties does not appear 
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To some degree, the findings on year of employment can be explained by 
the fact that construction firms in general are younger which obviously 
puts an upper limit for the seniority obtainable. However, if we in 1998 
consider the time of employment for companies established in exactly 
1981, construction workers still have a higher mobility than people 
employed in manufacturing firms (Figure 12).  
Figure 12: Year of employment of individuals for firms established 
1981 - Construction and manufacturing firms 1998 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
The resulting flows of employees are shown in table 7. In total, 
approximately a third of the employees of the total workforce is entering 
and / or leaving a construction firm for each of the five registered years 
compared with only one out of four in manufacturing. 
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Table 7: People entering a construction firm in previous year or 
leaving a construction firm the subsequent year18 
Construction 1981 % 1989 % 1992 % 1995 % 1998 % 
Entering 38693 32,2% 47402 33,0% 36020 31,8% 42694 33,3% 42349 31,2% 
Leaving 43669 36,3% 50099 34,9% 39868 35,2% 38522 30,1%   
No. of employees 120267 143463 113151 128050 135563 
Manufacturing 
Entering 107029 24,9% 126795 26,9% 107062 24,0% 118375 26,6% 108517 24,3% 
Leaving 104878 24,4% 128073 27,1% 117731 26,4% 115327 25,9%   
No. of employees 429114 472072 446732 445617 445787 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
 
5.5. Indications of organisation in trades, craft production and 
trilateral coordination 
It is noteworthy, in table 7, that the level of people entering or leaving 
construction firms is higher than manufacturing and approximately at 
the same level for all of the five observed years, even though some of 
these years represent upswings and others downswings. This suggests 
that the high mobility is not a direct response to market fluctuations. An 
alternative explanation is that the mobility is caused by organisation in 
trades. As argued in chapter 2, groups (=trades) of people with 
homogenous capabilities can be a way to reduce on coordination costs in 
environments where external changes do not favour long-lasting 
relations between specific persons or firms. As people belonging to the 
same trade do not specialise, they can enter a new firm with low 
switching costs (clearly exemplified in the case study in the next 
chapter). Thus, the high mobility within construction observed in table 7 
could be caused by the trade organisation. That mobility in construction 
                                           
18 For instance in 1981, 108127 persons were employed in a construction company. In 1980, 40040 of 
these people were not found in the same company and similarly, in 1982, 45885 were not found in the 
same company as in 1981. The movement can be within or in and out of the construction sector.    
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is not limited to any particular educational group further indicates the 
pervasiveness of the trade organisation.19  
The balance between in- and outflow of the sector is rather obviously 
affected by whether the construction sector is in a period of expansion or 
not. The adjustment of the total workforce in construction is made 
feasible due to a dense exchange of labour located outside the sector. In 
1995, approximately 40% of the people leaving or entering a construction 
firm was going to or coming from a firm outside the construction sector. 
In manufacturing the figure is approximately 45%.20 Again, the pattern 
does not seem to be highly influenced by educational backgrounds: both 
skilled and unskilled people leave and enter the construction sector. 
Consequently, a somewhat surprisingly high number of people educated 
as craftsmen are employed in non-constructing firms (34% for 
bricklayers, 53% for carpenters, 50% for plumbers, 41% for painters, and 
60% for electricians).  
Apparently, a craftsman education has a rather wide applicability. With 
this in mind, the low degree of penetration of people with one craftsman 
education into different types of construction firms is remarkable. Or put 
differently, the degree to which construction firms mix professionals is 
very low (table 8). 21 In fact, it is more likely to find an auto-mechanic 
than a plumber in a carpentry-firm.    
                                           
19 It could be imagined that the high mobility in construction was caused by a small group of 
extremely mobile workers, filling in the gaps in manpower, whereas the large majority of people 
working in the sector were as fixed as in other industries. However, at least concerning educational 
level, the mobility does not appear to be limited to a sub-group: unskilled people are only slightly 
more mobile than skilled workers. In 1998 people with public school or less represent 31% of the 
workforce, which fits rather well with their share of people leaving and entering a construction firm 
(33% and 35% respectively).  
20 The data on destination industry are rather incomplete (in 1995 not known for 37,5% for the people 
leaving manufacturing and 28,1% of the people leaving construction. This residual group has been 
distributed to the different industries according to the respective size of the known values (in other 
words, it is assumed, that the errors are distributed randomly across the industries).  
21 Table 8 was constructed in order to see, if there were any systematic patterns in the companies that 
survive. It was hoped, that the figure would illustrate, that construction companies integrating several 
educational backgrounds (which could be seen as a proxy for firms integrating a string of activities 
into a single firms) performed poorly compared with “pure” (with respect to education) firms. 
However, for both surviving and deceased firms non-pure firms are very rare, and hence, it was not 
possible to investigate this hypothesis by this approach.   
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Table 8: Educational background of employees and sector employment 
- 1981(bold letters = match between education and employment) 
 
 Surviving firms (1981-98) Deceased firms (1981-98) 
 
Domain of  
education 
Industry:
Education: 
Bricklayers Carpenters Plumbers Electricians Bricklayers Carpenters Plumbers Electricians 
 Public school or less 37,47% 28,14% 31,59% 34,28%
22
34,25% 27,05% 30,10% 31,66%
Bricklaying Bricklayer 46,77% 0,88% 0,06% 0,00% 45,97% 0,72% 0,06% 0,03%
Carpent. 2,06% 44,76% 0,19% 0,06% 2,78% 43,69% 0,28% 0,10%
Joiner 0,15% 11,85% 0,00% 0,00% 0,56% 12,79% 0,06% 0,00%Carpentry 
Cabinet m 0,11% 1,85% 0,00% 0,00% 0,09% 2,04% 0,00% 0,00%
Plumb. 1 0,07% 0,04% 13,32% 0,03% 0,08% 0,03% 10,91% 0,00%
Plumb. 2 0,04% 0,00% 14,28% 0,00% 0,06% 0,01% 14,70% 0,00%
Plumb. tech 0,15% 0,00% 9,55% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 7,64% 0,00%
Smith 1 0,04% 0,02% 2,56% 0,00% 0,11% 0,03% 11,06% 0,10%
Smith 2 0,15% 0,00% 3,16% 0,03% 0,02% 0,00% 1,85% 0,00%
Plumbing  
Smith 3 0,00% 0,00% 5,01% 0,03% 0,06% 0,01% 3,05% 0,03%
Electric. 0,07% 0,04% 0,35% 32,47% 0,17% 0,10% 0,59% 29,14%
Electricity 
El. techn. 0,04% 0,04% 0,38% 21,89% 0,08% 0,01% 0,43% 25,56%
Building tech 0,59% 1,03% 0,06% 0,00% 0,56% 0,89% 0,06% 0,00%
Mechanic 0,22% 0,06% 2,65% 0,06% 0,32% 0,10% 3,08% 0,06%
Auto mec 0,37% 0,21% 0,57% 0,09% 0,45% 0,18% 0,74% 0,03%
Other  
Other 11,72% 11,07% 16,26% 11,04% 14,44% 12,33% 15,40% 13,28%
 In total 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
Source: IDA database, own inquiries 2001.  
As seen in the table, approximately 85% of the workforce within the four 
trades is either non-skilled or skilled within an area corresponding to the 
industry (=NACE) code of the firm in which they are employed 
(carpenters works in carpentry-firms etc.). Only a very small portion of 
the skilled workers work out of their domain: 2,9% of the workforce in 
                                           
22 Almost all electricians in this category have 10 years of public school training, whereas for the other 
trades 7 years of public school training is the most common. Hence, electricians are more educated 
than the way of classifying education used here would suggest.   
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the surviving bricklaying firms are educated within other trades (within 
carpentry, plumbing or electricity). For carpentry, plumbing and 
electricity firms, the figures are as low as 1%, 1% and 0,16% respectively.  
Further, the homogeneity of firms concerning education could be seen as 
a result of a trade organisation.  This attribute of construction is also 
confirmed by the homogeneity of the education of the employers (table 
9). 
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Table 9: Educational background of employers and sector employment 
(%)- 1998 (bold letters = match between education and employment) 
 
Industry 
 
 
Education 
 
A
ll em
ployers 
outside construction 
G
eneral 
contractors 
B
ricklayers 
E
lectricians 
P
lum
bers 
C
arpenters 
P
ainters 
E
ngineers 
A
rchitect 
Total num
ber of persons 
Public school oress 25,99 39,84 8,54 2,89 7,24 6,96 8,64 1,53 3,82 18197 
Highschool 4,22 1,79 0,31 0,36 0,57 0,5 0,84 0,76 0,96 2839 
Bricklayer 0,35 8,46 78,6 0 0 0,13 0,46 0,76 0 29137 
Carpenter 1,32 9,27 1,68 0 0 78,3 0,19 0 0,64 1344 
Plumber 0,22 0,98 0 0,12 27,33 0 0,09 0 0 2892 
Smith 1,48 2,28 0,23 0,6 25,52 0,42 0 0,76 0 461 
Painter 0,33 0,49 0 0 0 0,08 80 0 0 1090 
Electrician 0,64 1,63 0,15 11,1 1,43 0,21 0,09 0 0 552 
Other basic vocational courses 43,12 20,81
23 2,52 3,25 10,38
24
4,69 5,67 4,58 3,83 1298 
Supplementary vocational courses 3,01 2,93 2,44 77,625 23,6226 3,35 1,67 4,58 5,73 3059 
Diploma 4,36 7,64 4,04 3,37 2,38 3,44 0,65 63,4 24,2 3290 
Bachelor 0,4 0 0,08 0 0 0,13 0 0 0 268 
Master 11,82 0,98 0,15 0,12 0,1 0,29 0,09 20,6 58 7994 
Doctoral / Ph.D. degree 0,08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,32 54 
Not known 2,66 2,93 1,3 0,6 1,43 1,55 1,58 3,05 2,55 1893 
Total  100 100,03 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
Total number of firms 65668 615 1311 830 1050 2386 1076 131 314  
Source: IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
                                           
23 This group consists of people with a wide range of educations. Motor mechanic is the most common 
(25 persons), 11 persons are sales assistants and 10 persons have an education as a farmer (“Grønt 
bevis”). No other educational codes can account for 10 persons or more.  
24 The majority of this group are mechanics (57 persons) or motor mechanic (16 persons).  
25 This group consists solely of electricians (educational code 40592425).  
26 This group consists solely of educations related directly to plumbing: “vvs-tekniker” (107 persons) 
and “gas, vand og sanitetsmester” (126 persons).  
 
Chapter 5: Unstable markets and non-repetitiveness  163 
As seen, there is a major overlap between industry and educational 
profile in the sense that the employer in the bricklaying firm is educated 
as a bricklayer etc. Only the general contractors have a diversified 
educational background, possibly suggesting that this group consists of 
firms doing casual and in technical terms not very difficult work 
(corresponding to the group “public school or less” and “other basic 
vocational courses”) and a group of firms that have developed from 
being either bricklayers or carpenters into the role of main or design and 
build contractors.  
To recall chapter 2, the raison d’être of a trade organisation is to replace 
repetition between specific persons and firms with repetition at a more 
aggregate level, i.e. between groups (=trades) of people and firms with 
identical capabilities. As people within the same group should not be 
different, it would be expected that these persons to a lesser degree 
obtain specialised capabilities over time than people working in 
industries facing more stable external conditions. An indication of low 
level of specialisation over time would be that the impact of seniority on 
income is relatively low. This expectation seems to fit well with figure 13. 
Figure 13: Seniority within the firm and average annual income (DKK) 
of full-time male employees with a basic vocational course as highest 
degree – construction and manufacturing 1998 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
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For employees with 0-1 year of seniority the annual income is only 5% 
higher in manufacturing than in construction. However, as the increase 
in salary of employees in construction evens out, with 17-18 years of 
employment the differences has amounted to 15%.   
The data also gives signs of the existence of craft production. As discussed 
in chapter 2 and 3, in case of low repetition in activities (for instance 
caused by changes in external conditions), skilled labour that act as local 
information processors would be expected to be common due to their 
ability to handle a wide range of different situations (whereas in more 
stable settings information is often more cheaply handled by standards 
for inputs or working procedures). Thus, in combination with apparently 
widely applicable skills as discussed previously, the low level of 
unskilled workers found in construction could be interpreted as a sign of 
craft production  (table 10).  
Table 10: Educational background of full time employees in 
construction and in total 1998 
Education  
(highest degree completed) 
Producers of 
building materials 
Contractors Engineers and 
Architects 
Full time employees 
in all industries 
Public school 45,4% 30,5% 9,8% 35,2% 
High School 3,2% 2,7% 6,0% 7,7% 
Basic Vocational Courses 37,5% 55,9% 23,8% 30,4% 
Supplementary Vocational Courses 4,0% 5,0% 7,4% 3,5% 
Diploma 6,0% 3,9% 30,7% 9,1% 
Bacehelor 0,4% 0,2% 1,4% 0,8% 
Master 1,4% 0,6% 18,0% 3,9% 
Doctoral / Ph.D. degree 0,1% 0,0% 1,2% 0,1% 
Not known 2,0% 1,3% 1,7% 8,4% 
In total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001. 
As it appears in table 10, only a few academics are employed in the 
building materials firms, almost no academics are found in contracting 
firms whereas the concentration of academia is high in firms of architects 
and engineers (this in turn implies a level of academia that is about half 
compared with the level for all industries, as the majority of employees 
are employed in contracting firms (145961 persons compared with 9580 
and 16589 persons in building materials producing firms and 
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engineering and architectural firms respectively)). In accordance with 
the finding in table 9, including the education of employers does not 
alter the level of academia found in contracting firms (but does change 
the average for all industries, as employers on average are more 
educated than employees, see table 1 in Appendix C).  
On one hand this concentration of academics in firms of architects and 
engineers can give rise to benefits from specialisation. On the other, it is 
often argued that the presence of academia enhances firms capacity to 
absorpe knowledge (Knudsen 2001). Assumedly, this would urge firms 
to employ some amount of academic staff. However, the observed 
concentration of academics may be accounted for by the widespread 
used of third party coordinators, i.e. firms (e.g. engineers and architects) 
specialised in the demanding job of coordinating construction activities.  
As argued in the theoretical part, high levels of external change is likely 
to favour such a separation between production and coordination. A 
generally low level of repetition in collaboration between specific 
contracting firms and specific firms of architects and engineers may also 
explain the limited co-localisation (in geographical terms) of these firms 
(see Table 2 in appendix C). 
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5.6. Summary on non-repetitiveness on the level of the sector, the 
firm and the individual 
This chapter has provided statistical information on overall changes in 
the market for construction products and made likely how these changes 
are related to changes at the level of the firm and individual. 
At the sector level it was shown that: 
 Different segments of the construction markets “co-oscillates”; e.g. 
when demand for one type of construction activities decreases, so 
does demand for other types of construction activities.   
 Accordingly, overall demand in construction fluctuates 
considerably compared with most other sectors. Furthermore, 
periods of downswings are followed quickly by periods of up-
swings and visa versa.  
In combination with a very limited export, this makes it difficult for 
construction firms to keep up a steady level of production. This seems to 
be consistent with the data found at the level of firms and individuals 
(compared with manufacturing firms): 
 High turnover in construction firms. Many construction firms go 
out of business in periods of recession (the survival rate is low) and 
in particular many new firms enter in periods of prosperity. Thus, 
construction firms are generally young.  
 Partly due to this, partly due to a limited growth in size of existing 
firms, construction firms are small with respect to number of 
employees. 
 Construction firms make more radical adjustment in number of 
employees.  
 Accordingly, the mobility of employees is high in construction. 
Roughly one third of employees are not employed in the same firm 
the year before and one third are not employed in same firm the 
year after. Thus, seniority is low in construction.  
Other things being equal, these characteristics lower repetition in 
working constellations from one building project to another. Repeated 
interaction between specific firms is limited due to the high turnover in 
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firms and due to the many small firms. High mobility of employees 
limits interaction within the firm.  
The data have also given some indications of how construction – perhaps 
as a response to limited benefits from repeated sequences of activities 
due to changes in overall demand - is organised. And in this way, the 
chapter provides some initial answers to in particular research question 
A and B relating to the division of labour and the role of the firm. 
Mainly skilled labour is used in construction. That roughly half of the 
people educated as craftsmen are employed outside the construction 
sector, suggests the wide applicability of these skills. It is conceivable 
that these observations are signs of the use of craft production in 
construction.  
A second set of observations potentially relates to the existence of trade 
organisation in construction. Firstly, it has been found that employees are 
grouped together according to their skills: Carpenters are employed with 
carpenters, plumbers with plumbers etc. The homogeneity of skills is 
also mirrored with respect to the educational profile of employers. The 
isomorphism of people working within the same trade can also explain 
the high mobility of both skilled and unskilled labour in construction as 
well as why seniority is not very important with respect to earned 
income. 
Finally, concentration of academics in firms of architects and engineers 
and the minor growth in size of construction firms potentially have to do 
with the existence of bilateral and trilateral coordination.  
Even though the present chapter in this way has made the existence of 
craft production, trade organisation and use of bilateral and trilateral 
coordination likely, their existence has not been directly identified or 
necessarily been well understood. Thus, in the following chapter these 
ways of handling low repetition are further explored and discussed in an 
empirical analysis of roof-construction targeted exactly at the research 
questions. 
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Chapter 6 – Coordination practices in the construction process 
 
6.1 Overview of the chapter 
By means of a case study, this analytical chapter addresses the research 
questions on the division of labour, the organisation of coordination 
within and between firms, and the use of coordination modes in 
construction. Hence, the main part of this chapter is devoted to 
describing and analysing, how coordination is organised and executed in 
the construction of a roof on a multiunit residential house being build in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
A brief introduction to the actors and phases of house construction is 
offered in appendix A. For readers that are not familiar with 
construction, I will recommend to read the appendix as an “appetizer” 
before the empirical inquiry into the research questions.  In the previous 
chapter it was illustrated how non-repetitiveness at the macro level of 
markets influences firms and individuals. Appendix A points out the 
non-repetitiveness related to the micro level of each building project, for 
instance (a) specifications of the client (or the architect), (b) physical 
variations on the site, (c) differences in many actors “surrounding” the 
building project (local authorities, public suppliers and neighbours). 
The low level of repetition at the macro level created by unstable markets 
consequently interacts with the low level of repetition at the micro level 
related to the specifics of each building project. The combined impact 
that these two sources to non-repetitiveness have on coordination is 
considered in the case study on roof construction (Section 6.2). The 
findings of the case study are organised according to the main concepts 
outlined in the research issues: the division of labour (6.2.1), 
coordination modes (6.2.2), the organisation of coordination (6.2.3) and 
the information involved in coordination (6.2.4, 6.2.5 and 6.2.6).  
The main thread of the argument developed throughout this chapter is 
the importance of (lack of) repetition on the way coordination is 
organised and structured. The chapter closes with an illustrative 
example of how coordination is organised and structured in a more 
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stable setting. This is done by briefly considering a case study on sofa 
production (section 6.3).    
 
6.2 The organisation and coordination of roof construction 
6.2.1 Specialisation and the division of labour in roof construction 
As a starting point, consider the production activities involved in 
producing the roof as outlined in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Activities involved in roof production 
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In the figure, each box represents an activity, that is one continuous 
working process (resulting in tangible or intangible transformation of an 
input), as conducted by a single person using the same tool(s) or 
equipment (see also chapter 4 on method). Boxes with dotted lines may 
include more than one activity. Each colour represents a firm.  
 
Firms and individuals involved in production 
Evidently, many different firms are involved directly in the process of 
constructing the roof. More precisely, there are seven of them: producers 
of the carcass, haulage contractors, carpenters, the surveyor, ventilation 
contractors, plumbers (making the gutter), and roofing felt contractors. 
Accordingly, each firm only carries out a limited part of the activities 
involved in the value chain of roof production. Most of the firms 
involved in roof production also work on other parts of the building; the 
roofing felt contractor was in fact the only firm that solely worked on the 
roof (I shall elaborate on this particular example later on). Within each 
firm, the activities are carried out by a rather limited group of people; a 
group of mostly four to five carpenters carries out all the carpentry 
activities involved in constructing the house. On the roof, two carpenters 
performed most of the work with additional support from two other 
carpenters. The two former carpenters worked on multiple other parts of 
the project, not only before and after, but also while the roof was 
constructed.  
The observation that each firm and each individual works on multiple 
parts of the building, is also found at a refurbishment project in Odense 
(box 2). As seen in the first table, most of the seven carpenters attached to 
this project use their time on multiple parts of the building (even though 
the single parts of the building entail sufficient work to keep a single 
person employed for longer time). At the firm level, the last table in box 
2 suggests that a low level of specialisation according to particular parts 
of the building is general to all five trades (with electricians as the most 
radical exception, as they only work on 3 out of the 7 parts the building 
for analytical purposes was decomposed into).  
Thus, both at the level of firms and individuals, there appear to be a very 
limited, if any, specialisation with respect to building parts. As the 
craftsmen vary their position in the value chain (i.e. in the part of the 
  
Chapter 6: Coordination practices in the construction process 173  
house they are working on), repetition in activities is not obtained by 
completely identical input and output. 
However, this does not however exclude the possibility of specialisation 
along other lines, more precisely specialisation in the tools and working 
procedures used. In fact, it could be the case that each firm and each 
individual shifts their position in the value chain in order to achieve 
repetition in tools and working procedures.  
The traditional way of organising trades according to materials (see 
Appendix A) can be interpreted in favour of specialisation of this kind. 
For example, by working on different parts of the building, the 
carpenters can always use their experience and equipment related to 
woodmaterials.  In this interpretation, trades are explained by lower 
production costs due to repetition in activities.  
Box 2: Specialisation in construction - a time study of refurbishment 
A second set of evidence on the characteristics of the division of labour and 
specialisation in construction can be derived from the time study of a refurbishment 
project in Odense (in Denmark). Based on the data (Bertelsen (1996, 2002) whom I thank 
for access) it can, among other things, be calculated how each craftsman (including 
apprentices) from the different trades spent his time on different parts of the building. 
Only the results from the carpenters are shown in the following table, but these reflect 
the general pattern for all trades: 
 Roof Facades Staircases Bath/WC Kitchen Heating Other Building site In total 
Carpenter 1 19% 0% 25% 1% 42% 0% 8% 0% 100% 
Carpenter 2 86% 0% 10% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Carpenter 3 41% 1% 0% 6% 40% 0% 12% 0% 100% 
Carpenter 4] 4% 0% 0% 0% 96% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Carpenter 5 26% 42% 0% 0% 32% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Carpenter 6 31% 44% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Carpenter 7 76% 0% 0% 10% 14% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Carpenters in total 48% 8% 6% 3% 31% 0% 4% 0% 100% 
Apparently, it is very rare for skilled craftsmen to concentrate on only part of the 
building, which supports the view that craftsmen are not very specialised – at least not 
concerning specific parts of the building. However, the picture is not entirely 
unambiguous. As summarised in the next table – showing number of contracts (defined 
for different parts of the building) per trade and distribution of each skilled craftsman 
and subcontractor according to contracts - subcontractors to the subcontractors 
concentrate mainly on one part of the building.  
 (Continues) 
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Box 2: Specialisation in construction. Continued. . 
 
 Carcass Carpenters Painters Plumbers Electricians 
Number of relevant contracts 5 6 6 5 5 
Number of contracts worked on by each skilled 
craftsman (avg.)  
3,17 3,4 3,25 1,67 3 
Number of contracts worked on by each 
subcontractor (avg.) 
1 1,2 - 1,76 - 
Thus, it appears that a dual structure among workers on the building site may exist: the 
unspecialised subcontractors performing activities on different parts of the building and 
specialised subcontractors working on specific parts. In this refurbishment case, the latter 
group only accounted for 13% of the total number of man-hours spent. 
But perhaps - one could argue with reference to the smithian idea that “the division of labour 
is limited by the extent of the market “ (1970) - the low division of labour is simply a result of 
the small size of this particular case. In this explanation, craftsmen work on many different 
parts of the building simply because the man-hours needed to complete one part are not 
sufficient to keep them employed full time. If this were the case we would only expect a few 
persons from each trade to work on a single part of the building. As seen in the next table – 
showing the number of people from each trade working on different parts of the building - 
this is clearly not so; craftsmen do work on many different parts of the building in spite of the 
fact that the single part of the building requires many man-hours to be completed. Of course 
this does not exclude the Smithian idea of a division of labour (for instance specialisation 
could be according to specific tools or materials used on various parts of the building), but 
does however signify, that such a division of labour at least is not done according to parts of 
the building.   
 No of people in different parts of the building 
 Roof Facades Staircases Bath/WC Kitchen Heating Other Building site 
Carcass 8 7 2 5 5 0 0 0 
Carpenters 10 4 5 3 10 0 4 0 
Painters 0 1 4 6 4 1 4 0 
Plumbers 3 0 0 3 1 6 2 0 
Electricians 0 0 0 3 4 0 6 3 
Total 21 12 11 20 24 7 16 3 
The number of people involved in each building part in this rather small refurbishment case 
is impressive. The kitchens are the most crowded with no less then 24 persons involved, but 
roofing and bathrooms are also “heavyweighters” in this respect. Taking the limited size of 
these areas into consideration, the sole number of people involved gives reason to expect 
problems of coordinating access to the objects. 
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The dynamics of trades 
However, it may not always be obvious for the people involved in 
construction whether new materials are more closely related to one trade 
or another. The carpenters from the case study gave the following 
example: when partition walls made of gypsum were introduced in the 
post-war period, it was not clear whether they should be erected by 
bricklayers or carpenters, as gypsum in this context was a new material 
that could be handled both by the carpenters (who made the wooden 
structure in the old type of board partition walls) and by the bricklayers 
(who did the subsequent plastering in board partition walls). In this 
particular case it was by union arbitration settled that partition walls is a 
carpentry-job. 
One may wonder why partition walls solely become a carpentry job. If 
both carpenters and bricklayers are equally qualified to do this job in the 
outset, craftsmen from both trades (or in order to ensure repetition, some 
craftsmen from both trades) might do this job. 
A possible reason for why one type of activity is not carried out by 
multiple trades, has to do with coordination costs (and not production 
costs). In the case that an activity can be performed by two or more 
trades, the parties involved in construction would have to exchange 
information in order to find out who does it. Assigning an activity once 
and for all to a particular trade renders this information superfluous.  
A further benefit of assigning an activity to a particular trade is that it 
will be carried out by people with identical backgrounds. For instance, 
all persons working in the carpentry firm were educated as carpenters. 
This observation reflects the more general observation from chapter 5, 
that trades, and in turn firms, consist of groups of people with almost 
identical educational background. A possible benefit of this way of 
organising is that a person in the value chain of house production knows 
more or less what to expect from the previous person, even without 
knowing the specific firm or person.1 
                                           
1 The interaction between persons without prior knowledge of each other is further promoted by the 
use of “trade uniforms” (provided by the employers): carpenters are dressed in white trousers and 
jackets; plumbers wear blue overalls and so forth. 
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The existence of a trade organisation – in which there generally is 
specialisation between the trades but not within the trades – is also 
reflected in the answers given to the part of the questionnaire relating to 
specialisation. Here the carpenters replied, that they believed that all 
carpenters in their company, and in other companies, would be as good 
as himself at performing the activity in question. In the same way 
“particular knowledge” is never stated as a criterion for how work is 
delegated. Rather, it is delegated according to health reasons (some work 
is tough and is left to younger personnel), personal relations (some 
persons have worked together previously), and some degree of 
coincidence. As no one is assigned for a particular job in the outset, 
delegation and redelegation of manpower takes place frequently. 
Usually, the carpenters are instructed by the foreman during the 
morning break: “today” or “this week we have to do so and so” and then 
without much discussion they are assigned to the different jobs. 2 
 
Cliques 
The category “personal relations” contains an interesting story. It turned 
out that the carpenters in the case study often establish cliques which 
enables them to maintain the same working relation from one project to 
another and, more remarkably, from one firm to another. One such 
example was the group of four carpenters that worked on the case 
project during the first half of the project (the replacement of carpenters 
is described later in this section). They and two additional carpenters 
had worked together on two larger projects previously. They preferred 
to work together since they knew each other beforehand and knew that 
they get on well, which in turn made it easier for them to plan their 
work. Firstly, this gives them a better piece-rate pay. Secondly, they find 
that it is more fun to work on large sections of a project than doing a bit 
of work here and there, or doing service calls, as a person working on his 
own is often forced to do. One of the reasons for their dissatisfaction 
with the case project was that they were not allowed to plan their work 
                                           
2 This practice was also observed during the first working day of the second team of carpenters 
(described below). The short time spent on allocating specific persons to an activity favours the view 
that allocation is done according to widely applicable skills of the carpenters, and not by advance 
knowledge of the speciality of the respective carpenters. 
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themselves. Moreover, the clique originally consisted of six persons but 
the management of the firm could only find work for four of them on 
this project. Consequently, the four carpenters jointly decided to leave 
the company in order to work on a building project large enough to 
employ all six of them and, they hoped, with more scope for planning 
the work themselves. In general, they had no major problems finding 
projects that were large enough to accommodate all of them, as “there 
are many big projects going on at the moment”.3  
A smaller clique was formed by the two experienced carpenters, who 
together with three other carpenters replaced the first clique midway 
through the project. The two carpenters were both educated in the 
beginning of the 1960s and worked together for many years until, at the 
end of 1980s, one of them was employed as responsible for erecting noise 
reducing screens as part of large road project. However, when this 
project was completed a decade later, the two carpenters started to work 
together again. According to the first four carpenters, these cliques 
frequently occur in carpentry as well as the other major trades. This 
conclusion is supported by a field study of site organisation in two 
Danish building projects conducted in the mid 1970s (Kristian Kreiner 
1976). On the other hand, statistical inquiries in the IDA-database - made 
exactly for assessing the extent of these cliques - points towards the fact 
that they are not very dominant both in absolute terms and compared 
with manufacturing (see box 3).  
As this illustrates, although carpenters can and do work together in 
different constellations, the carpenters of the case-study believes that 
there are benefits from repeating the same personal relations within the 
trade. These benefits are not related to producing a particular output (as 
this is described by the specifications of the architect) or a particular 
input (as this is provided by the outcome of the previous activities and 
the materials delivered by the foreman or clerk of works). Rather, the 
benefits have to do with a higher speed (or perhaps more fun) in their 
work, as the carpenters can easily split up a job into more narrowly 
defined activities based on experience. Besides economising on decision 
costs of who should do what, this also allows some (rather limited) 
                                           
3 The four carpenters were rather young and had in average 10 years’ experience. Thus, they have 
mainly been employed during booming periods.  
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specialisation in working tools. For instance, in the test study on 
installment of windows, it was observed how one of the carpenters had 
gained experience in using a lift in previous projects, and hence was also 
assigned to this job in this project. The other carpenters did not consider 
him to be the only one who could do this job – but he was a bit faster.   
 
Homogenous capabilities and mobility 
However, the (rather limited existence) of cliques does not challenge the 
overall picture of a limited division of labour within the trade. Besides, 
for the reasons listed above, the limited division is reflected in the 
answer given by the carpenters concerning what they considered it was 
important to be good at in order to perform a particular activity. Here, 
very general capabilities are pointed at as important. As one of the most 
experienced carpenters said: 
 “The basic principles are always the same. You have to ensure that 
things are in plumb, in level and at the right angel. It always goes 
back to the same things you need to be good at to make a playhouse 
for you children. For the same reason, besides being good at this, we 
do not transfer any particular skills from one building site to 
another.” 
Confronted with the question of how these capabilities differed from the 
capabilities of other trades, the carpenters answered that these 
capabilities were also fundamental to other trades. However, if other 
trades should do carpentry work, it would undoubtedly take them much 
longer time. As this illustrates, due to their education and their 
experience, carpenters do develop particular capabilities.4 
 
                                           
4 As the quote also illustrates, the particular knowledge of a group of professionals is difficult to probe 
into by interviews, as the professionals tend to take their competencies for granted.  Probably this 
tendency is enforced in a system like construction, where a profession is rather stable over time and 
only to a limited degree is confronted with close cooperation with other professional groups.  
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Box 3: Cliques – a non-firm dependent division of labour?
Inspired by the case study, the commonness of cliques in construction was investigated by 
the IDA-data base. A clique was defined as two persons or more, who in the initial year (for 
instance November 1995) were all employed in one firm and who in the next year of 
registration (for instance, November 1998) were also employed together, but in a different 
firm. The results are shown in the following table. 
Cliques 1995-1998 
Construction 
(Nace code in initial year) 
Manufacturing 
(Nace code in initial year) 
 
No of 
persons 
Persons as 
% of total 
workforce 
1998 
Persons as 
% of people 
changing 
job  
1995-98 
No of 
persons
Persons as 
% of total 
workforce 
1998 
Persons as 
% of people 
changing 
job  
1995-98 
2-person cliques 3290 2,4% 4,1% 7508 1,7% 3,5%
3-person cliques 1182 0,9% 1,5% 3099 0,7% 1,4%
4-person cliques 544 0,4% 0,7% 1916 0,4% 0,9%
5-person cliques 415 0,3% 0,5% 1245 0,3% 0,6%
6-person cliques 330 0,2% 0,4% 972 0,2% 0,5%
7-person cliques 266 0,2% 0,3% 700 0,2% 0,3%
8-person cliques 160 0,1% 0,2% 568 0,1% 0,3%
9-person cliques 189 0,1% 0,2% 540 0,1% 0,3%
10-person cliques 150 0,1% 0,2% 460 0,1% 0,2%
10+ cliques 2486 1,8% 3,1% 15605 3,5% 7,3%
Total 9012 6,5% 11,2% 32613 7,3% 15,2%
In 1995-1998, cliques represent 6,5% and 7,3% of the total 1998 workforce in construction and 
manufacturing, respectively. Compared with the actual number of persons changing firm 
within the period (estimated by information on year of employment provided in chapter 5), 
the level of cliques is even smaller in construction than in manufacturing (11,2% and 15,2% 
respectively)). 
This way of measuring cliques also includes persons, who incidentally both were in firm A 
and B in the first and second period respectively, but who did not work together (and in this 
way do not represent a clique in the sense of people working closely together). The chance 
that such coincidental co-movements exist is increased with the size of the two firms. In 
order to control for that, the following table shows the number of persons moving in cliques 
for companies with 2-9 fulltime employees (as cliques are defined by employment in 
November the respective year and not by fulltime employment, it is possible for these firms 
to have a 10-person clique as seen for manufacturing). 
(Continues) 
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Box 3: Cliques – a non-firm dependent division of labour? Continued. 
 
The statistical data presented in chapter 5 showed the homogeneity of 
educational background and the high mobility of workers between firms 
belonging to the same trade. The case study confirms and fleshes out 
these indicators of low specialisations among firms of the same trade. All 
persons working within the carpentry firm were educated as carpenters 
and shifts from one firm to another are very frequent, as illustrated in 
table 1.5 
                                           
5 The fact that it is not unusual to change from one firm to another several times a year indicates that 
the mobility of craftsmen, as reported in chapter 5 is somewhat understated. 
 
 
Cliques 1992-1995 Construction Manufacturing 
Firms with 2-9 full time employees No of persons Persons as % of total 
workforce 1995 
No of persons Persons as % of total 
workforce 1995 
2-person cliques 666 1,3% 630 1,0%
3-person cliques 243 0,5% 309 0,5%
4-person cliques 144 0,3% 228 0,4%
5-person cliques 65 0,1% 160 0,3%
6-person cliques 90 0,2% 108 0,2%
7-person cliques 28 0,1% 77 0,1%
8-person cliques 8 0,0% 48 0,1%
9-person cliques 18 0,0% 9 0,0%
10-person cliques 0 0,0% 10 0,0%
personer i kliker på 10+ 34 0,1% 27 0,0%
Total 1296 2,6% 1606 2,6%
Adjusting for firm size, cliques are at the same level in construction and 
manufacturing measured as percentage of the total workforce. However, taking 
mobility into account, it will most likely still be lower in construction than in 
manufacturing. Thus, it does not seem that this non-firm specific way of having a 
division of labour is particular dominant in construction. 
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Table 1: Mobility of carpenters – observation from the case study on 
roof construction 
 Seniority (working 
years) 
Number of employers (firms) 
for the whole period 
Maximum number of 
employers within a single year 
Carpenter 1 10 10-15 (n.i.) 
Carpenter 2 10 10-15 (n.i.) 
Carpenter 3 10 7-8 (n.i.) 
Carpenter 4 10 20-25 6 
Carpenter 5 10 5 (n.i.) 
Carpenter 6 38 (n.i.) (n.i.) 
Carpenter 7 28 25 3-4 employers has been 
common 
 
The low degree of firm specialisation was very clearly illustrated in one 
particular part of the case study. Midway through the building project, 
the four carpenters mentioned above decided to leave the project due to 
dissatisfaction with their salary and because they would like to work in 
their six person clique without foreman. They announced this in the 
beginning (Tuesday) of the week in which they quit. New carpenters, 
previously employed in another firm, were hired by the clerk of works 
and started the following Monday. They met, as always, at 7.00 and after 
eating breakfast and talking socially (among other things about which 
sites and firms each of them had worked on), the foreman showed them 
the site, equipment was handed out (each carpenter got a tool box), one 
or two questions were asked and at 8:15 work was carried on, as if they 
had worked there for many weeks. Yet, the work proceeded a bit slower 
in the beginning (for instance, the crane driver assessed that the speed of 
installing windows was approximately 20% lower than for the previous 
crew), but as reported by one of the carpenters:  
 “How long time it takes before you operate at maximum speed 
depends solely on the activities. There is no extra time spent on 
starting in a new company – the time spent on shifting from one 
activity to another is the same in a company as between companies”.  
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Finally  - as a sign of the limited division of labour and specialisation 
within a trade - the carpenters stress that it is important to be good at 
doing a bit of everything, “to be flexible”. Even though the activities 
involved in construction are similar from one project to another in some 
respects, they are never completely identical, and consequently the 
carpenters always have to adapt to new situations. As the right way to 
perform an activity depends on a wide range of changing conditions, it is 
not easily learned. As expressed by one of the carpenters:  
“As an apprentice, it was extremely confusing that the exact way to 
do things varied from time to time and from one carpenter to 
another. A lot of times I thought “now I got it”, but it then turned 
out that for “this and this reason” I had to do it a bit differently. 
There are so many ways to solve what appears to be the same job - 
which one to use is very much a matter of feeling.”  
As this quote illustrates, the right way to perform an activity depends on 
a lot of nuances that are very difficult to codify. Hence, it is difficult to 
establish formal rules that specify exactly what to do. This in turn 
implies that decisions on which working procedures and tools to use are 
made locally by the craftsmen. Further evidence of these elements of 
craft-production is given in the section on coordination modes that 
follows. 
6.2.2 Coordination modes  
As part of the case study, the coordination modes used during the 
process of constructing the house were identified. For each activity, the 
craftsmen were asked how they found out how to solve the various 
coordination objects. For instance, “How did you find out that it was you 
who should do this job” (“Who to conduct job” etc.). Answers could be 
given on a five-point Likert scale (1: Not at all, 2: only to a small extent, 3: 
to some extent, 4: to a large extent, and 5: completely) according to a 
typology of coordination adapted from Grandori (see chapter 3). Chapter 
4, (section 4.6.1) gives further information on the methods and 
operationalisations – among other things of coordination modes - used 
in this connection. 
The overall results on coordination modes in roof construction are 
reported in table 2. 
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Table 2: Coordination practices in the case of roof construction – 
overall results based on registration of twelve activities6  
 
 
Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to 
conduct 
W
hen to 
conduct 
W
hich 
m
aterials to 
H
ow
 m
uch to 
produce 
H
ow
 it should 
look like 
W
hich tools to 
use 
H
ow
 to do it 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if 
in doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman 4 
(3) 
4 
(2) 
       
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm 
4,3 
(3) 
3,8 
(5) 
3 
(2) 
5 
(1) 
 3 
(1) 
  3,6 
(3) 
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management  2,6 
(3) 
     4 
(2) 
 
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions)  
 3 
(2) 
4,2 
(5) 
4,7 
(7) 
4,4 
(7) 
 2 
(1) 
  
Pricing – Using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.  
4,5 
(2) 
 4 
(1) 
      
Teaming – Talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc. 2,5 
(2) 
3,5 
(2) 
 2 
(1) 
2,5 
(2) 
2 
(1) 
2,5 
(2) 
5 
(2) 
3 
(1) 
Formal rules – Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use)  
   2 
(1) 
     
Social norms 1 – By assessing the task and use my 
experience.  
  2 
(1) 
  2,5 
(2) 
4 
(1) 
3 
(2) 
3 
(1) 
Social norms 2 – Not something I think about, I do asI 
always do.  
  4 
(2) 
 4,5 
(2) 
4,8 
(6) 
4,8 
(6) 
  
Other 
 5 
(1) 
3 
(3) 
    3 
(2) 
3 
(1) 
 
The first figure in each box represents the average of the reported values 
on the five-point Likert scale. The figure in brackets represents the 
number of observations (i.e. observations with the value of 2-5). For 
instance, the value 4 and (3) in the first box means that in three cases a 
                                           
6 Eight activities performed by carpenters (construction of roof houses, making heads, erection of 
rafters, installing edge strip, covering rafters with wooden plates, wooden frame for eternit-covering, 
installing gratings, install plates of eternity); one activity by the crane driver (delivery and hoisting of 
building materials); one activity by the roofing felt contractor (making the roofing felt); one activity by 
the ventilation contractor (installing ventilating plant on roof); and one activity by the plumber 
(installing the gutter). Notice that no reports have been made for the producers of the carcass and for 
the surveyor.  
  
Chapter 6: Coordination practices in the construction process 184  
craftsman reported, that he undertook this activity due to instructions 
from the foreman, and that on average, these instructions “to a large 
extent” determined this. An empty box signifies that no use of this 
coordination mode was reported. 
The similar approach was used to study coordination forms in the test 
study of installment of windows (Table 3).  
Table 3: Coordination practices in the test study on installment of 
windows – general practices according to the carpenters7 
 
 
Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to 
conduct 
W
hen to 
conduct 
W
hich 
m
aterials to 
H
ow
 m
uch to 
produce 
H
ow
 it should 
look like 
W
hich tools to 
use 
H
ow
 to do it 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if 
in doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman 4 4 2    3   
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm 
     2    
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management        5  
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions)  
  3 5 5  3   
Pricing – Using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.  
         
Teaming – Talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc. 3 3     3   
Formal rules – Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use)  
         
Social norms 1 – By assessing the task and use my 
experience. 
  4   4    
Social norms 2 – Not something I think about, I do as I 
always do.  
      3   
Other          
   
Interestingly, as highlighted by the grey areas, there appears to be a 
dominant coordination pattern for activities related to the roof (and for 
installment of windows):  
                                           
7 This table summarises the approx. 20 hours of interviews and observation done on the installment of 
windows. The data is collected according to the same principles as used for table 2. Unlike in the final 
case study on roofing, however, the coordination modes were not mapped for each activity. Instead, 
the carpenters were asked towards the end of the installment of windows, how they had experienced 
that coordination was executed for this job. Thus, the reported values may on some occasions reflect 
an average (estimated by the carpenters) of multiple activities.     
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Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to 
conduct 
W
hen to 
conduct 
W
hich 
m
aterials to 
H
ow
 m
uch to 
produce 
H
ow
 it should 
look like 
W
hich tools to 
use 
H
ow
 to do it 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if 
in doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman          
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm 
         
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management          
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions)  
         
Pricing – Using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.  
         
Teaming – Talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc.          
Formal rules – Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use)  
         
Social norms 1 – By assessing the task and use my 
experience. 
         
Social norms 2 – Not something I think about, I do as I 
always do.  
         
Other          
 
When an activity is to be done and by whom is mainly decided by 
authorities within the firm, that is by the foreman or the clerk of works. 
During roof construction, usually the same two carpenters worked on 
the roof, however, in busy periods additional persons, one of them the 
foremen, stepped in. In this way, one might expect that instructions on 
who and when were given once and for all in the beginning of roof 
construction. However, the carpentry work on the roof was not done 
continuously. As seen in figure 2, activities by other trades have to be 
performed in between, and in order to utilise manpower, the two 
carpenters were allocated to other tasks on a weekly, if not daily basis, 
for instance to making sheds, installing windows, working on the roof of 
building number two etc.  
In fact, by being able to shuffle manpower around, it is possible for the 
management of the firm to avoid idle periods, even though there in some 
cases are substantial delays in some of the previous activities performed 
by other trades (for instance, the bricklayers were more than 1½ months 
delayed with the facing wall, which obviously delayed the completion of 
the roof-band accordingly). The three other carpenters were organised 
accordingly, two of them always worked as a team and the fifth one, as 
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well as the foreman, worked on their own or in different constellations, 
but on different activities. Undoubtedly, this constant reallocation of 
manpower solves a problem of optimising resources in situations of high 
(time)dependence, but it also requires constant coordination efforts by 
personal authority. 
External authority, as represented by the design team, coordinates the 
next three objects: which materials to use, how much to produce, and the 
finish of it. Instructions are nearly always provided in drawings and 
written description as the architects and engineers very rarely show up 
at the roof themselves (in fact, some of the carpenters did not know who 
they were or how they looked like).  
This raises the question of how it is ensured, that the instructions from 
the design team are followed. In particular, because the quality of all the 
intermediate and often in-built output are hard to assess by the client or 
client representative when the finished building is handed over 
(asymmetric information is substantial). To some degree, project 
management has the responsibility for following the building project as 
it evolves. Yet, as indicated in the next to last column in table 2, project 
management is not the only way quality is ensured, and indeed it would 
be very difficult for project management to examine all of the building 
processes in detail (they would have to be more or less permanently on 
the roof). Nevertheless, the contractors may not try to “cut corners” after 
all, as deviations from the specifications, and thus from the contract, 
inflict a risk of reduced payment. Perhaps the project management does 
not see such deviations in the first place, but learns about them from 
other contractors, who have been troubled by the “easy” solutions of a 
contractor upstream in the value chain. In this way, the scattered 
production of the single contractor on the one hand creates a need for 
external coordination, but on the other hand might solve some of the 
problems of monitoring associated with these.  
The materials used by the carpenters are provided by the clerk of work 
or the foreman according to the same design descriptions, but even with 
a limited bulk of material, the craftsmen have to consider the drawing in 
order to see exactly what material to use and what to use it for. This has 
to do with the general applicability of the materials: a pile of wooden 
boards and strips can be used for almost everything. Thus, the inflow of 
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materials only to a very limited degree coordinates exactly which 
materials to use, how much to use, and the finish of it.  
For the same reason - moving onwards to the next coordination 
objectives - which tools to use and exactly how to carry out the job is only to 
a very limited degree specified by the input provided by the building 
materials and outcome of previous activities. Here, the craftsmen rely on 
their experience. Without much reflection, they take the appropriate (and 
multi-purpose) tool from the toolbox, and carry out the job. However, in 
the beginning of an activity, the carpenters might occasionally discuss 
how to do it with each other. These decentralised decisions – and 
decisions taken individually by the carpenters without communication - 
resemble what in chapter 2 was termed craft production.   
As mentioned, control of quality is partly carried out by authority 
exercised by project management, partly done by firms in subsequent 
activities. Finally, resolution of doubts is done by different coordination 
modes with instructions from the clerk of works or the management of 
the firm as the dominant one. 
 
Coordination modes not in use 
It is worth noting which modes of coordination do not seem to be in play 
at the level of the craftsmen.  
First of all, instructions by project management play only a limited role 
at the level of craftsmen. However, at higher organisational levels, 
project management is more visible. Among other things, project 
management provides an overall timetable, specifying when (in which 
period) the activities have to be carried out. The timetable is open to 
some debate, as witnessed in the weekly site meetings in the social 
housing project in Farum (see appendix A), where a substantial part of 
the meeting was used to report the progress of the different trades. If 
there are delays the project management can interfere, but very often it is 
representatives from other trades that come up with remarks. In this 
way, the weekly site meeting can be seen as a forum for coordinating the 
timing of activities in a combination of authority (project management) 
and teaming (the trades talking directly to each other).  
The use of the contracts signed when tendering took place (or what with 
reference to Grandori could be perceived of as coordination by pricing) 
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is only reported on two occasions. Both of the reports are made by the 
foreman, who had the double position of being a carpenter and a 
superior. It is likely that the reporting relates to the latter position of the 
foreman, suggesting that on the level of the craftsmen, the documents 
provided by tendering or similar negotiations are not used directly for 
coordination. However, this naturally does not exclude that prices can be 
an important way to coordinate the allocation of resources at higher 
hierarchical levels or in earlier phases of construction.8  
Finally, formal general rules are not used at all by the craftsmen. This is 
perhaps somewhat surprising, considering the many different forms 
these rules can take. First of all, there are descriptions of some of the 
slightly more manufactured building materials, such as windows or 
hatches (on which observations were made as part of the test study). For 
these products, a description of how to install the products is attached to 
the product, but the carpenters hardly ever use them (in fact they seldom 
unpack them). The substantial amount of very specific regulations 
written by public research institutions or trade associations is another 
example of formal rules, which are not used directly for coordinating the 
behaviour of the craftsmen (of course, this does not necessarily prevent 
them for being used at higher organisational levels). And as final 
example, the very detailed working procedures, developed as part of the 
piece rate system, should be mentioned. None of the craftsmen referred 
to these with respect to coordination of the various objectives.  
The fact that the craftsmen do not mention the piece rate system as a 
means to coordination, does not imply that this system serves no 
purpose. First of all, as payment is done according to the piece, and not 
by the hour, it is a powerful way of reducing problems of shirking in 
situations, where the actions of the employees is difficult to monitor. 
Secondly, the cost of writing contracts can be reduced, as these are often 
written with reference to the common and very detailed piece rate 
system (see box 4). In this way, the piece rate system can, as the existence 
of trades, be seen as a way to establish a standard interface for interfirm 
relations and thus enable interaction in one-offs relations (of course this 
                                           
8 In fact, the common - and for publicly supported building projects mandatory (unless exemption has 
been granted) – use of price-based tendering in Denmark suggest that pricing indeed is important 
prior to the phase of execution.  
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does not suggest that the common piece rate system is a prerequisite for 
forming such contracts). However, the formal obligations and payments 
specified in the contract are usually far from what actually takes place. 
Hence, the piece rate system enables agreement on contracts prior to the 
execution phase, but plays a much more limited role during execution. A 
possible explanation of the coordinating role of these initial contracts, 
discussed later in this and the next chapter), is that the contracts 
coordinate work (originally provided by the client) and labour (provided 
by the contractors) at an aggregate level. Or put differently, these 
contracts ensure that each contractor at any given point has a sufficient 
“heap” of assignments to play around with. At the firm level this 
“playing around” is done by the clerk of work or master allocating 
manpower between building projects. At the project level, the foreman 
allocates manpower to specific parts of the project. In this way, the 
coordination of work and labour is solved in a sequential process by use 
of different coordination mechanisms.  
 
Box 4: Payment schemes in construction – the importance of piecework 
contracts 
Usually craftsmen on a building site are paid by the piece. The piece rate system is made 
and agreed upon by the non-governmental organisations representing the different 
groups of employers and employees found in construction. Consequently, it applies to 
the entire building sector.  For each trade a dense piece rate manual is provided that in 
great detail specifies how much the craftsmen earn by carrying out a particular kind of 
work using specific materials and tools. These manuals are deeply rooted in the daily life 
of construction. Subcontracting firms are usually paid according to the system and hence 
are descriptions of assignments  - used for instance at tendering - often done simply by 
referring to identity numbers in the manuals of the respective trades. The craftsmen are 
usually also paid according to the system on a individual basis. However, as seen in the 
case study, it is not uncommon that people working in the same trade group decide to 
group together their payment.  
To a certain degree, the piece rate system takes into account how many times a certain 
task is repeated (the more repetition, the less payment per unit). Yet, the payment does 
not always reflect the time spent – especially not for very small batches. In an example 
from the case study, two rather hardworking carpenters used in total approximately 
seven hours on installing a hatch in a loft. The piece rate of such a work is a mere 137,59 
DKr (approximately 15 ECU equalling a time wage just beyond 2 ECU). In order to 
compensate for this, fixed prices are occasionally used. Some companies also ensure a 
minimum salary beyond the level of the general minimum salary.  
(Continues) 
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Box 4: Payment schemes in construction – the importance of piecework 
contracts. Continued. 
However, according to the carpenters in the roof case, it is by claiming ”extra-
payments” it is possible to maintain a reasonable salary. Extra payments can be 
claimed when there are deviations from the description of the assignment (usually 
made by a general contractor or by the design consultants). As observed in the case 
study, lunch breaks are usually used for filling out extra payment claimant forms.  
The carpenters are, in many ways, not very pleased with the piece rate system. First 
of all, they think they waste time on discovering and reporting deficiencies in plans. 
Secondly, as one of the carpenters expresses it, ”the whole idea of the piece rate 
system is that you do not think yourself”. Since everything, at least in principle, is 
described very carefully in the outset, it does not make sense for the carpenters to 
put forward ideas that might improve the working process or the final product. It is 
very frustrating, the carpenters find, not to be able to use their ”hands-on” 
experience. For the same reason, the carpenters prefer a differentiated performance 
pay (”slump akkord” in Danish meaning something like ”performance pay based on 
a rough estimate”) as often used in refurbishment projects. In this payment system, 
the craftsman personally accesses a particular piece of work and agrees on a price in 
cooperation with, say, a foreman or clerk of works. 
But why then does the piece rate system exist according to the carpenters of the case 
study?  
Firstly, since prices are known and agreed upon in advance, it is possible to estimate 
the cost of the building prior to building it. However, claims for extra payments can 
easily ruin this advantage. A second, and according to the carpenters, more valid 
reason is the difficulties of monitoring how hard working they are. If they were paid 
a fixed salary, it would be very hard for managers to avoid shirking. The same 
reason is given to why construction companies are usually small. Small units make it 
easier to detect faults or shirking and hence are preferable when the doing of a 
person are hard to observe directly. Even larger firms are usually divided into profit 
centres. For instance the painting firm working on the roof case building project is 
split up into three separate economic units with approximately 13 employees in each.  
Finally, a piece rate system can also be a way to impose improvements in 
productivity. By lowering the piece rate over time, contractors and in turn employees 
are enforced to come up with improvements (however there is also the danger that 
contractors and employees hide or do not fully utilise an improvement in working 
processes in order not to bring about an, in their view, unfavourable change in the 
piece rate system).  
A few carpenter-firms do not pay their employees by the piece, but uses a fixed 
hourly rate. However, fixed rates are only offered to employees with some seniority. 
A possible interpretation is, that by doing so, the company screens the employees 
and only keep the ones (assumedly) requiring little monitoring.   
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The multiplicity of coordination modes 
The limited use of instructions from project management, the limited use 
of prices and the limited use of general rules (including the piece rate 
system) at the level of the craftsmen all illustrate one point: how 
coordination modes can change over time and for different 
organisational levels. For instance, at the level of the craftsmen, the 
timing of activities (“when to do”) is decided by authority exerted by the 
foreman /clerk of works. However, at the level of project management 
and foremen / clerk of works, it is partly decided upon by teaming. 
Similarly, the content of drawings and technical descriptions is given to 
craftsmen from the design team as the project evolves and in this way 
represents coordination by authority. However, in the planning phase 
(and in the ongoing adaptations during construction) these drawings (or 
at least establishing the detailed principles for their completion) are 
mostly an outcome of mutual agreement between the architect, engineer 
and main contractor in the design team. Hence, at this level and in this 
phase, coordination is done mainly by teaming (or negotiation). Or, to 
take the example of the piece rate system, it is an important facilitator of 
coordination by price in the early phases of construction, but plays a 
more limited role with respect to obligations and payments in later 
stages.  
Theoretically, it is not very surprising, that coordination modes can 
change over time and for organisational levels, as the information 
involved in coordination also could be expected to change. However, 
methodologically, it is a useful reminder of the importance of pointing 
out in which phase and for which organisational level, coordination 
practices are analysed.  
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6.2.3 The organisation of coordination 
Figure 2 illustrates another significant feature of construction: the 
activities carried out by a firm are very scattered; one firm performs one 
activity, another firm the next, and eventually the first firm enters the 
value chain again, etc. Since larger strings of activities are not 
internalised within a firm, a substantial part of coordination is carried 
out between and not inside firms.  
The way interfirm coordination takes place varies according to the 
objective (see table 2) and organisational level. At the level of the 
craftsmen, the foreman and the clerk of works decides when and by 
whom an activity should be performed; i.e. authority within the firm. 
Again, their decisions are based partly on a common agreement on the 
weekly site meeting, partly on instructions from project management. 
Hence, for these objectives interfirm coordination is done beyond the 
level of the craftsmen in a combination of teaming and authority, mostly 
residing outside the construction firm (except in those cases where the 
construction firm is identical to the contractor in charge of project 
management). With respect to which materials to use, how much to 
produce and how it should look, interfirm coordination is done by the 
design team, who instructs the different trades directly (based on an 
overall plan for the project). Finally, tools and working procedures are 
coordinated between firms by the norm-following behaviour of the 
employees.  
 
Third party coordination 
Thus, an important characteristic of construction is the existence of 
overarching coordinating firms specialised in coordination. Or put 
differently, the existence of firms, that do not carry out activities directly 
on the building project themselves, but solely instruct – often in a very 
direct and detailed way – how other firms should conduct their 
activities. Two different kinds of firms specialised in coordination are 
identified in the case study: the project management and the design team. As 
I will return to in the discussion in chapter 7, the work done by these 
specialised coordinators serves as an entry point to a more general 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of third party 
coordination. Here, it is sufficient to notice, that a substantial part of 
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coordination in the process of construction is done by what was termed 
trilateral coordination in the theoretical part (as in the case of the design 
team), or by unilateral coordination with separate production (as it is usually 
the case with project management).  
In this way, the construction firm does not partake in coordination along 
the value chain, i.e. the coordination of subsequent activities. Some 
aspects of this coordination is placed at higher organisational levels (i.e. 
with the design team and project management), other aspects are 
transferred “downwards” to the experience and skills of the craftsmen.  
Construction firms only carry out coordination between different 
building projects, or between “non-neighbouring” activities on the same 
building project (for instance, allocating people from roof activities to 
construction of sheds for bicycles). The purpose of this is to optimise the 
use of production facilities in general and of manpower in particular. As 
reported in table 2, the foreman and the clerk of works decide on when 
and by whom an activity should be performed. This decision is not 
merely a reflection of the overall timetable or the decisions made by the 
project management. First of all, the decision on how much manpower to 
use is in the hands of the firms. And as such, it is the clerk of works, or in 
smaller firms the master, who shuffle around manpower from one 
building site to another, in order to balance stable employment with the 
fulfilment of deadlines.  Secondly, the timetable establishes overall 
deadlines and consequently leaves some space regarding the exact 
moment for execution of a single activity. The constant deviations and 
rearrangement of the timetable - agreed on at the site meeting - furthers 
the need for constant decisions on when to do what.  
 
Ongoing sequencing 
Thus, a lot of resources at the project and firm level are devoted to 
finding a sequence of activities that, among other issues, enhances 
accessibility and reduces the amount of rework due to damages caused 
by, say, other trades or the weather. The sequence of activities varies 
very much according to the final product.  
To illustrate: one part of the building project included a two-story 
playing room for a kindergarten. Due to the height of this room, an 
indoor scaffold had to be used for installing the lowered ceilings.  Pipes 
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for radiators could not be installed and the floor could not be put down 
until the scaffold was removed. Hence, the carpenters were forced to 
complete the lowered ceiling rather early in the working processes. This 
is not the usual procedure as the gypsum plates easily pick up dirt from 
subsequent activities. In short, a variation in the building (the two-story 
room) brings about another sequence of activities than the one usually 
used for single-story rooms. To take another example, in this building 
project, rather large windows were used for the staircases. Consequently, 
they had to be hoisted by a crane instead of carried by the carpenters, as 
it is the practise for smaller windows. This in turn implies that the 
outdoor scaffold, which is necessary to build some parts of the roof and 
to build the brick facade, cannot be erected before the installment of 
windows is completed. Here, the use of certain building parts (a large 
window) triggers a late start on other parts of the building.    
One way to cope with the various interactions between activities is to 
provide very detailed schedules for their completion. However, as one 
activity cannot be completed before the successful completion of a wide 
set of other activities, delays frequently occur (a point I shall return to). 
This in turn creates a need for constant replanning of the sequence of 
activities, and thereby explains why the issue of staffing largely takes 
place ad hoc on the building site by the project management, and why 
the decisions in the various construction firms are not laid down ex ante, 
for instance in the specifications from the design team (specifications that 
in turn could be part of the contractual obligations of the contractors).  
6.2.4 Informational properties of roof construction 
So far, the information involved in coordinating roof construction has 
not been addressed. Since information properties have been pointed out 
as a potential explanation for the use of certain coordination modes in 
the process of construction, this section focus on these properties. To 
recall the discussion in chapter 3, three information-related variables 
were pointed out: variability (i.e. non-repetitiveness), complexity and the 
number of people involved in coordinating an activity with other 
activities.  In the following, roof construction will be analysed according 
to these variables.  
Originally, questions relating directly to the variability and complexity 
of activities were developed. However, for methodological reasons 
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mentioned in chapter 4, these questions turned out to be difficult to 
apply. Consequently, these variables have to be assessed by other means. 
A central means is the mapping of interdependencies found in roof 
construction and therefore, this section starts by looking at these. 
As part of the standard questionnaire used for all 18 activities involved 
in roof construction, the craftsmen was asked “What other jobs in this 
project affect the execution of this job?”. The activities mentioned were 
noted and the interdependence specified according to six different types 
of interdependence, which were located as part of the test study on the 
installment of windows (see chapter 4 for a more full description of the 
methods used):  
 Time-dependence: the degree to which other activities have to be 
completed before this activity can be commenced;9  
 Material-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect which 
materials to use for this activity,  
 Tool-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect which tools 
and equipment to use for performing this activity),  
 Method-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect which 
methods / working procedures to use for this activity; 
 Access-dependence: the degree to which other activities physically 
obstruct the physical accessibility needed to carrying out this activity); 
and  
 Damage-dependence: the degree to which other activities affect the 
quality of the result of this activity, for instance by damaging or 
making the outcome dirty. 
Based on these answers, a network diagram of the interdependencies 
found in roof construction can be drawn  (figure 3). 
                                           
9 Originally I expected this kind of time-interdependence to be supplemented with a variable called 
urgency-dependence; that is the dependence related to performing one activity quickly after another, 
for instance, due to building materials that harden or in order to protect vulnerable building parts 
from rain etc. Undoubtedly, interdependencies of this kind exist in construction, but they were not 
found to be important in the test study on the installment of windows, nor in the case study of roof 
construction.    
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Figure 3: Interdependencies of activities in roof production 
Explanation: The numbers represent the major activities involved in roof production.10 Based on the 
test study of installment of windows, the concept of “interdependence” has been decomposed into six 
different sub-categories and then measured on a five point Likert-scale. Green arrows represent 
interdependencies summing up to five or less. Red colours represent situations where the sum of the 
six different interdependencies adds up to six or more (and hence represents at least two kinds of 
interdependencies). 
                                           
10 11=: delivery and hoisting of building materials, 12= installment of safety railing, 13= construction 
of roof houses, 14= making heads, 15= erection of rafters, 16= installing edge strip, 17= covering 
rafters with wooden plates, 18 = wooden frame for eternit-covering, 19 = installing gratings, 10 = 
covering with “eternit” plates, 21= making site accessible, 31= construction of concrete carcass, 32 = 
bricklaying of facing wall, 40= making the roofing felt, 41= installing ventilating plant on roof, 42= 
surveyor mark out roof, 43= putting up scaffold, 44= design of rafters, 45=producing rafters, 56 = 
delivery of rafters, 47=hoisting of rafters, 48= installing the gutter, 61= doing the concrete around 
ventilation tubes and soil pipes at top of carcass, 62 = zinc-covering of top edge of brick wall. 
92=overall design of roof by architect, and 93= approval of design of rafters (by architect).  
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The interdependence of activities exceeds just being dependent on the 
previous activity. In the figure, such a situation would show as one 
arrow going to, and another leaving, each node. But at seen in figure 3, 
there are usually more connections resulting in network density for the 
investigated interdependencies of 3.9 (each node has in average 3.9 
connections).11 12   
In this way, even a very simple activity (in technical terms), like making 
the heads13 (A14), can be dependent on numerous activities: hoisting of 
building materials (A11), the surveyor marking out where to place the 
heads (A42), installation of the ventilation plant (A41) (forcing the 
carpenters to cut the heads in order make room for ventilation tubes), 
and of course also the completion of the concrete carcass on which the 
heads are installed (A31). On some occasions, the interdependencies 
build up for the activities towards the end of the value chain – as seen in 
the case of installing the gutter (A48) – but this is not necessarily the case, 
meaning that high interdependence can be found in all parts of the value 
chain. Hence, there does not seem to be any clear temporal dimension of 
interdependence (e.g. the interdependencies are not concentrated 
towards the end of the project). Probably, this increases the cost of 
discovering the true values of the interdependencies of this particular 
kind of roof.  
Time interdependence to a medium or strong degree was reported for all 
activities and thus, time interdependence accounts for the vast majority 
of interdependencies. The strength of this type of interdependence 
probably relates to the specificity of inputs that makes buffering by 
storing or by substitution very costly. For instance, it is almost 
                                           
11 The density for all 26 nodes in the network is 2,9. However, only 18 of the nodes have been subject 
to investigation in the case study – the remaining 8 are included because they are mentioned in the 
inquiries of the 18 nodes. Since the interdependencies of the remaining 8 nodes have not been 
investigated for all potential interdependencies, these are probably understated.  
12 Furthermore, some interdependencies are probably understated due to the bias only to report 
interdependencies in which problems occur. For instance, it is likely that the overall design of the roof 
by the architect (A92) had to be in place for at least those seven activities, where use of documents 
from the architect is reported (see Table 2). Unlike relations where both activities are performed at the 
roof, dependence on an off-roof activity like design is more difficult to check by observation. 
13 The heads are the horizontal wooden beams fixed lengthwise to the carcass. Fittings are nailed to 
these heads in which the rafters are later placed and attached.  
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inconceivable that the time interdependence inflicted on the installment 
of faces by the carcass could be reduced by building a stock of finished 
carcasses on the site (where to place these?) or by taking in another 
supplier of the carcass.14 Even though this example is extreme with 
respect to the size and costs of the input (the carcass), it is common to 
most intermediate construction products as they are built in and 
customised to a particular project. 
Delays are frequent in this system. Not only is each activity directly 
dependent on the successful completion of multiple other activities 
(activities do not flow in parallel). Indirectly, delays rapidly propagate 
from one part of the system to another due to rather high network 
density.  
This in turn implies that the number of people and firms that have to be 
taken into account in order to know when an activity can be performed, 
is rather high. A contractor cannot commence his activity before a 
number of activities upstream the value chain are completed. And in 
order to gain prior knowledge about this, the completion of activities one 
step further up the value chain also have to be considered, and so forth. 
In particular because the contribution of each firm is usually very 
restricted, the “warning time” from only considering neighbouring 
activities (and not activities that are two steps or more up in the value 
chain) is very limited.  
The co-located production – i.e. that all trades carry out their production 
at the same building site – complicates the exercise of making the various 
activities fit together.  Firstly, there is the question of accessibility. As 
various firms are working on the same part of the building, it may be 
difficult to gain access to this part. Presumably, the roof is not the worst 
part of the building in this respect, due to its large size (toilets and 
kitchens appear to be more difficult, as many persons have to work in a 
very narrow space (see box 2)). At the same time, materials are delivered 
in large bulks in order to reduce lift expenses, which obviously raises the 
question of where they should be placed (as for instance witnessed in a 
disagreement between the people doing the ventilation plant and the 
carpenters). Secondly, co-located production raises the risk of damages 
                                           
14 For reasons of production time alone. It takes at least 6 weeks from the time the precasted concrete 
elements are ordered, until they are delivered.  
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stemming from subsequent activities, so this is also an aspect to consider 
with respect to coordination.  
On top of this, there is also the interdependence of materials, tools and 
working procedures to consider.  
6.2.5 Coping with the information involved in roof production 
Thus, contractors, project management or the design team face an 
apparently enormous job of coordinating the novel and in turn many-
sided and multiple interactions between construction activities carried 
out by multiple contractors. One way to cope with this situation would 
be by planning, that is exactly specifying when each activity should be 
performed, specifying exactly which working procedures to follow, 
exactly where to place building materials ex ante production. At first 
sight, it is tempting to believe that this is actually what happens (or 
should happen) in construction – after all, rather detailed time-plans and 
drawings are made and are on some projects, as for instance the case 
study followed, plans for logistics used to specify when and where 
building materials should be placed etc.  
 
“Project errors” 
However, such plans clearly do not take everything into account. As it 
was observed on several occasions, some interactions were recurrently 
overlooked, mistakes were inevitably made or delays propagated 
through the system, resulting in late delivery. This is reflected in what 
the contractors called “errors in project” (“projektfejl” in Danish). These 
so-called  “errors in project” were observed on many occasions in roof 
construction (Ad A-G) and incidentally also on other parts of the 
building project (Ad H-J): 
(A) Reconstruction the roof houses I: After the first of three roof 
houses were constructed, a revised version of how to make the 
house was forwarded by the engineer. The modification 
caused the carpenters to make a new hole for the ventilation 
tube, including replacement of insulation (triggering 1½ hours 
extra work). It turned out that the hole in the top of the carcass 
was made according to the drawings made by the architect, 
but the ventilation plant was outlined according to the hole 
shown in the drawings made by the engineer. In other words, 
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the drawings of the architect and the engineer did not 
correspond. This was not discovered until the clerk of works 
on site had a meeting (taking place on the roof) with a 
representative from the ventilation firm to clarify the last 
details. 
The clerk of works doubted whether the new solution, worked 
out by the engineer and a superior from the ventilation firm, 
would work. But since the superior levels informed him to do 
so, he instructed the carpenters to perform the work 
accordingly.  
(B)  Reconstructing the roof houses II: As anticipated by the clerk of 
work, the new solution did not work. There was not enough 
room for the ventilation tubes. Consequently, the carpenters 
had to remove the insulation material in the roof in order to 
make space (it was not replaced by other means of insulation).  
(C) The faces blocked some of the holes made for the (vertical) 
ventilation tubes, and consequently, parts of the faces had to 
be removed. According to the carpenters, it would not had 
been a problem if the faces have been placed a bit differently - 
this error simply arose because the design consultants 
sometimes forget to put the drawings “on top of each other”.  
(D) The (horizontal) tubes used for ventilation did not fit into the 
prefabricated rafters, and consequently, the rafters had to be 
sawed through and secured with laskes15. Originally, the idea 
was to place the tubes at the high end of the rafters, where 
there is plenty of room for the ventilation tubes. However, the 
architect feared that it would be impossible to get access to the 
loft and consequently moved the position of the tubes towards 
the narrow part of the loft. In this position, there was not 
enough space between the crossbeams of the rafters, and as a 
result, some of the crossbeams were removed and replaced by 
laskes on site. 
                                           
15 Laskes are wooden beams nailed to the rafters in order to compensate for the part of the rafters that 
was removed due to the installment of the ventilation tubes.  
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(E)  The ventilation people had to remove the ventilation tubes 
installed since it turned out that the rafters were not in the 
right position.  
(F)  The persons doing the concrete around the ventilation tubes 
and waste pipes were not called in at the right time. 
Consequently, they had to do the concrete after the wooden 
plates had been nailed to the rafters, prolonging the man-hour 
s spent from approximately 8 to 32 hours due to difficult 
access (the distance between the plates and the concrete 
carcass was down to 30 cm).  
(G) The two persons doing the roofing felt came to the building 
site according to the timetable. Unfortunately, their clerk of 
works was not informed that the carpenters were delayed and 
that roofing had to be delayed accordingly. 
(H) Windows at the corners of the kindergarten did not fit due to 
a miscalculation made by the producer of windows. For this 
reason, a temporary shelter (of plastic) had to be installed in 
order to allow the building to dry out by heating (getting the 
right humidity is important for painting and floor-making).  
(I)  Some of the windows were produced according to the plan, 
but did not fit in the openings of the building. Apparently, the 
architect did not take into account that the top windows had 
to be narrowed.  
(J)  The angled fittings developed by the design team and 
produced by an external blacksmith for the installment of the 
big windows in the staircases did not fit. The holes did not 
allow for adjustment in the position of the screws and 
consequently, the small variations in the carcass could not be 
absorbed. In order to secure that the windows were in line 
vertically, some parts of the wooden frames of the windows 
had to be removed. This turned out to be a rather costly 
procedure as it could only be performed when the window 
was hoisted to its right position, causing all four persons 
involved in the installment of windows to be delayed.  
(K) The design consultants did not take the water pipes into 
account when calculating the space beyond the lowered 
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ceiling. Consequently, there was not enough room for the 
ceiling lights and in some parts of the building the in principle 
finished ceiling had to be lowered. This operation includes 
prolonging of straps (in which the ceiling hangs) and 
replacement of strips (fixed to the wall along the edge of the 
ceiling).  
(L)  At the kindergarten: the drawings used for the position of the 
roof did not correspond to the drawings used for the position 
of the brick-wall. Consequently, the plumber had to patch up 
the difference during application of the zinc covering. 
According to the two most experienced carpenters, the exact types of 
project errors are specific to this building project. However, errors occur 
on all projects; in fact errors of this magnitude are not at all particular to 
this project, but are typical to all the projects, that the carpenters have 
been involved in.  
In the perspective applied in this thesis, the examples given here do not 
have to be “errors”, but can represent a sensible way of balancing the 
costs of making plans (getting information) with the benefits of having 
(an efficient) plan (i.e. having information). Particularly due to the 
limited repetition (outlined in chapter 5 and appendix A.), the benefits of 
reducing uncertainty ex ante, and the potential for learning from past 
experience, is limited.  
Authority exerted by the project management working on the site is one 
way of making the ad hoc adjustments enforced by these project errors. 
Teaming is another option, i.e. agreements reached directly between the 
involved craftsmen. But as seen in table 2, these are only used to a very 
limited extent.  
 
Ad hoc planning and buffering of time and activities 
In general, coordination of activities on the building site is not solved by 
specification, but by non-specification. Or put differently, some degree of 
flexibility is built into the process of production, whereby the need for 
coordination is lowered (but at the same time, production costs are 
probably higher due to less repetition). This is done in various ways. 
As hinted previously – and not surprising, considering the high level of 
time-interdependencies - more detailed timetables are often not kept in 
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construction.16 Yet, the foreman of the work did not consider this to be 
particularly frustrating as he just allocated the carpenters to other 
activities on the site in the meanwhile, thus minimising the actual 
economic consequences of the deviations. This buffering was possible 
because the carpentry firm worked on many different parts of the 
building simultaneously: installment of windows, sheds for bicycles and 
garbage, putting down floors, installing lowered ceilings, erecting 
partition walls etc. Even though there was an overall timetable that had 
to be kept, this timetable was broad enough to allow some degree of 
shuffling around the activities. Furthermore, extensions could usually be 
obtained at the weekly site meeting, as long as they did not compromise 
the overall deadline of the house (the date of handing over). Partly 
overlapping phases further encouraged the possibility of shuffling 
around activities: first the construction of the kindergarten was 
commenced, then when this was roughly halfway done, the building of 
the first block of apartments was started and some months later the 
second block of apartments was initiated. Correspondingly, the handing 
over took place at three different dates.17  
Adjustment to delays is further facilitated by exchange of labour between 
building sites. As noticed, the number of carpenters attached to the 
building project of the case study varied from 4 to 8. These carpenters 
came from / went to other building projects in which the carpentry firm 
was involved. Even though one should be careful to compare 
refurbishment with construction of new houses (see chapter 4), the study 
of a refurbishment referred to in box 2 seems to support the claim that 
                                           
16 Which, as a researcher, could be rather troublesome, since I wanted to be present when activities on 
the roof were undertaken. Many times I showed up on the roof according to the timetable of the 
previous week, only to find out that for some reason or another, these activities were postponed. I 
later developed the habit of calling the foreman of the carpenters on the mobile phone the day before 
or the same morning that an activity was scheduled, in order to find out whether it would proceed as 
planned.  
17 This way of staggering building projects is quite common in construction.  As seen here, one 
advantage of doing this is that it enhances the possibility of shifting around from one activity to 
another and thereby reduces the impact of delays in previous activities. Furthermore, it is also a way 
to minimise on capital costs, as well as to reduce the adverse effects of the weather by advancing 
completion. A disadvantage of this staggered production is that the repetition of specific activities is 
lowered. 
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non-presence on a project, for instance due to exchange with other sites, 
can be quite intense (table 4).  
Table 4: Actual presence of each craftsman: Percentage of fulltime 
presence on the site - Refurbishment case in Odense18 
Carcass Carpentry Painting Plumbing Electrician All
Craftsman 01 17% Craftsman 01 43% Craftsman 0119 128% Craftsman 01 40% Craftsman 01 22%
Craftsman 02 26% Craftsman 02 60% Craftsman 02 22% Craftsman 02 10% Craftsman 04 2%
Craftsman 03 16% Craftsman 03 69% Craftsman 03 24% Craftsman 04 71% Craftsman 05 9%
Craftsman 05 24% Craftsman 04 57% Craftsman 05 12%  Craftsman 06 7%
Craftsman 06 27% Craftsman 05 27%   
Craftsman 07 34% Craftsman 06 22%   
  Craftsman 07 6%   
Average 24%  41% 46% 40%  10% 28%
 Calculated from Bertelsen 1996.  
With few exceptions, each craftsman in the refurbishment case spent less 
than half the time on the site and in average, the craftsmen spent almost 
three quarters of the time elsewhere. Even though the refurbishment case 
is a small building project, it gives us reason to suspect that workers 
actually do work on many different projects at the same time. To the 
degree that this study is representative, the craftsmen will in average 
work on almost four different sites at the same time. For trades like 
electricians, the number is up to ten projects at the same time.   
Thus, a not too tight a timetable and many activities to be performed at 
any given time, act as an important buffers for delays. This suggests that 
a reduced building time may decrease capital cost (as there are no 
incomes from the house until it is finished and used), but most likely also 
increase the cost of coordination (either due to more resources spent on 
coordinating or in a poorer coordinated state). Potentially, this claim is 
supported by, or is able to explain, the observations made by two of the 
                                           
18 These figures have been calculated by assessing how many hours each person spent on the site 
compared with the number of working hours he would have spent (with a 37-hour week), if he 
worked fulltime on the site in the period, that his trade was active.  
19 128% can either represent an error of measurement or overtime.   
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younger carpenters in a discussion of the pros and cons of the piece rate 
system. Their experience was that as long as there is no hurry, usually 
the different trades pay attention to each other. However, when time is 
tight, in order to keep their own deadlines, the subcontractors are not 
willing to postpone their respective assignments. Consequently, these 
assignments are carried out even in situations where the respective 
subcontractors know the difficulties that this brings to the other 
subcontractors. The two more experienced carpenters gave more 
potential evidence on how a ”loose” timetable can be important with 
respect to coordination. They stressed that shorter and shorter building 
periods are the main reason, why project errors in their view have 
become more common throughout their 30-year career.   
 
The wide applicability of skills, tools and building materials 
The flexibility in construction also relates to the skills and wide 
applicability of the simple hand tools used by the craftsmen. In fact, as 
referred in chapter 4, even in situations where project errors forced them 
to come up with a solution targeted at this particular problem, the 
craftsmen did not consider this to be different from what they usually 
do, as they always do things differently. In case smaller adjustments 
have to be made – for instance, sawing through a face or lowering the 
lowered ceiling a bit extra – the craftsmen perform these without any 
fuss. However, if changes are more comprehensive or require substantial 
rework – as in the case of the roof houses - the foreman or the clerk of 
work may be called for. However, this contact is not necessarily made in 
order to find out how to perform the activity, but is made in order to 
ensure the right to claim extra payment.   
The adaptability of the craftsmen to “whatever may come” is facilitated 
by the use of building materials with low degrees of prefabrication, such 
as uncut wooden beams or plates. A lot of processing on site is involved 
in making these semi-processed products a part of the building. These 
materials can be cut in exactly the necessary size, as well as combined in 
various ways and thereby adapted to the particular circumstances of 
each activity. Hence, even though production costs of processing 
building materials on the building site is probably high due to small-
scale production and less favourable working conditions, the limited use 
of prefabricated and highly specific products reduce on coordination 
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costs. This point was clearly illustrated in the test study on the 
installment of windows, where a prefabricated angle fitting caused 
serious problems to the carpenters (see Ad J in the project errors listed 
above). 
 
Some potential drawbacks from ad hoc adjustments and adaptability  
On the one hand, the flexibility of the construction process clearly 
reduces the costs directly involved in coordination, as less information 
has to be obtained, processed and distributed prior or during 
construction. However, the study also highlights some disadvantages of 
this flexible system. First of all, as craftsmen have to be prepared to do a 
bit of everything, resources have to be spent on their education. 
Secondly, the benefits from the division of labour are limited, because 
each craftsman works on a lot of different parts of the building project. 
Furthermore, as each activity may be affected by a wide range of 
different activities, the chance that two apparently identical activities 
(like for instance erecting rafters) are similar from one project to another, 
is very limited. This is why a carpenter with more than 30 years of 
experience considers building projects to be unique and, as a 
consequence, that he can only extract the most basic skills from the 20-30 
roofs of a size identical to the one in the case study he has completed 
previously (see section 6.2.1). Thus, lowering of coordination costs 
happens at the expense of higher production costs. Thirdly, as seen in 
the list of project errors, rework or work that becomes troublesome 
because of difficulties in access is common in construction. Hence, 
savings made on the costs directly involved in coordination are partly 
paid for by the indirect costs induced by a less coordinated state.  
Fourthly, to the extent that communication between different parties of 
the value chain is needed, it draws heavily on direct personal 
communication in all stages of production. The wide applicability of 
tools and building materials ensures flexibility, but at the same time they 
do not contain much information about how and when activities should 
be performed. Consequently, the potential for economising on 
information costs by providing specific tools or materials that can only 
be used in a certain way is very limited. Finally, the need for flexible 
building materials also reduces the potential for replacing small-scale 
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production on site with larger-scale production under more favourable 
site conditions on site.  
6.2.6 Coordination of highly interdependent activities – the case of roof 
houses 
The previous section described the means by which different types of 
interdependencies in general are tackled. However, there are cases 
where activities interact in a more complicated way. In the roof case, this 
is the situation for the interaction between the carpenters doing the roof 
houses and erecting the rafters, and the people installing the ventilation 
plant and ventilation tubes. This part of the roof construction turned out 
to difficult to coordinate due to a combination of incidents, that can be 
traced back to the characteristics of this particular building project: a 
one-way pitch roof; a late decision on placing ventilation tubes towards 
the narrow end of the roof (due to a specific placement of the roof hatch, 
which again is caused by a specific form of the stairway, that had to do 
with the design of flats, that is related to the need of the coming residents 
and the shape of the site); a discrepancy between the drawings of the 
architect and the engineer etc. According to the two experienced 
carpenters these particular interdependencies were unique to this 
particular roof. However, it is not at all unique for something unplanned 
to happen. In fact, the carpenters consider project errors to be an 
inevitable part of construction. As expressed by two of the most 
experienced carpenters in a discussion about the possibility of avoiding 
the double reconstruction of the roof houses:  
“It would be nice if construction could be organised in a way where 
these kinds of problems did not take place. But it will not happen – 
for more than 30 years we have experienced the same kind of 
problems.”  
In this case study, the problems in particular relates to the 
interdependencies between the carpenters constructing the roof house 
(A13 in the figure), making heads (A14) and erecting the rafters (A15), 
and the people installing the ventilation plant on the roof (A41) (figure 
3). Firstly, these activities are characterised by many and mutual 
interdependencies between the two firms: the carpenters have to finish 
the roof house and rafters, then the ventilation people can install the 
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tube, then roof house and rafters have to be adjusted etc. 20 Secondly, 
interdependencies are strong (i.e. red arrows), as multiple 
interdependencies are reported.  
This gives the coordination of these particular activities the following 
informational properties. Firstly, as only two firms and four persons are 
involved in producing these activities, the information regarding many 
actors is limited. Secondly, as the interdependencies are created by a 
particular combination of incidents, the degree of continuity is limited. 
And thirdly, the time spent searching and processing information on 
how to cope with the interactions of these activities is substantial, which 
implies a high activity complexity.  
These particular interactions are interesting to study, as they give us an 
indication whether coordination modes change according to the 
informational properties of the activities at the overall level, as claimed 
in the theoretical part. More precisely, this combination – a few actors, 
non-repetitive interactions and complex activities – is expected to favour 
coordination by teaming. Thus, the remaining part of this section (6.2) 
will be devoted to an analysis of the coordination modes used for these 
particular activities and the reasons for why exactly these are used.  
 
The use of teaming and authority in highly interdependent activities 
In order to address this issue, the coordination modes reported by the 
carpenters and the ventilation people for coordination of these particular 
activities are compared with the overall coordination practices in table 5 
and 6 respectively.   
                                           
20 As “each unit posing contingency for the other” (Thompson 1967, p. 55), the relation is reciprocal in 
the “Thompsonian” sense. This is not in conflict with the view, that the relation also can be perceived 
as a serial process: “There is, of course, a…serial aspect [of reciprocal relations] since the aircraft [the 
object chosen to illustrate the point] in question is used by one, then by the other, and again by the 
first.” (Thompson 1967, p. 55). What matters in order for the relation to be reciprocal is its two-way 
directionality, not that one thing is done before another.  
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Table 5: Coordination practices in the case of roof construction – 
values reported by carpenters compared with overall results (roof 
houses not included) 
 
 
Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to conduct 
activity 
W
hen to 
conduct activity 
W
hich m
aterials 
to use 
H
ow
 m
uch to 
produce 
H
ow
 it should 
look like 
W
hich tools to 
use 
H
ow
 to do it 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if in 
doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman 4 
4 
(3) 
5 
3 
(2) 
       
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm 
 
4,3 
(3) 
 
3,8 
(5) 
 
3 
(2) 
 
5 
(1) 
  
3 
(1) 
   
3,6 
(3) 
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management   
2,6 
(3) 
     5 
3 
(2) 
 
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions)  
  
3 
(2) 
5 
4 
(5) 
4 
4,8 
(7) 
4 
4,5 
(7) 
 2 
 
(1) 
  
Pricing – Using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.  
 
4,5 
(2) 
  
4 
(1) 
      
Teaming – Talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc. 2 
3 
(2) 
 
3,5 
(2) 
 2 
2 
(1) 
2 
3 
(2) 
2 
 
(1) 
2 
3 
(2) 
 
5 
(2) 
 
3 
(1) 
Formal rules – Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use)  
    
2 
(1) 
     
Social norms 1 – By assessing the task and use my 
experience.  
   
2 
(1) 
  2 
3 
(2) 
 
4 
(1) 
 
3 
(2) 
 
3 
(1) 
Social norms 2 – Not something I think about, I do asI 
always do.  
   
4 
(2) 
  
4,5 
(2) 
4 
5 
(6) 
4 
4,8 
(6) 
  
Other 
  
5 
(1) 
 
3 
(3) 
     
3 
(2) 
 
3 
(1) 
The first figure (underscored) in each box represents values of coordination modes used for the 
activity of making the roof houses. If there is no figure in first line, this mode has not been reported. 
The next figure represents the average of all reported coordination modes (roof houses not included).  
The figure in brackets represents the number of observations (i.e. observations with the value of 2-5) 
including observations for roof houses. 
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Table 6: Coordination practices in the case of roof construction – 
values reported by the ventilation contractor compared with overall 
results (roof houses not included) 
 
 
Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to 
conduct 
W
hen to 
conduct 
W
hich 
m
aterials to 
H
ow
 m
uch to 
produce 
H
ow
 it should 
look like 
W
hich tools to 
use 
H
ow
 to do it 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if 
in doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman  
4 
(3) 
 
4 
(2) 
       
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm 
5 
4 
(3) 
5 
4 
(5) 
 
3 
(2) 
 
5 
(1) 
  
3 
(1) 
   
3,6 
(3) 
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management   
2,6 
(3) 
      
4 
(2) 
 
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions)  
  
3 
(2) 
 
4,2 
(5) 
5 
4,7 
(7) 
2 
4,8 
(7) 
  
2 
(1) 
  
Pricing – Using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.  
 
4,5 
(2) 
  
4 
(1) 
      
Teaming – Talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc.  
2,5 
(2) 
 
3,5 
(2) 
  
2 
(1) 
3 
2 
(2) 
 
2 
(1) 
3 
2 
(2) 
 
5 
(2) 
3 
 
(1) 
Formal rules – Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use)  
    
2 
(1) 
     
Social norms 1 – By assessing the task and use my 
experience.  
   
2 
(1) 
   
2,5 
(2) 
 
4 
(1) 
 
3 
(2) 
3 
3 
(1) 
Social norms 2 – Not something I think about, I do asI 
always do.  
  5 
3 
(2) 
 4 
5 
(2) 
5 
4,8 
(6) 
4 
5 
(6) 
  
Other   
5 
(1) 
 
3 
(3) 
     
3 
(2) 
 
3 
(1) 
The first figure (underscored) in each box represents values of coordination modes used for the 
activity of installing the ventilation plan. If there is no figure in first line, this mode has not been 
reported. The next figure represents the average of all reported coordination modes (ventilation not 
included).  The figure in brackets represents the number of observations (i.e. observations with the 
value of 2-5) including observations for ventilation. 
As seen in the tables, teaming is used to a low or medium degree 
concerning “how much to produce”, “finish”, “tools” and “how to do it”. 
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Here, the two activities outlined in table 5 and 6 account for all the 
teaming used.  
However, in other areas teaming is not applied. In accordance with the 
general pattern, authority within the firm is used to delegate manpower, 
as well to time activities. Especially the latter is surprising, considering 
the high levels of time interdependence. Similarly, the architectural 
drawings are used to specify the amount of the work. So, even in some of 
the areas where teaming is used, coordination by authority is 
dominating, as seen by the reported values on the five point Likert scale. 
In an interview, the architect confirms the restricted use of teaming by 
reporting that he did not in any way make his instructions less specific 
for these activities.  
In this way, the (albeit limited) use of teaming for these highly 
interdependent activities is not due to, but rather in spite of, the project 
management, the architect and others at the superior level. As remarked 
by one of the craftsmen doing the ventilation: 
 “I was supposed to use the drawings, but the drawings did not work 
[did not take into account that the rafters were too narrow at this 
part of the roof]. Then, ideally I was supposed to contact the project 
management in case of doubts, but that is too difficult. It is much 
easier to discuss these matters directly with the carpenters”. 
This craftsman gets rid of the drawings after having observed how many 
tubes to install where on the first day. Instead of drawings, he uses his 
experience and, to a smaller degree, discusses with the carpenters. His 
superior is aware of this and also informally acknowledges, that 
deviations are made from the drawings. Yet, the craftsman does not 
think that his superior can get away without drawings due to the 
mandatory quality insurance system. However, an interview with a 
person responsible for this system at MT Højgaard indicated that this is 
not necessarily the case (Box 5).21  
                                           
21 Even though the impact of the quality insurance system on coordination modes should not be 
overstated, the example is interesting. It stresses that coordination modes are not only a matter of 
transferring information from one part of the production process to another. It is also a matter of 
transferring and especially storing information to the benefit of the client. So even though personal 
discussion between the craftsmen in this situation perhaps is a superior way of transferring 
information about the finish of the work, it may not be superior taking the cost of storing into account.  
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Box 5: The quality insurance system and use of teaming 
 
But why then is teaming only used to coordinate these relatively 
interdependent activities to a medium degree and only for some parts of 
the activities?  
                                                                                                                                   
 
The quality insurance system was introduced in Denmark in 1986 as a systematic 
effort to reduce building defects. The system is mandatory for public or publicly 
supported building projects like, for instance, social housing. Private clients can use 
the system on a voluntary basis, which is quite common. 
For each building project a quality inspection plan is carried out, specifying among 
other things, what to control, by whom the control should be made and when, the 
method used for inspection and the criteria used for approval. The main part of the 
control is carried out by the clerk of works or by the foreman, supplemented by spot-
checking performed by the project management.  
In principle, only the quality of the finished task is inspected, and as such there is no 
interference in the process used during construction, including the way the activities 
are coordinated. The results of the inspection have to be documented by drawings, 
text and/or pictures. Copies of the documents are handed over to the client upon 
completion of the project. Hence, provision of drawings and technical descriptions – 
for instance made as part of a tendering process or as instructions from architects and 
engineers - ease the process of carrying out the quality insurance system.  
However, this is not to say that quality control excludes the use of teaming. This is 
seen in the case of the installation shaft observed at the same building site, as the roof 
case was conducted. (An installation shaft includes pipes for water, heating, sewage, 
ventilation, and electricity, including electric and water meters for each apartment. In 
Denmark, these installations are usually not visible in recent houses). Making the 
shaft is complex, because many different installations have to be fitted into a very 
small room. Not only should it be possible for each of the four trades (ventilation, 
plumbers, electricity and carpenters (making the shaft)) to get enough room to 
perform their part of the work, service personnel also need access in order to maintain 
installations and read the electric and water meters. In order to find out how to do 
this, the traditional pattern with the architects and engineers specifying the solutions 
is not used. Instead – by approval from project management - a mock-up (a 1:1 model 
of the shaft) is made in a process of negotiation and discussion between the trades 
involved. When the craftsmen agree on a solution, pictures of the mock-up are taken 
and the solution forwarded to the design consultants for approval.  
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A possible and with respect to the theoretical framework presented in 
chapter 3, very radical explanation would be, that it is possible to ensure 
a well coordinated state of these highly interdependent activities without 
the use of information intense methods.  
Intuitively, the list of what the people at the site termed “errors in 
project” (see section 6.2.5) does not support this possibility. Even though 
these socalled “errors in project” were also observed on other parts of the 
roof, as well as on other parts of the building, it is remarkable that the 
majority of them (Ad A-E) are related to exactly those activities, where 
high interdependencies are observed.  
Of course the presence of project errors is not a proof of a badly chosen 
combination of coordination modes. We do not know the number and 
size of project errors if other coordination modes were applied. And as 
described, project errors appear to be an inevitable part of any 
construction project. However, in a discussion of the possibilities of 
avoiding project errors, the carpenter spontaneously addresses the issue 
of coordination directly:  
“Things works better on small projects like single-family houses, 
where the craftsmen talk together directly. This kind of conversation 
solves the problems like the ones with the ventilation tubes. On 
projects like this one, everything has to be passed on to the clerk of 
works, who has to pass it on to somebody else. Too much is lost in 
this process. Of course, the managers claim that this way of doing 
things reduces overall costs, but we have serious doubts if this is 
really the case.” 
In general, all of the seven carpenters, with whom the issue of 
coordination by authority versus teaming was discussed, stress the 
importance of direct communication between the craftsmen. Or as an 
alternative, direct communication between the foremen (or a master 
working on the site, depending on the size of the firm).22 If direct 
communication is absent – for instance, if the architects or engineers 
specify too much - a lot of errors occur, because too much information is 
lost in transfer to higher levels. This is in agreement with the 
                                           
22 This direct communication can take various forms. Some of the craftsmen think of direct interaction 
between the craftsmen out on the building site. Others have had good experiences with a daily half-
hour morning meeting between the foremen.  
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observations done by a carpenter from the first team working on the 
project:  
“We see a lot of things that project management or architects and 
engineers do not see. It ought to be mandatory for the project 
management to spend at least two hours daily out on every building 
site. Sitting there in their hut is not enough.” 
The crane driver expresses the same experience concerning how to hoist 
the windows:  
 “In general, it does not work very well when my boss agrees directly 
with the client about how to hoist the windows and which equipment 
to use. How to do things depends very much on a lot of things on 
site, so there is always something management does not take into 
account”.  
The perceived inadequacy of instructions by design consultants or 
project management has not only to do with the poor possibility of 
feedback from the building site. Even the information forwarded by the 
design consultants is not always coordinated, as seen in the example of 
the roof houses, where the position of the hole in the carcass was not 
coordinated between the architect and the engineers. “Well, the architects 
can’t think of everything. Mistakes are made” as one of the carpenters puts it.  
So why is teaming not used more often? And are the reasons, whatever 
they may be, inconsistent with the theoretical framework? 
Again, let us turn to the explanations offered by the carpenters on this 
issue.    
Independently, two of the carpenters mentioned, that it is very common 
to leave a substantial part of coordination to direct communication 
between the craftsmen on small projects. But for reasons not known by 
the carpenters, they observed that this form of coordination did not work 
on larger projects. However, chapter 3 has substantiated that teaming, 
due to number of communication links, is not very good at handling 
communication in large groups. And consequently, larger construction 
projects may be caught in a very difficult combination of low repetition, 
high degrees of interdependence and thus, high activity complexity. 
Since no coordination mechanism, or combination hereof, clearly reigns 
in this situation, the problems do not necessarily equal badly chosen 
coordination modes. Perhaps they simply illustrate that there is no easy 
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way to coordinate such a situation concerning the direct cost as well as 
the outcome (indirect cost) of coordination.  
Another explanation often referred to by the carpenters is the piecework 
contract, where salaries are paid according to the output of each person 
or trade.  Since each trade has no economic incentive to improve the 
output of other trades, it does not favour teaming. The problems 
especially arise while working under time pressure, where there is a 
tendency not to care about how other trades carry out their activities. For 
instance, building materials may not be removed, or solutions that 
trouble other trades’ access to hidden installations may be carried out. 
Nonetheless, on several occasions it was observed, how the craftsmen 
actually paid attention to other trades, even though they were not 
contractually obliged to do so (and hence not paid for it). So even though 
the piecework contract does not result in totally atomised rent-seeking 
behaviour, its existence is a valuable reminder of the important interplay 
between information and incentive structures.  
Thirdly, another explanation of the limited use of teaming, which comes 
to the mind doing observations on the building site, is something as 
simple as lack of physical presence. The seven different firms do not work 
on the roof simultaneously, they also work on other parts of the site, and 
on different projects. It seems obvious that this is an impediment to 
direct communication. To some degree, perhaps, the existence of project 
management can be understood along these lines: it is always present on 
the site in an easy to find place and hence it can act as a medium for 
people separated in time and place.23 In the same vein, project 
management may also be seen as a way of reducing costs of monitoring 
scattered, with respect to the firm, employees. The coordination practises 
used for the people doing the roofing felt – where firm authority was 
present on the building site for other reasons – illustrates this point (box 
6) 
These three explanations clearly add some important insights to some of 
the difficulties of using teaming, even when interdependencies are 
strong. Yet, they do not seem to explain why we do not observe the use 
                                           
23 Of course, what makes such a medium required is the fact that the craftsmen do not know each 
other in advance and that often, people are only assigned to the job at the very last minute. If not so, 
other means of communication, like mobile phones, would most likely come into play.  
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of teaming in the coordination of interdependencies between roof 
houses, installment of ventilation plants and erection of rafters. With 
respect to the first explanation, two companies, with only two employees 
working on this job each, are involved. This number hardly oversteps the 
information capacity of a team. Concerning lack of incentives due to the 
pay-by-performance scheme, both parties reported that they had a lot to 
gain by adjusting their activities to each other. And indeed, both parties 
were present at the roof on the same time. Actually, a major part of the 
coordination problem was that they had to work on exactly the same 
spot of the roof. If nothing else, opportunities for direct communication 
were plenty. 
  
Costs of identifying coordination modes  
So the question still remains: why is teaming not used for these 
activities?  
Now, teaming between carpenters and the ventilation people are in fact 
used, also concerning timing of events: not on the completion of the roof 
on the first apartment building, as was the object for this case study, but 
on completion of the identical roof on the second apartment building. To 
quote one of the carpenters, when asked about how he assessed the 
coordination of the activities in question: 
 “Well, on the second roof we did it somewhat differently. To follow 
the instructions from the management about the “rhythm” had 
proven far too difficult on the first roof. So together with the two 
people from the ventilation firm, we discussed and agreed on how to 
progress. Then we told the project management “we do it this and 
this way”, which they accepted.” 
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 Box 6: The importance of physical distance? - the roofing felt case 
As seen in the following table, the coordination of roofing felt activities differ from the 
general pattern with respect to the role of internal authority:  
Coordination practices – Roofing felt (underscored) compared with overall 
results for roofing (without roofing felt) 
 
 
Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to m
ake 
task 
W
hen to m
ake 
task 
W
hich m
aterials 
to use 
H
ow
 m
uch to 
produce 
H
ow
 it should 
look like 
W
hich tools to 
use 
H
ow
 to do it 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if in 
doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman 4 4           
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm 
5 
4 
(2) 
5 
3,5 
(4) 
4 
2 
(1) 
5 
 
(0) 
 3 
 
(0) 
 3 
5 
(1) 
5 
3 
(2) 
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management  2,6      4  
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions)  
 3 4,2 4,7 4,4  2 
 
  
Pricing – Using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.  
4,5  4 
 
      
Teaming – Talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc. 2,5 3,5  2 2,5 2 2,5 5 3 
 
Formal rules – Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use)  
   2 
 
     
Social norms 1 – By assessing the task and use my 
experience.  
  2   3 
2 
(1) 
4 3 
3 
(1) 
3 
Social norms 2 – Not something I think about, I do as I 
always do.  
  4 
 
 5 
4 
(1) 
4,8 5 
4,8 
(5) 
  
Other  5 3 
3,5 
(2) 
    3 
3 
(1) 
3 
Brackets = number of observations, observation from roofing felt not included.  
 
(Continues) 
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Box 6: The importance of physical distance? - the roofing felt case. 
Continued. 
 
The quote clearly gives credence to the importance of including costs of 
identifying appropriate coordination modes in order to understand the 
selection of coordination modes. No one, not even the craftsmen, knows 
the true value of the interdependencies for this particular kind of roof.  
Of course, they have some ideas from previous projects, but there are 
always small variations in the roof and hence, variations in 
interdependencies. This roof turned out to be difficult due to a set of 
conditions particular to this project (a one-way pitch roof; a late decision 
on placing ventilation tubes towards the narrow end of the roof etc.). 
The use of internal authority for roofing is not restricted to allocation and timing of 
manpower only. Unlike what has been observed for other activities, firm 
management also instructs the craftsmen on materials, tools and quantity, and they 
do quality inspections and resolves doubts as well. In this way, internal management 
carries out a substantial part of the coordination otherwise performed by the project 
management or design consultants external to the roofing felt firm. 
A potential explanation of these different coordination practises is the difficulty / 
importance of “welding” the roofing felt together correctly. If not done carefully, the 
roof is not waterproof, which in turn creates far-reaching damages and a costly 
repair (among other things, it is difficult to get access to the roof once the scaffold has 
been removed).  Historically, there have been examples of bad workmanship in this 
area, and for this reason, the roofing felt industry in Denmark has struggled with a 
bad image. Hence, it has been mandatory for the industry to ensure a proper quality. 
As part of this, firms need to be certified and external firms – appointed by the 
roofing felt producers – inspect the quality (=  the value of 3 in “other” / “If quality 
is OK”).  
Perhaps for this reason, firm management and the supplier of building materials 
follow their employees much more carefully than construction firms in general. The 
two workers doing the roofing felt in the case study reported that their manager visit 
them at least a couple of times weekly, and sometimes comes around daily – 
undoubtedly the highest employee-employer interaction observed in the roof case.  
Once the firm management is present on the site, it becomes obvious for them to also 
to engage in coordination of objectives – like for instance how much to produce - not 
strictly associated with the quality of the product. Hence, the coordination practices 
observed for roofing felt not only reflect how coordination practises differ with 
respect to the sensitivity of correct working procedures. They also inform us what 
coordination practices might look like, if the importance of physical distance was 
reduced (as it is for spatially fixed production).   
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Consequently, in the outset it is costly to obtain the information 
necessary to choose appropriate coordination modes.  
Then along the way, interdependencies (and various problems) are 
revealed, which, at least ideally, paves the way for a revision of the 
coordination modes applied. The story is essentially a Smithian one: by 
repetition, persons can increase their dexterity not only in carrying out 
activities, but also in coordinating them. And, it appears, in the long run, 
the story is also very consistent with the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter 3. In the beginning, there is not the anticipated 
relation between interdependencies and coordination modes – and 
hence, rather than having coordination modes fine-tuned to these 
interdependencies, robust patterns are applied – but as people learn, 
coordination modes and interdependencies come into agreement.  
Unfortunately, with respect to construction there are some “thorns” in 
this story. First and foremost, the same activities are not often repeated. 
In the roof case, two identical roofs were constructed and the people 
could learn from this. But they could only learn from the many roofs 
each of them had partaken in on previous projects to a limited degree. 
Secondly, there are also organisational reasons why construction is not 
conducive to learning about coordination modes. For instance, the 
circulation of personnel within and between building sites reduces the 
impact of delays, but at the same time may limit the learning obtained 
by, say, two identical roofs. Furthermore, as discussed in the chapter that 
follows, coordination by a third party, i.e. an external firm, renders 
incentive problems likely. To push it to the extremes (and far beyond 
what was actually observed in the case study): why should project 
management or design consultants spend extra resources on 
coordination to make life sweet for subcontractors? Even if project 
management does care, it is probably much more difficult to learn from, 
and teach to, people they do not know due to ever changing working 
constellations. At the craftsmen level, the same examples apply: the pay 
per performance system potentially creates problems of sub-optimising 
behaviour, and changing working constellations makes investment in 
firm- and person-specific learning less attractive.  
In balance, the interaction between carpenters and the people doing the 
ventilation illustrates the importance of including costs of identifying 
coordination modes in order to understand why certain coordination 
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modes, and not others, come into play. As argued, this conclusion is 
particularly important to have in mind when studying cases where 
repetition is limited. In construction, among others changes in demand 
reduce repetition and the emergence of long-lasting relations. Change in 
the taste of customers or technological development may spur the same 
situation, hence making the observation from this particular case 
relevant to a larger empirical field than simply construction.  
 
Robustness in coordination modes 
The costs of identifying appropriate coordination modes, as discussed in 
the previous section, imply that in order to save on these costs, 
coordination modes are not necessarily fine-tuned to interdependencies. 
In this perspective, it can make sense not to coordinate the interaction 
between the carpenters and the ventilation people by teaming, even 
though their activities are highly dependent on each other.  
The question then is how “robust” the general coordination pattern is: is 
it always the same, or will it be affected by differences in 
interdependencies if these are sufficiently large? Two observations made 
in connection to, but not directly on, the case study seem to support the 
latter position.  
The first observation is the installation shaft referred to previously (box 
5). As this example indicates, teaming between the craftsmen (and 
perhaps also between the craftsmen and the design team) is to a higher 
degree used here, than in the general pattern of coordination observed 
for the roof case. Interestingly, in an interview with the project manager, 
the installation shaft was pointed out beforehand as the part of the 
building, in which interdependencies were strongest. In line with the 
cost-of-identification-explanation of the selection of coordination modes, 
this suggests that different coordination modes when activities are more 
(or less) interdependent than usual AND when this is known ex ante 
production.  
Perhaps coordination modes used for refurbishment are a second 
example of the fact that even though coordination patterns were found 
to be rather robust in roof production, they were not indifferent to 
interdependencies (box 7).  
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Box 7:  The widespread use of teaming in coordination of 
refurbishment projects  
Refurbishment is interesting from a coordination point of view, since activities are reported to 
be more interdependent than in building of new houses. Due to the high costs of specifying the 
condition of the house subject to refurbishment ex ante, the exact procedures and the way trades 
interact are very difficult to foresee. According to the theoretical framework, due to the higher 
degree of interdependence, we would expect to find other modes of coordination in play.  
One of the craftsmen reported the use of the following coordination modes during 
refurbishment: 
Craftsmen – level 
 
Coordination object 
Coordination mode 
W
ho to m
ake task 
W
hen to m
ake 
task 
W
hich m
aterials 
to use 
H
ow
 m
uch to 
produce 
H
ow
 it should 
look like 
W
hich tkools to 
use 
H
ow
 to do 
If quality is O
K
 
W
hat to do if in 
doubt  
Authority 1  - Instructions from foreman 5 5 3 4 4     
Authority 2  - Instructions from clerk of works / 
management of firm   3 4 4     
Authority 3  - Instructions from project management   3       
Authority 4  - Instructions from architects and 
engineers (e.g. drawings and instructions)     2 2     
Pricing – Using the contracts signed when tendering 
took place.           
Teaming – Talking to other craftsmen, suppliers etc.   3 4 4  4   
Formal rules - Using general and written line of 
directions (e.g. instructions for use)           
Social norms 1 – By assessing the task and use my 
experience.    2    2   
Social norms 2 – Not something I think about, I do asI 
always do.       5    
Other   2       
The observed modes are in line with the theoretical expectations in the sense that teaming is 
used more forcefully for more coordination objects than in the roof case. Besides this, the 
observed patterns seem to support Thompson’s view, that the more interdependent activities 
are, the wider the range of coordination modes used.  
The payment system is also different from what is usually observed in construction of new 
houses. Instead of piecework contracts, payment is normally based on a rough estimate of any 
task; that is, the master estimates the number of man-hours needed for a task and gives a sum of 
money to the carpenters. If there is money left, this is a bonus for the carpenters. However, the 
relation between the master and client is not different. A contract specifying the extent of the 
work is signed, and if the actual work exceeds this contract, the master makes claims.  
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6.3 Exit – an illustrative example of activities and coordination in a 
repetitive setting 
So far, coordination has been studied in an environment with low degree 
of repetition in the activities carried out by a single person, by a firm or 
in an interfirm arrangement. It has been shown how this enforces a 
particular balance between production and coordination costs, between 
costs of coordinating and costs of not being coordinated, and between 
costs of creating, using, and identifying coordination modes.  
For the purpose of illustrating the impact of repetition, furniture 
production seems ideal in a number of dimensions. In a Danish context, 
construction and furniture production share many features24, but they 
vary with respect to how many times the same product is produced, as 
well as with respect to the existence of long-term interfirm relations. 
Hence, let us conclude this chapter on coordination in the construction 
industry by broadening the horizon and seeing what can be learned 
about selection of coordination mechanisms in a non-construction 
setting.25 
                                           
24 Both construction and furniture production take place in  (a) mature industries in which (b) 
Denmark has a reputation for performing well internationally (c) partly due to unique design skills; 
(d) they both produce physical objects, thus transportation and distance matters (irrespectively of new 
information technologies); (e) production is often ordered and in small batches; (f) skilled craftsmen 
constitute a significant part of the people employed and consequently, the educational background is 
to a high degree the same; (g) to some degree they work with the same materials and tools, in fact 
quite a few companies shift between production of furniture and construction components; (h) the 
regional setting of production is partly overlapping (since construction on at least site-level takes place 
all over the country); and (i) they are, in general, both subject to the same external conditions 
constituted by legislation and government policies. 
25 The case study on sofa production presented here is conducted as part of a LOK research project 
carried out in collaboration with Mark Lorenzen. Data has, as in the roof case, been collected in spring 
2001 by a combination of observations and semi-structured interviews. As it will be seen, in sofa 
production, each activity is ongoing, routinized, and known by the management. Consequently, it was 
possible to collect the required data in a two-day period, starting with key-informant interviews 
supplemented with short interviews with employees. We relied on existing empirical data on the 
firms (from Lorenzen 1999), and spent 20 hours on interviews and observation in two furniture firms 
in the Salling district. The interview/observation started out with a guided tour by the production 
manager or similar, showing the flow of activities. This provided a general overview, which in turn 
allowed for very focused interviews with individual employees. 
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To come up with the conclusion, on the one hand the sofa case supports 
the idea, that interdependencies and coordination modes are associated. 
But in some very crucial aspects the story is very different from the one 
offered in particular by Thompson and the contingency approach. First 
of all, coordination modes are not adjusted to (the interdependence) of 
activities. The causality runs exactly the other way. Rather than changing 
coordination modes, the activities are defined in a way so that 
interdependencies are low. Secondly, due to learning it is possible to 
handle rather interdependent relations with “information light” 
coordination modes. For instance, a sequential relation can be handled 
by standardisation (and not planning as Thompson proposes).  
The outline of this section is as follows. Firstly, the activities involved in 
sofa production are presented, then it is described how they are 
coordinated and finally, it is discussed why these particular mechanisms 
come into play.  
6.3.1 Activities in sofa production 
The activities involved in sofa production are illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Activities in sofa production 
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Compared with figure 2, there are some obvious differences between 
sofa and roof production.  
First of all, it is evident, that even though the number of man-hours 
spent on making a roof outweighs the number of man-hours spent on 
making a sofa, sofa production consists of at least as many activities. 
This, of course, has to do with a more extensive division of labour.  
Further, the ways colours (each colour representing a firm) are 
distributed in the two figures inform us of large differences in the role of 
the firm with respect to coordination. Sofa production is organized in 
sequences of activities located within two firms and hence, a substantial 
part of coordination takes place within the firm. In roofing, more firms 
(seven) are involved in production and what is more, they do not 
perform their activities in succession.  This implies a much higher level 
of interfirm coordination. 
And finally, sofa production is more modular concerning time 
interdependence, since the activities are organised as multiple streams 
rather than as a simple line of strings (as, roughly speaking, in the roof 
case).  
6.3.2 Coordination in sofa production 
As it would be expected from a learning based approach to coordination, 
the pattern of coordination changes as a sequence of activities is 
repeated.  
When a new batch (i.e. type of sofa) is launched, management spends 
extensive efforts manufacturing the information needed to produce 
templates and instruct workers on exactly how to do the job.26 In the 
                                           
26 In firm A, this work is conducted entirely by the manager-owner of the firm. In firm B, the process is 
the following. When an idea is accepted, a prototype is sketched out. Based on this, the management 
splits the prototype into different working operations, which allows a first test batch to be produced. 
The head of each of the three departments in which production is divided, closely follow this process, 
writing down problems or potential improvements. After the test batch, a meeting is held with the 
heads of departments and one representative from sales and purchasing respectively, in order to 
revise working procedures. If revisions are made, a new test batch is produced, and if everything 
works out, the series is put into production. Usually, two or three test batches are produced. This is in 
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development phase, teaming and negotiation is used at the management 
level, and authority at the level of the employees.  
Later, when production of a series is well tested and becomes routinized, 
management only contributes to the internal process of coordination by 
giving notice on when to produce which batches and providing 
deadlines, that is, deciding which customers to satisfy first. The 
employees work predominantly by standards and routines, that is, 
processes where little information transfer is needed.  In this part of the 
process, the only instances where information transfer is upgraded, is 
when management steps into change the work sequences, in order to 
accommodate specific, urgent needs of customers. This was particularly 
relevant for the activities undertaken by firm A, the smaller supplier of 
wooden frames, having a range of different customers.27 In order to cope 
with urgent deliveries, management shuffles around orders, which in 
turn makes it necessary for the foremen to adjust which activities they 
work on in the different parts of the value chain. Consequently, the 
foremen ⎯ especially in busy periods ⎯ spend some time discussing 
which of the many ongoing production activities to put at the top of the 
agenda.  
Hence, for well-known sofa types, a substantial part of the coordination 
is undertaken by structuring the work in a sequence of work stations 
within the two firms ⎯  the supplier of wooden frames (firm A), as well 
as the end producer of sofas (firm B). In both firms, each work station 
uses a specific machine and ⎯ depending on the batch ⎯ a specific 
template. Allocating activities to specific work stations allows for 
coordination by routines, concerning whom to do the activity and 
obviously also which tools to use. In combination with the template made 
by the foreman or manager, the tool also structures how to do the job to a 
substantial degree. Which materials and how much to produce (extent) to 
use is very much given by the input from previous activities, since the 
activities where new materials are added, are rare.  
                                                                                                                                   
agreement with the experience in firm A: it usually takes two or three tests before everything runs 
smoothly.  
27 Firm B mainly produces according to the sequence in which orders are given. Where the foremen in 
firm A ensure deadlines, a computerized system keeps track of progress in firm B. Each employee 
types a four-digit code for each operation completed. 
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Structuring the work around a defined sequence of activities further 
provides some information on when to do the activity, since the workers 
simply process the input provided to them. Instructions from the 
management on this matter is consequently limited to initiating the 
batch. Management also decides on which deliveries to make when. In 
this way, information on when to do the activities flows two ways. It 
flows forwards, since the output of one activity is the input of the next. 
And it flows backwards, since the foremen are responsible for making 
sure that deadlines for outbound deliveries are met. In case the foreman 
in the assembly part (i.e. at the end of the value chain with the end 
producer of sofas) discovers delays, in agreement with foremen 
upstream, manpower is allocated to bottlenecks. The specific form of the 
reallocation varies, depending among other things on the machinery. For 
machinery that demands personnel with little training, most persons can 
be reallocated, whereas only experienced personnel or skilled workers ⎯ 
very often the foremen ⎯ are used for more advanced machinery.  
Doubts are almost completely solved ex ante production, as the templates 
and the given sequences of working stations render few contingencies 
unforeseen. Quality control, on the other hand, is required, which to a 
high degree can be explained by deviances in input; in particular, the 
quality and colour of leather products can vary. Quality control is not 
done by management or third parties, but follows from the set-up of 
activities in a sequence: in most cases, defaults will be identified 
immediately by those carrying out the next activity.  
An interesting feature of coordination in ongoing sofa production is its 
reliance upon shared knowledge and knowledge embedded in 
machinery. This is made feasible by the recurrent nature of activities, 
and their integration into only two firms. Within these firms, little 
information is transferred directly between persons ⎯ not only because 
standards and routines govern actions, but also because information is 
embedded in how the products move along the value chain (in firm B, 
the information on how to carry out the activities in the sequence is 
printed on a production note that is stapled to each product). In daily 
operations, the role of management for coordination seems limited. But 
as described, it is management that “hardwires” coordination into 
machines, prescribing working procedures (i.e. activities), and fixing 
   
 
 
Chapter 6: Coordination practices in the construction process 228  
relations between working procedures. Hence, the role of indirect 
management is large. 
To recall, the opposite is the case in construction. Because of the nature 
of activities and their disintegration into a large number of firms, 
routinization and hardwiring of coordination cannot take place to a 
degree similar to the sofa production case. Relying on the skills and 
routines of single entrepreneurs,28 but not encompassing routinization of 
coordination or impersonal management of the kind found in the sofa 
case, roof production is based on authority provided by personal 
management. 
Some of the main (and interrelated) differences in the way sofa and roof 
production are coordinated, are summarised in table 7.  
                                           
28 This corresponds well with the observation, that in the roofing case only skilled carpenters were 
used for carpentry work, whereas more workers in the sofa case were unskilled. 
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Table 7: Main differencies in the coordination of  sofa and roof 
production 
 Sofa production 
(Repeated production) 
Roof production 
(Non-repeated production) 
The distribution of a 
firm’s activities in the 
value chain  
A firm carries outs a 
continuous row of activities.  
A firm carries out activities 
“here and there” in the 
value chain. 
Coordination and firm 
boundaries 
Unilateral and bilateral 
coordination.  
Bilateral and trilateral 
coordination. 
The firm as coordinator The sofa firm coordinates 
between value chains and 
within the single value chain. 
The construction firm 
coordinates mainly between 
value chains. The general 
contractor and design 
consultants mainly 
coordinate within the value 
chain. 
Type of authority29 Impersonal authority.  Personal authority. 
Carriers of information Mainly flows of materials. Mainly personal 
communication. 
Kind of standardisation Standardisation of skills, 
physical input, tools and 
working procedures. 
Standardisation of skills 
and output. 
Degree of variability in 
activities 
Low degree of variability in 
activities.  
High degree of variability 
in activities.  
Applicability of skills  Very specialised skills (to 
suit only a few activities). 
Widely applicable skills (to 
suit a wide range of 
activities). 
General educational 
level of workers 
Mainly unskilled. Mainly skilled. 
 
                                           
29 The distinction between impersonal and personal authority is from Arrow (1974), who describes 
impersonal authority as working through codes of conduct which prescribe what each member of the 
organisation is to do under a variety of possible circumstances. Personal authority is the giving and 
taking of orders.   
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6.3.3 Coordination modes and interdependencies 
As expected, more resources appear to be devoted to identifying and 
creating appropriate coordination modes in the repetitive production of 
sofas, than in the less repetitive roof construction. For example, when 
new products are introduced, the management of firms A or B devote 
their resources to finding out, how to produce and coordinate sofa parts, 
or sofas, respectively. In turn, these considerations are transformed into 
standards and routines, where information is inherent in the product 
flow and the given structure of workstations.  
However, these resources pertain to the division of labour more than to 
coordination mechanisms. In fact, coordination mechanisms seem rather 
stable. Rather than developing more and more fine-tuned coordination 
mechanisms, these producers reduce the complexity of coordination by 
simplifying activities. Hence, they reduce the amount of information to 
be transferred. In this way, even activities that in the outset are different, 
can come into agreement with a simple coordination scheme ⎯ reducing 
not only the information need in coordinating production activities, but 
also eliminating the need for further experimentation with new 
coordination mechanisms. Efficiency of learning ⎯ within, as well as 
across firm boundaries ⎯  leads to a change of division of labour, while 
maintaining a rather narrow spectrum of coordination mechanisms, and 
not too many fine-tuned mechanisms adjusted to particular 
interdependencies.  
It is notable, that a high level of learning has a positive impact on 
efficiency. Through such learning, even activities that first may require 
substantial transfer of information can later be coordinated by 
information-cheap means, such as standards and firm-routines, as 
provided by the flow of the product and a given structure of work 
stations. Hence, activities may have a very high degree of 
interdependence and at the same time require little interpersonal 
communication.  
It also refines the view on division of labour as the cause of coordination. 
Undoubtedly, little, if any, coordination would be required, if there was 
no division of labour. But as seen in the case of sofa production, by 
splitting up production in very delimited activities, it becomes easier for 
management to provide and implement a full description of how to 
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carry out the activity.  Hence, increasing the division of labour on the 
one hand creates a need for coordination, but on the other hand also 
enables the use of means, for instance well-described working 
procedures, by which the job of coordination can be made easier. 
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SUMMARY ON EMPIRICAL PART 
In combination with the theoretical speculations offered in chapter 2 and 
3, the empirical observations found in this and the previous chapter offer 
elements to a story of why construction is organised and coordinated the 
way it is. Let me conclude this chapter by presenting the puzzle in a less 
detailed version than the one presented on the many pages above.  
Lack of repetition due to market fluctuations play a key role here. Other 
sources to lack of repetition have been identified, for instance variations 
caused at the micro level by the particularity of the building site or client 
demands, by discontinuity of the project team and firm-relations etc. Yet, 
it has been argued that these variations to a large degree is a 
consequence of, or is amplified by, market fluctuations Therefore – and 
in order to keep the story as simple as possible - I will try to maintain 
market fluctuations as the single independent variable in the following 
line of reasoning.   
Due to unstable markets, the process of construction faces a low level of 
repetition at the macro level. This inflicts a high degree of novelty to the 
building process, as firms, individuals, the exact activities and their 
interdependencies differ from one project to another in spite of the fact 
that final products are not necessarily very different and that the 
technologies employed appear to be very stable. The non-repetitiveness 
at the macro level is a key to understand the division of labour, the 
organisation of coordination and the coordination modes used in the 
process of construction (the three research questions). 
The overall market changes propagate to the level of firms, thus making 
it more important for construction firms to be adaptable than to be 
specialised. Hence, construction activities are usually not internalised in 
a long string of activities carried out by a single firm specialised in 
producing a particular kind of building (for instance housing) or even a 
sub-set of a building (for instance a roof). Neither are construction firms 
engaged in long-term interfirm relations where firm or inter-firm specific 
capabilities are developed. Instead, construction firms carry out very 
delimited sets of activities “here and there” in the value chain with 
counterparts which at the level of the individual (and often also at the 
level of firms) are replaced from one project to the next.   
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In this set-up, a trade system - in which employers and their employees 
are grouped together according to their capabilities in trades like 
carpentry, plumbing etc. - holds the following advantages. Organising 
the work in trades allows for a degree of specialisation that is higher 
than in the “jack-of-all-trades” firm. At the same time, as firms within the 
same trade are identical to each other due to the skills and working 
procedures provided by for example the apprentice system, one, say, 
carpentry-firm (or carpenter) can be replaced with another with minimal 
impact on the operations of other firms. Thus, by having these sector-
wide interfaces, coordination costs are lowered substantially in a set-up, 
where overall fluctuations in demand make relations between specific 
firms and individuals costly to maintain. In this way, the lack of 
repetition at the levels of individuals and firms are to some degree 
replaced by repetition at the level of trades. The shared expectations 
towards the behaviour of other firms and individuals not known from 
prior working relations are further supported by a wider institutional 
framework: an industry-wide piece rate system, a quality insurance 
system, a court of arbitration, standard contracts between client and 
contractor etc.  
At the same time, by not being too specialised, it is possible for firms to 
engage in many different working constellations, not only between 
building projects, but also within the single project. This makes it 
possible to shift around the sequence of activities undertaken by the 
firm, and hereby adjust to the delays that easily arise because working 
procedures are not entirely routinised, and because input to a substantial 
degree is processed on the site and hence, cannot easily be stored or 
substituted.   
In balance, the trade system gives away some of the benefits of being 
very good at one particular activity in order to gain on lower coordination 
costs and, other things being equal, lower production costs stemming 
from less unused production facilities. Accordingly, even though the 
trades have long historical roots and most likely were created in a setting 
that was very different from that of today, it may be in the interest of the 
parties involved in construction to maintain this system.  
So far, the effects of changes that can be traced back to the macro level 
have been discussed. But sources to variations can also be found at the 
micro level. There are often small variations due to the wishes of the 
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client (or the architect), the particular shape and position of the building 
site, zoning laws etc. Yet, if not for change in overall demand, 
presumably identical strings of activities could be repeated by the same 
firm, or group of firms, specialised in a certain segment of the market. 
For instance, a firm could specialise in execution, and in turn perhaps 
also planning, of a one-way pitched roof on medium scale buildings.30 
But as specialisation – and consequently also the development of 
modular designs and products - is hardly an option, variations in the 
final product cause variations in the working processes.  
Since each project is new for the involved parties, successful 
coordination cannot be achieved by following past behaviour more or 
less unconsciously. Planning is one way by which construction tackle the 
issue of coordination in a deliberate manner. By providing timetables 
and output specifications, some agreement between the actions of all the 
separate actors in construction is reached. In particular, it is a way to 
ensure, that the final product is consistent with the specifications of the 
client. However, the benefits of a well-planned process (i.e. the benefits 
of having information) have to be balanced with the costs directly 
involved in making them (i.e. the cost of getting information). Here, the 
low level of repetition pushes the point of balance towards a rather 
unplanned building process, as plans cannot be reused by the involved 
parties (even if it is assumed that all information, at costs, can be 
acquired for a new product ex ante production).  
Correspondingly, robust patterns of coordination modes are used. As 
these patterns are not adjusted to variations in informational 
requirements, they do not minimise on the costs of using coordination 
modes; in particular not when new building materials and technical 
solutions or unfortunate coincidences complicate interactions locally and 
thus call for decentralised decisions by teaming. However, the stable 
patterns reduce the costs of identifying the best of coordination modes – 
                                           
30 From an interdependence perspective, it seems that roof activities constitute a cluster of activities. 
Only a few of the interdependencies shown in figure 3 in this chapter relate to activities on other parts 
of the building than the roof: making the site accessible (A21), bricklaying of facing wall (A32), putting 
up scaffold (A43, also used for bricklayers), and to a limited degree installing of the vertical 
ventilation tubes (a41). This gives reason to wonder about the possibility of integrating all activities on 
the roof into a single firm. 
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again, costs that are important to consider in construction due to the low 
level of repetition.  
As activities are different from one project to another (even though they 
may look alike with respect to the result) and as planning is far from 
perfect, the acceptance of many unforeseen events (“project errors”) and 
ad hoc adaptability to new situations is an important – and presumably 
often also efficient - way of handling coordination in construction. This 
in turn makes it costly to use input, tools and working procedures, 
which due to their limited flexibility in a very clear way instruct 
construction workers how to perform the activities. The implications of 
the limited use of these “behaviour-guiding structures” are threefold.  
First, the use of craft production: the complexity of the activity becomes 
substantial which in turn requires the use of skilled workers, who can 
decide locally which tools etc. to use. So besides being grouped together 
in trades according to their capabilities, construction workers are 
generally well-educated from the beginning of their career (at the other 
hand, due to high personal mobility, the continuous training of 
construction workers is probably limited; a conjecture that also could 
explain the limited seniority-related increase in salary within 
construction).  
Secondly, building materials that are not yet cut into size or assembled 
for final use are by far the most dominant in construction. The low level 
of prefabrication implies that a lot of value adding takes place on the 
building site. This ensures flexibility, but again reduces some of the 
benefits of the division of labour and large-scale production, as 
production on the building site obviously amounts only to the needs of 
that particular site. Furthermore, the physical co-production on site 
makes the complexity of each activity even larger, due to 
interdependencies concerning access and damage.  
Thirdly, as information, over time, only to a limited extent becomes 
incorporated in procedures or routines, or in the materials or tools used, 
coordination requires that substantial resources and particular skills 
constantly are devoted to processing and distribution of information. In 
combination with the limited potential for coordination within a firm or 
bilateral coordination between two firms, this paves the way for persons 
and firms specialised in coordination (and in turn creates a concentration 
of academics in firms of architects and engineers). Two types of such 
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firms engaged in trilateral coordination are observed in construction: the 
firms belonging to the design team, who mainly works with planning 
prior to construction, and the project management, who facilitates ad hoc 
adaptation during construction.   
Thus, with respect to coordination as observed at the level of the 
craftsmen, the following characteristics are central to construction. 
Firstly, even though plans, timetables and descriptions are made ex ante 
production, a substantial part of coordination is done by ad hoc 
adjustment during construction. In the interpretation given here, these 
ongoing adjustments balance the costs of not having information with 
the costs of getting information in a non-repeated setting. Secondly, 
coordination is partly done by centralised decisions (e.g. on the 
allocation of manpower and the outcome of an activity), partly done by 
decentralised decisions (e.g. on which tools and working procedures to 
follow). Consequently, each activity is coordinated by a particular 
combination of multiple coordination modes. This observation seems 
consistent with the theoretical claim, that no single coordination mode 
can handle the information involved in non-repeated, complex activities 
with many actors potentially involved (as information on 
interdependencies is costly to provide in advance for novel activities). 
Thirdly, presumably due to high identification costs in the non-repetitive 
setting, these coordination patterns are rather robust, in the sense that 
they are not fine-tuned to the interdependencies of the activities (but are 
not “immune” to different levels of interdependencies either). Finally, as 
a sign of trilateral coordination, the craftsmen receive instructions on 
how to perform their work not only from superiors within their own 
firm, but also directly from design consultants and project managers in 
external firms.  
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Chapter 7 – Theoretical perspectives 
 
…on the division of labour and knowledge, specialisation in 
coordination and the firm as a coordinator, and the efficient 
application of coordination modes in temporary organisations 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The interaction between theory and empirical observations is mutual. As 
hopefully seen in the previous empirical chapters (and the following 
chapter 8) theory can facilitate an interpretation of complex and 
otherwise hardly comprehensible phenomena. However, empirical 
observations also add new insights to theories through the support, 
deepening, complementation or contradictions they provide. The latter 
aspect is considered in this final chapter. Rather than going through the 
theoretical framework as presented in chapters 2 and 3 meticulously, I 
will focus on the areas in which contributions to the theoretical 
framework appear to be most profound in the light of the empirical 
findings presented in chapters 5 and 6.  
In order to stress that the discussion and suggestions offered in this first 
section of the chapter point towards analytical generalisation, the claims I 
make are formulated as three propositions (and not final conclusions). The 
propositions are organised according to the three main research 
questions.  
To recall, the first question relates to the division of labour in 
construction (the why-question). At a more general theoretical level, this 
question may inform us of scope and limits to the division of labour in 
situations with little repetition of sequences of activities. The 
observations offered in this thesis suggests the following 
 Proposition A: The less repetitive sequences of activities are, 
the more individuals and firms are driven towards 
isomorphism rather than innovation and specialisation. Thus, 
the less repetition, the lower the level of overall innovation 
and the higher the ratio of systemic innovation.   
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The second question relates to specialisation in coordination, and the role of 
the firm1 in the process of coordinating activities (the whom-question). An 
important sub-question here is why activities and coordination of 
activities in some situations are fixed in repetitive relations and in other 
situations interact on a more temporary (and interfirm) basis. This thesis 
suggest the following:  
 Proposition B: Low levels of repetitive sequences of activities 
increase the ratio of coordination done by a third party firm 
(trilateral coordination), but decrease coordination organised 
directly between two firms (i.e. bilateral coordination) or 
coordination organised within a firm (i.e. unilateral 
coordination). 
The final research question concerns the information costs of different 
coordination modes and why, in an information perspective, certain 
coordination modes are chosen for a given situation (the how-question). 
The proposition is as follows: 
 Proposition C: The more repetitive sequences of activities are, 
the more coordination costs are lowered due to not only to (I) 
lower costs of identifying appropriate coordination modes but 
also as an effect of (II) lower costs of using a given 
coordination mode, and (III) lower costs to defining activities 
in a way that they become easy to coordinate.  
The propositions provide a synthesis of how the empirical observations 
made within roof and sofa production contribute to a review of the 
theoretical framework presented in chapters 2 and 3. In the following 
sub-sections, I outline the stylised facts and (information and incentive 
based) reflections, which provide the foundation for, or follow from, 
these propositions.   
As the propositions and specific insights are based on (analytical) 
generalisation of findings made within a particular empirical setting, 
they should be treated as propositions and nothing more: claims about 
                                           
1 The firm is here both understood as a set of resources and activities and by its legal and contractual 
boundaries. 
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causal relations to be confirmed or rejected by further empirical studies. 
Acknowledging that design, not to say implementation, of such 
additional empirical inquiries is far beyond the scope of the present 
work, it is my hope that the propositions offered here may inspire others.  
In particular, I hope that the propositions inspire other to probe into how 
different kinds of change affect economic organisation. As pointed out 
on several occasions, repetition – not only in a single activity as Adam 
Smith (1970) focuses on, but also in sequences of activities – is a key to 
understand the division of labour, the organisation of coordination, and 
the selection of coordination modes. In construction, change in overall 
demand has been pointed out as a particularly important source of a 
limited scope for repetition of sequences of activities. Yet, it is possible to 
think of other sources of low degrees of continuity; for instance (a) 
change in costumers preferences; (b) technological development 
allowing new manufacturing principles and products; or (c) change in 
seasons or supply of raw materials (Stinchcombe 1990).  It could be 
conjectured, that the effect of change in these three dimensions will have 
the same effect, or at least some of the same effects, as change in overall 
demand: they make it less favourable to establish repeated sequences of 
activities. If so, the propositions offered here will be valid to a larger set 
of economic activities than construction and could be part in a more 
general framework on why temporary organisations (or project 
organisations) behave differently from less temporary ones.   
 
7.2 Proposition A - Perspectives on specialisation and the division 
of labour and knowledge in temporary organisations 
Even though Adam Smith was not at all ignorant of the limits to the 
division of labour, he primarily provided a compelling argument for 
why dissimilarity is in the interests of individuals and society. Drawing 
on Becker and Murphy’s (1992) basic idea, that low production costs 
obtained by the division of labour and specialisation have to be balanced 
with coordination costs, this thesis points to the benefits of similarity (or 
isomorphism). More precisely, what is suggested in proposition A is that 
when interactions in activities are not frequently repeated, the benefits 
firms and individuals can gain from being similar, tend to outweigh the 
benefits of being dissimilar.  
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7.2.1 The importance of isomorphism rather than specialisation  
Thus, at the overall level, the empirical observations (and hence 
proposition A) do not contradict the fundamental trade-off between the 
division of labour and coordination costs. However, the coordination 
practices found in construction and furniture production respectively, 
illustrate how important repetitiveness is for the exact point of 
intersection between, on the one hand, advantages from firm specific 
innovation and specialisation and, on the other hand, lower coordination 
costs due to isomorphism.   
In the case of sofa production, repetition of working constellations and 
activities encourages that employees focus on a very delimited and 
defined activity, which over time become standardised and routinised, 
and accordingly, coordination costs are low. Conversely, the division of 
labour is more limited in construction due to higher coordination costs 
and the importance of adaptability to new market situations. However, 
the number of different activities (concerning, materials, working 
procedures, tools etc.) are substantial in construction and do not favour a 
“jack-of-all-trades” solution. The existence of trades – in which firms and 
people with identical knowledge, skills and experience are grouped 
together – is a way of accommodating the need for lowering the costs of 
coordination and inflexibility in a non-repetitive setting, and at the same 
time to allow some division of labour to take place.  
An important role of organising in trades is to create shared expectations. 
Firms and individuals that do not know each other from previous 
interactions know what to expect, as firms and individuals within a trade 
behave identically.2 Thus, the more general lesson suggested in 
proposition A is that in industries where long-term relations due to 
rigidity are costly to maintain, it is in the interest of firms and 
individuals not to break away from an isomorphic way of organising (e.g. 
the trade-organisation), as this would limit their ability to shift to new 
working constellations.  
                                           
2 The surgery team conducting an operation or the crew of people producing a movie may represent 
features similar to that of the trade organisation in construction: in each project (i.e. operation/movie) 
a number of very specialised, but identical from one project to another, professions are involved. 
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With respect to indicators showing the (in)correctness of proposition A, 
we would expect to find that in industries with limited duration of 
interfirm or interpersonal relations, (non-specialised) firms and 
individuals that behave according to the rules and norms of their 
respective trades, will outperform (specialised) firms and individuals 
that deviate from the trade behaviour. Further, if the need for flexibility 
is dependent on overall market trends in such a way, that working 
constellations are more easily maintained in periods with stable or 
increased demand, it should be expected that the ratio of successful 
specialised firms is higher in periods with stable or increasing demand, 
than in periods of decreasing demand. In connection with the statistical 
inquiries presented in chapter 5, it was attempted to bring 
supplementary evidence on the benefits of isomorphism by looking at 
the survival rates of specialised versus isomorphic firms in construction. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to locate such specialised firms.3  
As discussed in the next chapter, limited benefits of specialisation are 
likely to have implications for the level and type of innovations as it 
favours systemic innovations rather than autonomous firm innovations. 
This in turn creates particular selection mechanisms (i.e. the mechanisms 
by which the less successful firms are sorted out from the more 
successful ones).  
7.2.2 Limits to isomorphism  
The study has empirically illustrated, how lack of repetition between 
specific individuals and firms is replaced by repetition at a more aggregate 
level, i.e. repetition among isomorphic groups (e.g. trades). Yet, repetition 
at these two different levels has not been found to be two of a kind with 
respect to the division of labour. The degree to which activities could be 
repeated in exactly the same way, appears to be much more profound in 
sofa production than in roof production. The “lack” of innovations in 
                                           
3 More specifically, the idea was to se whether firms that had a special educational profile (e.g. 
carpentry firms that employed other skilled workers than carpenters) had lower survival rates than 
“typical firms”. However, almost no firms with mixed professional background (i.e. specialised firms) 
could be identified, which on the one hand does not allow for additional empirical testing, but on the 
other hand can be interpreted exactly as a sign of the benefits of “being alike” in construction.   
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relations between specific persons or firms (see the previous section) 
could potentially account for this.  
Consequently, the study does not contradict the theoretical claim 
forwarded in chapter 2, that changes in demand (i.e. the macro level) 
transform into changes in working constellations between projects, 
which go on to promote changes in the relation between the activities 
within the single project, which eventually creates a lower level of 
repetition in the single activity. Accordingly, a limited level of 
specialisation within (or between) firms is likely to go together with a 
limited division of labour at the level of individuals (as the division of 
labour is dependent on repetitive activities).  
Thus, a potential drawback from isomorphism is a lower level of 
dexterity within a particular field. Or, as seen in construction, that more 
resources have to be devoted to the development of widely applicable 
skills (“craft production”).  Furthermore, presumably the limited 
division of labour results in a lower rate of invention of machinery to 
replace manual labour (an indication of the latter would be a relatively 
low capital-to-labour fraction in industries with low levels of repetition).  
Taking these drawbacks into account I do not suggest that isomorphism 
always is superior to specialisation. As captured in proposition A, the 
benefits of isomorphism appear to most dominant when adaptability to 
new working constellations are of essence due to some kind of external 
changes, and hence, it is expected only to be dominant with low levels of 
repetition in sequences of activities.  
 
7.3 Proposition B - Perspectives on the firm as a coordinator 
7.3.1 The limited role of the firm as a coordinator  
The theoretical part dealt with the trade off between benefits of repeating 
sequences of activities with benefits of being able to adapt to changes in 
external conditions. It was argued that in order to reap the fruits of 
specialisation, an unstable environment promotes not only persons 
specialised in performing specific activities, but also persons specialised 
in coordinating these activities. The job of coordination specialists is to 
adapt to external changes and, if necessary, to restructure activities 
internally in the sequence of repeated activities (and thus, two different 
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kinds of coordination specialists may occur). It was further argued that 
through authority and ownership, the specialists in coordination could 
reduce the costs of transferring decisive information, and the costs of 
experimenting with (re)structuring activities. And hence, that the firm 
perceived as a set of repeated interactions between activities, would not 
differ largely from the contractual or legal boundaries of the firm. Put 
differently, the incentive based view and the information based view on 
the firm respectively, do not seem to differ much with respect to where 
they draw the boundaries of firms.  
The empirical observations support this. Activities interacting 
repeatedly, are lastingly under the same direction and are performed by 
using tools and equipment belonging to the same owner(s). And equally, 
unified authority and ownership on a more than temporary basis, is only 
found for activities that are fixed together repeatedly.  Many different 
firms are involved in roof production whereas, each firm covers a much 
wider span of activities in furniture production (presumably working 
under more stable external conditions).  
However, or perhaps because of this, the empirical findings also 
demonstrate that firms do not always experiment with, or provide 
information structures for, a sequence of repeated activities. To put it 
more precisely: when sequences of activities are not repeated, (some) 
firms play a much more limited role concerning coordination, as they 
only coordinate between, but not within, value chains.  The coordination 
practices found in the construction and sofa-producing firms, 
respectively, illustrate this point.  
In sofa production, a string of subsequent activities is carried out within 
the firm. When a new product is launched, the management of the firm 
experiments with and determines the activities involved in producing 
this new product. Broadly speaking, this appears to be in line with the 
interpretation of K. Foss. Yet, there are some small nuances to the story 
on experimentation. Experimentation in sofa production is about finding 
out how a new product can be defined in such a way, that it becomes 
possible to handle with a given set of activities, i.e. by using existing 
tools, dies and working procedures. And as part of this, selecting the 
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exact activities, as well as the sequence to use for this particular product. 4 
It is less about developing new tools, dies, and working procedures as K. 
Foss pointed out as important elements of firm-based experimentation. 
And similarly, as a modification to Casson’s reflections on decisive 
information, it is found that both specialists to external changes (i.e. 
people working in the purchasing and sales department) and specialists 
in internal coordination (the shopfloor managers) are involved in the 
process of designing new sofas. Hence, the sofa production does not 
appear to be either design or market led and accordingly, none of these 
two groups of specialists are expected to hold decisive information. This 
seems somewhat surprising, considering that external conditions vary 
quite a lot due to changes in the preferences of customers, whereas the 
employed technology does not appear to be very capital intensive or 
subject to frequent changes. According to Casson (1994), this suggests 
high decisiveness in demand and low decisiveness in technology 
(favouring a market led firm). An alternative explanation of the 
empirical findings, similar to that offered as a refinement to K. Foss’ 
contribution on the importance of experimentation, is that decisiveness 
in technology is high due to advantages of specialisation and low 
coordination costs following from well-known interactions between 
activities. The shop floor managers are not included in the decisions on 
future products because technology changes, they are included because 
technology should not change.  
Nevertheless, in the overall picture, the sofa-producing firm seems to 
correspond well to picture of a firm as a trinity specialised in (I) 
                                           
4 Consequently, the sofa firm is able to produce a variety of different products using the same pool of 
activities. What is needed in order for decisions to be repetitive enough to make the creation of the 
firm economically viable, is not a steady stream of demand for identical products: the sofa firm can 
produce a few sofas of type A, then some of type D, switching to type B etc. and still maintain a high 
level of repetitiveness in activities. The only thing that really changes at the factory floor is the 
sequence of activities (defined once and for all by the management) and occasionally the dies. 
However, over time and on average, a particular sofa of, say, type A, should be expected to be called 
for repetitively in order to pay for the initial costs invested in locating and implementing the 
appropriate sequence of activities for this particular product. In short, what matters for creating the 
firm as a coordinator lengthwise the value chain, is not repetition in the sense that product A follows 
product A, but that within a given time frame product A is requested a minimum number of times, 
and that the sum of different products ensures a steady level of production.  
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coordination of external changes (performed by the purchasing and sales 
department), (II) coordination of internal changes (performed by shop 
floor managers), and (III) production of activities (performed by the 
workers).   However, this conceptualisation of the firm is not very apt for 
construction. The degree to which construction firms (i.e. subcontractors) 
engage themselves in length-wise coordination is hardly worth 
mentioning, as it is in the hand of project management and design 
consultants; i.e. is taken care of by external firms. Hence, construction 
firms as such do not experiment with how to delegate user rights in 
order to decompose a string of activities in the most favourable way. Nor 
do they to any significant degree establish a product particular structure 
to facilitate information transfer between the group of people involved in 
production. Partly, these functions are in the hands of firms specialised 
in coordination, i.e. the firms of the design team, and the firms 
responsible for project management. Partly, and perhaps predominantly, 
the role of experimentation and information structuring is minimised 
and taken care of, respectively, by the trade-organisation of the sector. 
Consequently, the need to organise construction according to common 
and well-known patterns, implies that some of the functions of the sofa 
production firm are moved to firms specialised in coordination, if not 
beyond the realm of any single firm (i.e. to the sectoral level).  
But what then is the role of the construction firm? Rather than 
coordinating within value chains, they coordinate solely between value 
chains. By moving equipment and in particular personnel from one 
construction site to another or from one part of the construction project 
to another, construction firms try to optimise the use of production 
facilities (identical to what sofa-producing firms do, when they shift back 
and forth between different types of sofas). Here, only specialists in 
coordination of external changes are found.  
The raison d’être for this type of construction firm appears to be more 
related to Coase’s general notion of the firm as a way of allowing 
ongoing adaptation to situations that are difficult to foresee, than to the 
specific experimentation-interpretation (or any other interpretation 
assuming that subsequent activities are placed within the firm) given by 
K. Foss (2001b).  
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In short, the firm can act as coordinator in two different set-ups. (A) 
Some firms handle market fluctuations and disrupts in production by 
coordinating activities between value chains and along the value chain, 
respectively. Experimentation and structuring of information is an 
important part of the latter. (B) Other firms play a much more limited 
role with respect to coordination, as they only coordinate between value 
chains, leaving coordination along the value chain to third party 
coordinators, or to general norms and rules that apply to the sector. 
Theoretically, it has been argued, and for roof and furniture production 
it has been found, that when external changes are high and cannot be 
resolved by shifts in markets, firms of type B will dominate, whereas 
firms of type A are more prevalent in stable settings.   
The different ways in which coordination is organised in sofa and roof 
production are summarised in figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1: The organisation of coordination in sofa production 
(repetitive production) 
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Figure 2: The organisation of coordination in roof production ( non-
repetitive production) 
 
The organisation of coordination in sofa production appears to fit well 
with the stylised picture given of the firm as a coordinator in chapter 2 
(Figure 1, section 2.3.). A sequence of identical activities is recurrently 
performed within the firm by the specialists in activities, i.e. by the 
workers (for a more exact representation of these activities, see the figure 
on activities in sofa production in chapter 6). Coordination of these 
activities is taken care of by the instructions and, in particular, the 
procedures and dies outlined by the shop floor manager who have 
specialised in internal coordination. External fluctuations are buffered 
not only by storing, but also by the purchasing and sales department, 
who – despite the long-term cooperation with some suppliers and 
costumers - shift back and forth between different markets for input and 
output respectively.  
In construction, however, the picture is very different. A construction 
firm only occasionally performs a repeated sequence of activities. Rather, 
construction firm 1 performs a single activity, then construction firm 2 
completes the next (sub)part of the building, and so on (at a certain point 
construction firm 1 will once again enter the value chain momentarily). 
Each construction firm buffers quantitative fluctuations by working on 
multiple parts of the building and on multiple building projects. Thus, 
not only is repetition limited in the sense that the persons do not interact 
over time (as part of producing identical products repeatedly); even 
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within a very short time span the attention of craftsmen can be dispersed 
among multiple projects. Within the project, the foreman switches 
around which parts of the building to work on. The clerk of work 
allocates manpower between building projects, and the department of 
tendering ensures a sufficiently large, but not too large, pool of ongoing 
projects. Coordination within the single building project is not 
coordinated within the construction firms, but are placed in the hands of 
external firms; i.e. third party coordination by the firm of architects and 
the firm of engineers (the design team) primarily executing their work 
during the idea and planning phase, and by the project management 
firm (that on some occasions is identical to one of the construction firms), 
that primarily works during the phase of execution. As the interaction 
between construction firms usually is on a one-off basis, so is the relation 
between the construction firms and the third party coordination firms (as 
well as within the third party coordinating firms).  
7.3.2 Third party coordination  
This raises the question of how coordination of subsequent activities is 
organised when these activities are not placed within the firm. Who 
takes over the responsibility of coordination in the presence of type B 
firms (i.e. firms that only coordinates between – not within – value 
chains)?  
The role of third party coordination - some problems with market based and 
bilateral interfirm coordination 
In order to answer this question, let us consider the organisation of 
construction, where the (sub-)contracting companies usually are of type 
B.  
Ideally, the process of construction could be organised in such a way that 
firms buy the input from the previous trade, and after executing a 
number of activities resell it to the next firm in line. However, the need 
for adaptability disfavours the internalisation of long sequences of 
activities in the firm, as well as the organisation by long term interfirm 
coordination (“cooperation” in the terminology of Richardson (1972)). 
Thus, the number of firms involved (even in parts of) house construction 
is substantial, and their interaction is not facilitated by repeated 
interaction. Consequently, the cost of forming contracts between the 
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numerous firms (that is, more a less a contract for each activity) would 
be enormous. In addition, as the output at any given point of the value 
chain is not identical from one project to another (the intermediate 
products are not standardised), the input is not buffered by the principles 
of large numbers or by cheap storage (i.e. they are not easily handled by 
a spot market).  Secondly, low levels of standardisation of products 
imply that contracts are more easily formed after, than before successful 
completion of previous activities. In a buy-and-resell system, this would 
most likely delay the building process and thus impose additional 
capital costs.  
The assumed costliness of organising interactions by such market based 
buy-and-resell systems, seems to fit well with the observation, that a 
subcontracting system is widespread in Denmark. In this subcontracting 
system, the subcontractor provides manpower and usually also 
additional materials, but the subcontractor does not own a part of the 
building at any time. Furthermore, contractual costs are reduced by 
bunching activities together (e.g. all the carpentry work on a building 
site is usually done by one or a few carpentry firms).  
When the objects subject to transformation are not owned by the 
subcontractor, the “burden of proof” concerning the value added to the 
product by him or previous subcontractors, is likely to change. As the 
subcontractor cannot be harmed by a low reselling price, in the outset he 
has no compelling reasons to convince or prove to a buyer, that the 
quality of his work is acceptable. Rather, it is the job of the general 
contractor to prove, that the subcontracted work has not been done in an 
acceptable way (i.e. the way it is outlined in the initial contract).  
In a situation of symmetric information, this would be of little 
importance. But if asymmetric information exists – e.g. the general 
contractor does not have and cannot cheaply acquire the same amount of 
information as the subcontractor on, for instance, the quality of the work 
performed by the subcontractor – the situation is different.5 Here, the 
                                           
5 The problem of asymmetric information in construction is supposedly high for at least three 
different reasons. Firstly, many parts of the final (and even intermediate stages of the) building are not 
visible to the client or to project management, as subsequently added parts physically cover them. 
Secondly, due to the long lifespan of a building, many errors are revealed long after construction 
which reduce the danger of being held responsible if an information advantage is (mis)used. And 
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subcontractor is more likely to use his information advantage to lower 
the quality of his work, since the general contractor, and not the 
subcontractor, carries the burden of undocumented quality of work.  
Another implication of the subcontracting system is, that, since 
subcontracting firms do not own the objects they are working on, they 
are not burdened by the (rather huge) capital costs created by, say, an 
unfinished building. The client (who owns the building) carries these 
costs. Strictly speaking, the interest of the subcontractor is to build in a 
pace, where he optimises his production capacity, i.e. allocating as few 
persons to the site as possible.6 The interest of the client is to reduce 
building time and hence capital costs, i.e. having as many persons as 
possible allocated to the site.   
In light of this, the reasons for the continuous presence of a project 
management firm working on the building site appear to be twofold.  
Firstly - in order to compensate for asymmetric information - to assess 
the quality of the work performed by subcontractors.7 Secondly, in order 
to look after his interest, the client needs to set up timetables, as well as 
sanctions, e.g. fines for delays, if these are not followed. As the execution 
of such sanctions requires information about local conditions – e.g. is the 
delay caused by external phenomena, such as the weather, or by a 
calculative subcontractor (and which one) – the more detailed planning, 
as well as its reinforcement, is well placed with a client representative 
working on site, i.e. the project management.  
                                                                                                                                   
even if they are recognised by the client at the time the building is handed over, it can be very difficult 
to point out exactly which firm to blame, due to the many different firms involved. Thirdly, the 
benefits of (mis)using asymmetric information have to be traded off with the risk, that the counterpart 
most likely would act in a less collaborative way in subsequent meetings. However, this mechanism is 
weak in a sector, where collaboration (for reasons given above) is not expected to exceed the length of 
the single building project.   
6 By having only a few persons allocated to the site, the subcontractor does not risk to have idle 
production facilities.  The only risk is to be delayed, a problem the subcontractor for the reasons given 
has no economic reasons to be concerned about (unless, of course, countermeasures such as fines for 
delays are taken).   
7 The existence of the quality insurance system– in which the subcontractor is obliged to document the 
way he has progressed with his work – used in the Danish construction industry, can be interpreted as 
another measure taken against scamped work. 
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Third party coordination in the production phase 
These reflections and propositions give ground to expect that particular 
incentive-problems arise when many and subcontracting firms are 
temporarily involved in production. This in turn favours the existences 
of one or more third party firms engaged in monitoring and enforcing on 
the work of subcontractors.  
Adding to these incentive based explanations for the existence of third 
party firms, are considerations regarding how to minimise on 
communication costs. In short, it can be costly for constructing firms to 
communicate directly with each other simply due to the many and 
temporarily involved firms. First of all, as the number of companies 
expands, other things being equal the need for a more centralised 
network design is accentuated. And secondly, it is not always feasible to 
identify which person to talk to. As a firm carrying out many activities at 
the same time, they can be allocated all over the site. Or perhaps they are 
not at the site for the time being. If the same persons were working 
together on a more permanent basis, direct communication lines could 
be established, but as new firms and new persons are selected on a 
project basis, personal relations have to be rebuilt recurrently.  
In this way, the project management acts as a centralised communication 
node enabling communication between subcontractors, as well as 
communication between subcontractors and people working off the site 
(e.g. project management). Due to the short span of activities carried out 
by the single construction firm, the degree to which these overarching 
communication structures can be placed within the legal boundaries of 
each of the subcontracting firms is very limited. Thus, unlike in sofa 
production, third party firms specialised in transferring information 
between distant parts of production arise.  
In combination, this gives reason to conjecture the following: the less 
repetitive sequences of activities are, the less frequent is coordination in 
the production phase performed by unilateral coordination within a firm 
or by bilateral coordination directly between two firms, and the more 
frequently is coordination performed by a third party firm.  Important 
elements in the work of a third party during production (i.e. the project 
management in construction) can be to (a) monitor the quality of the 
ongoing work of subcontractor; (b) to enforce timetables on behalf of the 
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owner of the product; and (c) to act as a communication node between 
the subcontracting firms.  
Third party coordination in the design phase 
Up to now, the role of project management in construction has been 
discussed, i.e. the use of a third party during production. But as witnessed 
in the case study on construction, the team of architect, engineer and 
main contractor also plays a critical role in the coordination of building 
activities in the design phase. Except for the general contractor 
occasionally, the persons involved in the design team are employed in 
firms that do not engage in contract work directly on the building site, 
and usually do not repeat their interactions with other firms from the 
design team or with subcontracting firms. Thus, like project 
management, the members of the design team represent third party 
coordination in both the legal sense of the firm, as well as in the 
perception of the firm as a set of activities and resources. However, 
unlike project management, the majority of the work in the design team 
is done prior to (i.e. in the planning phase) and not during construction 
(i.e. the execution phase). Correspondingly, the design team serves other 
purposes than the project management with respect to coordination. 
One part of the work of the design team is to centralise information 
processing and thus avoid duplication.  
For instance, it is the responsibility of the design team to design the 
building according to the budget and needs specified by the client. This 
work starts with making the very first sketches and overall dispositions 
in dialogue with the client and ends with the very detailed drawings 
specifying the materials and layout of each part of the building. Usually, 
the client expresses his demands in general (and not technical) terms 
related to the final result (and usually not related solely to the work of 
any single trade). Hence, the design team can be understood as a way to 
avoid duplication, by centralising the information processing involved in 
transforming the overall demands of the client into technical formulated 
specifications and thus, reduce information costs.  
Calculating the static of a building is another example of gains from 
centralising information processing relating to multiple parts of a 
building (and hence to the operation of multiple firms). In order to 
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calculate the static of a building, the interaction of all vertical and 
horizontal forces has to be considered. It does not make sense to 
calculate the static for a very delimited part of the building on its own. 
And consequently, if a subcontractor is to do the static, he has to 
consider the work done by the other subcontractors and likewise for 
each of the other subcontractors. Hence, by placing this job in the hand 
of a single firm, overlap of work can be avoided. This and the previous 
example illustrate Casson’s claim (1994), that sometimes it is easier to 
transmit decisions than the conditions on which they are based.  
Centralised information processing on, for instance, taste of customers 
was also found in sofa production. Here, it was the responsibility of the 
sales department to follow market trends and then – as a member of the 
team involved during production of the first two or three batches of 
sofas – transform them into technical specifications. In sofa production, 
these centralised and specialised information processing (and 
transmitting) units are kept in-house, except on very rare occasions.8 
However, due to numerous firms involved in construction, to place this 
function within each of the subcontracting firm will result in a lot of 
overlapping work. Hence, the shorter the string of activities internalised 
within a firm, in order to avoid duplication, the less coordination will be 
done by the producing firm itself and the more coordination will be done 
by a third party firm.  
A second objective of the design team is to avoid sub-optimal solutions. 
The existence of multiple separate firms is also likely to create incentive 
problems if solutions of design and pace of completion was placed 
within each of the subcontracting firms. For instance, when the 
carpenters commence the construction of the roof, they could choose a 
solution that is fully consistent with the specifications of the client, but at 
the same time a solution that is very difficult for say, the ventilation 
plant people, to proceed with (for instance due to low accessibility). The 
“lack” of repeated interactions between specific persons and firms 
probably accentuates this problem.  By placing the specification and rate 
                                           
8 One of the two furniture firms reported that they “once and many years ago” had used an external 
architect in order to design a new sofa. Apart from this example, the design people (usually a skilled 
upholsterer but not a furniture designer) had always been employed in-house.   
   
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Theoretical perspectives  254  
of completion of technical solutions in the hand of a party that it not 
itself engaged in production, the risk of such sub-optimising behaviour 
is reduced.  
Finally, as also discussed in the previous section, one potential benefit 
from third party coordination in the planning and in the production 
phase is that it enables communication (ex ante or during production, 
respectively) between activities that are temporarily separated or are 
placed in distant parts of the value chain. A phenomenon we may call 
“horizontal skip level reporting”. 9 As seen in the case studies on sofa and 
roof construction, decisions taken up-stream the value chain can have 
implications for neighbouring activities and for activities several steps 
down the value chain. The more distant interrelated activities are, 
assumedly the more costly it is to transfer information horizontally back 
and forth the value chain (among other things, there are costs related to 
duplication in transfer of information, as well as noise-costs due the 
multiple persons that the information runs through). Apparently, if 
unintended externalities are to be avoided, this situation encourages 
distant levels of production to interact directly. However, the knowledge 
of by whom non-neighbouring activities are performed may be limited 
and perhaps – as seen in construction – the persons performing non-
neighbouring activities may not be present at the production facility at 
the same time. So, even though the introduction a central agent implies 
an additional communication link compared with direct communication 
(but not compared with horizontal communication through all stages of 
production), it may reduce communication costs between non-
neighbouring activities.  
As for the organisation of coordination during production, I conjecture 
that the less repetitive sequences of activities are, the less frequently 
coordination in the planning phase is done by unilateral coordination 
                                           
9 The term “horizontal skip level reporting” refers to Balton and Dewatripont’s (1994) discussion of 
(vertical) skip level reporting, that is reporting given by a subordinate not to the immediate superior, 
but to superiors two or more layers beyond the subordinate. Balton and Dewatripont argument is that 
the extent of (vertical) skip level reporting is limited in an efficient communication network. As I 
argue here, this conclusion is not necessarily valid for horizontal skip level reporting, that is reporting 
given between non-neighbouring activities possibly mediated by a superior level (in which case it 
includes vertical elements as well).   
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within a firm or by bilateral coordination directly between two firms, 
and the more frequent is coordinating done by a third party firm.  
Important elements in the work of a third party in the planning phase 
are:  (a) to avoid duplication of information processing; (b) to prevent 
technical solutions that are favourable to a few, but harmful to many 
firms; and (c) to bridge communication between distant parts of the 
value chain (horizontal skip level reporting).  
7.3.3 Limits to third party coordination 
To sum up, in situations with little repetition in sequences of activities, 
there appears to be many advantages from placing the execution of 
activities and the coordination of activities in separate firms. However, 
the case study also points to disadvantages of not repeating interactions 
between the parties coordinating and executing activities, respectively.  
First, decoupling coordination and execution of production limits hands-
on experience as an important source of innovation. The case study on 
roofing gave several examples of how the craftsmen identified ways to 
improve the product or the working process. However, according to the 
craftsmen these observations were rarely utilised. One part of their 
explanation related to the long communication lines: a suggestion is 
forwarded to the project management, who forwards it to the design 
team, who considers the idea and reports back to the subcontractor via 
the project management. The subcontractors found this long response 
time to be very discouraging. However, the craftsmen also felt that the 
design team had difficulties in understanding what the problems were 
all about. A possible interpretation is that low levels of repetition in 
communication – in particular in combination with a design team 
working off the site10  – increase the cost of communication.   
Hence, an expected drawback from placing activities and coordination of 
activities in separate firms is that the information costs of using hands-on 
                                           
10 The obvious question then seems to be why the work of the design team is not done on the site. The 
immediate answer it that this would be difficult, because members of the design team usually work on 
multiple projects simultaneously (which also limits the co-location of the design team off the site).  
Thus, the explanation points towards that specialisation also occurs within the design team, which 
makes if difficult for any single person to be fulltime employed on a single project unless it is of a 
certain size.  
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experience as a source to innovation is increased.  With respect to 
possible empirical indications, this claim infers that the more 
coordination is done by third parties, the less innovations are made in 
working procedures and tools used by the workers, but due to higher 
level of specialisation, the more innovations are made in the procedures 
and tools used by the coordinators.    
The case study on roof construction also illustrates how trilateral 
coordination raises incentive problems in balancing production and 
coordination costs. The design team exerts coordination along the value 
chain, but is not directly affected by the state of coordination. Hence, 
they have a tendency to under-invest in coordination. As one person 
from the design team said during a meeting in the planning phase: “I do 
not spend an extra working hour just to reduce building costs with 5000 
DKK [approx. 600 ECU]”. It is hardly likely that 5000 DKK exceeds his 
costs of a working hour (including overhead). Similarly, as 
subcontractors are paid for doing a particular job, and not for a final 
house, their main focus is on reducing production costs and not on 
striking the balance between production AND coordination costs. As 
observed with respect to the roof houses, the subcontractors occasionally 
performed an activity as described by the design team, knowing that it 
would create significant problems for other subcontractors. But as they 
acted according to the contract – and perhaps even had a chance to earn 
extra payment for reworking their own output – they did not always 
inform the design team or project management about this.  
Thus, under-investment in coordination prior to production and lacking 
attention to coordination during production is a likely outcome of 
separating coordination from production. Of course there are limits to 
the under-investment in coordination. Firstly, even though contracts are 
not complete, they do specify some minimum requirements. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, although they are not paid directly 
according to the quality of the final product, all parties are to some 
degree dependent on a good reputation. And hence, they do not wish 
the project to be a total blunder. Furthermore, even though it is for a 
limited period, there is some level of mutual dependence between the 
design team and subcontractors, as well as directly between 
subcontractors (Kreiner 1976). This encourages the design team to 
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improve the coordination effort, and favours that subcontractors do not 
focus too narrowly on their own work. 
In conclusion, these disadvantages give reason to believe, that 
coordination by a third party is less widespread in environments with 
higher level of repetition in sequences of activities than, for instance, 
found in construction. Perhaps, they can also be part of an explanation 
for why – in spite of the fact that the general benefits of specialisation 
also apply to coordination – production and coordination of production 
is often co-located within the firm.   
 
7.4 Proposition C: Perspectives on coordination modes 
Adam Smith highlighted repetition of activities as the source of the 
division of labour and thus, as a source of “wealth of nations”. The 
smithian argument essentially is that repetition lowers production costs. 
Yet, as claimed in proposition C, repetition may also promote growth by 
other means, since repetition of sequences of activities can lower 
coordination costs (which again can allow for a greater division of labour 
and thus, lower production costs).  
The empirical study has highlighted three mechanisms of reducing 
coordination costs not very different from the three production costs 
mechanisms identified by Smith (lower switching costs, “dexterity”, and 
innovation). Repeated sequences of activities lower the costs of 
identifying appropriate coordination modes, that is switching costs 
induced by going from a well-known to a less well-known sequence of 
activities. Secondly, repetition of activities lower the costs of using a 
given coordination mode, as the persons involved become more 
knowledgeable and experienced in using it (they increase their dexterity).  
And finally, due to repetition it becomes possible to define, or innovate, 
activities in such a way, that they are easily coordinated.  
This subsection is organised according to these three different 
mechanisms. As in the previous sections, the stylised facts of the roof 
and sofa case leading to, or following from, the more general proposition 
C are presented and discussed.  
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7.4.1 Lower coordination costs due to dexterity 
How coordination by authority changes over time  
The empirical observations from the furniture and construction industry 
suggest, that the level of repetition matters for the exertion of authority. 
Not so much with respect to whether it exists or not, but more with 
respect to what different forms it may take. In order to see this, consider 
figure 3 which sketches the role of authority at time t0 (denotes when a 
product is made for the first time) and t1 (denotes the role of authority 
when a product has been produced repeatedly). The role of authority in 
t0  represents the sofa as well as the roof case, whereas t1 (due to lack of 
repetition in construction) only illustrates the role of authority in sofa 
production.  
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Figure 3: Repetition and the exercise of authority 
 
In t0 management in both sofa and roof construction plays a rather direct 
role throughout all stages of production. Mainly by direct 
communication, management informs the workers on how to perform 
each activity. In roof production these instructions concern in particular 
the outcome of the activity, whereas instructions in sofa production also 
include a very thorough description (often formulated in manuals) of the 
working procedures for the different tasks involved in each activity. 
Later (t1), when these procedures are laid down (and often have become 
routinised), the management of sofa production plays a much more 
limited role, as it is mainly concerned with getting the production of a 
sofa started (i.e. to inform the first person in the production line that this 
and this sofa should be produced now) and checking towards the end of 
the production line that sofas are ready as ordered. Often this function 
can be done directly by the sales department, but in case of an urgent 
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order, shop-floor managers can switch around batches at selected stages 
of production.   
So even though authority is present in both the roof and the sofa case, it 
will look very different in each case. In construction, authority is mainly 
done by the giving and taking of orders directly between superior and 
employees respectively. In sofa production, authority is harder to see in 
most phases of production, as it is inherent in the working procedures, 
tools and dies once and for all established by management. In the 
terminology of Arrow (1974), authority in construction is mainly 
personal, whereas it is impersonal in sofa production.   
More generally, this implies that the more sequences of activities are 
repeated, the more authority will change from being exerted directly by 
management in all stages of production, to being exerted indirectly in 
selected stages of production.  
The dissimilarity in the use of authority in roof and sofa production 
respectively illustrates another point: the various carriers of information. 
In construction, information is mostly provided by verbal or written 
communication. In the case of sofa production, people appear to 
communicate less, but how then is information transferred from one part 
of the value chain to another? Part of the answer lies in the extensive use 
of routines, which have captured the lessons from previous interaction 
and thereby rendered further communication unnecessary. However, 
this is not the whole explanation. Information embedded in dies and flows of 
materials is also found to be very important in the case of furniture 
production. Dies replace instructions about what to do and how to do it. 
Similarly, by fixing a person to a given workstation, and by forwarding 
the exact amount of materials needed, instructions on when to perform 
an activity and how much to produce can be reduced, as they are 
inherent in the flow of products. Only if deviations from this general 
pattern are necessary, managers have to intervene and instruct workers. 
In this way the established flow of materials running through 
thoroughly described work stations functions as what Casson and 
Wadeson (1994) termed a protocol; i.e. a procedure that economises on 
communication costs by clarifying exactly how much information to 
forward, what the information should be about and the way it should be 
sequenced.  
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In situations with low repetitiveness, these carriers of impersonal 
communication are costly to use (there are set-up costs of making dies; 
fixing a person to a particular workstation requires a stable production; 
to forward the exact amount of materials for the next operation requires 
experience about, among other things the exact waste rate). However, 
when production is repeated, these costs are outweighed by the lower 
variable information costs.  
Another more general implication of a high level of repetition in 
sequences of activities thus appears to be, that the information 
embedded in tools and dies and in materials flowing horizontally along 
the value chain increases, whereas vertical communication between 
superiors and subordinates decreases.  
Change in authority over time – implications for hierarchical layers and the size 
of firms    
Thus, part of the benefits of repetition has to do with the replacement of 
expensive information carriers with cheap ones. An important 
implication of this (and, in general, of ad II in proposition C) is that 
managerial resources are gradually freed due to repetition. As seen in 
furniture production, management was very engaged in production 
during the design and production of the two or three first batches of a 
new kind of sofa, but after this, there was minimal interference in 
production. For the same reason, each superior is able to instruct a large 
number of subordinates. For instance, in the largest of the two sofa 
producers on which the case study was conducted, three shop-floor 
managers instructed and supervised 120 employees. In the case study of 
roof construction, it was found that there usually is a superior person 
(i.e. a foreman or clerk of work) for each 5 to 10 employees.  This latter 
observation seems to be consistent with the fact that the size of a 
construction firm rarely exceeds 10 persons.  
Since repetition increases the number of subordinates related to a single 
superior, it could be expected that repetition also reduce the number of 
hierarchical layers in an organisation. Even though the case studies did 
not aim at exploring the issue of hierarchical layers, the empirical 
findings do not appear to contradict this line of reasoning. In the case of 
repeated production (sofas), three main hierarchical layers appeared: 
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worker, shop-floor managers and management. In the case of less 
repeated production (roofing), six hierarchical layers were identified: 
craftsmen, foreman, clerk of work / master, project management, the 
design team and eventually the client. No exact measures on the overall 
number of people working directly on the construction project have been 
made, but a rough estimate would suggest, that the number did not 
exceed the number of people employed in the larger of the two studied 
furniture producers (approx. 120 employees). 
In combination, these three propositions suggest that it may be difficult 
to estimate whether the level of authority is higher in, say, construction 
than in manufacturing (as fiercely discussed by Stinchcombe (1959) and 
Eccles (1981b)). In the one hand, authority is more dominating in 
construction, because managers are present and give instructions 
throughout the entire process of production. The presence of many 
hierarchical layers may also promote a picture of construction as being 
very much determined by centralised decisions. On the other hand, 
authority is less dominating in construction compared with sofa 
production; as working procedures, tools, and dies are not totally 
defined by management or inflowing materials, some decisions are left 
to the craftsmen. 
As observed in sofa production, when managerial resources are freed, 
management has time at their disposal to test new ideas and products. 
Some of these ideas do not work out well, whereas others eventually 
become a success and the firm expands its activities. Thus, the case study 
on sofa production supports the Penrosian idea, that hitherto unused 
managerial resources are an important source to why firms expand their 
size. And hence, it would be expected that growth in size of firms is 
different in a repetitive situation than in a non-repetitive one, as more 
managerial resourced are freed in the former.  Perhaps this line of 
reasoning, at least partially, can account for the very small growth in the 
size of construction firms observed in chapter 5.  
The persistence of authority in temporary and innovative organisations  
Pertaining to this discussion of authority, the conclusion is that even 
though authority to some respect is exerted differently in a temporary 
than in a stable setting, it exists in both cases.  
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Thus, construction can inform us of the organisation of sectors in which 
firm-based authority supposedly plays a limited role. The idea is – in 
consistence with much of the recent debate on how to organise in 
innovative and learning environments (N. Foss 2000a) – that in situations 
of great novelty (lack of repetition), it is not only difficult, but also 
unsuitable to put up defined goals in entering a process of innovation, 
where goals by definition are unknown. At the same time it is as difficult 
for managers to monitor or routinize activities that do not follow a 
recurring and well-known pattern, as it is to absorb the new knowledge 
being created. Hence, the argument goes, the more innovation and 
learning become of essence, the more centralised decision-making fades 
in favour of local decisions made by employees, or groups of employees, 
who are aware of, and can promptly react to, new and unforeseen 
situations.  
Now, let us take stock of the empirical results in order to see, if and how 
the use of authority is different in environments with temporary 
organisations and rather high levels of novelty (as in construction), than 
in more stable environments (as in sofa production).   
First of all, it appears that the claim, that lack of repetition favours some 
delegation of decision rights to local levels, holds some validity. 
Elements of craft production were found in construction, where craftsmen 
to a higher degree than employees in furniture production decide 
themselves, which tools and working procedures to use. However, even 
in construction a wide range of issues on the craftsmen-level was settled 
by central decisions made either internally in the construction firm (i.e. 
questions on when and by whom activities should be done), or 
externally by the design team (which materials to use, how much to 
produce and the finish of the output).  
As it appeared in the case study on construction, lack of repetition did 
not only make decisions by authority more costly. To some degree, it 
also made it more difficult to handle information by local decisions of 
the employees. First, due to the novelty, it is very costly, if not 
impossible, to design activities with little interdependence. And 
consequently, local decisions by a single agent would often create sub-
optimal solutions. This in turn calls for teaming, that is local decisions by 
the group of people performing the highly interdependent activities. But 
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again, due to the novelty, it is not easy to say exactly which activities that 
are highly interdependent on this particular project (recall the example 
of the roof houses discussed in chapter 5). And hence, the team easily 
grows beyond a size, which works with reasonable costs of 
communication. Further, the temporary and only partially simultaneous 
presence of the different construction firms is also a potential barrier to 
the use of teaming.   
Thus, on the one hand it was found that novelty (lack of repetition in 
sequences of activities) increases the costs of centralised decision-making 
by authority, but on the other hand also increased the costs of local 
decision-making by a single employee or by groups of employees. 
Consequently, the net effect of novelty / temporal organisations on the 
level of centralised decisions by management versus decentralised 
decision by employees appears to be less dramatic than often claimed 
(N. Foss 2000a). 
7.4.2 Lower switching costs to identification of coordination modes  
The empirical findings suggest a revision of the relation between 
activities and coordination modes outlined in the theoretical part. The 
first clarification relates to the learning cost of identifying coordination 
modes when switching to new sequences of activities with unknown 
interdependencies; costs that weaken the causality between the 
informational properties of activities and coordination modes. As the 
authors presented in chapter 3 did not pay much attention to this type of 
costs, such a gap between expected and actual coordination modes could 
not be accounted for. The second revision (discussed in the next section) 
suggests a revised causality between activities and coordination, and in 
particular argues for the contingency approach. 
A common feature of the theoretical contributions presented in chapter 3 
is that coordination modes are expected to correspond to the 
interdependence of activities and the informational properties following 
from these. However, we do not observe such a clear-cut relation in the 
case studies. The information involved in coordinating activities varies to 
a large extent in construction, without subsequent changes in the applied 
coordination modes.  As illustrated, some of these “lacking” adjustments 
are difficult to account for, unless the cost of identifying the appropriate 
coordination mode is included in the analysis. These costs may be 
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negligible in a repetitive setting, but in construction, where the exactly 
same sequence of activities is rarely made more than once, they are of 
significance.   
Consequently, the selection of coordination practices must be expected 
to be different in temporary organisations compared with more 
permanent ones. The more sequences of activities are repeated, the lower 
the costs of identifying appropriate coordination modes become and 
thus, the more coordination practises will vary according to 
informational content of the activities subject to coordination. 
Accordingly, the gap between the theoretically expected (according to 
chapter 3) and the actual coordination practices can be expected to be 
particularly high in temporary organisations.  
7.4.3 Lower costs of innovation of “easy-to-coordinate-activities” - 
revising the causality between interdependencies and coordination 
modes 
One might expect, that in the case of sofa production, the lower cost of 
identifying appropriate coordination modes would result in more 
varying coordination modes, as they are fine-tuned to the exact 
interdependencies between each set of activities. However, this is not the 
case; rather, repetition is used to break up the value chain in activities for 
which working procedures can be standardised and in turn routinised; a 
process that reduces coordination, as well as production costs. And thus, 
as for construction, a rather uniform (although different) set of 
coordination mechanisms is used for a wide range of activities.  
Hence, in sofa production, coordination modes are not adjusted to given 
interdependencies. On the contrary, activities and their 
interdependencies are defined in a way that corresponds to a particular 
coordination mode. This observation disagrees with the contingency 
views and favours the more recent approach offered by, for instance, 
Hippel (1990) and Grandori (2000), that causality between activities and 
coordination are a two-way , and not one-way – relation. 
In general, two different strategies can be pursued to fit coordination 
modes and activities: (a) change coordination mode and / or (b) change 
activities (and thus, the way they are interdependent). The empirical 
observations from construction and furniture production, respectively, 
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suggest that the former strategy is mainly used in a non-repetitive 
situation; and the latter is used when repetitive interactions between 
activities occur. Although the empirical foundation is limited, and a 
theoretical argument to why fixed costs are lower and variable costs are 
higher for strategy (a) than (b) is missing, this suggests that with low 
degrees of repetition in activities (a) is dominating, whereas strategy (b) 
is dominating with high degrees of repetition.  
Where the discussion in section 7.4.1 emphasised how coordination costs 
are lowered by repetition due to the subjects of coordination (i.e. due to the 
increased skills of the persons involved in coordinating activities), this 
discussion illustrates how coordination costs are lowered by repetition 
due to changes in the object of coordination (i.e. less complicated 
interdependencies between activities). 
In the case of sofa production, activities were designed in a way so that 
they could all be handled by standardisation (and in turn routinisation). 
Besides being a costs effective way of coordinating repetitive interactions 
due to low costs of processing and communication of information, the 
use of a single coordination mode is likely to hold many advantages, for 
instance lower switching costs and increased skills. This line of reasoning 
does not say anything about which particular coordination mode comes 
into play due to repetition. Yet, it shares Thompson’s idea, that a single 
coordination mode is used for activities that are simple to coordinate, 
whereas more complicated issues call for multiple coordination modes.  
 
7.5 Some implications for the study of coordination modes 
Interdependencies and coordination modes 
In summation, the discussion on how repetition lowers coordination 
costs (section 7.2-7.4) suggests a less clear-cut relation between, on the 
one hand activities and interdependencies, and coordination modes on 
the other, hand than proposed by the theoretical contributions offered in 
chapters 2 and 3.  
Firstly, in contrast to the contingency approach, it is indeed found that 
the causality runs both ways: coordination modes are adapted to 
activities and the other way around.  
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Secondly, when sequences of activities are not repeated, costs of 
identifying coordination modes can bring about a uniform coordination 
mode, even though interdependencies / the informational content of 
coordinating these activities varies. 
Thirdly, when sequences of activities are repeated, due to specialisation, 
coordination modes may not be very sensitive to the dependencies 
between activities. Firms and individuals, who handle repetitive 
sequences of activities and hence, can use the same (combination of) 
coordination mode(s) over and over, increase their skills within this 
particular field. Specialisation of this kind makes firms and individuals 
more reluctant to change coordination modes, as they may prefer to use 
the present (pattern of modes), although they are aware of other - and in 
the absence of switching costs - more preferable modes.11 
Another aspect of learning and coordination relates to the particular 
skills developed by repetition due to a division of labour. As the sofa 
case illustrates (and in contrast with the claims of Thompson 1967), by a 
process of learning, it becomes possible to coordinate activities with a 
medium or high degree of interdependence with, from an information 
processing point of view,  “light” coordination modes, such as norms or 
rules. This in turn challenges the view, that activities (with associated 
interdependencies) are to be the sole basic unit of analysis for studies on 
coordination. It appears that a temporal dimension relating to the skills 
and knowledge involved in, and created by, the process of coordination 
also have to be considered.  
                                           
11 An anecdotal story from the construction industry highlights this. Within the last five years or so, 
some of the major (main) contractors have expanded their activities vertically, meaning that they have 
all the major trades represented in-house. However, this development has not been accompanied with 
building projects conducted solely or mainly in-house. On different occasions I asked project 
managers, if they ever considered using the trades in-house in a more extended and systematic way 
than at present. The answer given was along the line: “Hell no! If something goes wrong with the 
external contractor, we can withhold payment or even get an arbitral award. But if it is in-house, what 
do you then do in case of a disagreement?” A possible interpretation of this answer is that in 
construction, the involved parties have knowledge and skills in writing contracts and in use of price 
coordination, and they have developed facilitating organisational structures (e.g. the court of 
arbitration). Hence, they find it very difficult to change to, say, coordination by teaming (perhaps) 
conducted in-house. 
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In general, it seems that the issue of how coordination skills can be 
improved over time does not appear to have drawn much attention in 
the existing literature on coordination. This study suggests that learning 
is a promising concept to dig into in order to understand the processes 
by which coordination modes are selected.  
The simultaneous use of multiple coordination modes and their changeability 
The case studies also bring nuances to the theoretical framework on 
activities and coordination modes by illustrating, how a single activity 
can be handled by a wide range of different coordination modes, and 
how coordination modes change according to phases of production, as 
well as hierarchical levels.  
The work at hand provides an in-depth study of the coordination modes 
used during the production of a roof. To recall, it was found that many 
different coordination modes were used for each activity. This seems to 
challenge the view, that a sector using a particular technology (as 
proposed by Thompson 1967) or even an activity with certain properties 
(as proposed by Grandori 2000) can be classified by a single coordination 
mode.  
The empirical investigation also reveals how coordination differs 
according to organisational levels and phases in the construction process.  
For instance, at the level of the craftsmen, instructions from the foreman 
or the clerk of work define when to perform an activity (i.e. coordination 
by authority). The foreman and the clerk of work base their instructions 
on unilateral decisions at the weekly site meeting and on the instructions 
from project management. Thus, at this organisational level, the 
coordination of when to perform an activity is done by different modes 
(some degree of teaming is used) and by different actors (project 
management).  
The sofa case shows how coordination modes change for different 
phases. In the initial design phase teaming is used. When the team has 
reached an agreement (and one or two prototypes have been produced), 
the employees are told what to do through directions, i.e. in the 
beginning of a product cycle coordination is done by authority. 
However, as the employees become acquainted with the activity (which 
is usually a swift process, as the activities they perform are almost 
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identical from one type of sofa to another) coordination by norms (e.g. 
routinisation) takes over.  Similarly, in construction, most decisions (in 
the design team) during the planning phase are, or at least appear to be 
made unanimously in the design team. Later (during execution), these 
decisions are forwarded to the craftsmen as instructions to be followed. 
The fact that coordination modes used for a single activity will often 
differ according to the organisational level and according to the phases 
of production further stresses, that sectors, firms or even activities cannot 
easily be classified by a single coordination mode. Consequently, the 
study of coordination practices is - at least until any regularity in the 
combination of coordination modes at different levels have been 
identified - a myopic affair. Furthermore, this also points to the 
importance of being very specific about at what organisational level and 
in what phases of production coordination practices are studied.  
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Chapter 8 – Empirical perspectives: the characteristics of 
construction revisited 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has addressed a set of rather specific questions relating to 
specialisation and coordination within the construction sector. In pursuit 
of these questions, elements of a more general understanding of the 
construction sector have been developed along the way. Potentially, this 
understanding can shed light on a wider range of organisational issues 
than the ones studied in the three research questions.  
This chapter is devoted for these wider empirical perspectives. Even 
though each of these perspectives probably deserves a thesis in their 
own right, I hope to show how a range of phenomena (elaborated on 
below) that intuitively seem surprising or perhaps even disturbing or 
alarming (or in economic terms ”inefficient”) appear more reasonable, 
when information costs are taken into account. Put differently, this 
chapter readdresses some of the major characteristics of construction 
mentioned in chapter 1 (section 1.4.2). But rather than taking these 
characteristics for granted or seeing them as fundamental, in the 
following I try to explain them largely as consequences of market 
fluctuations.   
These reflections however do not answer the rather obvious question of 
if there is any room for improvement in the construction sector. The 
epilogue (chapter 10) is devoted to this question.  
The discussion on how the general framework of the thesis can be used 
to explain some key characteristics of the present organisation of 
construction is structured as follows. Firstly, potential reasons to low 
levels of productivity and growth are considered. Closely related to this 
issue, follows a discussion on innovation in the sector. Thirdly, I offer 
some explanations to the dominance of many small firms within the 
construction sector. Trust is the fourth issue that is briefly analysed. And 
finally, reasons to ad hoc planning, overspending and poor quality are 
examined.   
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8.2 Key characteristics of construction and its performance – some 
explanations  
Productivity and growth in construction 
Figure 1 illustrates the increase in productivity (the outcome versus 
income ratio) for different segments of the economy from 1950-1998.  
Figure 1: Labour productivity for different sectors, Denmark 1950-2000 
(1950=100) 
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Source: Statistical 50 years review 2002 and calculations by Dan Ove Pedersen, The Danish Building 
Research Institute.1 
Even though one has to be careful with productivity measurements 
based on this kind of aggregate data, the figure clearly suggest that the 
overall improvement has been lower in construction than in 
manufacturing. In light of the argumentation of the present work, this is 
not surprising. As emphasised by Smith, a fundamental source of gains 
in productivity is the division of labour. In fact, the difference between 
productivity increases in construction and manufacturing is neatly 
explained by a mild paraphrasing of Smith’s explanation of how 
seasonal changes bring about a more limited division of labour within 
agriculture than manufacturing:  
“ [The] impossibility of making so complete and entire a separation 
of all the different branches of labour employed in construction 
[originally “agriculture”] is perhaps the reason why the 
                                           
1 I thank Dan Ove Pedersen for making these data available to me.  
 
Chapter 8: Empirical perspectives  273 
improvement of the productive powers of labour in this art does not 
always keep pace with their improvement in manufactures.” (Smith 
1970, p. 111).  
Now, seasonal changes have not been of main concern in this work (even 
though its impact on construction can not be totally ignored). Rather, the 
present work has stressed change in aggregate demand as an important 
source of limited repetition of sequences of activities, which in turn 
results in a limited division of labour.  Besides, for the theoretical and 
empirical reasons given throughout the thesis, this claim seems to fit 
well with the observation, that the decline in productivity within the 
construction industry (and thus, the time where the gap between 
productivity of construction and manufacturing seriously widens) began 
at the time of the first oil crises in Denmark (1973) when the unbroken 
post war improvements of GDP came to an end.2  
Innovation in construction 
According to Smith, one important element of the division of labour is 
that it allows for innovation of working procedures and machinery that 
facilitates production. The present work also adds insights to this claim 
by pointing to the different ways in which lack of repetition in 
construction can be an impediment to innovations in processes and 
products.  
The importance of “being alike” makes it less attractive for firms to 
develop idiosyncrasies that change their interface with other companies. 
Or put differently, if, say, a firm by will or by incident discovers a way of 
reducing the costs of performing an activity, implementation of this idea 
has to be counterbalanced with either the coordination costs imposed by 
doing things differently or with the costs related to lack of adaptability to 
new working constellations. This leaves the innovative firm with two 
options: should it (a) stick to innovations that do not alter its interface 
with other firms; or (b) try to promote / wait for simultaneous change in 
the behaviour of its partners. With respect to (a), the possibilities of 
doing so are usually limited due to the short string of activities 
internalised in firms working in temporary interfirm organisations. 
                                           
2 An additional explanation for the halt of productivity improvements in construction in the beginning 
of the 1970s relates to a more ideologically motivated shift from large high-rise buildings to small-
scale low-dense housing (Bertelsen 1997). 
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Concerning (b), change in the behaviour of a few collaborative firms is 
not enough, as the constellation of firms changes from one project to 
another. Hence, it appears that a rather large subset, and perhaps even 
the whole sector, has to change at the same time in order to allow for 
new interfaces.  
In essence, it seems that in industries where it is important to behave in 
according to the norms and rules of a trade, the ratio of systemic 
innovations  (i.e. innovations requiring simultaneous change in many 
parts of a system) is higher, than the ratio of autonomous innovations (i.e. 
innovations that can take place in one subsystem without changes in 
other subsystems); autonomous innovations being either interfirm 
innovations (i.e. innovation between specific firms) or intrafirm innovations 
(i.e. innovation taking place solely within a single firm).  
Since firms and individuals within the same trade will behave more or 
less identically, introduction of a superior solution by a single firm, that 
gradually outperform less innovative firms, are not very frequent. As the 
“name of the game” is to provide identical solutions, a competitive edge 
can only be obtained on prices. In construction, the dominance of sheer 
price based competition is institutionalised in the tendering systems, 
where bids are mostly given for, in principle, fully described jobs; that is 
construction firms are not allowed to come up with bids that, apart from 
the price, differ from the bids of other firms.  
The combined effect of (I) systemic rather than firm based innovations, 
and (II) competition based on prices and not on innovation, suggests a 
low overall level of innovation with low levels of repetition in sequences of 
activities. Since innovations will only be successfully implemented when 
they take place simultaneously across the sector, innovations that only 
take place in parts of the system are ruled out. Interestingly, this implies 
coordination costs for innovation. Secondly, as firms compete only on 
prices, presumably, they spend fewer resources on innovative purposes. 
Besides, discontinuity also limits the possibility of learning and in turn 
complicates innovation (Gann and Salter 1998). 
Thus, shifting working constellations favour systemic innovations, that is 
innovations that take place simultaneously in the whole industry, or at 
least a large subset hereof.   
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An empirical study on the deviance in productivity across Danish 
industries (Madsen et al 2000) can be interpreted in favour of this line of 
reasoning. If systemic innovations are dominant, we would expect the 
deviance in productivity to be low across firms within the construction 
industry. And this is exactly what Madsen et al find; of the 18 sectors that 
the economy has been divided into, construction has the lowest deviance 
for manpower, and for total factor productivity in 1990 and the second 
lowest in 1996. Furthermore, to the degree that there is a difference in 
productivity between firms, it is not maintained (measured for an one 
and five year lag in the period 1990-97). After one year, the highest loss 
in advantage of productivity is found exactly within the construction 
industry and in a five-year lag the construction industry is second to last. 
The picture remains the same when analysed for small and big firms, 
respectively.   
The common procedures (or isomorphism) of the industry – and as part 
of this the governmental regulation – can be perceived as an impediment 
to innovation (Pries and Janszen 1995). But to get the full picture, the 
essential role of these procedures with respect to lowering coordination 
costs should be kept in mind.  
Similarly, the tendering system, where bids mostly are given for, in 
principle, a fully described job (construction firms are not supposed to 
come up with novel solutions), can be seen as a restriction to innovation 
(Goodchild and Chamberlain 1999, Miozza and Ivory 2000). But again, 
the tendering system is part of a way of organising, which lowers on 
coordination costs in an industry subject to radical external shifts in 
aggregate demand.    
A third limitation to innovation can be ascribed to the separation of 
coordination and manufacturing. The final product is designed and to 
some degree coordinated by the architecture and engineering firms, but 
is produced by the construction firms.3 Further, the building materials 
                                           
3 The degree to which coordination of construction activities is separated from production depends on 
the contractual form. In a traditional/separate trades contract, the coordination in the planning phase 
(by architects and engineers) and during execution (by project management) is placed outside the 
contracting firms. In a traditional main contract, the main contractor is responsible for coordination on 
site and consequently, coordination and production are in some cases taken care of by the same firm. 
However, as the main contractor in most cases makes use of a substantial amount of subcontractors, 
the extent of integration should not be overestimated. In a turnkey/design and build contract, the 
turnkey contractor is also responsible for the design and planning of the building. Yet, these are with 
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and building components made by the producers direct how a house can 
be produced, but once again, the house is built by contracting firms. This 
way of organising can have several advantages: firms can specialise in a 
limited span of capabilities, problems of shirking can be reduced with 
smaller firm size, and the benefits of integrating activities along the 
value chain is in any case limited due to the need for adaptability to 
external changes. However, the separation of (and as part of this, the lack 
of repetition in the relation between) design and production can, as 
illustrated in the discussion in section 7.3., limit hands-on experience as a 
source of innovation, as well as create incentive problems. Even in the 
presence of trades, it may be more costly for people without prior 
knowledge of each other, and thus without specific codes or standards 
for communication, to exchange information about, say, improvements 
in working processes. And indeed, the interest for doing so is limited, if 
there is not a new project in sight for which this improvement can be 
used. Furthermore, due to fragmented production (each firm only carries 
out a very limited subset of all activities) the odds are, that the 
improvement goes to other firms (Bowley 1966). If so, the firm that 
knows of and potentially can initiate an improvement, will have to 
balance the costs of doing so with the expected compensation given by 
other firms.4 Finally, the absorptive capacity (Knudsen 2001) – i.e. the 
ability to use the ideas of others – is most likely reduced in the 
manufacturing part of construction due to very limited presence of 
design offices and academics (Bougrain and Haudeville 2002) 
Fourthly, as argued with reference to Casson (1994) in chapter two, it can 
sometimes be more costly to transfer information for decisions than to 
transfer a decision. If so, information is decisive and favours the existence 
                                                                                                                                   
rare expectations performed by architects and engineers employed in separate firms, so once again, 
the extent to which coordination and production is integrated in the same firm appears to be very 
limited, even in this contractual form. Nonetheless, the fact that the producing firm (the turnkey 
contractor) has a contractual relation directly with the design team (rather than having an indirect 
contact via the client) may enable coordination. Thus, according to Moore and Dainty (2000, p. 44) 
“The reasons for the popularity of Design and build [in UK construction] seem to revolve primarily 
around its perceived ability to bring the design and construction processes closer together...”.  
4 The expectation will of course depend on how well the market for this kind of information is 
working. However, it could be assumed to be far from perfect for a number of reasons. Firstly, by 
definition, the exact nature of this innovation is not known in advance and hence, is difficult to 
include in a contract ex ante. Secondly, as pointed out by Arrow (1973), markets for information can 
have imperfections as the seller cannot make the value of the information known to the buyer, without 
revealing the content of the information.  
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of an authority relation, with the person holding the decisive 
information as the superior. In the case of construction, information on 
market-change is likely to be decisive and thus, favours decisions to be 
made by the people who have this knowledge (but not necessarily have 
or pursue knowledge on production). So, if demand volatility is very 
high compared with potential changes in input or production, it may pay 
to completely ignore the two latter conditions and simply base decisions 
on knowledge on markets. Thus, when information costs related to 
decisiveness are taken into account, it may be profitable for firms 
deliberately to disregard potential improvements in production.  
As discussed in chapter 7, this setting is likely to create a particularly low 
level of innovation within the firms specialised in production, i.e. within 
the construction firms. Firstly, construction firms are not supposed to 
innovate due to the price based tendering system. Secondly, they will 
only benefit from innovations, if these are in pace with innovations in 
other parts of the value chain on which the construction firm has little 
influence. Thirdly, construction firms are, for reasons discussed in the 
next section, usually of a limited size and without the presence of 
academics (who, as learned in chapter 5, are concentrated in the 
coordinating firms of architects and engineers); conditions that may also 
limit innovation. Rather, innovation, is expected to take place in the 
coordinating firms and perhaps also, due to their size, in producers of 
building materials. A survey focusing on, among other things, 
innovation in Danish firms in the period 1993-95 seems to support this 
interpretation (table 1).  
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Table 1: Innovation in selected industries – the DISCO inquiry5 
Not 
innovative 
Innovative 
in the firm  
innovative 
in Denmark 
Innovative 
Globally 
Percentage 
Firms of architects and engineers (n=38) 41,46 53,66 0 4,88
Construction firms (n=249) 77,65 19,61 1,96 0,78
Producers of building materials (54) 6 44,44 27,78 16,67 11,11
Furniture firms (n=52) 26,92 61,54 5,77 5,77
All firms in survey (n=1867) 49,24 38,64 6,69 5,43
Source: Own Inquiries in DISCO database 2000 
As seen, the level of innovation in construction firms are way below the 
level of innovation in firms of architect and engineers and of producers 
of building materials – a finding that also seems consistent with the very 
rudimentary questions asked on innovation during the case study.7 
Although innovations are concentrated in this latter, and small, group of 
firms, innovation is not much beyond the average level of innovation in 
all industries, which supports the previously stated claim, that 
innovation is low in construction. The innovative rate of furniture firms 
is included with reference to the discussion of sofa producers in chapter 
4. A possible interpretation of the figures is that sofa production, which 
in many ways resembles roof production, is significantly higher, because 
a more stable environment allows for repeated sequences of activities, 
which in turn enables specialisation and the division of labour.8  
                                           
5 These figures are based on inquiries in the DISCO database (I thank Anker Lund Vinding for access). 
The DISCO-survey is based on a questionnaire submitted to 4000 firms in the summer of 1996. 1900 
firms responded, with 684 firms belonging to the manufacturing industry and the remaining 1216 
belonging to the service sector. As part of the questionnaire, the firms were asked, if they in the period 
1993-1995 had introduced new products or procedures (Gjerding 1996).  
6 In this group, firms with Nace value 26.30.09 (tiles, cement, and concrete) and 28.10.09 (building 
materials in metal) are included.  
7 As innovation is not a core feature of this thesis, questions relating to this were not systematically 
pursued during the case study of roof construction. However on five occasions (i.e. for five activities) 
a plumber, a crane driver, a person doing the roofing felt and two different carpenters, respectively 
were asked if they during this or previous building projects, had experienced that they, or some other 
persons working on the site, had changed their way of performing activities. In all five cases the 
answer was “no”.  
8 Hillebrandt (1975) discusses the impact of change in demand on the level of innovation as a balance. 
Periods with variance in demand will at one hand increase innovation, since “rapid technological 
changes were produced in the booms which were consolidated in the depressions when attention 
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The argument presented so far could support that no innovation what so 
ever takes place in construction firms. But as seen in table 1, after all, this 
is not the case. In a study of the residential construction industry in the 
U.S., Slaughter (1993, 1993b) identified 34 innovations to a specific new 
technology (the stressed-skin panel). Her overall argument is that the 
construction firms, and not the manufacturer of building materials, are 
the source of most innovations. And thus, her general claim is that the 
innovative activity of contractors is underrepresented by concentrating 
on manufacturing products alone. This critique seems reasonable if 
resources spent in independent R&D-labs, patents or articles in scientific 
journals (as used by Pries and Janszen 1995) are used as proxies for 
innovation. Yet, it seems less obvious that the DISCO-survey – in which 
firms not unlike Slaughter’s approach, are asked directly, if they have 
introduced or used any new products or processes – should be 
particularly vulnerable to this critique.   
Nonetheless, Slaughter’s study is very informative of the kind of 
innovations executed by contractors. Where the innovations of 
manufactures were confined to the stressed-skin panels themselves, 
contractors’ innovations allowed the panels to work in conjunction with 
other building systems. The raison d’être for contractors to engage in 
these innovations was mostly to ensure continuation of the building 
process. Rather than waiting several weeks for a modified panel, in a few 
hours, contractors could come up with an innovation that allowed the 
original panel to be used for situations not considered by the 
manufacturer. Besides potentially illustrating hands-on experience as an 
                                                                                                                                   
could be concentrated on cost reducing changes.” (ibid, p.55). But at the other hand, it will be the 
traditional type of contractors rather than the innovative ones that tends to survive because they have 
the lowest overhead costs. Hillebrandt find it “difficult to access the balance of the two tendencies”. 
The observations and reflections offered in this thesis seem to suggest, that the impact of the latter 
outweigh the former tendency. Furthermore, in the PPB-consortiums I observed that even though the 
idea was to build many projects, most parties within the four consortia’s found that break-even for 
innovative costs should be reached on the first or, at the very least, the second project. This 
observation does not support Hillebrandts idea that construction firms engage in innovative activities 
disconnected from ongoing specific building projects.  Similarly, Baark find that specific clients 
significantly determine the innovative routines of the engineering consultancy firms of Hong Kong.  
Additionally, Nedo (1978, p. 71) concludes that the construction sectors willingness to train men is 
harmed by change in demand. as the “men coming forward for training must have the expectation 
that they will be able to get a long term benefit from that training, and the industrialist must have an 
expectation that he will be able to make a return on, and in due course, recover his investment”. The 
effect of decline in demand exceeds the actual period of decline as confidence in future growth takes 
time to establish and even then, a number of years are required to regain capacity.  
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important source to innovation, this observation emphasises the 
problems of changing one part of the building process without changing 
other parts as well (Slaughter 2000). Due to a highly skilled and 
experienced workforce, contractors can often, to some degree, remedy 
problems of uncoordinated innovations, but it is doubtful whether the 
manufactures lack of information, control and responsibility for the 
activities performed on the site strikes an appropriate level of innovation 
(Slaughter 1993). Perhaps it is not coincidental that Pries and Janszen 
(1995) in a study of innovations in the Dutch building industry in the 
post-war period find, that since the introduction of the large-scale 
concrete-casted systems in the mid-1960s, innovations have tipped in 
favour of being conducted in cooperation between multiple firms, rather 
than being performed by single firms.  
Using the terminology of Weick (1976) Dubois and Gadde (2002) argue 
that construction consists of tight couplings in individual projects and 
loose couplings in the more permanent network, e.g. the network 
between projects and firms. A system of standardised (and thus loosely 
coupled) organisational units enables coordination and short term 
productivity. At the same time, the loosely coupled system make each 
construction site an “experimental workshop” (ibid., p. 628) with a lot of 
local adaptations.  However, the same loose coupling also prevents the 
diffusion of novel solutions and hence all in all reduces innovation and 
learning. This observation seems to be consistent with Slaughters in the 
sense that at the level of the building site, construction is highly 
innovative, but since innovations are rarely diffused to other projects or 
to the permanent part of the firm, at higher levels (the firm or the sector) 
construction is not very innovative.  
Even though there for quite a few years has been somewhat of an 
obsession with the idea of “industrialising construction” (see for instance 
Diamant 1968, Kjeldsen 1988), the line of reasoning provided here 
favours a cautious view on the possibility and desirability of moving 
production from “the site to the factory floor”.9 As emphasised in the 
summary of the empirical part (chapter 5), building materials that are 
                                           
9 Here, I do not consider the wider issue of whether industrialisation equals large-scale and 
monotonous buildings (or cities for that matter) of a poor architectural quality. Undoubtedly, these 
and more ideological issues played an important role, when the expansion of prefabricated high-rise 
buildings came to an end in Denmark in the beginning in the 1970s in favour of low-dense (and 
diversified) buildings (Bertelsen 1997).  
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not yet cut into size or assembled for final use (i.e. materials with a 
limited degree of prefabrication) can be adjusted to interdependencies 
that are impossible or too costly to foresee in one-off projects. Or to put it 
differently, a lower degree of prefabrication may increase production 
costs, but conversely decrease information costs related to coordination. 
Perhaps, this is why construction after many years of intensive efforts (In 
Denmark especially in the period 1947-1972) in favour of prefabrication 
and large-scale production still is characterised by a substantial degree of 
on-the-site adaptations and small-scale production (Nam and Tatum 
1988, Bertelsen 1997). 
The existence of many small construction firms 
As noticed by Eccles (1981b, p. 450): “One of the most striking features of 
construction is the large number of firms”. The framework presented 
here provides a set of explanations for the continuous existence of the 
many small firms; thus, this feature is perhaps still striking, but is a little 
less mysterious. 
Eccles rooted his claim in his study of homebuilders in the U.S. in the 
late 1970s (although he consulted more general statistics as well). 
However, the questions seem to be relevant for a much wider field of 
construction activities; Slaughter (1993) also points to the existence of 
many small firms in the U.S; Pries and Janszen (1995, pp. 43-44) make 
“the great number of small enterprises” a general characteristic of 
“European” or “Western” construction; fragmentation is a feature of the 
traditional organization of construction in the UK (Miozzo og Ivory 
2000). And, as pointed out in chapter 5 of this thesis, construction firms 
are indeed small. Not only due to a higher mortality rate of construction 
firms, but also because the firms that do survive, expand less in size than 
manufacturing firms.  
The question why small firms are so common in construction is 
intriguing as such. However, it may also form part of the explanation for, 
and perhaps improvement of, the performance of the industry. 
According to the general statements of K. Foss (2001) and Casson (1997), 
the existence of many small firms and a fragmented building process, in 
which each firm is only performing a very limited set of activities, may 
explain the low level of innovation in construction (Slaughter 1993, 
Connaughton et al 1995, Miozzo and Ivory 2000).  
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To some degree, fluctuations in overall demand can directly explain the 
existence of many small firms. Steep down-swings force construction 
firms out of the market, and thus construction firms are in general 
younger than manufacturing firms. And as firms usually start small and 
then grow, this affects the average size of firms. However, this is not the 
only explanation. As also seen in chapter 5, construction firms start 
smaller and (in absolute terms) grow more slowly than manufacturing 
firms. In order to provide an explanation for this observation, it seems 
necessary to consider the impact of changes in overall demand on the 
way construction firms are organised.  
One obvious reason for the limited size of construction firms relates 
directly to a core argument in this thesis. Due to external changes, it is 
not profitable for firms to internalise repeated strings of activities within 
the firm. Thus, it could be hypothesised, that an important element of a 
larger size of manufacturing firms is that their raison d’être is to provide 
stability to a span of activities by placing them under the direction of 
specialists in coordination. However, this is not the case in construction, 
where firms - roughly speaking - only carry out a single activity in the 
value chain at the time (recall figures 1 and 2 in chapter 6). Accordingly, 
construction firms can work efficiently even when they are very small.  
The limited benefits of integrating repeated sequences of activities in 
construction may explain the difference in size between newly 
established construction and manufacturing firms. However, it is less 
clear how this argument accounts for the fact that manufacturing firms 
grows more than construction firms over time. Here, the Penrosian 
argument on growth of the firm elaborated on in chapter 2 (section 2.6.) 
seems more obvious. As seen in the sofa case, repetition of activities frees 
managerial resources that can be devoted to new activities and thus, the 
firm can expand its activities. In roof production, resources of managers 
are only freed to a very limited extend, and thus expansion of the firm 
size is likely to create information overload of managers (i.e. at the 
superior layers) or, as an alternative, the introduction of more 
hierarchical layers, which in turn can create other information related 
costs due to a large span of control (see also the discussion on authority 
in appendix B).   
In essence, the existence of many small firms in construction may seem 
odd and even adverse to the operation and development of the 
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construction sector. But the small firms are part of a system geared to 
encompass the fluctuations created by change in overall demand.  
Low levels of trust in construction 
As mentioned in chapter 1, one key characteristic of the construction 
sector is often believed to be low levels of trust and high levels of 
conflicts (Korzynski 1994, Loosemore 1998, Loosemore 1999).  
Perhaps for the same reason, trust is nearly always emphasised as an 
important ingredient of partnering – se for instance typical partnering 
definitions provided by Latham (1994, p 62), Matthews (1996, p. 119); 
Barlow et al (1997, p. 6) and Blak (1997, p. 49), Bennet and Jayes (1995) 
and Bennet et al (1998) (or Madsen and Olsson 1995 or Thomassen 1999b 
for an overview). 
Surprisingly, much of the literature on partnering is not very specific on 
how mutual trust is created – or why it is not there in the outset. This 
thesis provides some pieces to the answer of the second part of the 
question (and hence indirectly also to the answer of the first part).   
Trust can be defined as “An expectation of a manager that his (potential) 
business partner will not act opportunistically – even if he holds no power over 
him to ensure that he behaves” (Lorenzen 1998, p. 11). Underlying this and 
other definitions is usually rather fierce discussions on whether trust is a 
rational phenomenon or not (Swedberg 1998). See for instance the debate 
between Williamson (1985 and 1993) - who considers trust to be 
calculative – and some of his opponents Coriat and Guennif (1998), 
Baudry (1998) and, as indicated in his definition of trust, Mark Lorenzen 
(1998). Similar reflections are implicit or explicit found in some of the 
general works on the reason to the existence and erosion of trust, see for 
instance Weber 1995, Hollis 1998, Fukuyama 1998, Hansen 1998. 
The following argument will be based on the assumption that trust is 
created or at least maintained by the bounded rationality of people.   
The preoccupation with trust in much of the economic literature has to 
do with the economic benefits that trust is supposed to create. Dodgson 
1996 and Lazaric and E. Lorenz  (1998) argue that trust is essential to 
learning and innovation, as it is very difficult to write complete contracts 
for an relation aimed at providing something that is not known in 
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advance. Arrow (1974, p 23) takes it one step further and argue that 
"trust is an important lubricant of a social system" (p. 23) 
So, besides being a characteristic in its own right, the existence of low 
trust also elaborate on some of the other issues discussed in this chapter, 
in particular the low level of innovation and learning and the poor level 
of coordination.  
But if trust is so beneficial, why isn’t it always present? An answer 
consistent with the assumption that people behave in a bounded rational 
way would be that even though trust and cooperation offers the best 
overall outcome, cheating/non-cooperation still pays off seen from an 
individual point of view. If this is true, we are in a prisoner’s dilemma 
situation.  
The prisoner’s dilemma is essentially a situation where two persons – 
not knowing the decision of each other beforehand – individually have 
to decide whether to cooperate (=displaying trust) or to defect. The 
payoff each part receives depends on his own as well as the partner’s 
decision. The properties of the prisoner’s dilemma are shown in table 1. 
Table 1:  The Prisoner’s dilemma. 
              Player Y 
 Defect Cooperate 
 
Defect 
2 $ 
each 
(4$ total) 
6 $ for X 
0 $ for Y 
(6$ total) 
 
 
 
 
Player X 
 
Cooperate 
0 $ for X 
6$ for Y 
(6$ total) 
4 $ 
each 
(8$ total) 
 
Seen from an individual point of view the best strategy in a single-shoot 
prisoner dilemma game is to defect, no matter what the other player is 
doing. If the other player is cooperating one get 6$ by defecting 
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compared with 4$ for cooperating. If the other player is defecting, one 
get 2$ and not 0$.  
Inevitably, the result is defect-defect if each player seeks his own benefit. 
This is not a nice outcome from an overall point of view. Defect-defect 
only creates values for 4$, which in this example is only half of the 
overall maximum cooperate-cooperate output.  
One way out of the prisoner’s dilemma is to repeat the game.  
Rapoport and Chammah (1965) find that people show a strong tendency 
to cooperate when the play repeatedly with the same partner.  This 
observation has been supported by Axelrod that finds that a tit-for-tat 
strategy – a strategy formally defined as “cooperate on the first move, 
then on each successive move do what ever the other player did on the 
previous move” – will be the dominant strategy in computer simulations 
against a number of other strategies (Frank 1988, p.p. 29-35). Axelrod 
specifies that some conditions has to be met in order to assure 
cooperation; i.e. the set of players have to be reasonably stable, each 
player can remember what the other players did in previous interactions, 
players have a significant stake in future interactions and no one 
amongst the players know exactly how many times they will interact 
with each other (Frank 1988, p.p. 29-35).   
The importance of repeated games is actually not a new insight. In a 
paper from Adam Smith from 1766 we learn that (Smith 1766, op. cit. 
Klein 1997, p. 17): 
“A dealer is afraid of loosing his character, and is scrupulous in 
observing every engagement. When a person makes perhaps 20 
contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to 
impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would 
make him lose. Where people seldom deal with another, we find that 
they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can more by a 
smart trick than they lose by the injury which it does their 
character.” 
Experimental economics have supported the positive impact of 
repetition, especially if the value of cooperation is relatively high 
compared with the payoff for defection (Ledyard 1995)   
Another result from experimental economics is that communication 
enables cooperation. Even though the dominant strategy (from an 
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individual point of view) in any case is to defect, people who are given 
the chance to communicate before they participate in an experiment with 
a public-good investments like the prisoner’s dilemma will be much 
more cooperative (Ledyard 1995).   
Davis and Holt (1993) find that the impact of communication in 
particular is high when it is allowed initially. In experiments where 
communication were allowed in the first period of the game, 
contribution rates continues to be high in many periods with no 
communication while contribution rates only increases slowly when 
communication is introduced in the second period or later.   
This is “bad news” to construction. Repeated games are not very 
frequent in construction. The need for adaptability does not encourage 
long-term relations between specific firms or individuals. Additionally, 
low survival rates and the existence of many small firms makes it less 
likely that construction firms by chance will meet again.  
Lack of repetition and many hierarchical layers induce “noise” (Balton, 
P. and M. Dewatripont 1994) and thereby reduce the value of 
communication. Furthermore, the scattered (in time and physically) 
work in particular on the construction site does not enable in particular 
the initial communication that is essential for trust building. 
Thus it seems that the partnering literature is right when it points to the 
problem of trust. But it also seems that trust is not so much a cause as a 
consequence of more fundamental organisational aspects of 
construction. Creating trust in this organisational set up does not appear 
– no matter how much the positive effects of trust is highlighted in 
teambuilding seminars and the like – to be an easy job. 
Ad hoc planning, delays, overspending and poor quality in construction 
One of the initial reasons why I became interested in the construction 
process was the experience as a client in a social housing organisation, 
that building projects were usually over time and budget, or were only 
kept on time and budget by last minute cuts and quick  (and not always 
thoroughly considered) solutions on the site.   
Unfortunately, this observation does not appear to be confined to the 
social housing organisation in which I worked. The list of “project 
errors” in the case study is lengthy and at the same time, the carpenters 
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do not consider this building project to be any worse than the majority of 
projects they had worked on. Additional sources also seem to support 
that construction projects are difficult to handle regarding timetables, 
spending (Skamris 2000) and quality (Byggeskadefonden 2001).  
In a study of 5510 communication events in four Swedish building 
projects, Carlsson and Josephson find that a substantial part of 
communication is devoted to changes or errors in the project (Table 2).10  
Table 2: Reasons for communication on four Swedish construction 
projects 
Reasons for communication %
Coordination, planning, scheduling etc 17
Give or receive information or document 22
Give or receive explanation due to changes 22
Receive or give explanation due to errors 15
Receive or give information about decisions 13
Other 11
Total 100
Source: Carlsson and Josephson 2001 
The level of information related to changes and errors (and perhaps also 
to decisions) indicates that construction is not about simply carrying out 
a thorough plan taking anything into account, nor is it a matter of only 
following well-known procedures from previous projects. Rather, as 
novel and anticipated events occur, a lot of adjustment is done as the 
building process evolves. A study on the distribution of the 7853 
working hours spent by consultants (engineers and architects) and 
contractors on a refurbishment project in Odense (Funen, Denmark) 
confirms this picture. Of the 16,5% of the time spent by consultants and 
contractors on managing the building site (83,5% of the time was spent 
on construction), only one quarter (4,5%) was spent during the planning 
                                           
10 The study is limited to communication between client, architect, structural designer, installation 
designer, contractor, installation contractor and material supplier. For each of the four building 
projects one to three key persons were identified as representatives for each group of actors (52 
persons in total). These persons themselves registered the information in a special diary combined 
with interviews on how time was spent on each formal meeting.  
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phase, whereas three quarters (12%) was spent on execution and 
handing over of the building (Bertelsen 1996, 2002).  
In the same study, the magnitude of changes (weighted according to the 
expenditures) was estimated by comparing the contract with the finished 
product, that is the refurbished house as handed over to the client. 
Although the results naturally depend on the criteria used for assessing 
changes, the results reported in figure 2 support the view of significant 
ad hoc changes. 11  
Figure 2: The level of change (% of expenses) from contract (tendering) 
to handing over in a refurbishment project in Odense, Denmark. %  
Source: H. Bertelsen 2002 
Changes are particularly high with respect to extent and size of work, as 
well as for working procedures. The relatively low (but in absolute terms 
still high) level of change in standard and quality could be explained by a 
predominant use of output contracts (as also observed in the case study 
on roof construction).  
                                           
11 The procedure for this inquiry was as follows. First the contract written by the architect as part of 
the tendering process was split up according to different parts of the house. Then at the time of the 
handing over the refurbished house, the actual solutions used for these different parts were written 
down. And finally, the original description was compared with the actual solutions and the deviations 
were, based on an assessment made by the researcher, grouped in four categories ranging from no to 
fundamental changes. 
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But why is construction apparently coordinated this poorly? The 
framework established here suggests that, at least to some degree, 
efficiency explanations to the level of coordination in construction can be 
given. Due to change in external demand, the benefits from repeating 
sequences of activities between the same individuals working within a 
firm or in continuous relations between firms is limited. This encourages 
temporary interfirm organisations formed for a particular project. As 
interactions are not repeated, the costs of getting information become 
more important than the costs of not having information. And in this way 
the resources spent on improving information ex ante production may 
not be justified with the savings made by better planning during 
production.  
However, there may also be less justifiable (from an welfare economics 
point of view) reasons for problems with complying with budgets, 
timetables and quality standards. For instance, the lack of information on 
the true difficulties of an assignment can create the winner’s curse 
syndrome in which the contractor with the most optimistic (but often 
wrong) estimation of the assignment wins the contract. Consequently, 
the tendering system does not necessarily reveal the real costs of 
production. At the same time incomplete information also increases the 
room for asymmetric information. The contractor may use such an 
asymmetry in his favour to claim extra payment. This may balance the 
losses due to the winner’s curse, but nevertheless implies an 
unproductive exercise of finding and in some cases maximising the 
effects of, say, deficits in the plans (as in the roof case, where the 
carpenters in order to claim extra payment completed the roof house in 
agreement with the contract knowing fully that the solution did not 
work and had to be reworked). Besides surpassing budgets, asymmetric 
information may also create problems with respect to the quality of the 
work, which can be hard to monitor by project management and by the 
client.  
The flow of work on a construction site is not very steady due to changes 
and changes and the many parties involved.12 This results in an 
                                           
12 The way delays build up in a chain of production with many working stations (each working station 
producing a, within limits, random amount of output) is vividly illustrated in the so called “game-of –
parades”. 
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inevitable conflict between deadlines for the project at one hand and 
high utilisation of resources of the single company - that can be achieved 
“…by a sufficiently slow rate of progress, so that there are always tasks 
on which the resources can be deployed” (Bishop 1975, p.67) – at the 
other hand. So unless some kind of penalties for delays is introduced, it 
will usually be in the interest of the single contractor to be behind the 
timetable. Another consequence with respect to delays of the uneven 
workflow is that contractors tend to work on multiple projects at the 
same time. This makes it difficult for the project management to plan 
and control how much work the contractors perform on their particular 
site.  
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Chapter 9 - Summary and conclusion 
 
9.1 Research questions 
This thesis has studied patterns of specialisation and coordination in 
construction. Three interrelated research questions have been considered 
by means of theoretical reflections and empirical studies:  
Research question A:  How is the division of labour in construction 
and what are the consequences hereof with 
respect to coordination?   
Research question B:   What are the roles of construction firms with 
respect to coordination:  does coordination 
take place within or between firms and what 
limits that activities are handled within a 
single firm?  
Research question C:  What particular coordination modes are used 
for construction and how do they cope with 
the activities involved in construction? 
 
9.2 The theoretical field  
This thesis has been an inquiry into theories on a fundamental concept 
within organisational economics: the concept of coordination. Theories 
on coordination relate to why coordination takes place, by whom it is 
done, and how it is conducted. 
At a more general level, the work at hand has aimed at providing 
insights into the theoretical field of organisational economics, i.e. the 
comparative assessment of the cost of producing and allocating 
resources by different structures of ownership and coordination. In 
particular, weight has been given to information aspects of organisation, 
and hence, the incentive based approaches (e.g. Transaction Costs 
Economics) have not been explored theoretically (although incentive 
aspects are occasionally hinted at in the empirical analysis).  
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9.3 The empirical field and method 
The primary source of data has been a case study on the construction of a 
roof in a multiunit social housing project.  
As a thorough understanding of the activities, coordination modes, as 
well as persons and firms involved in the process of coordination was 
needed, only a limited part of the construction process could be made 
subject to a case study. The roof was chosen, because it is one of the final 
parts of the construction process whereby the relation to other parts of 
the process could be studied as existing, rather than expected 
phenomena.   
Because empirical studies of site organisation are sparse, in particular 
with respect to coordination practices, primary sources were used for 
answering the research questions. As a range of formal (e.g. authority 
exerted by written documents) and informal ways (e.g. teaming, where 
craftsmen on the site talk and agree on solutions together) of 
coordinating construction activities are studied, fieldwork on the site was 
necessary. During this fieldwork, all activities involved in roof 
construction were mapped out by observation, and the people doing 
these activities were interviewed according to the empirical research 
questions.  
The people involved in the case study did consider the division of 
labour, the organisation of coordination and the coordination practices to 
be general to the house-building sector, with the possible exception of 
very small (single-house) projects and refurbishment.  
Statistical data (partly provided by the unique Danish IDA-database) 
was used to illustrate changes in aggregate demand, and to investigate 
how these overall changes correspond to a low level of repetition in the 
relation between firms and individuals, respectively. Further, indicators 
of the organisational responses to low levels of repetition (as more 
thoroughly examined in the case study on roof construction) were 
derived from the IDA-database.  
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9.4 The empirical findings 
Having in mind that generalisation from the case study relates to 
theoretical propositions or claims (“analytical generalisation”) - and not 
to populations (“statistical generalisation”) - the empirical findings of the 
study offer the following description and interpretation of specialisation 
and coordination in the construction sector.   
The process of construction faces a low level of repetition at the macro 
level (created by unstable markets), which is further accentuated 
towards the micro level by the specifics of each building project. This 
inflicts a high degree of novelty to the building process, because firms, 
individuals and interdependencies between activities differ from one 
project to another, in spite of the fact that final products and in particular 
their sub-parts are not necessarily very different, and that the employed 
technologies appear to be very stable. The combined effect of non-
repetitiveness at the macro and micro level is a key to understand the 
division of labour, the organisation of coordination and the coordination 
modes used in the process of construction (the three research questions). 
Research question A  
In general, the frequency and amplitude of fluctuations in demand for 
construction is likely to establish a situation, where the benefits of 
specialisation to a lesser degree outweigh the benefits of adaptability 
obtained by using stable and homogenous knowledge, common to a 
large and well-defined group of people and firms (i.e. trades). The 
benefits from this limited and non-firm-specific division of labour 
applies to the level of the sector, the firm, the project, and the individual:  
At the sector level, homogenous and in particular stable knowledge 
facilitates the entry - and thus also the exit - of people employed outside 
construction. Consequently, common practices are an important 
prerequisite for the overall workforce adjustments critical to the 
construction sector running smoothly.  
At the firm level, knowledge that is not targeted at specific common 
practices makes it possible to engage in new working constellations 
depending on demand. As the only safeguard to market fluctuations is 
to keep the door open to all kinds of projects, specialisation in particular 
   
 
 
 
Chapter 9: Summary and conclusion  294  
products and / or working constellations is hard to maintain. Investing 
in specific firm relations is further discouraged by the high entry and exit 
rates of construction firms. In addition, it becomes less difficult to 
establish construction firms, if new firms do not have to penetrate long 
lasting firm relations, or catch up with continuous improvement brought 
about by specialisation.  
At the project level, delays are handled by working on multiple parts of 
the house and on multiple building projects simultaneously. The 
importance of minimising the adverse effects of delays by lower degrees 
of division of labour is presumably advanced by the limited possibility 
of routinisation or substitution of activities upstream in the value chain.  
And finally, at the individual level, common practices increase job 
mobility and thereby minimise the risk of long-term unemployment in 
the likely event of staff reduction or closing of the firm. Even when 
employed within a firm, it probably pays for the employee not to be too 
specialised in particular activities, since this gives the firm higher 
degrees of adaptability between and within a project.   
The existence of these highly skilled and homogenous groups of 
individuals and firms organised in trades do not only balances the 
benefits of specialisation with the benefits of adaptability. The 
organisation in trades also enables coordination.  
Firstly, the skilled craftsmen can handle activities associated with 
different parts of the building, as well as activities that are not identical 
from one project to another, due to variations in working constellations, 
the final product and interdependencies of activities. In this way, a 
substantial degree of coordination is done by the craftsmen, who decide 
locally which tools and working procedures to use. Since skills are 
required for this decision-making, a jack-of-all-trades craftsman and firm 
is hardly conceivable; the complexity of the activity sets an upper, as 
well as a lower boundary to the level of the division of labour.  
Secondly, it is costly to standardise working procedures and in- and 
output for activities, which are not repeated often. Hence, a promising 
way to decrease the variations in output, and consequently, to some 
degree reduce activity complexity in subsequent operations, is by 
combining decentralised decision-making with uniform skills. So 
although each craftsman due to this craft production has some degree of 
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freedom with respect to how he will carry out his activity, the fact that 
the same skills are used irrespectively of the specific person or firm, give 
the next person in the value chain some idea of what he can expect. 
Hence, the efforts to specify the outcome or working procedures of an 
activity can be reduced.  
Research question B  
As demand fluctuations favour the ability to switch from one value 
chain to another, and to switch from one part of the value chain to 
another, it is less likely that construction firms will devote their resources 
to being good at a particular string of subsequent activities. Rather, they 
will work on different parts of the project, as well as move from one type 
of project to another.  
Since coordination only to a very limited degree is internalised in the 
construction firm, interfirm coordination is substantial.  For the same 
reasons as it is disadvantageous to internalise construction activities, the 
benefits of engaging in bilateral interfirm relations are limited. Thus, 
even if repetition of firm constellations from one project to another 
occasionally occur (as it did in the case study of this thesis), it is rare that 
firms and individuals in construction invest resources in developing 
interfirm specific assets.  
Furthermore, coordination by a third party solves many of the 
information problems created, when many firms scattered around in the 
value chain work together on a temporary basis as subcontractors. 
Centralisation of transfer and processing of information at one or few 
third parties is a way to economise on information costs. Moreover, 
incentive problems – which could be severe due to low repetitiveness, 
subcontracting and asymmetric information – are probably reduced with 
a mediating third party, and through the specification of output in 
combination with monitoring on the site.  
Finally, as standardisation or routinisation is not encouraged in an 
environment with low repetitiveness, the job of coordinating 
construction remains challenging in all phases of the project, as well as 
from one project to another. The need for an advanced coordination 
effort promotes individuals and equipment specialised in this field. And 
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in addition, as competences become more particular, they may become 
more difficult to encompass in the same firm.  
Research question C 
A combination of modes is used to coordinate construction activities. 
The overall pattern at the level of craftsmen is that firm-based authority 
is used to specify which activities to do when. The input (which 
materials to use) and output (how much and what to produce) is 
determined by the information provided by architects and engineers (the 
design team) employed in separate firms. And finally, the specific 
working procedures and tools are selected by the craftsmen according to 
their skills and experience.  
As expected for a sector with high demand volatility, the construction 
activities of the case study are mostly characterised with low degrees of 
repetition, high activity complexity, and that the actions of many other 
actors have to be taken into account. The study supports that the 
information involved in this set-up is difficult to handle by any 
coordination mode. In smaller projects (like single-family housing) with 
fewer people involved, more decisions are left open to the group of 
trades working on the site (i.e. coordination by teaming). In the case 
study, however, coordination by instructions from the design team was 
dominant. These instructions occasionally enforced solutions that did 
not minimise on materials or working hours spent, nor provided the 
desired final result. In addition, as all interactions between the various 
trades working on the project were not taken into account by the design 
team, rework and lower “buildability” for trades further down the value 
chain was frequent. Nonetheless, the rather dominant use of 
coordination by authority allowed many actors to interact on a non-
permanent basis at reasonable information costs.   
Thus, on the one hand, the findings of the case study support the 
theoretical framework (chapter 3) on the cost of using different 
coordination modes. On the other hand, coordination practices do not 
differ much, even though the interdependencies of activities – and in 
turn presumably also the informational content of the activities - vary. 
Deviations from the stable pattern of coordination modes are only made 
in rather extreme cases. This apparently surprising use of stable 
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coordination modes can be accounted for by taking the cost of identifying 
and creating the appropriate coordination mode(s) for a given set of 
activities into account. As firms and individuals no not carry out 
completely identical activities on a recurrent basis, the importance of 
these set-up costs is significant. Hence, in order to minimise on these 
costs, it makes sense not to fine-tune coordination modes to each activity, 
even though the latter will reduce the cost of using coordination modes.   
 
9.5 Theoretical contributions   
The thesis has contributed to theories on coordination. Based on the 
empirical findings, three propositions - relating to the “why, whom and 
how” aspect of coordination, respectively - have been proposed:  
 Proposition A: The less repetitive sequences of activities are, 
the more individuals and firms are driven towards 
isomorphism rather than innovation and specialisation. Thus, 
the less repetition, the lower the level of overall innovation 
and the higher the ratio of systemic innovation.   
 Proposition B: Low levels of repetitive sequences of activities 
increase the ratio of coordination done by a third party firm 
(trilateral coordination), but decrease coordination organised 
directly between two firms (i.e. bilateral coordination) or 
coordination organised within a firm (i.e. unilateral 
coordination). 
 Proposition C: The more repetitive sequences of activities are, 
the more coordination costs are lowered due to not only to (I) 
lower costs of identifying appropriate coordination modes but 
also as an effect of (II) lower costs of using a given 
coordination mode, and (III) lower costs to defining activities 
in a way that they become easy to coordinate.  
The observations also provide a range of more specific nuances to the 
theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 and 3.  
The firm - in which coordinators are specialised in handling variations 
and workers are specialised in performing their part of a repeated 
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sequence of activities – has theoretically been found to be an important 
way of ensuring a division of labour in a setting subject to discontinuity. 
However, this representation of the firm did not in all cases fit well with 
the findings in the construction sector. Thus, the role of the producing 
firm in construction is more limited with respect to coordination, as it 
coordinates between but not within value chains. Coordination of the 
latter (within the value chain) is carried out by third party firms 
specialised in coordination. 
Furthermore, with respect to the notion of the firm, a significant overlap 
between the “incentive based” and “information based” has been suggested 
theoretically as well as empirically.  
Adam Smith identified repetition of activities as the source of the division 
of labour and lower production costs and thus, as a source of “wealth of 
nations”. This thesis has found repetition of sequences of activities to be 
another potential source of growth, since it lowers coordination costs 
(which again can allow for a greater division of labour and thus, lower 
production costs). Three such mechanisms to reduce coordination costs, 
that are not very different from the three production costs mechanisms 
identified by Smith (“dexterity”, lower switching costs, and innovation), 
have been identified. Firstly, repeated sequences of activities lower the 
costs of identifying and creating appropriate coordination modes (that is 
switching costs induced by going from a well-known to a less well-known 
sequence of activities are reduced). Secondly, repetition of activities 
lower the costs of using a given coordination mode, since the persons 
involved become more knowledgeable and experienced in using it (they 
increase their dexterity).  And finally, due to repetition it becomes 
possible to define, or innovate, activities in a way so that they are easily 
coordinated.  
The latter suggests that, in contrast to the contingency view, activities are 
not given to firms. Consequently, the way a product is partitioned into 
activities is an essential part of understanding the process by which 
activities and coordination modes co-evolve. 
Further, the study has given empirical evidence on how the use of 
different coordination modes, as well as specific coordination modes can 
change over time and at different organisational levels. Among others, it 
has illustrated how authority changes as sequences of activities are 
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repeated. And how authority persists even in temporary and innovative 
organisations. 
 
9.6 Empirical contributions  
Finally, the thesis has provided an analytical frame and empirical 
observations that facilitates the understanding of present and potential 
organisational forms in construction. By this, the thesis contributes to the 
ongoing debate on how to organise the building sector.  
The empirical contribution is to some degree captured in the three 
research questions discussed in section 9.4. But as seen in chapter 8, the 
framework also add insights to other issues within construction: (a) the 
level of productivity, (b) innovation, (c) the existence of many small 
firms, (d) trust and (e) ad hoc planning, overspending and poor quality. 
Much of the ongoing debate on how to improve the construction sector 
considered in chapter 1 implicitly seem to assume that the characteristics 
of the sector is undesirable and to some degree unexplainable (besides 
that they are obsolete left behinds from ancient times). In contrast, this 
thesis suggests that the present way of organising the construction 
process solves many of the challenges created by rapid changes in 
overall demand. Without recognising these benefits, suggestions on how 
to improve the sector stands a little chance of being successful.  
Yet, the (lacking) long term dynamics of the present organisation still 
make improvements of the sector desirable. How to do this is the topic of 
the epilogue that follows.  
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Chapter 10 - epilogue 
 
A room for improvement  
If anything, this thesis has substantiated the claim that the present 
organisation (including coordination) of construction at least in the short 
run is a way to minimise on costs related to production and 
coordination. Or to put it in less economic terms: that sound reasons for 
the present organisation of construction can be given. Without 
considering the positive sides of the present organisation, suggestions to 
a reorganisation of the sector do not stand a good change of survival. 
But although the thesis devotes more attention to understanding the 
present organisation of construction rather than to criticising it, the 
question still remains: is it possible to improve the organisation of 
construction and in what way? 
The benefits of present organisational forms have to be understood in 
light of the need to adjust to fluctuations in overall demand. To recall, 
these external changes in general favour adaptability more than 
specialisation and as part of this, promote temporary working relations, 
isomorphism, the involvement of many small firms, and the separation 
of coordination and production. 
However, one should not be blind to the disadvantages of this system. In 
particular, this thesis has substantiated that the present organisation of 
the construction industry may economises on costs in the short term, but 
not in the long term.  
For instance, through the trade system it becomes possible to obtain 
some of the benefits – e.g. lower coordination costs - from repetition, 
which cannot be reached at the firm and personal level due to demand 
fluctuations.  However, some of the particular benefits from repetition – 
as for instance continuous improvements in production and 
coordination or more radical innovations of products or processes - are 
hard to obtain, as the whole idea of the trade system is to follow well-
known paths. Correspondingly, selection mechanisms are weak in 
construction; because it is important to be “alike”, more efficient firms do 
not drive out the less efficient ones.   
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For the same reason it is very difficult for a single firm gradually to 
improve this system. Although other ways of organising the construction 
sector may be more efficient in the long run, it would not pay for a single 
actor to change to this “other” way of organising, unless other firms do 
the same. This makes it likely that construction is in a situation, where 
the in the long term unsound behaviour of a few dictates the behaviour 
of all.  
Figure 1 shows a simplified view of the long-term structural impact of 
market fluctuations (and the associated temporary working relations) 
proposed in this thesis.  
Figure 1: Structural impact of market fluctuations on the organisation of the 
construction process  
 
If correct, this figure suggests that rather than treating many of the issues 
within the ongoing debate on how to organise construction (see chapter 
1) as problems on their own, we have to see them as consequences of a 
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more fundamental problem. The issue of how to create trust is one 
example of this (discussed in chapter 8). “Industrialisation” of 
construction by means of building systems is another. Building systems 
is often perceived as a way of reducing uncertainty (Russel 1981). What 
is suggested here is the opposite: some degree of certainty (in particular 
with respect to long-term working relations) is a prerequisite for 
building systems (which then again can reduce uncertainty even 
further). A third example is the ongoing discussion (at least in Denmark 
and the UK) on how to improve the educational level and skills of the 
people working on the building site. No matter how appealing this idea 
seems, it is very hard to implement when the logic of the sector is not to 
invest in specialisation beyond the level of trades.  
Following from this, the question of how long term relations can be 
established in an unstable setting becomes of outmost importance.  
One possibility is to create some level of stability in overall demand.  
Large public investments may create “isles of stability” that - combined 
with a conscious focus on organisational behaviour – could bring about 
changes. This is at least one possible interpretation of how the 
prefabricated concrete building system - that is now the dominant way 
of building multi-unit housing in Denmark - was invented in the post 
war period. Besides encouraging a change by means of legislation and 
research, the Danish Government provided an isle of stability by 
launching four major building plans consisting of in total approx. 7000 
flats (Bertelsen 1997 and Bang, Bonke, and Clausen 2001).  
Yet, large building programmes initiated and financed by the 
government do not appear to be at the top of the political agenda today.  
If that is indeed the case, this raises the question of who can initiate and 
direct concerted change. Here, Chandlers (1990) story on the rise of large 
vertically (this is integration of subsequent activities in a value chain) 
integrated corporations in United States in the late nineteenth century is 
thought provoking. In essence, his argument is that a combination of 
higher income and improved infrastructure paved the way for mass 
production. However, to bring about mass productions required 
simultaneous change in various parts of the value chain and this was 
facilitated by central ownership and control (Langlois 2001). It could be 
conjectured that the large construction firms, which have surfaced in 
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Denmark in recent years (e.g. MT Højgaard, NCC, Skanska) perhaps1 
could play this role.  
This would be particularly effective, if these firms were able to locate (or 
through the use of their developer function create) segments of the 
markets that are less volatile than the construction market in general. 
The basic idea is that in a large construction firm it should be possible to 
promote “isles of stability in production” as there even in periods of 
recession will be some level of building assignments. Fundamentally, 
this idea is identical with Berger and Piores (1980) notion of a dual 
organisation in which one part of the company (or the market) works 
under stable conditions and consequently uses relatively specialised 
human and capital resources. The other part absorbs fluctuations by 
means of a less articulated division of labour and specialisation.2  
The idea of creating long term relations in the Danish construction sector 
have recently been encouraged by recent legislative changes that enable 
long-term framework agreements with specific client. Moreover, the 
National Agency of Enterprise and Housing has announced its support 
to the clustering of governmental building projects.  
Basically, I argue in favour of what could be termed as a “demand 
shock” (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen 2001), in which long-term relations 
are encouraged. According to the main argument of this thesis, this 
could in turn pave the way for a new organisation of the building 
process. By the end of the day, the result might be as depicted in figure 2.   
                                           
1 I stress “perhaps” because despite the fact that these large construction firms exist, and even though 
they have almost all functions in the value chain in-house, at present these different functions work 
rather independently.   
2 The fact that the idea is to introduce this kind of dualism in construction also suggests that dualism – 
in contrast with the general claim of Berger and Piore (1980) – is not necessarily very dominating in all 
sectors.  
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Figure 2: Hypothesis on the structural impact of reduced market fluctuations  
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calculating expenses geared towards small-scale production can explain 
this. Similarly, piece rates and ways of calculating costs at contracting 
firms are based on experience from one-off projects, so no one knows the 
right price if projects and collaboration are made continuous (in general 
the higher level of uncertainty probably implies that benefits from 
repetition is underestimated). The end-users are so used to products 
made according to what is possible to build on site by the trades, that it 
is difficult for them to accept truly new solutions. For instance, it is only 
acceptable to use prefabricated bathroom units it they look exactly as if 
they were build traditionally on site.  
To illustrate, changing the way the sector collaborates probably 
corresponds to changing a traffic system from left-lane driving to right-
lane driving (or conversely). Such a change is hardly likely to emerge by 
local initiative (the “premium” from being the first to change lane is not 
exactly attractive) – it has to be concerted.  
It is remarkable that more fundamental changes within construction 
often coincide with a strong external pressure for change. The 
prefabricated concrete building system alluded to previously in this 
chapter would hardly have emerged in Denmark without a strong 
political pressure to (a) increase the supply of buildings and (b) reduce 
the bottlenecks of imported goods and skilled bricklayers (Bertelsen 
1997). Similarly Bowley (1966, p. 83) observe with respect to the British 
building industry that  
“…the Second World War provided the opportunity for the 
exploitation of some of the new techniques and knowledge that had 
been used so hesitantly, or not at all, in the interwar period”.  
Bowley gives four reasons to “wartime innovations”: (a) greater risks are 
accepted, (b) initiatives are centrally coordinated, (c) the market for 
solutions are guaranteed and (d) costs are calculated differently. Reason 
b and c corresponds well to (and a and d are not inconsistent with) the 
framework proposed here. The impact of war (in UK) and of housing 
and inputs (in Denmark) is twofold. Firstly, it creates “isles of stability” 
in demand, and secondly it coordinates by central means the behaviour 
of the various people working along the (fragmented) value chain.  
Perhaps all the various initiatives going on in and “around” the Danish 
Construction sector provide an external pressure strong enough to 
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ensure a shift to a path based on long-term collaboration. Perhaps, 
additional shocks are needed (for instance technological chock, chocks 
from firms and actors not presently working in the construction sector or 
regulatory shocks).  
Irrespectively, a simultaneous change is needed in various part of the 
construction sector. Even though further reflections are needed in this 
area, let me conclude by pointing towards some of the actions that I 
believe rather immediately could and should be taken by key actors: 
Government:  
 By legislation and information, keep on promoting the idea of 
long-term framework agreements and clustering. 
 Use long-term framework agreements for projects directly financed 
by the central government (“Statslige byggeopgaver”).  
 Offer quotas for building of private rented houses3 in particular to 
clients who offer the largest long-term price reductions.  
Local Government 
 Provide the right to build social housing to clients on a long-term 
basis. Again, the ability to ensure long-term price reduction should 
be a major criterion for selection.   
 Cluster own building activities with neighbouring municipalities 
and establish long-term agreements with integrated supply teams 
(including architect, engineer, general contractor and the major 
contractors).  
Larger clients 
 Use the possibility of forming long-term framework agreements; 
and as part of this establishes long-term relations with integrated 
supply teams.  
Architects and engineers: 
 Engage in integrated supply and production teams 
 Focus on design of modules, that at one hand gives flexibility to 
the product and at the other hand ensures repetition in the design 
and production process. 
                                           
3 Cf “lov om fremme af privat udlejningsbyggeri” 
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General contractors 
 Establish a dual strategy and organisation in which one part of the 
firm is specialised in working in more permanent relations, and 
another part (as now) work in temporary relations.   
 Segmentation of supplier relations (i.e. contractors as well as 
architects and engineers) according to the dual strategy, in 
particular establishing or participating in integrated supply teams.  
 Establish Research and Development units, that can promote 
change and that can profit from the possibilities of innovation in 
products and processes.  R&D units could be placed within the 
firm or externally and perhaps in cooperation with core members 
of integrated supply teams.  
Contractors 
 Choose which part of the dual market to be in. 
 
Most likely, these ideas also have rather radical implications for the 
various institutions that provide important inputs to the construction 
sector, for instance the education system and producers and suppliers of 
building materials.  
Furthermore, a limitation of these initial reflections is that they depart 
from the existing roles in construction. By the end of the day, we might 
see presently unknown types of roles and firms. And we might not see 
the roles and firms that we presently do know.  
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Appendix A - Introduction to the building project: Project 
specific sources to non-repetitiveness and uncertainty – an 
introduction to the construction process 
The aim of this appendix is twofold. First of all, an overall understanding 
of the main phases and actors of the building process would be beneficial 
in order to understand the details of the case study (on roof 
construction); in particular for readers without prior knowledge of the 
construction sector.1 A second objective of this appendix is to illustrate 
some of the project specific sources to non-repetitiveness and 
uncertainty.  
Partly, this appendix is based on observations from the case study  - in 
which also the idea and planning phase was followed with participation 
in five project-planning meetings. However, as the idea of this appendix 
is to facilitate a wider understanding of the building process than the one 
relating directly to the research questions and roof construction, 
additional sources have also been used; for instance observations from 
site meetings on another project and personal experience as a client 
representative in a medium scale social housing organisation (see 
overview of data sources in chapter 4). Even though these different 
sources expand our view of the construction process, the reader should 
be aware that they all relate to the building activities. Hence, the 
following description will only to some degree capture civil engineering 
activities.2 
1.1.1. Phases of the building process  
The case study focuses on (some of the) activities and coordination 
during execution of the building process. However, as seen in the very 
stylised figure 1, building the roof is just one part out of many in the 
                                           
1 An alternative introduction to construction activities and contracting firms can be found in chapter 2 
in Bang 2002. 
2 Civil engineering activities concerns construction of physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, 
ports etc  
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value chain providing housing facilities (roof production is part of the 
box emphasised with a double line).3 
It should be noted that the size of each phase in the figure does not 
represent their respective duration. This obviously varies according to 
the size of the project. But even for cases of an identical size, say medium 
scale social housing projects, the time spent from the moment the first 
idea of a house emerges until the house is in operation, varies 
considerably. Especially the idea and planning phase varies a lot, since 
many conditions have to be sorted out prior to building the house, for 
instance feasibility studies, clearance from local authorities, and 
negotiations on price for plot. So this phase often takes years. Passing 
this first stage, the remaining phases are somewhat more stable. For a 
medium scale social housing project, tendering and execution takes 
approximately 12-18 months in total. However, the tendering phase can 
also be substantially prolonged in case the parties cannot come to an 
agreement concerning price. Handing over is ideally an activity that takes 
place within a few days but if error recovery is necessary, weeks and 
even months can be required. Especially if the parties cannot come to an 
agreement on the extent of, and possible extra payment for, the error 
recovery. The duration of operation obviously equals the life span of the 
building. 
                                           
3 The figure is a conventionalised representation of the phases and actors involved in building a 
medium scale multiunit residential house. The aim of the figure is not to give an idea of all the 
complexities and backflows involved in construction, but rather to give a simplified view of this 
process as it is usually perceived by the people working in the sector (see also Thomassen 1998).  I am 
grateful to Knud Bindeslev, an experienced engineer, who helped me producing the figure. It should 
be noticed that in the case study, as part of the PPB-programme, the tendering process was replaced 
with direct negotiation between the turnkey contractor and subcontractors.  
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Figure 1: A stylised representation of phases and actors in the value chain of house construction 
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This randomness of when a project is launched, inflicts disturbances on 
the level of production, and in turn on the level of employment, for the 
various firms involved in construction. This element of volatility is not 
considered in the analysis provided in chapter 5. If the impact of this 
randomness is assumed to be dependent on the size of the assignment 
compared with the size of the single firm (e.g. the resources of small 
firms will be highly affected if they get / do not get a large project), 
supposedly this impact is in general very high for (the small) 
construction firms compared with (the larger) manufacturing firms.  
As it usually not known when, and if, a project will commence, it is 
difficult to commit resources to a particular project well in advance. 
Perhaps this explains why it apparently is common for firms within 
construction to have a big portfolio of projects in spe. In this 
interpretation, each project in spe is a kind of “lottery ticket” that 
occasionally is “drawn” (and subsequently built), which on average 
provides an even amount of orders. However, due to the “lumpiness” of 
construction projects (rather big assignments compared with the size of 
most firms), situations with excess or lack of orders are expected 
occasionally. As a way to reduce this effect, firms can pool together their 
orders, which - according to the carpenters and painter on the case study 
- is not an unusual practice in construction. Nevertheless, problems of 
this nature further stresses why flexibility rather than specialisation are 
of essence for construction firms.  
1.1.2. Actors of the building process 
Figure 1 also gives us a clue of the many actors that partake in the 
building process. 
The client and client representative4 
The client is the actor ordering the product. The client is responsible for 
paying for the building, which in practice often means being liable for 
the loan – provided by mortgage-credit institutions or banks - financing 
the building. In this way, he holds the residual rights to the building, 
                                           
4 In Danish known as “Bygherren” and “bygherrerådgiver” respectively. 
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which are those rights that are not defined in contracts or by law.5 These 
rights contain an economic responsibility, for instance in case of loss of 
rental. 
Consequently, it is in the interest of the client to specify the product 
according to the needs of the future users (who may, or may not, be him 
self). Sometimes, as in the case study, the client presents some overall 
ideas, and in dialogue with an external architect or contractor, a 
programme for the building is gradually developed. In other cases, as for 
instance in some of the major social housing, very dense manuals are 
made that describe the building very thoroughly, for instance which 
bricks to use for the cladding wall, types of floors, the exact type of 
refrigerator etc. In other cases, such as large industrial companies that 
build production facilities recurrently, the client has an in-house project 
development department. This department designs the building 
according to the needs for that particular building, which obviously 
gives less room for the external design team that, nevertheless, usually is 
employed.  
However, the engagement of the client goes beyond the initial phase in 
the sense that he, to a varying degree, also takes part in the planning and 
production phase. In the planning phase the client ensures that the 
specifications set initially are met. Very often this includes elaborating 
and specifying the specifications further. The client ideally approves all 
major decisions in this phase and plays a less significant role in the 
production phase. However, a lot of planning goes on ad hoc during the 
production process, which enhances the role of the client even in this 
phase. In this way, the client is often enrolled in the (very technical) 
decisions on production. 
The role of following the planning and production phase is either carried 
out internally by the client or externally by a client representative. 
Internal advisers are mainly used on very large projects or when the 
client builds repetitively. Clients who only build once or occasionally 
usually hire an external client representative. For instance, the client in 
the case study, a rather small social housing organisation that had not 
                                           
5 In general terms, these rights include use rights (defining the use of the building), income rights (or 
right to use the building himself), rights to exclude non-owners, and rights to sell the plot and the 
building  (K. Foss 2001b) 
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built for many years, hired a client representative from a larger social 
housing organisation.  
Producers of building materials 
This consists of a large group of very different kinds of firms performing 
a wide range of activities. However, they are all identical in the sense 
that they provide the materials used in the construction process.6  
In this group, four different kinds of actors can be identified. Producers of 
raw materials extract the basic materials that building materials consist of. 
Producers of materials then transform these into semi-processed 
standard building products. Examples of such products could be bricks, 
mortar, standard wooden boards etc. These products are produced in 
large scale and to a wide range of customers. Occasionally, these 
standard products are cut into size and assembled by producers of 
components. So even though these prefabricated solutions are based on 
standard products, they are highly specific since they are usually made 
for a specific building project. With few exceptions, prefabricated 
components or building parts are made to order. Examples of such 
products are bath and toilet units, kitchen units, rafters and concrete 
panels. Finally, dealers take care of selling the products. This includes 
storage, informing about the different products, and occasionally also 
transportation from the producer to the building site. However, these 
activities are not always carried out by an independent actor, but can be 
internalised by the producers. Direct sale is particularly common for 
producers of components, which can be traced back to the specificity of 
these products.  
Architects 
Together with civil engineers, architects form the design team (in the 
following architects and engineers are referred to as “design 
consultants” or “the design team”). The design team is the cornerstone of 
the planning process, but also plays a vital role during production.  
                                           
6 This appendix is far from an exhaustive description of the building materials sector. However, since 
the focus of this thesis is mainly on coordination practices during the process of construction, the 
rather divergent group of producers of building materials are treated under one heading.  
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An architect covers a lot of different activities during a construction 
project. At first, he transform the overall wishes of the client into a visual 
design of the building, suggesting the overall disposition of the plot, the 
exterior lay-out (shape and materials) and types and shape of rooms. In 
this activity, the architect uses his knowledge on shape, function, 
aesthetics, colours etc. Often a landscape architect is employed to design 
the areas that surround the buildings. Later on in the planning process, 
the architect adjusts the visual design to the more detailed desires of the 
client, as well as the requirements put forward by the civil engineer.  
The design team has the overall responsibility for the planning process 
except when carried out as a design and build contract, in which the 
general contractor takes the responsibility. Thus, architects and 
engineers do not only have to provide services themselves, they also 
coordinate the contact with other parties, such as the client, local 
authorities and different kinds of technical experts.  
During construction, the role of the design team is potentially two-fold. 
First, to carry out the ad hoc planning that becomes necessary due to 
unpredicted events. Secondly, in some organisational set-ups (i.e. 
traditional contracts as described below) it is the role of the design team to 
coordinate the activities of the contractors.  
Civil Engineers 
A main activity of this other half of the design team is to ensure that the 
building lasts. It is the job of the civil engineer to transform the drawings 
and models of the architect into a house that is capable of resisting the 
forces of nature. This activity of calculating the static includes a lot of 
computation. Adding to this, it is also the role of the civil engineer to 
ensure – as part of the quality control document – that the installations of 
the house (water, electricity, ventilation) have the right dimensions.  
Secondly, the engineers – sometimes in collaboration with the architect – 
ensure the “buildability” of the house, that is they ensure that the 
different parts of the house fit together and can be built/completed by 
the (sub)contractors. This activity includes work-plans and technical 
drawings.  
Finally, the civil engineers take part in the construction process as 
described above.  
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Where it is usually the same architect that takes care of all the different 
aspects of the planning phase, civil engineering can be divided among 
different firms. Some civil engineering firms have specialised solely in 
for instance making calculations concerning ventilation, leaving the 
overall coordination issues to other civil engineers.  
General contractors and project management7 
As the name indicates, general contractors are not specialised in any 
particular trade, but take on a more superior position. The exact way in 
which this is done depends on the contractual scheme. In a traditional 
contract there are no general contractors – the client representative 
contracts directly with the different trades. In main contracts, the general 
contractor usually carries out the activities of one of the trades himself 
(usually some of the bigger trades, like concrete or carpentry).8 
Furthermore, the general contractor is responsible for the work 
performed by the firms to which the remainder of tasks are 
subcontracted. In design and build contracts the role of the general 
contractors is even bigger, since the design team now contracts with him 
and not the client (the client only contracts with the general contractor). 
Hence, in this set-up the contractor is (a superior) part of the design 
“team”.  
The general contractor conducts the project management except in 
traditional contracts, where a firm (often an architect) contracting 
directly with the client performs this job.  
Project management is usually located on the building site during the 
entire phase of execution. With respect to interfirm coordination, an 
important role of project management is to ensure that timetables are 
met. This is done by providing timetables and by monitoring the 
progresses made by the contractors. The latter issue constitutes an 
                                           
7 In Danish general contractors are known as “hovedentreprenører” and in turnkey or design and 
build contracts, as “totalentreprenør”; project management as “byggeledelse” (working during the 
execution phase).  
8 Occasionally, the general contractor carries out the job of multiple trades on a single project. 
However, this is rare, and usually does only come about if each of the firm’s respective departments 
wins a tender.  Hence, general contractors do not internalise building activities – and coordination 
hereof - in any systematic and recurrent way.  
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important part of the agenda at the weekly site meeting chaired by 
project management and with representatives from the respective trades 
working on site (see box 1). The site meeting can also be used in order to 
solve disagreement between contractors. For example, project 
management can come up with solutions that are acceptable to all parties 
or clarify who is responsible according to the contract. Secondly, project 
management also monitors that activities are carried out as prescribed by 
the design team. In particular, this is done by reinforcing the quality 
insurance system. As part of this, project management considers the 
reasons for technical deviations or delays and based on this, they assess 
whether extra payments or extensions can be approved. Project 
management also approves deviations from these prescriptions. 
Occasionally, the design team is contacted prior to approval, and 
conversely, the design team uses the project management as a 
transmitter of information to the subcontractors. For instance, 
subcontractors get in touch with the project management in order to find 
out if any revisions of drawings or technical specifications have been 
made. Similarly, project management provides information to 
subcontractors, public suppliers and other actors of the building process 
about where they can find other firms or persons working on the site.   
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Box 1: The weekly site meeting1 
 
At almost every building project in Denmark, a weekly site meeting (byggemøde in 
Danish) with representatives from the major contractors is held. This site meeting is 
chaired by the project management. The institutionalisation of the site meeting is seen in 
the fact that it is mandatory according to AB92 (roughly translated to General Conditions 
of 1992). AB92 (or ABT93 for turn-key projects) is compulsory to use for all publicly or 
public supported building projects, but is also frequently used for building projects with 
private clients.  
The agenda for a site meeting is more or less the same from one building site to another 
and can include the following topics:  
1) comments to the minutes from account for last week,  
2) manpower and equipment used at site for the different trades,  
3) number of wasted days,  
4) deviations from timetable,  
5) percentage of work completed by each trade,  
6) conditions on the building site,   
7) comments to the performed work,  
8) quality insurance,  
9) economy, and  
10) any other business.  
The minutes from the site meetings are important, as decisions made here are legally 
binding. For instance, if a specific solution is allowed by the project management and 
reported in the minutes from the site meeting, this replaces the contract originally 
written between the client and the contractor. Due to the legal character of site meetings, 
the minutes only reflect certain parts of the building project. During a case study 
conducted in the beginning of the PhD.-programme, it was often observed, how issues 
were informally discussed before or after the site meeting, or that the parties decided 
not to include a discussion at the site meeting in the minutes.  
(Continues) 
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Box 1: The weekly site meeting. Continued. 
 
Subcontractors9 
Subcontractors, or simply contractors, are the actors who actually build 
the house. Contractors represent different trades: bricklaying, carpentry, 
plumping, electricity, painting, concrete labouring and gardening.  
Traditionally, different trades correspond to different materials: the 
bricklayer takes care of tile-products (bricks and tiles for, say, 
bathrooms); the carpenter mainly makes large and simple wood 
constructions and other constructions in semi-soft materials (e.g. eternite 
plates), but also performs more delicate woodwork; the plumber works 
with metal; the painter with painting; and finally, the gardener works 
with soil and plants.10 Even though observations in the case study 
suggest that this description still is fairly correct, the picture is not static. 
First of all, as new building materials are introduced, the trades expand 
                                           
9 “Underentreprenører” in Danish. These contractors are subordinates either to a main contractor or a 
turnkey contractor. In case of a traditional contractual scheme (one without main contractors or 
turnkey contractors), they are simply called contractors (“entreprenører”).  
10 Terminologically, there is a rather direct relation with the name of the trade and the work they do. A 
“tømrer” (carpenter) works with “tømmer” (wood), a “murer” (bricklayer) works with “mursten” 
(bricks), a “maler” (painter) works with “maling” (painting) etc.  
If nothing is added at Ad 1 in the agenda, the minutes from the last meeting are 
approved. Ad 2 clarifies how many men and how much machinery (not hand-
tools) that have been allocated to the site during the last week. Ad 3 concerns how 
many days have been wasted by the contractors, due to, for instance, changes made 
by the client, delays by other contractors, or the weather (in these cases the 
contractor can claim extension of the deadline according to AB92). Ad 4 is used for 
discussing deviations from the timetable in the week that follows. Ad 5 
summarises (in percentage) how much of the different activities of each firm have 
been completed. Ad 6 relates to the conditions of the building site, for instance, if 
some firms are blocking the access-roads, or if there in wintertime are problems 
with the outdoor lighting. Ad 7 is used for discussing or informing about 
deviations or clarifications of technical descriptions. Ad 8 reports if the required 
quality insurance documents have been provided. Ad 9 is used for discussing and 
perhaps approving the claims for extra payment made by the subcontractors.  
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their activities into new areas. According to the carpenters in the case 
study, separation walls in plaster have been added to the list of materials 
processed by carpenters. Furthermore, in addition to these ancient 
trades, a few “newer” trades have emerged as a response to the technical 
development, for instance electricians or the concrete labourer (the latter 
as a response to the development of concrete panels).  
Within each trade, further specialization takes place occasionally. For 
instance, some carpenters only make kitchens, whereas others specialise 
in floors, wooden structures etc. However, these kinds of specialised 
firms were not observed in the case study, and a case study on a small 
refurbishment project in Odense (Bertelsen 1996, 2002) seems to support 
the view that, at least within refurbishment, they are not dominating.  
A foreman is usually appointed for each trade working on the building 
site. The foreman can have various obligations, for instance (a) allocation 
of activities within the group of people employed in the trade, (b) form a 
communication link between the craftsmen on the one hand and 
superior levels (e.g. project management or the management of the firm) 
on the other hand, and (c) participating in the ongoing planning 
conducted on the site.  
Within the firm, the foreman is usually subordinate to a clerk of work11 in 
larger firms or to a master12 (the owner) in smaller firms. The clerk of 
work (or master) can share some of the obligations of the foreman (as it 
was the case in the carpentry firm studied in roof construction), but an 
additional and very important role is to allocate employees between 
different building projects. Thus, unlike the foreman, the clerk of work is 
usually connected to multiple building projects at the same time.  
Local authorities  
Even though the aforementioned actors do often not consider local 
authorities a part of the project organisation, they have a big say in the 
process of building. For social housing two elements constitutes this role. 
First of all, the local authorities has to – as for all kinds of construction 
projects – approve that the building process as well as the final product 
                                           
11 “Konduktør” in Danish.  
12 “Mester” in Danish. 
   
 
Appendix A: Introduction to the construction process 339 
fulfil the present legislation at the EEC, the national, and the local level. 
The latter includes zoning laws, which sometimes are very specific with 
respect to the design of the building. Due to especially the zoning laws, 
local authorities quite frequently interfere in the planning as well as in 
the production phase.  
Secondly, for social housing, the local authorities administer and partly 
finance the governmental support. In order to give this support, the 
client has to provide different kind of documentation and fill out 
application forms. This interaction mainly takes place in the planning 
phase.  
Technical assistance  
Different kinds of technical assistance can be included in planning and 
production. With very few exceptions, a land surveyor is used in order to 
estimate the exact size of the plot and – which is very important for the 
subsequent production  – to map contour lines. A soil analyst can also be 
included in order to estimate laying foundations and potential pollution. 
If the latter is observed, the soil analyst will have to estimate the extent 
of the pollution and what to do in order to fulfil governmental 
requirements. Sound technicians are a third example of external technical 
assistance used for a specific and delimited purpose.  
The three parties mentioned here will often carry out their activities early 
in the process, that is prior to or in the beginning of the production 
phase.  
Public supply 
This covers the supply of electricity, water, sewage and eventually 
heating. Different firms provide all these services that may be termed 
under the heading “public supply”. The role of these companies is to 
promote the connection to the general net for the respective services. As 
part of this, these companies inform about the capacity and exact terms 
of connection.  
Apart from providing this main supply, they have nothing to do with the 
further distribution in the building; this is taken care of by the 
contractors.  
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Allowances for existing main installations also necessitate a close 
interplay with public suppliers during the idea and planning phase.   
Neighbours 
As part of the Danish system of district plans, neighbours can raise 
objections to the proposed design and / or use of a building. This can 
seriously change or prolong the idea and planning phase. During 
construction, neighbours can affect the process be insisting that 
especially noise levels are not violated.  
In dense areas, new buildings often adjoin neighbouring houses. In these 
cases the neighbours have to approve the union. As seen in the case 
study, this process can become even more complicated, if the new 
building imposes an exchange of real property. Ideally, this interaction 
takes place in the initial phases of the planning period. In reality 
however, negotiations are not always closed before the building project 
is well under way. Obviously, this inflicts elements of uncertainty on the 
project. 
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Appendix B - An “information-structure” interpretation of 
costs of coordinating non-repeated and complex activities 
with many actors 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3, the costs of handling information by different coordination 
modes were discussed. In particular, contributions reflecting on the costs 
of handling coordination when many actors were involved in temporary 
and complex activities were consulted. In this appendix I take this 
discussion one step further by following up on the idea (forwarded in 
section 3.1.4) that the different coordination modes can be perceived as 
different types of networks / information-structures. Further, with 
reference to the discussion in chapter three, I will propose different 
information costs that all structures cope with, but not in equally 
efficient ways.  
Thus, the overall objective of this appendix is to illustrate, how an 
information-structure approach contributes to a systematic 
understanding of information costs of different coordination modes. In 
time, this may pave the way for a more formalised body of literature, and 
consequently this appendix is inspired by the works of e.g. Marschak 
and Radner (1972) and Balton and Dewatripont (1994). However, where 
their arguments are based on general mathematical reasoning (proof), I 
use analytical concepts provided by social network analysis to show, how 
information-structures handle information differently.  
The appendix is organised as follows. Firstly different types of 
information costs are pinned out. Secondly, a “translation” of 
coordination modes into information-structures is proposed. Then it is 
outlined how the costs of these structures can be analysed by concepts 
from social network analysis. Finally, results are given and the use of 
information-structures / coordination modes in situations that vary with 
respect to the number of people involved, complexity and repetitiveness 
is briefly discussed.   
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1.2 Information costs  
The first step is to identify different kinds of information costs in 
information-structures. As part of the costs of using1 different structures, 
I propose the three following possibilities:  
Costs associated with the number of information connections. The 
assumption is, that every act of sending off, transmitting and absorbing 
information includes costs: “an efficient network minimizes the number 
of communication channels between agents” (Balton and Dewatripont 
1994, p. 822). Thus, other things being equal, the more links there are in a 
structure, the higher information costs. 
Costs associated with concentrated information collection and processing. 
Assuming that each individual has a limited capacity to handle 
information (Arrow 1974), communication costs are raised when 
concentrated in single nodes rather than dispersed equally among nodes. 
These costs can be directly related to more than proportional time and 
mental resources spent on processing information or can be indirect as if 
for instance, relevant information is not considered (K. Foss 2001). 
Hence, other things being equal, the more the structure relies on specific 
transitional actors (that is actors transferring information between actors 
that are not in direct contact with each other), the higher the information 
costs.  
Costs associated with a large span of control. If information has to move 
through many actors (i.e. a large span of control), it can result in slow 
and out-dated decisions. The basic assumption is that the decision of 
each actor takes time and that, other things being equal, prompt 
decisions are better than slow decisions. Secondly due to knowledge of 
the detail of the problem (Robinson 1934, Hayek 1945) or due to noise 
(Marschak and Radner 1972) a superior may not capture all details off 
the information provided by subordinates (or visa versa). Hence, other 
things being equal, “an efficient network minimizes the number of 
agents through which a given item transits” (Balton and Dewatripont 
1994, p. 822).  
 
                                           
1 Note that costs of creating and identifying coordination modes for matters of simplicity are not 
considered here, except in the final discussion towards the end of the appendix.  
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1.3 Coordination modes as information-structures 
The second step of this exercise is to translate coordination modes into 
information-structures. In agreement with Grandori’s visualisation of 
information-structures (see section 3.1.4), I will propose the following 
simplification (some might say “caricature”):  
 Price (and voting) represents a partially connected hob-and-spoke 
structure; it is a structure in which communication between all 
actors is mediated by a single central node (for instance an 
auctioneer). 
 Authority, and to some degree agency, represents a partially and 
centralised connected structure; that is a structure where 
communications between sub-ordinate nodes are mediated by a 
superior node. If the number of sub-ordinate nodes involved 
exceeds a certain amount, more superior nodes are involved hence 
creating multiple layers of subordinate-superior relations (i.e. the 
structure is hierarchical).  
 Teaming (and negotiation) represents a totally connected and 
decentralised structure, that is a structure where all nodes interact 
directly with each other without use of mediating nodes.  
 Norms and rules represent an unconnected structure; that is a 
structure in which the actions of each node are not associated with 
any act of communication with other nodes.  
Examples of the three first different information-structures are shown in 
figure 1-3. Each number represents an actor (or a node) and each 
connection represents exchange of information (which can go both ways 
and thus is illustrated with a double arrow (yet in the calculations that 
follow in section 4.5, communication is considered as undirected)).  
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Figure 1 : A 7-actor pricing communication structure 
 
 
Figure 2: A 7-actor authority communication structure  
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Figure 3: A 7-actor teaming communication structure 
 
As norms and rules is an unconnected structure (there is no relational 
data) there is no visual representation of this structure. And for the same 
reason, no calculations are made for it in the sections that follow.  
Authority is here conceived of as a system in which each superior has 
exactly two subordinates (and one subordinate has one, and only one, 
superior). Of course this a somewhat arbitrary choice as the superior 
could have less (=1) or more (3 and upwards) subordinates. The results 
on centralised information possessing and span of control are affected by this 
choice (the more subordinates to a superior, the less increase in the span 
of control and the less increase in centralised information processing).2  
For matters of simplicity I have only considered authority structures 
where the number of actors fits to the rule of one superior to two 
                                           
2 In order to investigate the impact of number of subordinates, an authority structure with 3 
subordinates per superior was compared with an authority structure with 2 subordinates with 
approximately the same number of actors involved (121 and 127 actors respectively). Distance was 6,16 
for the triple-structure and 8,35 for the double-structure. With respect to betweenness, the identical 
figures are 310 and 463 for the mean and 4800 and 4929 for the maximum value  
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subordinates. Thus the smallest authority structure consists of 3 actors, 
the next of (2x3+1=) 7, the next of (2x7+1=) 15 and so on.  
 
1.4 Application of social network concepts to information costs 
The cost associated with the number of information connections relates to 
how many relations that have to be activated in order to transmit an 
information to all parts of the structure. Thus, the total number of relations 
in the structure represents a simple proxy for this cost. With 7 actors this 
number amounts to 6, 6, and 21 for prices, authority and teaming 
respectively (see figures 1-3). 
Costs associated with concentrated information collection and processing 
concerns the information load put on nodes connecting other nodes. The 
(Freeman) betweenness centrality measure is proposed as a proxy for this 
cost. This measurement counts the number of paths connecting (not 
directly connected) nodes that go through a node. For instance, the value 
for actor 1 in the 7-actor authority structure (see figure 2) is 9 (actor 2 can 
connect to 5 other nodes through actor 1 and as the network is not 
counted with direction, actor 3 can connect to 4 actors through actor 1).  
The span of control has been measured by the distance function in Ucinet 
(with the type as data set as costs/distances). This algorithm finds the 
number of relations in the shortest path between each pair of nodes. For 
instance, the value for an authority structure with 7 persons as displayed 
in figure 2 is 2,3 meaning that in order to connect one actor to another 
actor in average 2,3 actors have to be passed through.  
A basic assumption when using the two latter measures is that any actor 
can have information that he wants to send to any other actor.3 Of course 
this is a simplification; for instance, the hub in the price information-
structure may be an auctioneer that is specialised in transmitting 
information of others but who does not himself come up with any 
information. In case such inter-mediating specialists in coordination 
exist, this will on one hand increase the costs of using information-
                                           
3 This is identical to Hart and Moores assumption (1999), that any individual in a hierarchy can come 
up with an idea. Unlike Hart and Moore, however, I do not assume that, information or ideas in 
certain parts of the structure (for instance higher hierarchical layers) exclude or have precedence to 
information in other parts of the structure.  
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structures as the distance and concentration grows. On the other hand, 
costs per information bit are properly decreased due to specialisation.  
 
1.5 Results on the efficient use of coordination modes 
Now, having identified different types of costs, let us see briefly 
reconsider the costs of handling the three informational contingencies 
(variability, complexity, and number of actors) by different coordination 
modes / information-structures.  
With respect to the first kind of costs, the number of connections does not 
vary much for the different information-structures for very small groups. 
However, as size increases, the total connected structure (teaming) 
becomes very heavy to operate (Table 1).  
Table 1: Size and the total number of communication links  
Number of 
actors 
Prices Authority Teaming 
3 2 2 3
7 6 6 21
15 14 14 105
31 30 30 465
63 62 62 1953
127 126 126 8001
 
Authority, as an only partially connected structure, is better at handling 
larger groups with respect to number of connections. On the other hand, 
it may create costs due to concentrated collection and processing of 
information (table 2).   
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Table 2: Size and “average betweenness” and “max betweenness”   
 Prices Authority Teaming 
Number of 
actors 
Mean Max. Central-
isation 
Mean Max. Central-
isation 
Mean Max. Central-
isation 
3 0,33 1 100% 0,33 1 1 0 0 0%
7 2,14 15 100% 3,86 9 40% 0 0 0%
15 6,1 91 100% 17,53 57 46,47% 0 0 0%
31 14 435 100% 59,33 273 50,76% 0 0 0%
63 30 1891 100% 173,19 1185 54,37% 0 0 0%
127 62 7875 100% 463 4929 57,16% 0 0 0%
 
As seen, measured by the average, authority is the structure that suffers 
the most from increased size. The betweenness values are increased 
towards higher hierarchical layers and are for networks at a certain size 
largest at the level second to the top.4 As these figures illustrate, 
grouping activities with high interdependencies in the same part of the 
structure (i.e. placing them under the same superior at the lowest 
possible level), can be an essential part of an effectively designed 
authority structure. Thus, without knowledge of interdependencies (for 
instance due to low repetitiveness), it can be costly to handle information 
by this structure.  
Since each central node (superior) can only handle coordination for a 
limited number of decentralised nodes (subordinates), more levels have 
to be introduced as the number of people involved in coordination 
expands. For very large groups this can increase costs associated with a 
large span of control.  
                                           
4 In a 7 actor authority structure with 2 subordinates per superior, the betweenness values for the 
“zero” level (i.e. the lowest level) is 0, for the first level it is 9 and for the top level it is 9 as well. If this 
structure is expanded to comprise 15 actors, the values are 0, 25, 57, and 49 for the zero to the third 
level, respectively.  
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Table 3: Size and average distance 
Number of 
actors 
Prices Authority Teaming 
3 1,33 1,33 1
7 1,71 2,29 1
15 1,87 3,51 1
31    1,94 4,96 1
63 1,97 6,59 1
127 1,98 8,35 1
 
Unsurprisingly, the average distance in a teaming communication 
structure is always 1 as all actors by definition are directly related. The 
average distance in pricing communication structure is approaching 2, as 
the importance of the hub-actor (the only actor with a value different 
(=1) than 2) decreases with increasing numbers of actors. In the authority 
structure, however, distance grows increasingly with size and is even for 
small structures greater than in pricing or teaming. Even though the 
increase soars less, if each superior can handle more than two 
subordinates (e.g. in a triple authority structure with 121 actors, the 
average distance is at approximately the same level as the double 
authority structure with 63 actors), the conclusion is not fundamentally 
different.  
A way to reduce the problem of a big span of control is by introducing a 
hob-and-spoke structure as in pricing. However, the potential 
information overload of the central node in this structure can be extreme. 
This relates to a second aspect of costs of concentration processing of 
information displayed, but not yet discussed, in table 2. To recall, due to 
limited capacity of actors to handle information, costs are expected to 
increase more than proportionally when concentrated on a few 
individuals. Thus, it is not only the average betweenness but also the 
degree to which the betweenness is concentrated in a few persons (as 
measured by the centralisation index) that is of essence. In this respect, 
pricing is more exposed to increased size, as all information is located at 
a single person (the hub). Hence, in order for pricing to be efficient, 
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assumedly information has to be codified (or at least easily transferred 
and understood). An alternative is to make a disconnected structure (as 
in norms and rules). Yet, if this system is to be effective, some guidelines 
for behaviour have to be disseminated among the involved parties.  
In balance, these reflections show, how the number of people involved 
affects the information costs of using alternative information-structures. 
Teaming is very efficient with respect to costs associated with 
concentration and span of control, but is costly to use with respect to the 
number of communication links. And as the latter grows dramatically 
with increased size, teaming seems most appropriate for small groups. 
The number of communication links expands less with group size in 
authority and pricing. On the other hand, authority faces problems with 
larger groups due to high average costs of concentration and, in 
particular, an increasing span of control. Pricing is in most respects 
capable of handling information in large groups at low costs, except for 
the information transfer and processing concentrated at the central node 
(the hub).  
As the latter illustrates, there is a trade-off between costs of using and 
creating coordination modes. If pricing is to be effective, information has 
to be of a format in which it is easily handled by a single central actor; 
thus the need of codifying information in prices. Correspondingly, an 
efficient authority structure will to a large degree depend on being 
organised in a way, by which activities with high interdependencies are 
grouped together.  
Partly due to a presumably different composition of creating and using 
costs, and partly due to using costs on its own, the alternative 
coordination modes are also differentiated with respect to the second 
contingency considered: variability in activities. With low variability (i.e. 
with high degree of repetition) the initial costs involved in coding of 
information is reasonable to bear in order to gain lower variable costs. 
Accordingly, if repetition is high, it makes sense either to invest in the 
provision and dissemination of formal rules, for instance working 
procedures, or to accumulate and rely on past experience laid down in 
social norms. However, if high activity variability creates less repetition, 
the cost of using pricing or norms or rules is higher either due to high 
fixed costs, or due to actions, that are not well fitted to the new situation. 
Particularly the non-calculative element of norms and rules creates a risk 
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of an “institutional gap” arising from a prescription originated in 
conditions that are no longer the same.  
The complexity of the activity has been the last contingency considered. For 
very simple activities, only a few conditions have to be taken into 
account before they can be carried out. This enhances the possibility that 
a single central node can handle the information involved in connecting 
the activities of all other nodes; hence pricing and voting can handle 
activities with low levels of complexity. However, as activities become 
more complex, it is favourable to use less centralised information-
structures. For less simple, but not very complex activities, authority can 
be used. However, for coordination of very complex activities, the 
information and knowledge, which the superior actor has to master, is 
beyond the cognitive restraints of a single person. Here, direct 
information without any mediating nodes, like in teaming, is preferable. 
Yet, there may be situations of such extreme complexity, that the 
information involved in coordination exceeds the capacity of even 
decentralised structures. Here, the only option is to use a non-connected 
structure; that is to abandon the deliberate act of coordinating as it is 
done by norms and rules.5 
                                           
5 Or as in “rationing” suggested by Thompson (1967).  
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Appendix C – Supplementary statistical data 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This appendix provides additional statistical information to chapter four. 
Hence the appendix is hardly readable in its own but should only be 
used in combination with chapter 5. 
 
4.2. Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1: Employment in all sectors 1981-92 (1981=100) 
Source: Statistical ten-year review 1990 and 1997.  
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Table 1: Education of employers and employees in manufacturing (%) 
- 1998 
 Manufacturing 
Construction: 
Contracting firms All sectors 
Public school 35,88 30,59 27,91 
High School 5,78 2,71 9,38 
Basic Vocational Courses 42,18 55,8 37,8 
Supplementary Vocational Courses 5,51 4,93 4,64 
Diploma 5,42 3,86 12,23 
Bacehelor 0,76 0,16 1,02 
Master 2,54 0,62 5,38 
Doctoral / Ph.D. degree 0,15 0 0,21 
Not known 1,79 1,32 1,43 
Total 100 100 100 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
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Table 2: Geographical distribution of manufacturing firms, 
construction firms and firms of architects and engineers. 
County Manufacturing Construction Architects and Engineers
København og Frederiksberg Kommune 7,4% 5,9% 14,9% 
Københavns Amt 10,1% 10,5% 13,3% 
Frederiksborg Amt 6,2% 7,4% 9,5% 
Roskilde Amt 3,9% 5,2% 3,7% 
Vestsjællands Amt 4,7% 6,6% 5,1% 
Storstrøms Amt 4,2% 5,4% 2,7% 
Bornholms Amt 4,0% 3,7% 2,1% 
Fyns Amt 6,0% 6,0% 5,2% 
Sønderjyllands Amt 4,6% 5,2% 3,5% 
Ribe Amt 4,9% 5,1% 3,6% 
Vejle Amt 8,3% 6,8% 6,8% 
Ringkøbing Amt 7,5% 5,6% 3,6% 
Århus Amt 13,0% 11,2% 13,7% 
Viborg Amt 5,6% 5,5% 3,2% 
Nordjyllands Amt 9,5% 9,9% 8,2% 
Other (foreign countries included) 0,1% 0,1% 0,8% 
Total  100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Number of firms 17133 17155 2309 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
Where the geographical distribution of construction firms is close to the 
distribution of manufacturing firms, firms of architects and engineers are 
mainly based in the counties with, or close to, the major cities of 
Copenhagen and Århus.1 
                                           
1 A more fine grained analytical level than “amter”, for instance “kommuner”, would probably show 
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Table 3: Survival of construction and manufacturing firms 1981-97 
according to size (no. of men year in 1981) 
0-4 Employees Construction firms Manufacturing firms 
 
In Business %Survived 
% change
from prev.
year 
In Business %Survived 
% change 
from prev. 
year 
Start 1981 15904 100,0%  12350 100,0%  
End 1981 12487 78,5% -21,5% 9862 79,9% -20,1% 
1982 10578 66,5% -15,3% 8487 68,7% -13,9% 
1983 9531 59,9% -9,9% 7598 61,5% -10,5% 
1984 8628 54,3% -9,5% 6875 55,7% -9,5% 
1985 7952 50,0% -7,8% 6257 50,7% -9,0% 
1986 7404 46,6% -6,9% 5785 46,8% -7,5% 
1987 6885 43,3% -7,0% 5277 42,7% -8,8% 
1988 6344 39,9% -7,9% 4859 39,3% -7,9% 
1989 5847 36,8% -7,8% 4464 36,1% -8,1% 
1990 5347 33,6% -8,6% 4092 33,1% -8,3% 
1991 4948 31,1% -7,5% 3787 30,7% -7,5% 
1992 4570 28,7% -7,6% 3501 28,3% -7,6% 
1993 4250 26,7% -7,0% 3271 26,5% -6,6% 
1994 4015 25,2% -5,5% 3013 24,4% -7,9% 
1995 3812 24,0% -5,1% 2828 22,9% -6,1% 
1996 3640 22,9% -4,5% 2663 21,6% -5,8% 
1997 3489 21,9% -4,1% 2513 20,3% -5,6% 
       
                                                                                                                                   
that also in other parts of the country, the firms of architects and engineers will cluster more than 
contractors.   
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5-24 Employees Construction firms Manufacturing firms 
 
In Business %Survived 
% change
from prev.
year 
In Business %Survived
% change 
from prev. 
year 
Start 1981 4749 100,0%  6876 100,0%  
End 1981 4549 95,8% -4,2% 6565 95,5% -4,5% 
1982 4276 90,0% -6,0% 6108 88,8% -7,0% 
1983 4057 85,4% -5,1% 5766 83,9% -5,6% 
1984 3888 81,9% -4,2% 5491 79,9% -4,8% 
1985 3749 78,9% -3,6% 5221 75,9% -4,9% 
1986 3603 75,9% -3,9% 5000 72,7% -4,2% 
1987 3481 73,3% -3,4% 4746 69,0% -5,1% 
1988 3359 70,7% -3,5% 4555 66,2% -4,0% 
1989 3206 67,5% -4,6% 4286 62,3% -5,9% 
1990 3042 64,1% -5,1% 4079 59,3% -4,8% 
1991 2884 60,7% -5,2% 3862 56,2% -5,3% 
1992 2757 58,1% -4,4% 3648 53,1% -5,5% 
1993 2636 55,5% -4,4% 3466 50,4% -5,0% 
1994 2535 53,4% -3,8% 3270 47,6% -5,7% 
1995 2440 51,4% -3,7% 3142 45,7% -3,9% 
1996 2359 49,7% -3,3% 3024 44,0% -3,8% 
1997 2278 48,0% -3,4% 2896 42,1% -4,2% 
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25+ Employees Construction firms Manufacturing firms 
 
In Business %Survived 
% change
from prev.
year 
In Business %Survived 
% change 
from prev. 
year 
Start 1981 630 100,0%  2658 100,0%  
End 1981 613 97,3% -2,7% 2585 97,3% -2,7% 
1982 574 91,1% -6,4% 2485 93,5% -3,9% 
1983 537 85,2% -6,4% 2396 90,1% -3,6% 
1984 517 82,1% -3,7% 2322 87,4% -3,1% 
1985 497 78,9% -3,9% 2251 84,7% -3,1% 
1986 485 77,0% -2,4% 2162 81,3% -4,0% 
1987 467 74,1% -3,7% 2048 77,1% -5,3% 
1988 438 69,5% -6,2% 1970 74,1% -3,8% 
1989 415 65,9% -5,3% 1872 70,4% -5,0% 
1990 397 63,0% -4,3% 1755 66,0% -6,3% 
1991 374 59,4% -5,8% 1662 62,5% -5,3% 
1992 348 55,2% -7,0% 1586 59,7% -4,6% 
1993 324 51,4% -6,9% 1513 56,9% -4,6% 
1994 311 49,4% -4,0% 1446 54,4% -4,4% 
1995 303 48,1% -2,6% 1414 53,2% -2,2% 
1996 291 46,2% -4,0% 1368 51,5% -3,3% 
1997 285 45,2% -2,1% 1320 49,7% -3,5% 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
A Mantel-Haenzel test gives the following values. For 0-4 employees the 
difference is insignificant (p=0,2111; df=1).  For 5 –24 employees the 
difference is significant (p<0,0001, df=1). For 25 employees or more the 
difference is also significant, but with a rather high p-value (p=0,02, 
df=1).  
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Figure 2: The year of establishment for construction and 
manufacturing firms in Zealand, Funen2 and Jutland 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
The regional difference in year of establishment is not very profound in 
manufacturing (chi-square=53,49, df=36, p=0,031, and if the first year of 
registration, 1980, is excluded chi-square=52,3, df=34, p=0,023). 
However, the regional difference is strongly significant within 
construction (chi-square=152,36, df=36, p<0,0001, and if 1980 is excluded, 
chi-square=63,9, df=34, p=0,001).  
The difference in year of establishment in manufacturing compared with 
construction is significant in all three regions (Zealand: chi-square=96,98, 
df=17, p<0,0001; Funen: chi-square=47,2, df=17, p<0,0001; Jutland: chi-
square=150,96, df=36, p<0,0001). 
                                           
2 Bornholms and Storstrøms Amt is included in Funen.  
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Figure 3: Year of employment for three counties at Zealand, Fun and 
Jutland3 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
3 The three counties Københavns Amt, Fyns Amt and Ribe Amt were selected for further investigation 
as they with respect to year of establishment of firms had values close to the average of Zealand, 
Funen and Jutland respectively.  
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Figure 4: Year of employment in construction and manufacturing firms 
– all persons and males 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
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Table 4: Educational background of employees and sector employment 
(%)- 1998 
 
General 
contractors 
Bricklayers Electricians Plumbers Carpenters Painters 
Public school or less 38 34 23 25 28 26 
Highschool 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Other basic vocational courses 21 10 16 31 9 9 
Bricklayer 7 44 0 0 2 0 
Carpenter 13 4 0 1 52 1 
Plumber 1 0 1 31 0 0 
Painter 1 0 0 0 0 59 
Electrician 1 0 39 2 0 0 
Supplementary Vocational Courses 3 1 12 6 2 1 
Diploma 8 2 3 2 2 1 
Bachelor 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Master 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Doctoral / Ph.D. degree 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not known 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
IDA-database. Own inquiries 2001.  
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Dansk Resumé 
 
Indledning 
Byggeriets organisation har i stadig stigende grad været i fokus det 
seneste 10-år. Gennemgående for den danske såvel som udenlandske 
akademiske, erhvervsmæssige og politiske debat er ofte en antagelse om, 
at byggeriet for det første klarer sig dårligt (eksempelvis i forhold til 
produktivitet, innovation, læring, kvalitet, arbejdsmiljø med mere). For 
det andet, at problemerne – og dermed løsningerne – ikke primært er 
tekniske men snarere knytter sig til byggebranchens og –processens 
organisering. Populært kan man måske sige, at hvor meget af 
efterkrigstidens udviklingsindsats har set på relationen mellem 
bygningsdele, er relationen mellem mennesker nu i centrum.  
Denne afhandling bidrager til denne diskussion. Ikke ved i 
udgangspunktet at kritisere eller komme med ændringsforslag. Men ved 
at prøve at forstå, hvad de økonomiske rationaler er ved byggeriets 
nuværende organisation – en organisation hvis delelementer kan 
genfindes i en lang række lande og som i en række sammenhænge 
forekommer at være meget stabile over tid og som derfor ikke uden 
videre kan afskrives som værende ineffektive.  
Teori 
Afhandlingens teoretiske ståsted organisationsøkonomi, altså den 
sammenlignende vurdering af omkostninger ved at  producere og 
allokere ressourcer gennem forskellige ejerskabs- og koordinations-
former.  Indenfor dette felt er særligt informationsbaserede tilgange til 
økonomisk organisation blevet vægtet, mens incitamentsbaserede 
tilgange, herunder transaktionsomkostningsøkonomi, har været tildelt 
mindre opmærksomhed.  
Forskningsspørgsmål 
Afhandlingen tager sit afsæt i tre empiriske forskningsspørgsmål 
 Forskningsspørgsmål A: Hvordan er arbejdsdelingen i 
byggeprocessen og hvad er konsekvenserne heraf for 
koordination? 
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Forskningsspørgsmål B: Hvilken rolle spiller virksomheder 
indenfor byggeriet i forhold til koordination: sker koordina-
tion i eller mellem virksomheder og hvilke grænser er der for 
at håndtere på hinanden følgende byggeaktiviteter indenfor 
en enkelt virksomhed? 
Forskningsspørgsmål C: Hvilke koordinationsformer 
benyttes i byggeprocessen og hvordan håndterer de den 
information, der indgår i at koordinere byggeaktiviteterne?  
De indbyrdes relaterede forskningsspørgsmål tager udgangspunkt i 
grundlæggende begreber indenfor organisationsøkonomien: arbejds-
deling og specialisering (forskningsspørgsmål A), koordination og 
koordinationsformer (forskningsspørgsmål C) samt organiseringen af 
koordination, herunder betydningen af virksomheder (forsknings-
spørgsmål B).  
Empiri 
Til belysning af forskningsspørgsmålene er gennemført et case studie af 
koordinationsformer i opførelsen af et tag på et fleretages boligbyggeri 
beliggende i København. Dette dybdegående casestudie er blevet 
suppleret med en mere summarisk case af koordinationsformer anvendt 
ved møbelproduktion, der har en række fællestræk med tagproduktion, 
men som adskiller sig ved en højere grad af gentagelse. 
Statiske kilder har været brugt til at dokumentere graden af udsving i 
den samlede efterspørgsel i byggebranchen i sammenligning med andre 
brancher. Endvidere er særkørsler i en unik dansk database – IDA-
databasen – blevet benyttet til at undersøge afledte ændringer i 
relationen mellem henholdsvis virksomheder og personer. IDA-
databasen giver også en række indikationer på de i forsknings-
spørgsmålene rejste problemstillinger (problemstillinger der som 
bekendt er behandlet mere detaljeret i casestudiet).   
Konklusion 
Med udgangspunkt i disse kilder konkluderes følgende i forhold til de 
tre forskningsspørgsmål. 
Byggeprocessen er kendetegnet ved en lav grad af gentagelse på makro-
niveau (forårsaget af ændringer i den samlede efterspørgsel) der 
yderligere forstærkes ved forskelle i det enkelte byggeprojekt. Dette 
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medfører en høj grad af foranderlighed i byggeprocessen eftersom at 
virksomheder, personer og de indbyrdes afhængigheder mellem 
aktiviteter varierer fra et byggeprojekt til et andet til trods for, at det 
færdige produkt – og i særdeleshed dets enkelte dele – ikke 
nødvendigvis er væsensforskelligt og til trods for, at den anvendte 
teknologi og arbejdsmetoder fremstår som meget stabil. Den 
kombinerede effekt af mangel på gentagelse på makro- og mikroniveau 
er en nøgle til at forstå arbejdsdelingen, organiseringen af koordination 
og de anvendte koordinationsformer anvendt i byggeprocessen (de tre 
forskningsspørgsmål).  
Generelt betyder hyppigheden og størrelsen i udsving i efterspørgsel, at 
fordelene ved at specialisere sig i mindre grad opvejer de heraf følgende 
ulemper i form af mindre tilpasningsevne. I denne situation er der 
fordele ved at benytte en begrænset og ikke virksomhedsspecifik 
arbejdsdeling (svarende til de forskellige fag). Denne fordel knytter sig 
til forskellige niveauer: sektoren, virksomheden, det enkelte 
byggeprojekt og det enkelte individ.  
Foruden at afbalancere fordelene ved specialisering versus 
tilpasningsevne, så mindsker opdelingen i fag – det vil sige faglært og 
højtuddannet arbejdsarbejdskraft samlet i homogene grupper på person 
og virksomhedsniveau – også de til koordinationsprocessen knyttede 
informationsomkostninger. For det første muliggør fagene fælles 
gentagelseseffekter, herunder fælles forventninger, mellem personer og 
virksomheder, der ikke har forhåndskendskab til hinanden (og som 
heller ikke har udsigt til at skulle gentage samarbejdet). For det andet 
bevirker brugen af faglært arbejdskraft, at aktiviteter der ikke er helt 
identiske fra gang til gang i et vist omfang kan håndteres decentralt. 
Standardisering af in- og outputs såvel som af arbejdsprocesser erstattes 
således af standardisering af kompetencer.  
Hvad angår forskningsspørgsmål B så bevirker behovet for at kunne 
tilpasse sig til nye situationer, at udførende byggevirksomheder 
(fagentreprenører eller underentreprenører) i meget begrænset omfang 
håndterer sekvenser af på hinanden følgende aktiviteter. I stedet udfører 
de aktiviteter ”her og der” i værdikæden på det enkelte byggeprojekt 
såvel som deltager i mange forskellige byggeprojekter samtidigt. 
Byggevirksomhederne rolle som koordinatorer er således altovervejende 
begrænset til koordination på tværs af værdikæder. Koordination indenfor 
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den enkelte værdikæde varetages hovedsageligt af virksomheder 
specialiseret heri, nærmere bestemt af rådgiverne (arkitekt og 
rådgivende ingeniør, der især er aktive i planlægningsfasen) og af 
byggeledelsen (typisk en hoved- eller totalentreprenør, der især er 
involveret i udførelsesfasen). Specialisterne i koordination og 
specialisterne i produktion er dermed placeret i separate virksomheder. 
Denne brug af tredjeparts koordinering løser en række af de 
informationsproblemer (samt incitamentsproblemer) der er knyttet til 
mange forskellige aktører der opererer ”her og der” i værdikæden. Men 
adskillelsen af produktion og koordination indebærer også en række 
problemer hvad angår afbalanceringen af koordinations- og 
produktionsomkostninger og hertil knyttede forbedringer og innovation.  
Hvad angår forskningsspørgsmål C, peger empirien i retning af, at flere 
forskellige koordinationsformer anvendes samtidigt for at koordinere de 
enkelte aktiviteter i byggeforløbet. På håndværksniveauet er det 
gennemgående billede at information om hvem der skal udføre hvilke 
aktiviteter og hvornår de skal udføres tilvejebringes gennem overordnede 
personer placeret i det samme firma som håndværkeren. Information om 
hvilke materialer der skal bruges og hvor meget og præcis hvad der skal laves 
er derimod bestemt af instrukser fra eksterne rådgivere. Endelig er 
håndværkernes erfaring og rutiner oftest afgørende hvad angår 
information om hvilke redskaber og hvilke fremgangsmåder der skal 
benyttes.  
Denne observation synes på den ene side at være i overensstemmelse 
med den teoretiske forventning om, at det er svært at håndtere 
komplekse, ikke-gentagne aktiviteter med mange aktører involveret ved 
hjælp af en enkelt koordinationsform. Omvendt blev det i empirien 
konstateret, at de anvendte koordinationsformer i mindre omfang end 
teoretisk forventet modsvarer forskelle i de indbyrdes afhængigheder 
mellem aktiviteter. En mulig forklaring på disse ”robuste” kombina-
tioner af koordinationsformer er, at selv om de ikke minimerer 
omkostningerne ved at bruge forskellige koordinationsomkostningerne, 
så er de ikke desto mindre hensigtsmæssige når omkostningerne ved at 
lære hvilken koordinationsform der passer til et givent sæt af aktiviteter 
- samt omkostninger ved at indføre denne koordinationsform - 
medtænkes. Endvidere nuancerer empirien den i litteraturen ofte 
antagede sammenhæng, at koordinationsformer er bestemt af (den 
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indbyrdes afhængighed i) aktiviteterne. Som observeret i 
møbelproduktion, kan det omvendte også være tilfældet, altså at 
aktiviteter defineres på en sådan måde, at de kan håndteres med 
bestemte koordinationsformer.  
Teoretiske perspektiver 
Overordnet set bidrager afhandlingen til en teoridannelse om hvorledes 
koordination organiseres og finder sted – især i situationer kendetegnet 
ved foranderlighed. 
Eksterne forandringer med deraf følgende mulighed for forandring i den 
enkelte aktivitet medfører ikke fraværet af en arbejdsdeling. Men den 
medfører derimod en bestemt og begrænset arbejdsdeling knyttet til 
grupper af virksomheder og personer der i forhold til hinanden er 
specialiseret, men som internt er homogene. Fordele herved er samtidig 
specialisering og tilpasningsevne. Blandt ulemperne er koordinations-
omkostninger ved innovation som følge af systemiske innovationer.  
Den enkelte virksomhed spiller en begrænset rolle som koordinator. 
Modsat hvad det må forventes at gælde for aktiviteter underlagt mindre 
grad af eksterne forandringer, så udfører nogle virksomheder kun 
koordination på tværs af værdikæder, mens andre virksomheder 
primært udfører forandringer i den enkelte værdikæde.  Med andre ord 
så synes koordination direkte mellem to virksomheder og i særdeleshed 
koordination ved en tredje part at være afgørende ved lav grad af 
gentagelse i eksterne forhold. 
Underliggende for denne diskussion er en forståelse af virksomheden 
som én måde at reducere informationsomkostninger på. Teoretisk og 
empirisk supplerer afhandlingen derved overvejende incitaments-
baserede teoridannelser til at forstå virksomheders eksistens, grænser og 
interne organisering.  
Adam Smith fremhævede gentagelse af aktiviteter som årsagen til 
arbejdsdelingen og deraf følgende lavere produktionsomkostninger. Denne 
afhandling har fundet at gentagelse af sekvenser af aktiviteter som en anden 
potentiel kilde til vækst, da gentagelse heraf mindsker 
koordinationsomkostninger.  
Afhandlingen udvider på en række punkter forståelsen af den 
hensigtsmæssige brug af koordinationsformer. Ved at supplere 
omkostninger ved at bruge koordinationsformer med omkostninger ved 
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at lære om koordinationsformer gøres det klart, at koordinationsformer – 
især ikke ved lav grad af gentagelse i sekvenser af aktiviteter – ikke kan 
forventes nøje af afspejle de koordinerede aktiviteter. De 
informationsrelaterede egenskaber ved aktiviteter kan således godt være 
forskellige uden at koordinationsformerne nødvendigvis er det. Men 
forholdet mellem aktiviteter og koordinationsformer er ikke blot mindre 
klart end især angivet i kontingensteorien. Kausaliteten kan decideret 
være omvendt. Hvor kontingensteori tog udgangspunkt i at 
egenskaberne ved aktiviteterne var givne og at samklang mellem 
aktiviteter og koordinationsformer alene kunne ske ved at vælge de 
rigtige koordinationsformer, har afhandlingen påvist at udformningen af 
aktiviteter og deres indbyrdes bindinger også er en ledelsespåvirkelig 
variabel.  
Graden af gentagelse i eksterne forhold synes alt i alt at have en 
afgørende indvirkning på hvordan koordination organiseres og udføres. 
I det omfang denne konklusion er general gyldig, peger den i retning af 
at aktiviteter, personer og virksomheder og måske endda brancher der 
som følge af et højt niveau af eksterne ændringer – ikke bare i samlet 
efterspørgsel, men måske også af andre årsager som eksempelvis skift i 
kundernes smag eller i den anvendte teknologi – vil have en række 
fællestræk, der dårlig kan indfanges ved teoridannelser udviklet i 
relation til gentagne produktion.  
Empiriske perspektiver 
Afhandlingen påpeger at byggeriets organisation og væremåde i mange 
henseender er en fornuftig måde at håndtere konjunkturudsvingenes 
krav om fleksibilitet. Og at byggeriets nuværende organisation på en 
række forskellige niveauer kan ses som et logisk svar på behovet for 
fleksibilitet (figur 1) . 
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Figur 1: Konsekvenser af kortvarigt samarbejde (byggeriets nuværende organisering) 
 
Samtidig påvises en række indbyggede problemstillinger i byggeriets 
nuværende organisering. Ikke mindst, at det grundlæggende behov for 
at være ens er hæmmende for virksomheders og individers interesse i at 
innovere og dygtiggøre sig. Dette gør det igen tvivlsomt om byggeriets 
nuværende organisering på langt sigt er den mest hensigtsmæssige.  
Med udgangspunkt i ovenstående analyse, bør en række af de forhold 
der ofte fremhæves som typiske for byggeriet – adskillelse af design og 
produktion, kortsigtet priskonkurrence, lille brug af præfabrikation, 
manglende tillid, begrænset efteruddannelse og så videre – ikke ses som 
selvstændige problemer, men som konsekvenser af en mere 
grundlæggende problemstilling, nemlig behovet for at tilpasse sig især 
markedsudsvingene.  
Af samme grund er det også mod behovet for markedstilpasninger at 
opmærksomheden rettes i afhandlingens afsluttende diskussion af 
muligheder for at forny sektoren. Konjunkturer er svære at undgå - i 
hvert fald så længe at bygninger holder længe og koster mange penge. 
Mest realistisk er det nok at forestille sig ”øer af stabilitet”. Enten 
tilvejebragt gennem ”klumpning” af offentligt eller privat udbud. Eller 
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ved at nogle af branchens større aktører er i stand til i sig selv at 
absorbere udsvingene lokalt. Selv i perioder med en lille byggeaktivitet 
vil der eksempelvis altid være nogen byggeaktivitet i et større 
entreprenørfirma. Man kunne således forestille sig en todelt struktur, 
hvor en del af virksomheden er specialiseret i at optimere en jævn strøm 
af byggeopgaver i langvarige samarbejdsrelationer (måske især opgaver 
tilvejebragt ved projektudvikling eller i totalentreprise, hvor 
entreprenøren selv sætter holdet), mens den anden del af virksomheden 
(som i dag)  er specialiseret i at håndtere variationen i stadig skiftende 
samarbejdsrelationer.  
”Øerne af stabilitet” vil på sigt muliggøre en ganske anden måde at 
organisere byggeprocessen på. Med figur 1 som afsæt, kan måske anes 
hvilke muligheder ”øer af stabilitet” med dertil hørende langvarigt 
samarbejde vil afstedkomme (figur 2). 
Figur 2: Mulige konsekvenser af langvarigt samarbejde (byggeriets fremtidige 
organisering?) 
 
Hvis bare en smule af dette er rigtigt, indebærer det to ting. For det 
første, at der er store muligheder for at forandre og formentlig forbedre 
sektoren. For det andet at den (eller i hvert fald en del af den) vil se helt 
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anderledes end den byggesektorer, som vi igennem århundrede har 
vænnet os til.  
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